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Abstract
This thesis consists of three empirical chapters that explore contemporary topics
related to risk. Specifically, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature relating
to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy and the literature relating to the
household sector’s risk profile by examining three distinct but related topics.
The initial empirical chapter examines the link between monetary policy and
banks’ appetite for risk in the U.S.. Specifically, the risk-taking channel of mone-
tary policy is examined by scrutinizing the response of banks’ nonperforming loans
to total loans ratios to an identified monetary policy shock. The chapter also in-
vestigates if there is any type of systematic heterogeneity in the way banks react to
monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, the chapter examines the presence of spillover
effects as a result of a shock originating from a specific bank. The results show that
in the medium run, banks’ nonperforming loans ratios increase, providing evidence
in support of the presence of an active risk-taking channel in the U.S. banking sys-
tem. A bank’s characteristics play an important role in the way they react to a
policy rate shock. The results also indicate that shocks originating from larger and
riskier banks have lasting effects on the whole system, while shocks from smaller
and less risky banks do not.
The subsequent chapter presents empirical analysis of the determinants of risky
asset holdings by Japanese households. Four different econometric methodologies
are used to assess whether the methodological approach employed affects the esti-
mated parameter coefficients. Furthermore, key explanatory variables that capture
household trust in the stock market; household trust in the government; and house-
hold perception of risk are used to provide further insight into the determinants of
risky asset holdings in Japan. The results indicate significant impacts from these
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key explanatory variables, revealing new channels which influence Japanese house-
holds’ financial decisions. Moreover, the four alternative methodological approaches
employed in the analysis reinforce the robustness of the impact of the variables con-
sidered in this chapter and also reveal considerable heterogeneity in the effects of
some variables.
The final chapter provides an empirical comparison of the determinants of risk
attitudes in Japan and the U.S.. This chapter also tests if the risk attitudes mea-
sures used in the analysis explain individuals’ actual choices in a variety of contexts
to ensure that these measures are valid proxies for actual risk taking behaviours.
Furthermore, it is crucial to examine the stability of individuals’ attitudes towards
risk, since exogenous shocks, such as experiencing natural disasters, can cause a
permanent change in an individual’s risk attitudes. Therefore, the final chapter
also assesses the impact of experiencing natural disasters on individuals’ attitudes
towards risk. The results indicate that a number of variables have a statistically
significant impact on individuals’ risk attitudes and the impact of some of these
variables differ across Japan and the U.S.. The exposure to natural disasters influ-
ences the risk attitudes of Japanese male individuals and this impact is robust to
the use of a number of different measures of the risk of natural disasters.
ii
Acknowledgement
I would like to express my greatest sincere gratitude to my supervisors, Daniel
Gray, Alberto Montagnoli and Konstantinos Mouratidis for their time, guidance
and unwavering support at every stage of my PhD. Special thanks to Gerogios
Efthyvoulou, Juan Paez-Farrell and Arne Risa Hole for their helpful comments and
suggestions during my confirmation review.
I would also like to express my thanks to everyone at the Department of Eco-
nomics at the University of Sheffield for their friendly support and encouragement.
I am also grateful to Professor Sarah Brown who gave me the chance to further
my research experience and helped me develop and refine my skills in independent
research. In addition, I would also like to acknowledge InstEAD for their financial
support.
I would also like to thank my friends and peers who have made the PhD ex-
perience extremely enjoyable. Thanks goes to Kemar Whyte, Celia Wallace, Yifei
Cao, Samuel Lordemus, Cyriac Kodath, An Thu Ta, Andrew Bryce, Emily Barker,
Bertha Rohenkohl Cruz, Bingxue Wang, Mahvish Faran, Fatema Majeed, Hanan
Naser, Bo Tang and others.
I would like to express my greatest heartfelt thanks to my wife Maymona, for
her love, friendship, encouragement and complete support in every way possible. A
special thanks to my daughter, Yara, her heart touching smiles are a constant source
of inspiration and motivation.
Lastly, but most importantly, I wish to express my very profound gratitude to
my family. I wish to thank my father, Anees, my gratitude to him is beyond words.
My sincerest appreciation goes to the soul of my mother, Hajar.
iii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Aims and motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Structure and content of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.1 Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.2 Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2.3 Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 The Risk-taking Channel of Monetary Policy: A GVAR Approach 16
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 The operative framework of risk-taking channel . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Empirical evidence on the risk-taking channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4 Econometric model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.1 The GVAR model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5.1 Constructing bank’s level data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5.2 Measuring bank risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5.3 Measuring monetary policy shock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.6 Preliminary tests of GVAR conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.6.1 Unit root test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.6.2 Exogeneity test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.6.3 Average pair-wise cross-sectional correlations . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.6.4 Stability of the GVAR model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.7 Empirical findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.7.1 Generalized impulse response functions analysis . . . . . . . . 48
iv
2.7.2 Spillover effects: Global versus bank specific shocks . . . . . . 53
2.7.3 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.7.4 Impact elasticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.7.5 GFEVD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.9 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.10 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3 Risky Asset Holdings by Japanese Households: The Role of At-
titudes, Trust and Risk Perception 82
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2 The classical theory of household financial portfolios . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.3 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.4.1 Dependent variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.4.2 Independent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.5.1 Tobit Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3.5.2 Fractional Response Model (FRM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.5.3 Censored Quantile Regression (CQR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.6.1 Baseline specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.6.2 Key explanatory variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
3.6.3 Models’ performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.6.4 Censored Quantile Regression (CQR) analysis . . . . . . . . . 150
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
3.8 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
3.9 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
4 Individual Risk Attitudes: A Comparison of the U.S. and Japan 182
v
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
4.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
4.2.1 Measuring and validating individual’s risk attitudes . . . . . . 188
4.2.2 Determinants of risk attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
4.2.3 Time varying risk attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
4.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
4.3.1 Dependent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
4.3.2 Independent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
4.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
4.4.1 Random effects probit model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
4.4.2 Random effects ordered probit model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
4.4.3 A joint modelling framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
4.5 Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
4.5.1 Correlations and transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
4.5.2 The determinants of risk attitudes: Baseline specification . . . 223
4.5.3 The determinants of risk attitudes: Full specification . . . . . 226
4.5.4 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
4.6 Validation of the risk attitudes measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
4.6.1 A Joint modelling framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
4.8 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
4.9 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
5 Conclusion 272
5.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
5.1.1 Thesis summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
5.1.2 Policy implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
6 Appendices 281
6.1 Appendix to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
6.1.1 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
vi
6.1.2 Weights construction: Estimating bilateral exposure with in-
complete information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
6.2 Appendix to Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
References 311
vii
List of Figures
2.1 Banks’ ranking according to assets size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.2 Banks’ average total loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.3 Banks’ total loan composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.4 Banks’ average nonperforming loans ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.5 Banks’ average Z-score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.6 Average equity capital ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.7 Response of nonperforming loans ratio to a negative shock in mone-
tary policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.8 Response of return on assets to a negative shock in monetary policy . 69
2.9 Response of loans to assets ratio to a negative shock in monetary policy 70
2.10 Response of nonperforming loans ratio to a positive global shock in
nonperforming loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.11 Response of nonperforming loans ratio to a positive shock in Bank3
nonperforming loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.12 Response of nonperforming loans ratio to a positive shock in Bank61
nonperforming loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.13 Response of banks’ Z-score to a negative shock in monetary policy . . 74
2.14 Response of banks’ Z-score to a negative shock in Bank3 Z-score . . . 75
2.15 Response of banks’ Z-score to a negative shock in Bank61 Z-score . . 76
2.16 Response of Banks’ Z-score to a negative shock in Bank13 Z-score . . 77
2.17 Response of nonperforming loans ratio to a negative shock in the
Romer and Romer measure of policy rate shock . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.1 Adventure and taking risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
viii
3.2 Proportion of risky assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
3.3 Distribution of risky assets ratio conditional on holding . . . . . . . . 181
4.1 The distributions of the subjective risk attitudes measure . . . . . . . 270
4.2 The distributions of the hypothetical gamble risk attitudes measure . 271
ix
List of Tables
2.1 Summary statistics: Top 100 banks vs. the 30 banks used . . . . . . . 79
2.2 Details of the 30 banks used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.3 Contemporaneous effect of foreign variables on domestic variables . . 81
3.1 Selected indicators for the innovation-driven economies . . . . . . . . 159
3.2 Summary statistics and the distribution of main assets and debt
classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
3.3 The distribution of risky assets share in 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
3.4 Independent variables: Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
3.5 Summary statistics: Explanatory variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
3.6 Correlation between the share of risky assets and the key explanatory
variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
3.7 Distribution of impression about the stock market variables as a per-
centage of total response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
3.8 The determinants of risky assets share: Baseline specification . . . . . 168
3.9 The determinants of risky assets share: Marginal effects of the base-
line specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
3.10 The determinants of risky assets share: Tobit regressions of the key
explanatory variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
3.11 The determinants of risky assets share: One-part FRM regressions of
the key explanatory variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
3.12 The determinants of risky assets share: FRM two-part regressions of
the key explanatory variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
3.13 The determinants of risky assets share: Marginal effects of Tobit and
FRM of the key explanatory variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
x
3.14 The determinants of risky assets share: CQR baseline specification . . 175
3.15 The determinants of risky assets share: CQR regressions of the key
explanatory variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
3.16 Household’s employment status across age categories . . . . . . . . . 177
3.17 Model performance of the three alternative methodological approaches178
3.18 Mean of risky asset holdings: Sample and predicted . . . . . . . . . . 178
4.1 Summary statistics: Risk attitudes measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
4.2 Summary statistics: Financial assets holdings and risky behaviours . 254
4.3 Independent Variables: Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
4.4 Summary statistics: Independent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
4.5 Correlations between risk attitudes and behavioural outcomes . . . . 257
4.6 Transitions table of the subjective measure of risk attitudes . . . . . . 258
4.7 Transitions table of the hypothetical gamble measure of risk attitudes 259
4.8 Determinants of risk attitudes measures: Baseline specification . . . . 260
4.9 Determinants of risk attitudes measures: Full specification . . . . . . 261
4.10 Determinants of risk attitudes measures: By gender . . . . . . . . . . 262
4.11 Marginal effects: Hypothetical gamble measure of risk attitudes . . . 264
4.12 Marginal effects: Subjective measure of risk attitudes . . . . . . . . . 265
4.13 Robustness check for the impact of earthquake risk. . . . . . . . . . . 266
4.14 Marginal effects of the hypothetical gamble measure on male individuals267
4.15 Validation of the risk attitudes measures: Marginal effects . . . . . . 268
4.16 Validation of the risk attitudes measures: A joint modelling approach 269
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
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1.1 Aims and motivation
Policy makers and regulatory authorities assign a central role to the level of risk
in the economy when conducting and setting out their policies. Different agents in
the economy have different attitudes towards risk. For example, some agents tend to
have excessive risk taking behaviours, while others tend to overprotect their financial
portfolios from exposure to any risk. The two agents whom attitudes towards risk
are of a particular concern to policy makers are households and financial institutions,
especially banks. The observed level of risky assets held in a household’s financial
portfolio is lower than the predictions of the classical theory and it is sub-optimal
from policy makers’ prospective (Badarinza, Campbell, & Ramadorai, 2016). On
the other hand, the level of risk in the banking system in general is high and was
excessively high in the years preceding the 2008 financial crisis. This level of risk
prompted various regulatory authorities, in most developed countries, to implement
and continuously improve a number of prudential policies to make the banking
system more resilient and to prevent banking crises from occurring (Diamond &
Rajan, 2009).
Empirical examination of the risk taking behaviours of banks has gained sig-
nificant interest since the 2008 financial crisis. This is not surprising given that
the social and the economic costs of systemic banking crises are large and have far
reaching implications.1 Financial institutions, and especially banks, operate in a
high-risk environment and the widespread impact of a banking crisis is related to
the fact that banks’ systemic risk comes from two sources. The first source comes
from outside the financial system, as each bank faces exposure to the real economy
and these exposures are correlated. Also banks have financial exposure to each other
as a result of the interdependencies among banks. These interdependencies have no
geographic limits, which was evident in the 2008 financial crisis that originated in the
1See Besar, Booth, Chan, Milne, and Pickles (2011) for an overview of a number of financial
crises.
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U.S. but quickly spread through the U.S. and around the world causing a dramatic
collapse to the banking sector of most developed countries. Furthermore, the crisis
permeated through to the real sector of the economies of these countries and trig-
gered an economic crisis.2 The consequences of the excessive risk taking behaviours
of banks has led the financial regulators and supervisory authorities to strengthen
their macroprudential framework to prevent the occurrence of another crisis. The
U.S. “Volcker Rule”, effective from 1 of April 2014, and the UK “Ring-fencing”,
implemented as of 1 of January 2019, are examples of legislation developed by the
U.S. and the UK governments to improve the resilience of banks and to protect the
core retail banking services from risks associated with banks’ investment and inter-
national activities. Under these legislations, banks are required to separate their
investment and international banking activities from the provision of retail banking
functions.
A number of studies have examined the fundamental cause of the 2008 financial
crisis (see, for example, Diamond & Rajan, 2009; Taylor, 2009; Allen & Carletti,
2010). There is wide agreement among these studies that expansionary monetary
policies and the increase in debt instruments available were two important factors
responsible for the onset of the 2008 financial crisis. Persistently low real interest
rates caused a reduction in risk aversion of banks and other investors, implying an
increase in their appetites for risk, see Maddaloni and Peydro´ (2011). Banks softened
their lending standards over and above the improvement of borrowers’ creditworthi-
ness, which in turn fuelled a boom in asset prices and securitized credit inducing
global financial imbalances between savings and investment in major countries.
The 2008 financial crisis intensified the debate about whether the responsibili-
ties of monetary policy have to be extended beyond price stability and aggregate
demand, to encompass financial stability and mainly the risk-taking propensity of
economic agents. Financial stability has long been an important consideration of
2See Adrian and Shin (2010) for an overview of the events preceding the 2008 financial crisis.
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central banks, but has never been set out as an objective to achieve (Goodhart
& Schoenmaker, 1995; Bernanke & Gertler, 2001). Angeloni, Faia, and Lo Duca
(2015) argue that there are three fundamental elements that establish the paradigm
within which central banks were operating until 2007. The first one is the single
focus, which states that central banks’ only objective is maintaining price stability.
The second element is the independence of central banks from other agents in the
economy, such as the government and trade unions. The final element is the assign-
ment principle, which states that other agents in the economy should not share the
responsibility of price stability with the central bank, nor should the central bank
be distracted by the objectives of other agents. The existence of a link between
changes in the interest rate and banks’ appetite for risk suggests that the single
focus principle of central banks may have to be revisited. The assignment principle
has also been put into question given that the 2008 financial crisis has caused an-
other “Great Recession” with its effect still weighing heavily on economic growth in
many countries.
Before the 2008 financial crisis, the literature on the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy has extensively examined the channels through which monetary
policy impacts the quantity of credit in the banking system. However, the 2008
financial crisis highlighted that analysing the quality of credit in the economy as
well as the quantity is important for the stability of the financial system. The
quantity of credit could be used as an indicator of the level of economic activities,
whereas analysing the quality of credit could help in identifying the sustainability
of the banking system when faced with shocks from these activities, see De Nicolo`,
Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Valencia (2010). The link between low interest rates and
banks’ appetite for risk, identified by the 2008 financial crisis, has extended the
channels through which monetary policy impacts financial institutions. The new
channel of the monetary transmission mechanism is referred to by Borio and Zhu
(2012) as the risk-taking channel and examines the impact of changes in monetary
policy rates on either risk perceptions or risk-tolerance of banks. Based on the
4
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underpinnings of the theoretical research on the risk-taking channel, a number of
researchers have provided evidence that in an environment with low interest rates,
banks exhibit risk taking behaviour (see, for example, Jime´nez, Ongena, Peydro´,
& Saurina, 2014; Ioannidou, Ongena, & Peydro´, 2015; Altunbas, Gambacorta, &
Marques-Ibanez, 2014; Angeloni et al., 2015; Buch, Eickmeier, & Prieto, 2014b,
2014a).
The household sector is another sector that can influence a variety of macroeco-
nomic and microeconomic outcomes given its size and its significant exposure to the
financial sector. The financial behaviours of households relating to saving, spending
and the levels of debt have a significant impact on the level of aggregate demand in
the economy and on individuals’ levels of well-being. At the macro level, the impact
on aggregate demand will influence market prices, which will in turn have an impact
on monetary and financial stability. The level of household debt in the economy has
serious implications for the stability of the financial system if the increased level of
debt is not sustainable. Greater household debt will make households more sensitive
to movements in interest rates and to changes in income. At the micro level, the
way in which households allocate their funds is of interest to economists and policy
makers given the current ageing population as a result of high life expectancy and
a low fertility rate.
Households can allocate their financial wealth to safe assets, such as bank de-
posits and government bonds, or/and invest in risky assets such as shares and secu-
rities. Understanding how individuals allocate their wealth is an important factor in
promoting growth and financial stability. Specifically, capital markets are now more
attractive for firms and small businesses for raising funds than using the traditional
banks’ loans. Therefore, for an efficient capital allocation this increase in the sup-
ply of equity and securities should be met by changes in the demand side, that is
increasing the share of risky assets in household financial portfolios. Furthermore,
the recent adaptation of the defined contribution pension scheme in many countries,
5
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such as Japan and the U.S., means that individuals will be indirectly exposed to
movement in stock markets. Therefore, understanding individuals’ perceptions of
the stock market functioning is valuable from a policy formation perspective.
Promoting participation in the stock market among households is crucial given
the changing population demographics. This change means that individuals in the
future will be faced with the choice of smaller pensions or later retirement as the
support ratio is decreasing and expected to decrease more in the future.3 This indi-
cates that households should find stock market participation attractive as they will
have a greater incentive for wealth accumulation. However, the observed compo-
sition of households financial portfolios across developed economies indicates that
households on average hold a low proportion of their wealth in risky assets. This is
of concern to governments and policy makers, specifically in countries with a rapidly
ageing population and a shrinking workforce, such as Japan. Furthermore, the level
of risky asset holdings by households does not accord with the predictions of the
classical theory of household financial portfolios.4 This disparity between the sug-
gested optimal level of risky asset holdings, by policy makers and theory, and the
observed holdings is referred to in the literature as the “participation puzzle”.5
The conservative investment approach by households is not specific to one coun-
try, the low level of risky asset holdings is observed in many countries. For example,
in the U.S. the share of equity held by households is on average 36.0% of total fi-
nancial portfolio, while it is 18.0% in the EU, see Bank of Japan (2017b). However,
risky assets in Japan make up only 10.0% of households portfolios, which is much
lower than that observed in the U.S. and the EU. This poses a real challenge to the
Japanese government given that Japan is one of the world’s oldest societies, with
3The support ratio is defined as the ratio of the number of people working compared to people
beyond retirement age and describes the burden placed on the working population.
4The classical theory suggests that rational investors will participate in the stock market as
long as the stock market return is higher than the return on risk free assets.
5See Badarinza et al. (2016) and Guiso and Sodini (2013) for an excellent review of the litera-
ture.
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the UN expecting that, by 2040, more than one in three people in Japan will be
over 65 years old. Given the low level of risky asset holdings and the ageing feature
of Japanese society, it is surprising that only a limited number of empirical studies
have analysed the composition of Japanese households’ financial portfolios (see, for
example, Iwaisako, Ono, Saito, & Tokuda, 2016; Aoki, Michaelides, & Nikolov, 2016;
Ito, Takizuka, Fujiwara, et al., 2017). Ascertaining the determinants that influence
the composition of a household’s financial portfolio is crucial given the efforts of
governments in many developed countries to encourage households to participate in
the stock market.
Governments in developed countries, such as Japan, the U.S. and the UK, regu-
larly make significant financial reforms which aim to reduce barriers faced by individ-
uals to stock market entry and develop initiatives, which aim to enhance individuals’
understanding of the different financial products available in the market. An exam-
ple of how governments are trying to encourage stock market participation is the
UK Individual Savings Account (ISA) scheme, which is a tax incentive investments
and/or savings vehicle. Under this scheme individuals can put an annual allowance
of £20,000 into a Stocks and Shares ISA (or a Cash ISA) which allows the individual
to invest in a range of different asset classes and instruments and the returns from
these investments are not subject to income tax or capital gains tax.
The literature suggests that individuals’ attitudes towards risk are an important
characteristic which influences investment decisions. These decisions are not lim-
ited to financial decisions, attitudes towards risk will have an impact on employment
choice, health outcomes, political and migration decisions. Therefore, understanding
the determinants of individuals’ preferences towards risk and the stability of these
preferences are conceptually at the heart of microeconomics. Systematic changes
in individual risk preferences will have important implications for macroeconomic
performance. For example, experiencing an external negative shock, such as the
2008 financial and economic crises, will make individuals less willing to take risk.
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This will subsequently amplify an economic crisis since the systematic increase in
individuals’ aversion towards risk will possibly divert investors from high growth but
risky investments to safer but lower growth investments. Furthermore, a systematic
increase in individuals’ aversion towards risk will increase individuals’ required risk
premium, which will then increase the cost of capital. For a country such as Japan,
with its ageing population and the high frequency of natural disasters, an increase
in the proportion of individuals who are less willing to take risk will potentially
have even worse consequences on economic growth. Therefore, identifying the de-
terminants of individuals’ risk attitudes and examining if risk attitudes vary when
individuals are faced with high risk of exposure to natural disasters is of great inter-
est to policy makers and academics. For example, policy makers should anticipate a
systematic change in individuals’ attitudes towards risk after a shock if the exposure
to this shock is likely to alter individuals’ risk attitudes.
In summary, the focus of this thesis lies on topics related to financial institu-
tions’ risk appetite and the household sector’s risk profile. The first empirical chap-
ter examines the link between monetary policy and banks’ appetite for risk in the
U.S.. This chapter contributes to the empirical literature on the risk-taking chan-
nel of monetary policy by implementing the Global Vector Autoregression (GVAR)
methodology, developed by Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004). This flex-
ible econometric framework accounts for the heterogeneity of banks’ risk taking
behaviours in response to monetary policy shocks and for the transmission of shocks
across banks (spillover effects) with differing characteristics.
The aim of the second empirical chapter is to provide further insight into the
determinants of risky asset holdings in Japan. The contribution of this chapter
to the existing literature is threefold. This chapter is the first study that uses
the Keio Household Panel Survey (KHPS) dataset to analyse household financial
portfolios. The chapter examines key explanatory variables that capture: household
trust in the stock market; trust in the government; and household perception of
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risk. Finally, this chapter analyses whether the methodological approach employed
affects the estimated parameter coefficients by applying four different econometric
methodologies.
The final empirical chapter provides an empirical comparison of the determinants
of risk attitudes in Japan and the U.S.. The contributions of this chapter are as
follows: this chapter is the only empirical study, to my knowledge, that compares the
determinants of risk attitudes between Japan and the U.S.. This chapter uses a set of
natural disaster risk of exposure measures to explore the robustness of the impact of
experiencing a natural disaster on risk attitudes. Finally, this chapter examines the
validity of the “Preference Parameters Study” measures of risk attitudes by assessing
whether these measures reflect actual risk taking behaviours of individuals.
1.2 Structure and content of the thesis
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 present the empirical analysis of this thesis and each chapter
is a standalone self-contained study. Chapter 2 examines the link between monetary
policy and banks’ appetite for risk in the U.S.. Chapter 3 presents empirical anal-
ysis of the determinants of risky asset holdings of Japanese households. The final
empirical chapter, Chapter 4, provides an empirical comparison of the determinants
of risk attitudes and how these relate to risky behaviours in Japan and the U.S..
Finally, Chapter 5 provides a conclusion to the whole thesis and discusses key policy
implications. A brief overview of each of the empirical chapters is given below.
1.2.1 Chapter 2
Existing literature related to the risk taking behaviours of financial institutions
argues that in periods of low interest rates, financial intermediaries soften their lend-
ing standards and take on excessive risk. This chapter empirically examines the link
between monetary policy and banks’ appetite for risk; a link that has been explicitly
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named the “risk-taking channel of monetary policy” by Borio and Zhu (2012). To
do so, bank level data relating to 30 banks from the largest 100 banks in the U.S.,
in terms of assets’ size, is examined over the period of 1985Q1-2007Q4. The data is
extracted from the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income (“Call Reports”);
all insured commercial banks in the U.S. have to submit this report to the Federal
Reserve in each quarter. The causal effect of a monetary policy shock on banks’ risk
taking behaviours can only be identified if the impact of expected defaults in the
banking system is isolated from changes in monetary policy. Therefore this chapter
uses an exogenous measure of the policy rate constructed by Caglayan, Kocaaslan,
and Mouratidis (2017) that captures changes in monetary policy and accounts for
the time-variation and structural breaks in the data generating process. Further-
more, the chapter uses the Romer and Romer (2004) measure as an alternative
proxy for a monetary policy shock. Banks’ risk taking activities are captured by the
ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans. The Z-score measure is also used as an
alternative proxy for bank’s risk in the robustness check.
The contribution of this chapter to the empirical literature is the use of the
GVAR methodology. By using this econometric methodology, this chapter aims to
provide further insight into the risk-taking channel as the GVAR approach accounts
both for the heterogeneity of banks’ risk taking behaviours in response to monetary
policy shocks and for the transmission of shocks across banks (spillover effects) with
differing characteristics. These two issues have not been addressed simultaneously in
the previous literature and the approach reveals interesting dynamics in the banking
sector.
The empirical results provide further evidence in support of the presence of
an active risk-taking channel in the U.S. banking system. Specifically, the results
show that in the short-run, banks’ nonperforming loans ratios moderately decline
in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock, while in the medium-run,
these ratios tend to increase for most of the banks implying an increase in risk
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taking activities. Furthermore, the investigation shows that in the medium- and
the long-run, the magnitude and the duration of banks’ reactions to the shock vary
depending on their capital structure. The response to a monetary expansion is more
pronounced for large, well capitalized banks. Furthermore, the size of the bank
plays an important role in the transmission of shocks (spillover effects). Shocks
originating from larger and riskier banks have lasting effects on the whole system,
while no such effect is observed when the adverse shock emanates from a smaller
bank. The composition of a bank’s loan portfolio also plays an important role in the
behaviour of the bank’s total loans to assets ratio after a monetary policy shock.
Specifically, only banks with commercial loans being the largest component of their
loan portfolio do increase their ratio of total loans to assets, whereas the opposite
is observed in banks where consumers and real estate loans are the largest share of
their total loans. These results are robust to the use of the Z-score as an alternative
measure for bank’s risk and to the use of the Romer and Romer (2004) measure as
an alternative proxy of monetary policy shock.
1.2.2 Chapter 3
This chapter provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of risky asset
holdings by Japanese households by analysing data drawn from the Keio Household
Panel Survey (KHPS). Initially, all waves of the KHPS data set (2004 to 2015) are
used to examine the determinants of risky asset holdings. Subsequently, the focus is
on wave 10 since in this wave respondents were asked detailed questions regarding
their perceived risk of selected assets and respondents’ opinions about the function-
ing of the stock market. The aim of this chapter is to provide further insight into
the determinants of risky asset holdings in Japan by analysing potentially important
explanatory variables that have not been explored for Japanese households before in
this context. These variables capture: household trust in the stock market; trust in
the government; and household perception of risk. In addition, this chapter aims to
assess whether the methodological approach employed affects the estimated param-
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eter coefficients by applying four different econometric methodologies. These are:
the tobit model; the Censored Quantile Regression (CQR); and the one-part and
the two-part of the Fractional Regression Model (FRM). The last two approaches
are rarely used in household finance literature.
The results of the tobit model are used to verify the findings obtained in the
existing literature and serve as a benchmark to compare the results of the alter-
native econometric models used. Each of the approaches employed in this chapter
has unique features which help in exploring and fully understanding the determi-
nants of Japanese households attitudes’ towards risky investments. The two-part
FRM model jointly models the incidence and extent of risky asset holdings, which
is important as factors that explain the former decision may not be the same as
those that affect the latter decision or their magnitudes may be different. The CQR
accounts for the full characterization of the conditional distribution of the depen-
dent variable. In contract, estimators which are based on the mean conditional
distribution of the dependent variable provide only a partial view of the relationship
between a set of regressors and the outcome variable. The results of the alternative
methodological approaches reinforced the robustness of the impact of the variables
considered in this chapter but also revealed considerable heterogeneity in the effect
of some variables. This confirms that each model unmasks an important aspect of
the financial behaviours of Japanese households.
The analysis relating to the key explanatory variables reveals some interesting
results. The variable related to trust in the current government indicates that those
who cannot decide on whether to support the current government hold, on average,
a 8.2% lower proportion of risky assets than those who do support the government.
This is an important result given the fact that the Japanese government announced
in January 2013 its “three-arrows” strategy (also known as “Abenomics”) to achieve
an early end to deflation and overcome economic stagnation.
The variables related to the household’s impression of the overall reliability of the
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stock market are statistically and economically significant. For example, individuals
who agree that in the stock market “profit cannot be made with certainty” hold
a lower proportion of risky assets. Moreover, the variables that reflect individuals’
perceived trustworthiness of different dimensions of the stock market operations,
namely; fairness, efficiency and prudential supervision, are also important predictors
of risky asset holdings by Japanese households. Finally, the results of the variables
related to the individual’s perception of risk associated with selected assets suggest
that the individual’s risk perception is an important predictor of their financial
decisions in Japan.
The findings of the chapter have important policy implications related to Japanese
households’ financial decisions. For example, the findings of the two-part FRM will
inform policy makers about which variables will have the greatest impact if the aim
is to promote a culture of participation in the stock market in Japan and which
variables to target if increasing the level of holdings is the concern.
1.2.3 Chapter 4
In the existing literature, major developments have been made in examining the
determinants of an individual’s attitudes towards risk. However, with the exception
of Dohmen, Lehmann, and Pignatti (2016) and Vieider et al. (2015), comparisons
of the determinants of risk attitudes across countries are scarce in the literature.
Furthermore, it is important to understand how individuals’ risk attitudes vary
when they face a high risk of exposure to natural disasters. The final empirical
chapter aims to examine the determinants of risk attitudes in two countries, namely
Japan and the U.S.. This chapter also tests if the risk attitudes measures used in
the analysis explain individuals’ actual choices in a variety of contexts to ensure
that these measures are valid proxies for actual risk taking behaviours. Moreover,
the final empirical chapter examines if Japanese individuals change their attitudes
towards risk differently to U.S. individuals if faced by a higher risk of exposure to
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natural disasters. To do so, the final empirical chapter uses panel data from the
“Preference Parameters Study of Osaka University” which is conducted in Japan
and the U.S. covering the period from 2005 to 2010. Direct comparisons between
Japan and the U.S., which is one of this chapter’s contributions, can be made using
this survey since it asks identical questions in each country. To ascertain the impact
of natural disasters, an exogenous shock, on risk attitudes this chapter uses a range
of measures of natural disaster risk.
The results indicate that a number of variables have a statistically significant
impact on an individual’s risk attitudes in both countries. However, the magnitude
and the statistical significance of some variables differ across Japan and the U.S..
For example, the magnitudes of some variables are larger for Japanese individuals,
such as: age; being exposed to the risk of unemployment in the near future; and
the risk of facing borrowing constraints. Whereas the magnitudes of other variables
have a larger impact on U.S. respondents, such as: being self-employed; level of
education; income; and self-reported health status.
An important concern in the literature is whether the measures of risk attitudes
used reveal actual attitudes towards risk of individuals. The validity of the risk
attitude measures used in the final chapter are confirmed as they have consider-
able predictive power in explaining individuals’ decisions in a variety of contexts
such as; smoking, drinking, gambling and a number of financial choices outcomes.
Furthermore, the issue that there could be unobserved factors that affect both the
determinants of attitudes towards risk and the holdings of risky financial assets or
engaging in risky activities is addressed. Specifically, the validity of these mea-
sures is further confirmed using a system of two equations to account for possible
endogeneity between risky choices and attitudes towards risk.
The risk of exposure to natural disasters is found to only influence Japanese
male individuals. Specifically, as the earthquake intensity increases Japanese male
individuals become less willing to take risk, and this impact is robust to the use of
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different earthquake risk measures.
An interesting finding of this chapter is that the determinants, stability and sus-
ceptibility to change of attitudes towards risk are different depending on the gender
and the country of the individual. For example, the height of the individual and
the risk of experiencing an earthquake are found to influence the risk attitudes of
Japanese male individuals only. The state of the economy has a statistically signifi-
cant impact on risk attitudes of U.S. male individuals, and U.S. male individuals who
live in cities are more willing to take risk than those who live in rural areas. Based
on these findings, it is possible that policy makers may locate and predict where
policies, which aim to influence an individual’s risk profile, will have the greatest
impact. Furthermore, the findings related to experiencing earthquakes mean that
policy makers should expect a systematic change in the attitudes towards risk of
Japanese male individuals after earthquakes with large intensities.
15
Chapter 2
The Risk-taking Channel of Mone-
tary Policy: A GVAR Approach
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2.1 Introduction
The 2008 global financial crisis has brought the relationship between monetary
policy and financial institutions’ appetite for risk to the forefront of the economic
stability debate. The low level of interest rates in the years preceding the global
financial crisis, stretching from 2001 to 2005, made financial intermediaries soften
their lending standards and take on excessive risk. In an earlier paper Lowe and
Borio (2002) have shown that financial imbalances may develop in high growth, low
inflation, low interest rate economies. This environment will eventually require a
monetary response to preserve both financial and monetary stability in response to
developments in credit and asset markets.
The required monetary response is not clear as the paradigm within which cen-
tral banks previously operated is now questionable. Before the financial crisis in
2007-2008, the literature was questioning the balance between central banks’ price
stability objective and its financial stability role as the lender of last resort (see, for
example, Goodhart & Schoenmaker, 1995; Bernanke & Gertler, 2001).1 However,
the 2008 global financial crisis raised the question that central banks’ responsibilities
may have to be extended beyond price stability and aggregate demand, to encompass
financial stability (other than the lender of last resort) and mainly the risk taking
propensity of economic agents. In particular, Angeloni et al. (2015) argue that if
monetary policy contributes to the formation of risk in the financial sector, and if
the latter in turn feeds back on macroeconomic variables with unknown lags, then
monetary policy has to take into account the impact of financial stability on real
economic activity. Therefore, it is critical to have a comprehensive understanding of
the linkages between monetary policy, assets prices and risk in the financial sector.
A body of literature has emerged exploring the link between monetary policy, and
the perception and pricing of risk by economic agents (see, for example, Altunbas
1 For example, Goodhart, Ito, and Payne (1994) argue that central banks should not be dis-
tracted by the assignment of targets other than that of price stability.
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et al., 2014; De Nicolo` et al., 2010; Maddaloni & Peydro´, 2011; Borio & Zhu, 2012;
Jime´nez et al., 2014). This link has been explicitly named by Borio and Zhu (2012)
as the “risk-taking channel” and has been added to the existing channels of the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.2 Since then few theoretical models
have been developed to build a conceptual framework for the risk-taking channel.3
These models suggest that the risk-taking channel will take effect through the impact
of the policy rate on asset valuation, or from the link it has with the market rate.
Overall, the empirical literature presents mixed evidence in relation to banks’
risk-taking channel as the association between bank risk and monetary policy varies
across types of banks (size and ownership), banking systems, and time. Specifically,
Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Suarez (2017) have argued that when banks are allowed to
adjust their capital structures, lower interest rates lead to greater leverage and higher
risk. However, if the capital structure is fixed, the impact of a reduction in interest
rates on bank risk depends on the degree of bank capitalization: well-capitalized
banks increase risk, while highly leveraged banks may decrease it if loan demand
is linear or concave. It should also be noted that the financial accelerator model
developed by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) implies that lower interest
rates may have countervailing effects on bank risk. In particular, while low interest
rates would reduce bank risk by decreasing the interest burden of firms, it would
also increase the collateral value and borrowing capability of high-risk firms.4
This chapter contributes to the empirical literature on risk-taking channel by
implementing a flexible econometric framework, which accounts both for the hetero-
geneity of banks’ risk taking behaviours in response to monetary policy shocks and
for the transmission of shocks across banks (spillover effects) with differing charac-
2These channels are: interest rate channel, credit channel, asset price channel, exchange rate
channel and expectations channel. See Mishkin (2016) for more details.
3 See, for example, De Nicolo` et al. (2010) and Buch et al. (2014a).
4Furthermore, recent DSGE models have different implications about the role of monetary
policy on bank risk. Angeloni and Faia (2013) show that monetary expansion and a positive
productivity shock increase bank leverage and risk while Zhang (2009) argue that the reverse is
true.
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teristics. In this context, the Global Vector Autoregression (GVAR) methodology,
developed by Pesaran et al. (2004), is most suitable as it is capable of estimating
possible interactions among a large set of variables by decomposing the underlying
large VARs into smaller conditional models that are linked together through their
cross-sectional averages while no restrictions are imposed on the dynamics of the
individual sub-models.5 The GVAR model provides a flexible means to compute
the interlinkages between the variables of interest in comparison to its alternatives.
For example, the Factor Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) model, which
is used the most in the literature, can summarizes the information of a large data
set of variables in few factors augmented, but the economic interpretation of the
extracted factors is a difficult task. Therefore, this chapter distinct itself from the
existing literature by adopting a coherent global model which can address issues
that have not been examined in the previous literature such as the spillover effects
or heterogeneity of banks’ responses to monetary policy shocks.
The chapter examines the presence of a risk-taking channel by scrutinizing the
response of the ratio of banks’ nonperforming loans to total loans as monetary
policy changes. More formally, this chapter uses quarterly U.S. data that covers
the period 1985Q1 to 2007Q4 to examine whether monetary policy influence banks’
risk taking. Furthermore, this chapter investigates if there is any type of systematic
heterogeneity in the way banks react to monetary policy shocks. Finally, the chapter
shows how the response of one bank to an expansionary monetary policy shock is
transferred among other banks in the system.
The empirical results of this chapter provide evidence that in the short-run,
banks’ nonperforming loans ratios moderately decline in response to an expansionary
monetary policy shock. However, in the medium run, nonperforming loans ratios
5A fundamental problem of global models is the curse of dimensionality, which arises when the
number of variables is large compared to the time dimension. To overcome the curse of dimen-
sionality, Pesaran et al. (2004) developed a global VAR for the analysis of global interdependencies
and the propagation of shocks across countries.
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tend to increase for most of the banks, suggesting the prevalence of a risk-taking
channel. Furthermore, the investigation shows that although in the short-run the
reaction of banks to an expansionary policy shock is rather homogeneous, in the
medium- and the long-run, the magnitude and the duration of banks’ reactions to the
shock vary. In relation to these observations, it turns out that banks’ heterogeneous
risk taking responses to monetary policy shocks relate to their capital structure.
Furthermore, the impulse response functions results provide evidence that bank size
plays an important role in the transmission of shocks (spillover effects): an adverse
shock to nonperforming loans ratio of a large bank would lead to an immediate and
long lasting impact on the remaining banks within the system, while no such effect
is observed when the adverse shock emanates from a smaller bank.
The results present a strong co-movement amongst banks’ nonperforming loan
ratios and stress the importance of a healthy banking system as whole as well as at
individual level. Moreover, the composition of banks’ loan portfolio has a significant
impact on the reaction of banks’ loans to assets ratio to a monetary policy shock.
The results are robust to the use of banks’ Z-score as an alternative measure for
banks’ risk and to the use of an alternative measure of monetary policy shock.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The theoretical framework
and the literature review of the risk-taking channel are provided in Section 2.2 and
Section 2.3 respectively. An analytical description of the methodology is presented
in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the data and Section 2.6 presents the model
estimation. A discussion of the empirical results is given in Section 2.7. Section 2.8
concludes the chapter and suggests areas for further research.
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2.2 The operative framework of risk-taking chan-
nel
The designation of the “risk-taking channel” of monetary policy first appeared
in Borio and Zhu (2012) who shed light explicitly on this transmission mechanism
defined as “the impact of changes in policy rates on either risk perceptions or risk-
tolerance and hence on the degree of risk in the portfolios, on the pricing of assets,
and on the price and non-price terms of the extension of funding.” Borio and Zhu
(2012, p. 242). Subsequently, researchers begun to establish theoretical frameworks
to link monetary policy to risk taking activities by financial institutions.
Borio and Zhu (2012) suggest that there are at least three ways through which
the risk-taking channel may operate when interest rates are kept low or has been
declining for a long period. The first channel, which is referred to as ‘search for yield’
by Rajan (2006), relates to the linkages between bank manager’s target return and
the market rate of return. Financial institutions manage their assets with reference
to their liabilities; therefore, the incentive to switch to riskier assets in a period of
declining interest rates will increase. This behaviour might reflect the contractual
nature of some institutions, such as, pension fund and insurance companies. These
institutions are obliged to set a minimum rate of return linked to their liabilities, and
in some countries, such as Switzerland, this minimum rate of return is reinforced by
regulation. Financial institutions will start engaging in risky investments in order
to reduce the gap between the yield on highly rated government bonds and the
minimum guaranteed rate of return linked to their liabilities.
The second channel through which the risk-taking channel operates is through
the impact of the interest rate on valuation, income and cash flows. This mechanism
is similar but broader in spirit to the financial accelerator mechanism, by which
debtors’ borrowing constraints will be reduced as a result of an increase in collateral
values, (see, for example, Bernanke et al., 1996; Bernanke & Gertler, 1995; N. Chen,
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2001). A reduction in interest rate will lead to an increase in collateral and asset
values, which in turn influences either banks’ risk perceptions or risk tolerance.
Risk perceptions are reduced as the increase in collateral and asset values will alter
the way banks estimate risk indicators such as probabilities of default, loss-given
defaults and volatilities. This is a risk taking indication as lending is driven by
the behaviour of banks rather than the improvement in the debtors’ collateral and
repayment capacity. The fact that these risk indicators have procyclical behaviour
amplifies the change in banks’ risk perceptions. Risk tolerance is simply influenced
by the fact that an increase in banks’ wealth, as the cost of the liabilities side
decreases with monetary easing, is associated with an increase in risk tolerance.
The third channel operates through the leverage affect, which is a complementary
view to the search for the yield channel, as it will reinforce the initial increase in asset
prices. The leverage affect view addresses the link between asset price volatility and
corporate leverage, see Buch et al. (2014a). In this context, a low interest rate will
boost assets prices, which will in turn reduce assets prices volatility. This reduction
in volatility will cause a fall in leverage as equity prices will increase; hence banks
will have more incentive to take on more risks to fill this gap. Adrian and Shin (2010,
p. 419) argue that “financial intermediaries adjusting their balance sheets actively,
and doing so in such a way that leverage is high during booms and low during busts.
That is, leverage is procyclical.” The overall result from the leverage and search
of yield channels is a fragile banking system, which is highly sensitive to negative
changes in assets values.
All three channels indicate that monetary policy easing will induce greater risk
taking. However, these channels will not operate in a similar way across different
banks, different banking systems, and time. Specifically, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017)
provided an analytical model which predicts that the strength of the relationship
between the policy rate and bank risk taking is a function of bank’s capital struc-
ture, borrowers’ collateral and monitoring cost. To elaborate more on this, part of
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Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017) and Buch et al. (2014a) theoretical model is used. In this
model the probability of loan repayment is increasing in the intensity of monitoring.
Banks’ will choose an optimal level of monitoring by assessing the gains and losses
from monitoring efforts. Therefore, the degree of banks’ risk is linked to banks’
optimal monitoring intensity q∗:
q∗ =
1
c
[iL − iD(1− k)− w + ak], (2.1)
where k is the portion of bank’s assets financed by equity capital, (1 − k) is
the deposit portion of asset, iL is bank’s revenue from loans and iD(1 − k) is the
share paid to depositors.6 w is the collateral value which is exogenously given. ak is
the cost of equity capital. According to Equation 2.1, q∗ decreases (risk increases)
in the costs of monitoring c, in the deposit rate iD (which is fixed at the policy
rate) and in collateral values w.7 It increases in lending rates iL and in the degree
of capitalization k. In this set up the model predicts that the effect of monetary
policy on banks’ risk will depends on two countervailing forces, the interest rate pass
through effect which increases the incentives to monitor and the risk shifting effect
which decreases monitoring incentives.
The interest rate pass-through is related to the intermediation margin (iL − iD)
which will increase after a policy cut as this will lower the deposit rate. The overall
effect will be an increase in bank expected return and hence reducing investments
in risky assets and reducing monitoring cost. However, the pass-through effect
magnitude depends on the structure of the banking system and how fast the lending
rate reflects policy rate. Therefore, the pass-through effect on banks’ risk will be
minimal in the case of full competition, and maximal in a monopolist environment,
6Note that k and (1− k) represent banks’ only liabilities.
7The reason for including collateral vale in the model is because real estate market development
has an impact on risk taking behaviour of banks. In this model, lending is backed up by real estate,
hence and increase in the values of these collaterals as a result of monetary policy actions, will
reduce the benefit from monitoring. Therefore, banks’ will reduce their efforts in monitoring.
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when the pass-through to the lending rate is zero.
The risk shifting force is related to the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet
and the degree of limited liability protection offered to the bank. If deposits are
the highest portion of a bank’s capital (high leverage), the bank will benefit from a
reduction in policy rate, and this will increase its incentive to monitor (and hence
reduce risk). However, in the case of low leverage (banks with high portion of equity
capital) the gain from a higher intermediation margin is relatively modest and hence
the incentive to monitor decreases (increase in risk).
Furthermore, Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2018) argue that funding condi-
tions play an important role in banks’ risk taking activities. This is because the
cost of taking leverage decreases (risk taking increases) when the cost of holding
liquid securities is low (the liquidity premium). Therefore, risk taking activities by
banks will increase in a low interest rate environment since the liquidity premium
decreases when nominal interest rate is low, see Drechsler et al. (2018). The rela-
tionship between liquidity premium and risk taking is amplified by the existence of
institutional friction as discussed in Acharya and Naqvi (2019). They argue that,
since managerial compensation is based on lending volume, “managers have an in-
centive to reach for yield by over investing in risky assets and under investing in
safer assets as long as the bank has access to sufficient liquidity”, Acharya and Naqvi
(2019, p. 2).
Therefore, as the capital structure is crucial in the risk-taking channel, it is
important to take into account the time by which banks are able to adjust their
capital structure after a monetary policy change. In the short-run, as banks are
unable to adjust capital structure, well-capitalized banks will increase risks and
poorly capitalised ones will reduce risk. In the medium to the long-run banks can
adjust capital easily, which will then determine banks’ risk attitudes.
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2.3 Empirical evidence on the risk-taking channel
The literature on the risk-taking channel is limited, due to the challenges con-
cerning the identification strategy of the link between monetary policy stance and
risk taking by banks. One of these challenges is identifying the exogenous changes
in monetary policy. This is because, monetary stance is endogenous in banks’ risk
equation, and therefore it is difficult to identify an orthogonal shock for monetary
policy. Another challenge is related to the availability of data. Assessing the link
between banks’ risk taking and monetary policy requires examining the supply side
of credit, as this is what reflects the appetite for more risk by banks, not the change
in demand for credit and the quality of borrowers in periods of low interest rate.
However, only detailed bank level data can disentangle the effect of low interest rate
on credit supply from its effect on credit demand. Even if this data is available, in
general it will be limited to a certain types of banks’ activities. For example, the
Survey of Terms of Business Lending in the U.S. gives detailed information only of
new commercial and industrial loans.
Empirical literature examines the risk-taking channel by looking either directly
at how banks, during low interest rate periods, extend their supply of loans to riskier
borrowers, or by linking the risk taking behaviour of banks to the loan rate charged
to the risky borrowers compared to the rate charged to the less risky ones. Both
approaches are conditional on banks’ specific characteristics and the state of the
economy. In particular, Jime´nez et al. (2014) identify four hypotheses by which the
link between monetary policy and risk taking can/should be addressed.
The first one is by identifying if banks change their lending standards when mon-
etary policy changes. For example, engaging with borrowers who are in the past
considered to be risky but now worth engaging with as their net worth has increased
in a low interest rate period. A second method is to assess if banks will change the
way by which they price new loans in a low interest rate period; this will make
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ex-post risky borrowers also worth engaging with. The third method looks at the
collateral values of the borrowers. Since, after a period of low interest rates, a
contractionary monetary policy will devalue the net worth of the outstanding risky
borrowers. Finally, the link between monetary policy and risk taking by banks can
be examined by assessing the quality of loans in banks’ loan portfolios. Hetero-
geneity is an important factor in the analysis, as the risk-taking channel will not
operate in a similar way across different banks, different banking systems, and time.
The empirical examination of the first two hypotheses require access to confidential
data, whereas the assessment of the last two hypothesis can be carried out using
bank level data which are publicly available in most countries.
To test the first hypothesis, Jime´nez et al. (2014) use confidential loan-level data
from the Spanish Credit Register covering the period from 1988 to 2006. They
examined the risk-taking channel by measuring banks’ credit supply expansion in
Spain in response to a change in monetary policy stance. Their results show that
lower overnight interest rates induces less capitalized banks to grant more loan
applications to ex-ante risky firms. The results indicate that these banks also commit
to larger loan volumes with fewer collateral requirements to firms which have a
higher ex-post likelihood of default. Jime´nez et al. (2014) argue that the values of
collateral and the search for yield will be higher in the medium run than in the short-
run. Furthermore, in the short-run the reduction of interest rates will reduce the
burden on existing borrowers, and generally in the short-run the volume of existing
loans is larger than the volume of new loans. Jime´nez et al. (2014) also indicate
that the impact of monetary policy on banks’ risk taking is not symmetric amongst
all banks. Small, liquid and weakly capitalised banks take on more risk when the
interest rate is low, as liquid assets hold a high cost with low return.8
To control for endogeneity of monetary policy and to address the first two hy-
8In Jime´nez et al. (2014) paper, the problem of identifying the exogenous changes in monetary
policy didn’t arise as monetary policies in Spain were set in Frankfurt up until 1999 and within
the Euro-system afterwards.
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potheses discussed above, Ioannidou et al. (2015) examined the impact of the federal
funds rate on the riskiness (banks’ credit supply expansion) and pricing (the change
in interest rate charges) of new loans granted in Bolivia between 1999 and 2003.
The U.S. monetary policy will affect the Bolivian economy as the Bolivian peso
during that period was pegged to the U.S. dollar, and hence a good indicator of
an exogenous monetary policy will be the U.S. federal fund rate. Ioannidou et al.
(2015) reported evidence that initiating loans with a sub-prime credit rating or loans
to riskier borrowers with current or past non-performance become more likely when
the federal funds rate is low. What is more, the results confirm that banks’ risk
perception also changes when the interest rate decreases, as Bolivian banks reduce
the loans rate charged to risky borrowers compared to less risky ones. In the context
of banks’ characteristics, the results were similar to Jime´nez et al. (2014) regarding
liquidity, size and capital. However, Ioannidou et al. (2015) have added that banks
with low funding from foreign financial institutions take on more risk due to the
lack of external monitoring.
Unlike the previous two papers, Altunbas et al. (2014) used a market based risk
measure to examine the link between bank risk taking and monetary policy on a
sample of 643 banks in Europe and U.S. from 1998 to 2008. Banks’ risk is estimated
by the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) which is supplied by Moody’s KMV.
Their results confirm the existence of the risk-taking channel, and their findings are
in line with Jime´nez et al. (2014), in the sense that banks tend to grant more risky
loans only in the medium run. However, in the context of banks’ characteristics,
their findings are contradictory to those of Jime´nez et al. (2014) and Ioannidou et
al. (2015). They find that liquid and well-capitalized banks are less tolerant towards
new risk than illiquid and less capitalised banks. These contradictory results could
be due to country specific characteristics.
The Federal Reserves Survey of Terms of Business Lending questionnaire asks
banks to rate the risk of new loans to businesses based on a number of borrowers’
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related factors.9 Buch et al. (2014a) used these factors to classify new loans into
different risk categories and assess the riskiness of banks’ loan portfolios by examin-
ing shifts across risk categories. They examine how shocks to commercial property
prices and monetary policy affect the riskiness of new loans using a FAVAR model.10
Their results indicate that there is no evidence of increased risk taking at the ag-
gregate level of the banking system after an expansionary monetary policy shocks
or an unexpected increase in housing prices. However, they argue that there are
important differences across banking groups at the bank level. In particular, they
show that bank risk increases for small domestic banks while it declines for foreign
banks and remains unchanged for large domestic banks.
Similar to the approach used by Buch et al. (2014a), Maddaloni and Peydro´
(2011) also rely on answers from banks to the Bank Lending Survey for Europe and
the Senior Loan Officer Survey for the U.S.. Both of these surveys request banks
to provide qualitative answers (no figures are required) on the lending standards
they apply to customers (supply of credit) and on the loan demand they receive
(demand of credit). Maddaloni and Peydro´ (2011) use these information alongside
securitisation activity and banking supervision standards to assess the impact of
changes in the short-term and long-term interest rates on lending standards for both
businesses and households. They find that banks’ risk tolerance increases when the
short term interest rate is low, and this increase is amplified in high securitisation
activity and a weak supervision environment. However, these findings do not hold
for long-term interest rate.
Buch et al. (2014b) examine the link between banks and the macro-economy
for the U.S. using bank level data from the Call Reports. Data for more than
1500 commercial banks and major macroeconomics variables are used in a FAVAR
9These factors are: customer’s credit history; the health of the customer’s cash flow; credit
rating; access to alternative sources of finance at favourable terms; management quality; collateral’s
value and liquidity; and quality of the guarantor.
10They include commercial property prices to capture changes in collateral values.
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to analyse the dynamic impact of an identified orthogonal macroeconomic shocks
(supply; demand; monetary policy; and house price) on bank’s variables. They mea-
sured banks’ level of risk using two different measures. The first one is the share
of nonperforming loans which is a backward-looking measure and gives an overall
indication of the quality of credit stock. The share of non-interest income in bank’s
total income is used as a forward-looking measure of risk since it gives an indication
on how volatile the income of the bank is. They find that the backward-looking
measure of risk tends to decline after expansionary macroeconomic (including mon-
etary) shocks, which is contradictory to the results found in the papers discussed
above. However, the forward-looking measure of bank risk increases after expan-
sionary monetary policy shocks. Moreover, Buch et al. (2014b) findings indicate
that a number of factors explains heterogeneity in individual bank’s responses to
macroeconomic shocks. Specifically Buch et al. (2014b, p. 716) argue that “Bank
size, capitalization, liquidity, risk, and the exposure to real estate and consumer
loans matter for risk and lending responses of individual banks to monetary policy
and house price shocks”.
De Graeve, Kick, and Koetter (2008) use a combination of micro and macro
data in a hazard model for bank stress and VAR model to examine the relation
between monetary and financial stability. Examining the largest European economy,
Germany, and data from 1995 to 2004, they find similar results to Buch et al. (2014a).
In particular, they show that the average probability of bank stress increases after
one year of an unexpected tightening of monetary policy. This response is not the
same across all banks, as the response of small and not well capitalised banks is
stronger than publicly owned banks.
The literature on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy is large and is
not limited to the banking sector. For example, Hau and Lai (2016) examine the
impact of a decrease in the real short-term interest rate, in eight European countries,
relative to the European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy on the investor asset
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allocation process in the mutual fund industry. They found that loose monetary
policy encourage investors to shift their portfolio investments out of money market
funds and into the riskier equity market funds.11
Di Maggio and Kacperczyk (2017) also study the impact of low interest rates
on the reach for yield behaviour in the mutual funds industry. Specifically, they
examine the response of money market funds to the low interest rate environment
using weekly data on the universe of U.S. prime funds and found that these funds
take on greater risk by investing in longer-maturity and riskier asset classes, even
though they are designed to hold only safe, short-term assets.
Pension funds responses to changes in monetary policy are also examined in
the risk-taking channel literature. Pension funds managers have the temptation to
take on higher risk to reach for yield in order to avoid making larger contribution.
Chodorow-Reich (2014) finds that pension funds with worse funding status or shorter
liability reached for higher returns during the period 2009 to 2011, but not after that
period. This increase in risk taking is necessary since funds with shorter liability
have less time to make up any funding short. Similarly, Joyce, Liu, and Tonks (2017)
examined the impact of quantitative easing (QE) policies on the portfolio allocation
decisions of large institutional investors, specifically UK insurance companies and
pension funds. They found that these institutions shift their portfolios away from
government bonds towards corporate bonds, increase in risk taking, in response to
the Bank of England asset purchases.
The empirical studies, related to the banking sector, discussed above have ap-
plied various models to investigate the risk-taking channel without simultaneously
considering how the increase in risk in the financial system will spread. Moreover,
the increase in banks’ risk might be associated with many channels, not only the
11Money market funds are mutual funds that considered relatively safe as this type of funds
invest only in short-term debt securities like U.S. Government Treasury products. Whereas equity
funds are also a mutual fund, but one that primarily invests in stocks.
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channel of monetary policy. In particular, the increase in risk might be due to a
change in the level of activities of the economy or, more importantly, this increase
might be as a result of a sector shock or a shock in a bank or a group of banks.
Analysing all these points simultaneously require an advanced and comprehensive
model with the possibility of including a large set of variables of different institutions.
While the FAVAR can consider the empirical content of a large set of variables by
means of principal components analysis, the economic interpretation and the iden-
tification of the factors is problematic. Furthermore, even though the FAVAR can
accommodate a large set of variables for a single institution or country, its ability
to link these institutions or countries in a global setting is not clear.
Moreover, the empirical studies discussed in the previous section have not con-
sidered how the increase in risk in the financial system will spread. The risk of
contagion within the financial system became more pronounced in recent years as a
result of the increased financial integration and inter-linkages.
Therefore, to provide a detailed analysis to the risk-taking channel, and to ad-
dress the impact of monetary policy and macroeconomic shocks on bank’s risk while
accounting for possible spillover and feedback effects, a coherent global model that
includes a large set of variables from many institutions is required. This chapter
aims to model a number of bank specific variables over a period of time and across a
number of banks, by applying the Global Vector Auto-regression (GVAR) modelling
approach. This modelling approach is first proposed by Pesaran et al. (2004) and
further developed by Dees, Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007).
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2.4 Econometric model
2.4.1 The GVAR model
The GVAR model is particularly suitable for the analysis of the transmission of
real and financial shocks across countries and regions.12 The GVAR model consid-
ered in this chapter analyses the transmission of shocks across 30 U.S. banks.13 In
this GVAR approach, i indicates a bank rather than a country or a region. More
specifically, the GVAR model is built on a set of VARX* models.14 Each model
will include a vector of bank specific variables xit (treated as endogenous), a vector
of bank specific foreign variables x∗it (treated as weakly exogenous) and a vector of
observed common variables dt (treated as exogenous).
Formally, considering a world of N banks indexed by i=1, 2, ...N, a typical bank
specific VARX∗(pi, qi) has the following representation:15
Φi(L, pi)xit = ai0 + ai1t+ Ψi(L, qi)dt + Λi(L, qi)x
∗
it + uit , (2.2)
where L is the lag operator, ai0 is a vector of fixed intercepts and ai1t is a vector
of coefficients of the deterministic time trend, both of these vectors are of a ki × 1
dimension.16 The vector of bank-specific idiosyncratic shocks is denoted by uit,
which are assumed to be serially uncorrelated with zero mean and a non-singular
covariance matrix, namely uit ∼ i.i.d.(0,Σii).
The matrix lag polynomial of the coefficients associated with the domestic, for-
12The GVAR model was initially developed as a tool for analysing credit risk in the 1997 East
Asian financial crisis; many other applications of the GVAR have been adopted soon after that.
13di Mauro and Pesaran (2013) collect a number of empirical applications of the GVAR in one
handbook.
14VARX∗(pi, qi) models with weakly exogenous non-stationary variables have been introduced
by Harbo, Johansen, Nielsen, and Rahbek (1998) and Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (2000).
15This section draws heavily from Pesaran et al. (2004) and Dees et al. (2007)
16The lag order of the domestic and foreign variables are selected on a bank-by-bank basis.
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eign, and common variables are Φi(L, pi) = Iki −
pi∑
l=1
ΦlL
l, Λi(L, qi) =
qi∑
l=0
ΛlL
l and
Ψi(L, qi) =
qi∑
l=0
ΨlL
l respectively. The dimensions of these matrices Φi,Λi, Ψi are
ki × ki , ki × k∗i and ki × g, respectively.
The vector of bank specific foreign variables, x∗it, is specific to each bank, and
represents the importance of bank i to bank j. This captures interdependence among
banks, which is calculated as weighted averages of the corresponding variables for
that bank. Specifically, this vector is constructed as x∗it =Σ
N
j=1wijxjt, where wij ≥ 0
is a sequence of bank specific weights with ΣNj=iwij = 1 and wii = 0.
The associated weights are constructed using the bilateral interbank exposure
of banks. However, only aggregate data for each bank’s interbank total assets and
total liabilities can be observed from the Call Reports. Therefore, imposing further
restrictions is needed to compute bilateral exposures as complete data on the bilat-
eral exposure are not available. The literature suggests the use of a distribution that
maximises the uncertainty of the distribution of these exposures (see, for example,
Upper & Worms, 2004; Wells, 2004). In particular, banks are assumed to spread
their borrowing and lending as widely as possible across all banks. This assumption
implies that the exposure of bank i to bank j is increasing both with the total in-
terbank lending of bank i and total interbank borrowing of bank j. In that sense,
these exposures reflect the relative importance of each institution in the interbank
market.17
Equation (2.2) indicates that spillover effects across banks can occur through
three distinct but interrelated channels: a) direct and lagged impact of x∗it on xit;
b) dependence of bank specific variables on common global exogenous variables
(i.e. dt); and c) non-zero contemporaneous dependence of shocks via cross-bank
covariances Σij.
17The approach discussed here has been used by Upper and Worms (2004) and Wells (2004).
See Section 6.1.2 in the appendix for details.
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Reordering equation (2.2) yields:
Ai(L, pi, qi)zit = ai0 + ai1t+ Ψi(L, qi)dt + uit, (2.3)
where
zit = [xit,x
∗
it]
′
Ai(L, pi, qi) = [Φi(L, pi)−Λi(L, qi)].
Let p = max(pi, qi) and construct Ai(L, p) =
p∑
l=0
AilL
l then (2.3) can be written as
Ai0zit = ai0 + ai1t+
p∑
l=1
Ailzit−l +
p∑
l=0
Ψildt−l + uit, (2.4)
where Ai0 = (Iki − Λi0), Ail = (Φil,Λil) for l = 1, 2, ...p, Φil = 0 for l > pi and
Λil = 0 for l > qi. Estimation of (2.4) is the first step of the GVAR approach. The
second step of the GVAR approach consists of stacking N bank specific models in one
large global VAR. In particular, let xt = [x
′
1t,x
′
2t, ...x
′
Nt]
′ and using the (ki + k∗i )× k
link matrices Wi= [E
′
i,W˜i
′
], where E is k× ki dimensional selection matrix so that
xit = E
′
i xt and W˜i is k × k∗i such as x∗it = W˜′ixt, we have18:
zit =
 xit
x∗it
 = Wixt. (2.5)
Substituting (2.5) into (2.4) yields
Ai0Wixt = ai0 + ai1t+
p∑
l=1
AilWixt−l +
p∑
l=0
Ψildt−l + uit (2.6)
18where x∗it = W˜
′
ixt, = [wi1Ik1 wi2Ik2 · · ·wiNIkN ] [x1t x2t · · ·xNt]′
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and stacking these models for i = 1, 2, ...N, we obtain
G0xt = a0+a1t +
p∑
l=1
Glxt−l+
p∑
l=0
Ψldt−l + ut , (2.7)
where ut = (u
′
1t,u
′
2t, ...,u
′
Nt)
′, and
a0 =

a10
a20
·
·
·
aN0

, a1 =

a11
a21
·
·
·
aN1

, Gl =

A1lW1
A2lW2
·
·
·
ANlWN

, Ψl =

Ψ1l
Ψ2l
·
·
·
ΨNl

for l = 1, 2, ...p. If the matrix G0 is invertible, then (2.7) can be written as:
xt =
p∑
l=0
Flxt−l+G−10 ut (2.8)
where Fl = G
−1
0 Gl. The GVAR model (2.8) is solved and used for the Generalized
Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) and the Generalized Forecast Error Variance
Decompositions (GFEVD) analysis. The results of the GVAR model are derived
using the routines, which are based on MATLAB, included in the GVAR toolbox
provided by Smith and Galesi (2014).
2.5 Data
The analysis in this chapter is carried out using both macroeconomic and bank
level data on a quarterly basis covering the period from 1985Q1 to 2007Q4. The
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data used are only up to 2007 because agency problems between the borrowers and
lenders would be larger in crisis periods in comparison to normal times. Furthermore,
as the framework of monetary policy has changed substantially following the global
financial crisis, it is preferable to examine the presence of a risk-taking channel of
monetary policy in normal conditions to capture the true relation, see Buch et al.
(2014b).
The GVAR framework adopted in this chapter utilizes several bank level vari-
ables extracted from the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income. All insured
commercial banks in the U.S. have to submit to the Federal Reserve in each quarter
the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income, which is referred to as the “Call
Reports”. Bank’s total loans to assets ratio (tlit) is constructed, using the Call Re-
port codes, as (rcfd1400/rcfd2170), where the numerator measures total loans and
lease financing receivables net of unearned income, and the denominator is total
assets.19 Bank’s return on assets (qit) is used as a performance measure, which is
calculated as (riad4340/rcfd2170). The ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans
is the main proxy for bank risk (brit), which is calculated as (rcfd1403/rcfd1407).
This chapter also uses quarterly macroeconomic variables comprised of the log
of GDP (yt) and real house prices (hp
r
t ). Real house prices were measured as a ratio
of the Freddie Mac Mortgage price to the GDP deflator. Data on house prices were
extracted from FreeLunch.com. Data on GDP deflator were obtained from Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
2.5.1 Constructing bank’s level data
To carry out the investigation, bank level data is extracted from the largest 100
banks in the U.S. banking system based on bank’s total assets value at the end of
2007. This chapter follows Buch et al. (2014b) in the selection criteria of the banks
19All codes that start with rcfd refer to consolidated (domestic and foreign offices) balance
sheet items. Codes that starts with riad are related to all income statement items. See Table A1
for a full definition of the codes used in this chapter.
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used in the analysis. Specifically, the analysis focuses on those banks which fully
contribute to the dataset for the entire period under examination. Banks whose loan
to assets ratio was greater than 1 are also removed from the dataset.20 Furthermore,
banks whose nonperforming loans to total loans ratio or return to asset ratio were
in the bottom or top percentile at any point in time are eliminated.21
Given the screening above, the investigation focuses on 30 banks which com-
manded 46.0% of the total assets in the U.S. banking system in 2007 and account
for 60.0% of the assets of the top 100 banks in the U.S.. Figure 2.1 shows the
ranking of the banks in the sample based on bank’s total assets, where the largest
bank is Bank2 and the smallest bank is Bank61.22 Table 2.2 provides further details
on the 30 banks used in this chapter. The table shows that the total assets of the
top two banks are around 46.0% of the sample assets, of which around 45.0% in
foreign branches. Bank17 and Bank26 also hold a high percentages of their assets in
foreign branches (61.0% and 64.0% respectively). The rest of banks in the sample
hold almost 100% of the their assets in domestic branches. Table 2.1 shows a sum-
mary statistics for selected variables for both the sample used in this chapter and
a sample that includes all of the top 100 banks. These statistics indicate that the
distribution of the data do not change significantly after implementing the selection
criteria discussed above.
Figure 2.2 presents the average total loans of these banks. The volumes of
total loans depicted in this figure indicate that some banks have a large proportion
of their assets in non-traditional bank activities. This means that our sample is
quite heterogeneous as visualized by Figure 2.3, which shows the composition of
loan portfolio of each bank. In fact, the theoretical model explained in Section 2.2
2028 banks were not present over the entirety of our sample while three banks were found to
have loan to assets ratio greater than 1.
2139 banks failed to satisfy both criteria.
22Note that the number which follows the word “Bank” refers to the ranking of the bank among
the top 100 banks according to assets values at the end of 2007. This means that Bank2 is the
second largest bank in the U.S. in 2007
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suggests that individual bank characteristics would play a role on the response of
risk variables to monetary as well as other shocks. For instance, Dell’Ariccia et al.
(2017) have provided an analytical model to show that there is a negative association
between bank’s risk taking behaviour and monetary policy shocks for well capitalized
banks, while no such relation is observed for less capitalized banks.
2.5.2 Measuring bank risk
The literature suggests two different ways to measure banks’ risk taking activi-
ties. Forward-looking measures (ex-ante measures) and backward-looking measures
(ex-post measures). The expected default frequency (EDF) (see, for example, Al-
tunbas et al., 2014; Aspachs, Goodhart, Tsomocos, & Zicchino, 2007; Castre´n, Dees,
& Zaher, 2008) and internal loan rating (see, for example, Jime´nez et al., 2014; Buch
et al., 2014a; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2017) are among the forward-looking measures that
are used the most in the literature.
The EDF, which is the probability that a bank will default within a given time
horizon, has the advantage of allowing for a direct assessment of how the markets
perceive the effects of a transfer of credit risk impact on bank risk. The internal
loan rating approach uses information on the risk rating assigned to loans by banks
to measure changes in the strictness of lending criteria on new loans. This forward-
looking measure of bank’s risk have the advantage of distinguishing between realized
risk (on existing loans) and new risk (on new loans).
A disadvantage of the forward-looking measures is the availability of the informa-
tion needed to construct these measures. The EDF, which is computed by Moody’s
KMV using financial markets data and Moody’s proprietary bankruptcy database, is
only available since 1999 and only for large banks. The internal loan rating measure
is based on lending surveys, such as the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey (BLS) or the
Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices
(SLOOS). These surveys are usually not available for public users. Even if such
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data is available, in general it will be limited to certain types of banks’ activities.
For example, the Survey of Terms of Business Lending in the U.S. gives detailed
information only of new commercial and industrial loans. Furthermore, Dell’Ariccia
et al. (2017, p. 617) argue that lending survey data “generally indicate only whether
lending standards have changed relative to the recent past, not their absolute level.”
Unlike the forward-looking measures, the backward-looking measures, such as
nonperforming loans and Z-score, have the advantages of being widely available, not
affected by the changes in the accounting standards and they can be constructed
over a long time period, see Buch et al. (2014b). However, these types of measure are
unable to distinguished new loans from outstanding loans at the time of a monetary
policy shock.
Therefore, similar to Buch et al. (2014b), the share of nonperforming loans to
total loans is used in this chapter as the main proxy for bank’s risk (brit). Total non-
performing loans equals the sum of “Total Loans and Lease Finance Receivables,
Nonaccrual” (item rcfd1403) and “Total Loans and Lease Finance Receivables, Past
Due 90 Days and More and Still Accruing” (item rcfd1407). This proxy indicates
any changes in the overall quality of the stock of credit and allows the exploration
of the relationship between monetary policy and the stability of the financial inter-
mediaries.
Banks’ Z-score is used in this chapter as an alternative proxy of bank risk. This
measure, too, has been widely used in the literature (see, for example, Laeven &
Levine, 2009; Foos, Norden, & Weber, 2010; Altunbas, Marque´s-Iba´n˜ez, & Man-
ganelli, 2011). The Z-score is calculated using the ratio of banks’ return on assets
and its standard deviation, as well as the equity to assets ratio. This measure can
be interpreted as the distance (number of standard deviations) that bank’s profit
has to fall for the bank to become insolvent. Therefore, it is inversely related to
the probability of insolvency: the higher the Z-score is, the more stable the bank is.
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The Z-score is calculated as follows:
Z =
ROAit + CARit
Sd(ROAit)
,
where ROA is the return on assets of bank i in year t (riad4340/rcfd2170), CAR is
total equity over total assets of bank i in year t (rcfd3210/rcfd2170) and Sd(ROA)
is the standard deviation of return on assets, which is computed over a four quarter
rolling window. Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 show the ranking of banks in the sample
according to their nonperforming loans ratio and the Z-score, respectively. Even
though the focus of each measure presented in these figures is different, it is worth
noting that both measures yield a very similar ranking of banks.
2.5.3 Measuring monetary policy shock
One of the challenges in examining the link between monetary policy shocks and
banks’ risk taking behaviour is the identification of exogenous changes in monetary
policy. The causal effect of monetary policy shock on banks’ risk taking can only be
identified if the impact of expected defaults in the banking system is isolated from
changes in monetary policy. This condition will only hold if financial stability is not
included in central banks’ loss function.23 However, current monetary policy and
the expected default rates in the banking system are indirectly associated since the
latter will be related to future economic conditions. Ioannidou et al. (2015) argue
that during periods of financial uncertainty central banks tend to reduce the interest
rate. Therefore, the presence of endogeneity between the proxy for monetary policy
and credit risk should be controlled for in the assessment of monetary policy effects
on banks’ appetite towards risk.
The conventional way of measuring monetary policy shocks is by capturing the
actual changes of the Federal Funds Rate (FFR). However, this approach has been
23After the 2008 financial crisis, the debate in the literature focuses on the balance between
central banks’ price stability objective and its financial stability role (see, for example, Smets,
2014; Goodhart, 2011; Cukierman, 2013)
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criticized in the literature. For example, Romer and Romer (2004) argue that the
actual changes of the FFR will be contaminated by the endogenous movements
of the interest rate and expected actions of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed).
Therefore, this measure will underestimate the impact of monetary policy on output
growth, which is in turn associated with future defaults in the banking system. To
overcome this problem, Romer and Romer (2004) suggest regressing the intended
policy rates, the one set by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), on the
Fed’s internal forecast of real economic activity and of inflation. These internal
forecasts are taken from the Greenbook of the Fed’s Board of Governors in which
they produce projections of various economic indicators for the U.S. economy before
each meeting of the FOMC. In Romer and Romer (2004) model, the impact of
these projections are assumed to remain constant across time in the central bank’s
reaction function.24
However, Caglayan et al. (2017) and Barakchian and Crowe (2013) argue that
the Romer and Romer (2004) approach will lead to biased information regarding
the impact of monetary policy shocks on the target variables as it does not capture
time-variation and structural breaks in the data generating process. Specifically,
Barakchian and Crowe (2013) argue that policy makers have become more forward-
looking over the years and that Romer and Romer (2004) measure of monetary policy
shock is subject to structural breaks and time-variation. Caglayan et al. (2017)
modify the approach of Romer and Romer (2004) by allowing all parameters of the
eighteen variables in the Romer and Romer (2004) model to be time-variant with
regime switching. Therefore, the Caglayan et al. (2017) measure will capture the
exogenous changes in the FFR since it will only include the unexpected component
of FFR changes as well as accounting for the forward-looking expectations of the
Fed.
24Romer and Romer (2004) model has eighteen parameters: the desired Federal funds target
prior to the FOMC meeting, the current quarter of unemployment, eight forecasts for the real
GDP growth and eight forecasts for the GDP deflater.
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This chapter uses the monetary policy shock constructed by Caglayan et al.
(2017) since this modification is the most recent approach in measuring monetary
policy shock. However, in the sensitivity analysis section, the Romer and Romer
(2004) measure is used as a robustness check.
2.6 Preliminary tests of GVAR conditions
The uniqueness of the GVAR model is not just its rich results and substantial
forecast power, its large cross-section and time dimensions make the GVAR model
preferable to the traditional VAR model. However, Pesaran et al. (2004) stated
that the GVAR model is only valid if specific conditions are satisfied. Therefore,
as a prerequisite, the investigation starts by testing the order of integration of the
endogenous and exogenous variables. This will be followed by an examination of
the endogeity of bank specific foreign variables (x∗it). Furthermore, the validity of
the GVAR model requires that the cross-dependence of the idiosyncratic shocks are
weakly correlated. This means testing if the inclusion of the foreign variables (x∗it)
in each bank model is successful in reducing the common correlation among all the
variables in the system. Finally, the stability of the GVAR model is tested.25
2.6.1 Unit root test
The GVAR methodology can be applied to stationary and/or integrated vari-
ables. However, Pesaran et al. (2004) argue that to be able to distinguish between
short-run and long-run relations, the variables included in the GVAR model should
be all integrated of order one, I(1) for short. Furthermore, I(1) variables will allow
to interpret the long-run relations as cointegrating. Therefore, the order of inte-
gration of all domestic, foreign and global variables series used in this chapter are
examined by means of formal unit root tests. Sgherri and Galesi (2009) argue that
25Another condition of the GVAR validity is that the weights (wij) used to link bank’s models
to each other and reflect interdependence among banks are relatively small. Table A10 shows that
the vast majority of the weights are not too close to one.
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the traditional Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is a powerful test only in small
samples. Therefore, and for the sake of brevity, only the weighted-Symmetric Aug-
mented Dickey-fuller (WS-ADF) test introduced by Park and Fuller (1995) is used
to test all the domestic and foreign variables on levels, levels with trend, first and
second differences. Whereas, both tests, (ADF) and (WS-ADF), are used for the
global variables.26
The lag length employed in the WS-ADF and ADF unit root tests are selected
by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) based on standard ADF regressions. The
results of the WS-ADF test of the domestic and foreign variables in levels and time
trend, level without time trend, first differences and second differences are shown in
Table A2 and Table A3 respectively. Both tables indicate that the hypothesis of a
unit root for most of the variables cannot be rejected.
Furthermore, Table A4 shows the output for panel unit root test. The test which
is implemented in Table A4 is the Levin–Lin–Chu test Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002),
where the null hypothesis is that panels contain unit roots, and the alternative
is that all panels are stationary.27 The table shows that we can not reject the
null hypothesis for the levels with trend and levels without trend of the variables.
However, the null hypothesis is rejected for the first difference of the data meaning
that there are no unit roots in the panels once the first difference is considered
ensuring that the variables included in the GVAR model are all integrated of order
one, I(1).
2.6.2 Exogeneity test
A vital assumption in the estimation of individual bank VARX∗(pi, qi) model is
the weak exogeneity of bank specific foreign variables (x∗it = [br
∗
it, q
∗
it, tl
∗
it]). The weak
26Note that Leybourne, Kim, and Newbold (2005) and Pantula, Gonzalez-Farias, and Fuller
(1994) also show that the WS ADF test outperforms both the traditional ADF and the GLS-ADF
test proposed by Elliorr, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996).
27Levin et al. (2002) recommend using their procedure for moderate-sized panels (between 10
and 250 unit and 25 to 250 observations per unit).
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exogeneity assumption implies that there is no long-run feedback from bank-specific
domestic variables (xit) to the bank-specific foreign (x
∗
it), without ruling out any
lagged short-run feedback between these variables, see Hiebert and Vansteenkiste
(2010). If the weak exogeneity assumption is not rejected then x∗it is said to be
a “long-run forcing” for xit, which implies that the disequilibrium error does not
have any information about the marginal distribution of x∗it. A formal test for the
weak exogeneity of bank-specific foreign variables is implemented by testing the joint
significance of the estimated error correction terms in the marginal models of the
foreign variables. In particular, for each variable ` of x∗it the following regression is
carried out:
∆x∗it,` = ci0,` +
ri∑
j=1
δij,`ECM
j
i,t−1 +
p∗i∑
s=1
φ
′
is,`∆xit−s +
q∗i∑
s=1
θ
′
is,`∆x
∗
it−s+
j=1∑
j=0
ψij,`∆dt−j + uit,`,
(2.9)
where ECMij,t−1, j = 1, 2, ...ri, are the estimated error correction terms associ-
ated with the ri cointegrating vectors found for bank i. In Equation 2.9 p
∗
i and q
∗
i
are the orders of lagged changes of domestic and foreign variables; (xit) and (x
∗
it),
respectively.28 The test for weak exogeneity is an F -test of the joint hypothesis that
δij,` = 0, for j = 1, 2, ..., ri in Equation 2.9.
Table A5 reports the 5% critical values and test statistics for all foreign variables
(x∗it).
29 The F-test results show that the weak exogeneity assumption is not rejected
for most of the foreign and global variables at the 5% significant level. Most of
the studies that use the GVAR approach find that some variables fail to satisfy the
28Note the specification of marginal model in Equation 2.9 is independent of the conditional
VARX∗ model in (2.2). Therefore, the lagged orders p∗i and q
∗
i are not necessarily the same as the
pi and qi of bank specific VARX
∗( pi, qi).
29The table also includes the results of the global variables dt = [rrt, yt, hp
r
t ]
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weak exogeneity assumption (see, for example, Sgherri & Galesi, 2009; Hiebert &
Vansteenkiste, 2010; Cashin, Mohaddes, Raissi, & Raissi, 2014). Similar to these
studies, Table A5 also shows that the weak exogeneity assumption cannot be rejected
for the overwhelming majority of the variables considered in this chapter. Specifi-
cally, only 21 out of 180 exogeneity tests reported to be statistically significant at
the 5% level.
2.6.3 Average pair-wise cross-sectional correlations
Another assumption of GVAR modelling is that idiosyncratic shocks of the indi-
vidual banks models are cross-sectionally weakly correlated. Such as the covariance
between the weakly exogenous foreign specific variables and the idiosyncratic error
term should converge to zero, Cov(uit,`,x
∗
it)→ 0, as the number of banks approaches
infinity N →∞.
The average pair-wise cross-sectional correlations are computed to see whether
foreign variables are effective in reducing the cross-sectional correlation of idiosyn-
cratic shocks across all variables in the GVAR. Specifically, the average pairwise
cross-sectional correlation for the level and the first differences of the endogenous
variables in the model and the associated residuals are computed.30 This approach
relates to the cross-sectional dependence test proposed in Pesaran (2004). In par-
ticular, conditioning the bank specific models on foreign variables, the remaining
correlation across banks is expected to be small. Specifically, Sgherri and Galesi
(2009, p. 9) argue that “Our purpose is thus to obtain simultaneously weakly corre-
lated residuals in the system, such that, in the context of the dynamical analysis of
the model, our simulated shocks would be potentially idiosyncratic.”
30In particular, the computations, both in levels and in first differences, are the average pair-
wise correlation of bank-specific variables. For example, the average pair-wise correlation of the
risk of bank i is given by: bri =
1
N
N∑
j=1
ρij(br) where ρij(br) is the correlation of the risk of bank
i with the risk of bank j, N is the number of banks included in the sample. The residuals are
obtained after estimating all bank-specific VARX∗(pi, qi) models.
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Table A6 presents the average pair-wise cross sectional correlations for the level
and the first difference of the endogenous variables in the model, as well as the
associated model’s residuals. Results show that the average cross sectional corre-
lation is generally high for the level of endogenous variables and declines for the
first difference and the estimated VARX∗ residuals. In particular, the highest cross-
sectional correlation is observed for the level of nonperforming loan ratios of large
banks. This observation is consistent with the view that nonperforming loans ratio
reflects changes in the underlying macroeconomic environment. Whereas the return
on assets and loans to assets ratios show a lower correlation.31 This finding suggests
that changes in return on assets and loan to assets ratio reflect changes in bank
behaviour concerning managerial and policy preferences.
However, when the first difference of the variables are considered, the degree of
correlation for all the variables under study fall. Furthermore, the cross-sectional
correlations for the residuals for all VARX∗ models are near zero, indicating that the
model is successful in capturing the common effects among the variables. Moreover,
these results show the importance and usefulness of modelling the bank specific
foreign variables, as confirmed by the size of the bank residual correlations.
2.6.4 Stability of the GVAR model
Another condition stated by Pesaran et al. (2004) is that the GVAR model has
to be dynamically stable, and this can be checked by analysing the eigenvalues of the
system. In particular, the theorem developed by Pesaran et al. (2004) states that the
rank of the cointegrated matrix in the GVAR model should not exceed the number of
cointegrating relations in all the individual banks’ models. In principle, if there are
k variables and the cointegration test suggest r cointegrating relations, then there
should be k−r unit eigenvalues and the remaining eigenvalues should have modulus
strictly less than one. The GVAR model in this chapter has 93 endogenous variables
31Similar results are found by Sgherri and Galesi (2009) who analysed credit growth using data
from several countries.
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in total and the total number of cointegrated relations is 60. Table A7 shows that
indeed there are 33 eigenvalue on the unit circle and the remaining eigenvalues have
moduli less than unity and we can conclude that the model is stable.
2.7 Empirical findings
Given that all the requirements of the GVAR model are met and that most of
the variables have a unit root, each bank-VARX∗ model is estimated individually
in its vector error-correcting form VECMX∗. The results of the GVAR model are
discussed in the following steps.
Firstly, the findings from the dynamic analysis of the GVAR model are presented
using the Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) to several shocks. This
will start by analysing the impact of an expansionary monetary policy shock on
a number of variables. Subsequently, the spillover effects that may emerge due to
global shocks or due to shocks emanating from specific banks will be analysed. In
particular, the GIRFs analysis presents details on spillover effects arising from a
shock from the largest and the smallest banks. These findings are further confirmed
using banks’ Z-score, as an alternative measure of bank’s risk and the Romer and
Romer (2004) measure as an alternative monetary policy shock measure.
Secondly, the coefficient estimates of the contemporaneous foreign variables (x∗it)
on their bank specific counterparts are obtained using the estimation of each bank-
VECMX∗ model. These estimates measure by how much a domestic variable changes
as a result of a one percentage change in the foreign-specific counterpart. Results of
the Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decompositions (GFEVD) which capture
the linkages among the banks are discussed last.
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2.7.1 Generalized impulse response functions analysis
To analyse the dynamics and interdependencies, both on impact and over time,
among different banks and across different variables, this chapter relies on the re-
sults of the GIRFs. The GIRFs are first proposed by Koop, Pesaran, and Potter
(1996) and further developed by Pesaran and Shin (1998) as an alternative to the
Orthogonalised Impulse Responses (OIR) of Sims (1980). The main advantage of
the GIRFs over the OIR is that the former are invariant to the ordering of the vari-
ables and of the banks in the GVAR model. This is very important consideration
given that one could argue for a specific ordering of the variables included in each
bank model, but it would be difficult to justify how banks are ordered in the GVAR
based on economic intuition.
Another advantage of the GIRFs is that it follows the idea of nonlinear impulse
response function and computes the mean impulse response function by integrating
out all other shocks. Specifically, Vansteenkiste (2007, p. 17) argue that “The OIR
approach requires the impulse responses to be computed with respect to a set of or-
thogonalised shocks, whilst the GIR approach considers shocks to individual errors
and integrates out the effects of the other shocks using the observed distribution of
all the shocks without any orthogonalisation.”
Therefore, the GIRFs are used to present the time profile of the impact of shocks
to exogenous variables and the spillover effects. In particular, the following inno-
vations are simulated: 1) the impact of an expansionary monetary policy shock on
banks’ nonperforming loans ratios, return on assets and loan to assets ratio.32 2)
The impact of a positive global shock on banks’ nonperforming loans ratios.33 3)
The impact of a positive shock that emanates from a large and a small bank on the
rest of the banks’ in the system.
32An expansionary monetary policy shock implies a negative change (i.e. a decrease) of the
interest rate.
33A positive shock to nonperforming loans ratio implies an increase in nonperforming loans.
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Impulse response to an expansionary monetary policy shock
The focus of this section is on the effect of a negative interest rate shock (ex-
pansionary monetary policy) on banks’ risk taking behaviour. The behaviour of
bank’s nonperforming loans ratio is examined in reference to a downward movement
in policy rate rather than an upward movement because the risk variables are more
sensitive to downward movement, see Lopez, Tenjo, and Zarate (2011).
Response of nonperforming loans ratio
In line with the theoretical model explained in Section 2.2, an expansionary mone-
tary policy shock has a significant impact on the main risk indicator, nonperforming
loans ratio. Figure 2.7 shows that, in the short-run, nonperforming loans ratio of
all banks generally decline in response to a downward one standard deviation shock
to monetary policy. However, this initial response reverses in the medium run as
nonperforming loans begin to increase for most banks. In particular, Figure 2.7
indicates that banks’ nonperforming loans, i.e. bank risk, increase after the fourth
quarter following the expansionary monetary policy shock. This reversal is consid-
ered as evidence in favour of the bank risk-taking channel (see, for example, Altunbas
et al., 2011; Lopez et al., 2011; Castre´n, De´es, & Zaher, 2010; Jime´nez et al., 2014).
The dynamics of nonperforming loans ratio can be explained as follows. As the
collateral and assets values of potential borrowers increase following an expansionary
monetary policy shock, banks extend credit to credit worthy as well as risky bor-
rowers. In the short-run, all new borrowers are expected to pay the interest charge
on the loans given the low rates. As a result, a drop in nonperforming loans ratio is
expected when the interest rate declines due to the reduction of the interest burden
on existing borrowers. However, in the long-run, as interest rates increase, coupled
with the competitive nature of the business environment, it is expected that a fair
number of riskier borrowers would fail to comply with their commitments rendering
an increase in nonperforming loans ratio.
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It should be noted that the reaction of nonperforming loans ratio to the monetary
policy shock varies across banks. The heterogeneity of bank response to a monetary
policy shock is consistent with the theoretical predictions explained in Section 2.2.
To that end, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017) argue that in the medium to the long-run,
the response of bank risk to a monetary policy shock is driven by two countervailing
forces, which are related to the capital structure of the bank. In particular, due
to limited liability there is the risk-shifting effect, which increases the probability
of monitoring after a decrease of the policy rate. Alternatively, there is the pass-
through effect, which decreases the incentive to monitor due to declining profits
following a decrease in the lending rate. The relative strength of these two forces
depend on the extent of bank capitalization. For low level of capitalisation the
former will dominate the latter effect and lead to a lower level of nonperforming
loans. This is because low policy rates will increase the intermediation margin.
Thus banks with high levels of leverage have an incentive to increase monitoring to
realize expected returns from higher margin. However, for banks with high levels of
capital, the pass-through effect will dominate leading to an increase in the level of
nonperforming loans.
In the light of this discussion, banks with higher deposits in their capital structure
would exhibit low risk (for instance Bank2, Bank13, Bank26, Bank33 and Bank61),
whereas, banks with high equity capital ratio (for instance Bank5 and Bank7) would
show stronger and higher increase in nonperforming loans ratio. Figure 2.6 plots
banks’ average equity capital ratios.
It is not possible with the data set used in this chapter to make a firm conclusion
that the increase in risk is driven by the change of banks’ behaviour towards risk
taking (supply side). However, the heterogeneity across the banks in the sample in
the response to a monetary policy shock, can be interpreted as a supportive point
to the supply driven argument (see, for example, Kashyap & Stein, 1995; Angeloni
et al., 2015).
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Response of return on assets
Figure 2.8 depicts the response of return on assets to an expansionary monetary
policy shock. Theoretical predictions suggest that return on assets would increase
in the short-run but fall in the medium horizon, see Buch et al. (2014b). This is
consistent with the results observed in Figure 2.7 where nonperforming loans ratios
decrease in the short-run but increase in the medium run. As a consequence, return
on assets increases initially, as nonperforming loans ratios decline. However, in the
medium run, as the level of nonperforming loans increase, return on assets declines.
It is useful to recall that, through a negative change of the policy rate, the aim
of policy makers is to achieve higher economic growth and lower unemployment by
inducing businesses to increase their fixed investment expenditures. However, bank’s
level data that are examined in this chapter indicates that expansionary monetary
policy shocks can introduce a certain fragility into the financial system evidenced
by declining return on assets and increasing nonperforming loans in the medium to
long-run. This observation is in contrast with the initial objectives of the policy
makers and suggestive for the prevalence of the risk-taking channel.
Response of loans to assets ratio
The response of loans to assets ratio to monetary policy shock is well documented
in the literature theoretically and empirically (see, for example, Altunbas et al.,
2011; Angeloni et al., 2015; Buch et al., 2014b). In line with the credit channel of
monetary policy, loans are expected to increase immediately after an expansionary
monetary shock before they start to decrease in the long-run Buch et al. (2014b).
Moreover, the long-run real neutrality of monetary policy suggests that expansionary
monetary policy shocks lead to a rise in economic activity which will in turn increase
the demand and supply of loans.
However, Figure 2.9 shows that not all banks react in the way theory predicts,
in fact some banks decrease loans immediately after the shock (Bank7, Bank30,
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Bank38 and Bank58). On the other hand, other banks increase loans immediately
after the shock and decrease them in the medium run (for example, see Bank11,
Bank13, Bank 21 and Bank51). However, when looking at the impulse response
functions with reference to bank’s loan portfolio composition shown in Figure 2.3,
an interesting pattern can be observed. The immediate increase and then decrease
in loans is mostly observed in banks with commercial loans being relatively a large
component of their loan portfolio (Bank13, Bank21, Bank26, Bank54 and Bank59).
However, the opposite is observed in banks where consumers and real estate loans
are the largest share of their total loans (Bank7, Bank30, Bank38 and Bank58).
These results contradict Den Haan, Sumner, and Yamashiro (2007) findings that
commercial and industrial loans increase after a monetary tightening while consumer
loan increase.34
A possible explanation to the increase in commercial loans is related to the
change in the supply from banks’ side. Commercial loans are considered to be short
term loans, so banks alter the volume of these loans to adjust the structure of the
risk weighted assets or to optimize the credit portfolio return. Hence banks meet
the capital regulation; specifically if one considered the adverse effect of change
in monetary policy on banks’ interest revenue. Moreover, banks also change their
supply of consumer and real estate loans as a result of changes in monetary policy.
The reason for this change is related to the stickiness of the rate of consumer loans.
This means that the spread banks can charge on consumer loans cannot be altered
quickly after a monetary policy shock, making other loans more attractive for banks.
Therefore, it is expected to observe a decrease in these types of loans after a negative
monetary policy shock as a results of banks’ substituting out these loans with more
attractive loans, such as commercial loans.
It is difficult to form a concrete conclusion regarding the interaction between
monetary policy and loan components with the results observed in Figure 2.9. This is
34This might be related to the measure of monetary policy shock used, as Den Haan et al.
(2007) measure is based on the innovations in the federal funds rate.
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because this chapter examines the impact of monetary policy on loans to assets ratio
(an aggregate measure) and uses portfolio composition to aide the interpretations.
In Den Haan et al. (2007), the authors used individual series for each component
of the loans portfolio composition (commercial, consumers and real estate loans).
However, the discussion above shows how informative it is to study the behaviour
of loan components as they might have different laws of motion. According to
Den Haan et al. (2007, p. 905), “if the micro components of a variable have different
laws of motion, then the impulse response function of the aggregate variable may hide
useful information about the role that these micro components play in the monetary
transmission mechanism”.
2.7.2 Spillover effects: Global versus bank specific shocks
An important question that policymakers would seek an answer to is whether
there is evidence of spillover effects of credit risk within the banking system. To
examine the possibility of spillover effects this chapter follows two routes. Initially,
following Dees et al. (2007), a global bank risk shock is generated, which is defined
as the weighted average of specific shocks across all banks, to examine its impact
on nonperforming loans ratio of individual banks. Results, which are shown in
Figure 2.10, do not provide clear evidence of spillover effects due to global shocks.
For some banks (Bank13, Bank17 and Bank53), following the global shock, there is
evidence that the risk is increasing but for some others there are no such effects.
Another way of examining spillover effects is to investigate the impact of an
adverse shock emanating from an individual bank to the rest of the system. The
results of these shocks show evidence that risk could spillover through the financial
system. To that end, this chapter provides details for the case of a shock that
emanated from a large bank, Bank3, and that from a small bank, Bank61. It should
be noted that in terms of assets, Bank3 is on average ten times larger than Bank61.
Furthermore, based on the Z-score and nonperforming loans ratio, it turns out that
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Bank3 is one of the riskiest bank whereas Bank61 can be considered as one of the
least risky banks in this sample.
Figure 2.11 and Figure 2.12 portray the response of banks to a positive shock to
the nonperforming loans ratios of Bank3 and Bank61 (i.e. large and small banks),
respectively. Figure 2.11 shows that the nonperforming loans ratio of banks increase
significantly when an adverse shock emanates from Bank3. The magnitude of the
response is not homogeneous across all banks, some banks show a strong and sig-
nificant response (Bank13, Bank17 and Bank42) while others show a mild but long
lasting response (Bank2, Bank3, Bank6 and Bank59). In some cases nonperforming
loans ratio decrease after about a year (Bank38, Bank54 and Bank56). In con-
trast, Figure 2.12 provides evidence that the remaining banks in the system are not
affected significantly when a similar type of shock emanates from Bank61.
The presence of spillover effects from a large and risky bank to the rest of the
banks in the system should be of concern to the policy makers. Given these findings,
there is a firm basis for regulators and policy makers to closely monitor large banks,
as managers’ of larger banks have the tendency to approve loans to riskier borrowers.
This mechanism is amplified by the fact that risky borrowers are charged a higher
rate, see Buch et al. (2014b). Were the interest rates to increase unexpectedly, these
banks may end up with substantial amounts of nonperforming loans, affecting the
whole of the banking system. Furthermore, if these banks are considered to be too
big to fail, their managers would not refrain from lending to riskier borrowers in
search for higher yield when they believe that the bank would be rescued by the
Fed. As a consequence, risk taking behaviour of large risky banks could ultimately
yield a financial system which is open to systemic failures.
2.7.3 Sensitivity analysis
To check the robustness of the findings, the analysis is repeated replacing non-
performing loans ratios with banks’ Z-score as a measure of risk. Overall, this
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alternative risk proxy provides similar findings. In particular, Figure 2.13 plots the
response of the Z-score to an expansionary monetary policy shock.35 The figure
shows an immediate and significant decline of the Z-score of several banks (Bank2,
Bank19, Bank53, Bank54 among others) following the monetary policy shock. The
decline in banks’ Z-score is considered as an evidence in favour of the risk-taking
channel. Interestingly, the Z-score is found to be increasing for four of the banks in
the sample (Bank13, Bank25, Bank30 and Bank58), suggesting that bank risk for
these institutions reduces when the monetary policy is relaxed. Among these four
banks, only Bank13 is relatively large.
When banks’ Z-score is used as an alternative measure of bank risk to examine
the spillover effects, the results remain similar to the findings of nonperforming
loans. In particular, Figure 2.14 plots the impulse responses of banks’ Z-score to
a shock emanating from Bank3 (large bank). The figure indicates that bank risk
increases for a large fraction of banks in the system (the Z-score declines). However,
an inspection of Figure 2.15, which displays the results of the same experiment
using Bank61 (the smallest bank) as the source of the shock, do not indicate to any
significant response from the rest of the banks that are included in the sample of
this chapter.
Note that an investigation of the spillover effects from Bank13, whose Z-score
increased (declining risk) in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock (see
Figure 2.13) is also considered in this chapter. Figure 2.16 shows that an adverse
shock to the Z-score emanating from this bank does not have any impact on the rest
of the banks in the sample. This is in line with prior expectations, as Bank13 has a
low risk structure. Overall, this is a useful exercise because it shows that being large
is not the real reason why a bank would affect the health of the financial system but
its capital structure and riskiness.
35The Z-score is inversely related to the probability of insolvency: the higher the Z-score is, the
more stable the bank is. See Section 2.5.2
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The results found in this chapter are also robust to the use of an alternative
measure of monetary policy shock. Specifically, the Romer and Romer (2004) mea-
sure of monetary policy shock is used to repeat the results found in Figure 2.7. In
particular, Figure 2.17 plots the response of nonperforming loans ratio to an ex-
pansionary monetary policy shock using the Romer and Romer (2004). The figure
clearly shows that banks’ nonperforming loans rations behave in the same way that
found in Figure 2.7. One notable observation from comparing the two figures is that
the response of banks’ nonperforming loans ratios is more pronounced in the short-
run when using the main measure of policy rate shock (see Figure 2.7), whereas it
is the medium run reaction that is more pronounced when the Romer and Romer
(2004) measure is used.
2.7.4 Impact elasticity
Table 2.3 provides the contemporaneous effect of the foreign (starred) variables
on their domestic (bank level) counterparts, which can be interpreted as the im-
pact elasticity of the starred variables on the domestic variables. The information
presented in this table is particularly informative in describing the co-movements
among variables across different banks which are examined in this chapter. Most of
these elasticities are significant and high in magnitude. In particular, the elasticity
of bank risk captured through nonperforming loans ratio (brit) is found to be sig-
nificant in more than 60.0% of the sample and mainly for larger banks. This is an
indication to the presence of relatively strong co-movements across banks’ nonper-
forming loans ratios. Using Bank2 as an example, a 1% increase in nonperforming
loans ratio of foreign banks (br∗2t), weighted by the importance of these banks in
Bank2’s nonperforming loans ratio, will lead to a 2.7% increase in nonperforming
loans of Bank2 (br2t). According to Sgherri and Galesi (2009, p. 11) “impact elas-
ticities greater than one indicate that the domestic variable overreacts to a variation
in real equity prices of its financial partners, while the opposite holds when impact
elasticities are lower than one”. Therefore, this finding, can be considered as prima
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facie evidence of spillover effects across banks in the sample of this chapter.
Table 2.3 also shows that for a considerable fraction of banks there is high elas-
ticity of bank’s return on assets (qit and q
∗
it) implying strong co-movements between
bank specific and foreign measures of return on assets. Moreover, when total loan
to assets ratio are examined, the results indicate to a mild and negative elasticity
(tlit and tl
∗
it), which are significant only for a few banks.
In general, the statistical significance and magnitudes of these impact elasticities
provide further confirmation of the findings of the (GIRFs) found in the previous
section. Specifically, the strong co-movements among nonperforming loans ration
variables across different banks further confirms the synchronization of the GIRFs
associated with changes in nonperforming loans rations.
2.7.5 GFEVD
This chapter further examines the linkages among the banks under study by
means of GFEVD. In doing so, the forecast error variance of the simulated historical
shock is allocated into its respective variables and banks. The importance of the
innovation of a given bank’s variable to the rest of the banks’ variables is measured
by the relative contributions of each bank to the explanation of the forecast error
variance of the historical shock. The sum of these contributions does not add up
to unity, due to the existence of contemporaneous correlations among innovations
(non-zero covariance), see Pesaran and Shin (1998). Although the contributions of
each bank to the forecast error variance of the historical shock cannot be considered
as proportions, GFEVD remain a useful device to study the transmission channels
through which banks’ shocks are systematically propagated.
Results of the GFEVD are reported in Section 6.1.1. Specifically, a one unit
positive standard error shock to Bank2 (a large bank) and Bank61 (a small bank)
nonperforming are shown in Table A8 and Table A9, respectively. Following the
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historical shock to the global nonperforming loans ratio of Bank2, most of the fore-
cast error variance in the short-run is explained by Bank2 variables; however, the
share decreases over time. Large banks’ nonperforming loans are also an important
determinant of the forecast error variance of Bank2 nonperforming loans, suggesting
that there are strong financial linkages within large banks in the sample. For exam-
ple, on impact, Bank3 contributes for 11.7 percent of the variance of the historical
shock. However, the relative contribution of nonperforming loans decreases over
time. In contract, the contribution of total loans to assets ratio in explaining the
forecast error variance increases overtime. For example, after four quarters, Bank2
total loans to assets ratio contributes 9.7 percent to the explanation of the forecast
error variance. The influence of the global variables (GDP, monetary policy shock
and house prices) also increase over time. For example, the contribution of interest
rate is stronger after four quarters, explaining about 6.5 percent of the forecast error
variance, while the GDP and house prices explain 2.5 and 2.8, respectively.
Table A9 presents the results relating to Bank61, a smaller bank. The results
reveal that the linkages with other banks are less pronounced but there is greater
influence from global variables. The forecast error variance of Bank61 is mainly
explained by its own nonperforming loans and by those of the top two banks. Unlike
the case of Bank2, monetary policy shock seems to have greater influence on smaller
banks and this influence increases over time. For example, the contribution of
monetary policy shock after one quarter is about 21.3 percent of the forecast error
variance, while the GDP and house prices explain 2.6 and 2.1, respectively.
In general, these results suggest that larger banks are more linked to each other
and to the rest of the banks, while smaller banks being independent and not largely
influence by the other banks. However, the results show that the contribution of
monetary policy shock to the smaller bank’s nonperforming loans variance is much
larger than its contribution to the variance of nonperforming loans of larger banks,
which might suggest that large banks hold greater market power and funding ad-
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vantages than smaller banks.
2.8 Conclusion
The 2008 financial crisis has led us to see that an integrated macroprudential
regulation requires that the monetary authority’s responsibilities may have to be
extended beyond price stability and aggregate demand to encompass financial sta-
bility. Yet the previous literature on the link between policy rate and risk taking by
banks is limited.
This chapter exploited information on the view that expansionary monetary
policy shock increases the incentive of banks to take on more risk through using
a GVAR model. Specifically, the chapter used the GVAR framework to investi-
gate three interrelated questions concerning the risk-taking channel of the monetary
transmission mechanism. The first one was to test the impact of a downward exoge-
nous change of policy rate on banks’ risk taking activities, profitability and lending
behaviours. The second question was related to the heterogeneity of banks’ risk tak-
ing response to exogenous monetary policy shocks. The final question was related
to whether there are spillover effects following global and bank specific shocks to the
measure of bank’s risk. These issues are relevant and important to both monetary
policy authorities and academic circles as the findings showed that central banks
can inadvertently destabilize the functioning of the financial markets.
The findings of this chapter provided further evidence in support for the pres-
ence of an active risk-taking channel in the U.S.. In particular, the results showed
that banks’ risk taking behaviours, in response to a monetary expansion, was more
pronounced for large, well capitalized banks. This observation is consistent with
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017) who discussed the role of capital structure in relation to
banks’ risk taking behaviour.
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The impulse response function presented clear evidence of spillover effect of risk,
as shocks originating from larger and riskier banks had lasting effects on the whole
system. Larger banks that tend to have more nonperforming loans will persist in
lending to risky borrowers, and this mechanism is amplified by the fact that risky
borrowers are charged a higher rate, Buch et al. (2014b). The results presented a
strong co-movement amongst banks’ nonperforming loan in the sample and stress
the importance of a healthy banking system as whole as well as at individual level.
Regarding the behaviours of the banks’ loans to assets ratio after a monetary
policy shock, the empirical results of this chapter shed light on some important
characteristics. Generally, loans are expected to increase immediately after an ex-
pansionary monetary shock before they start to decrease. However, the results indi-
cated that mostly banks with commercial loans being the largest component of their
loan portfolio increased their total loans to assets ratio initially but decreased it in
the medium to the long-run. The opposite was observed in banks where consumers
and real estate loans were the largest share of their total loans portfolio.
The results relating to the reaction of the ratio of the return on assets to expan-
sionary monetary policy shocks showed that these shocks can introduce a certain
fragility into the financial system as the return on assets declined in the medium to
the long-run. This is an important observation since policy makers aim from lower-
ing interest rate is to achieve higher economic growth and lower unemployment.
The statistical significance and magnitudes of the impact elasticities of the for-
eign (starred) variables on their domestic (bank level) counterparts provided a fur-
ther confirmation to the presence of relatively strong co-movements across banks’
nonperforming loans ratios. These co-movements were also confirmed in the results
of the variance decompositions of the nonperforming loans ratio. The GFEVD re-
sults suggested that larger banks were more linked to each other and to the rest of
the banks in our sample, while the smaller banks being independent and not largely
influence by the other banks. The contribution of monetary policy shock to smaller
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banks’ nonperforming loans variance was much larger than its contribution to the
variance of nonperforming loans of larger banks.
These results were robust to the use of two alternative bank risk measures;
nonperforming loans and the Z-score. Moreover, the results were also robust to the
use of Romer and Romer (2004) measure as an alternative proxy of the monetary
policy shock provided by Caglayan et al. (2017).
The evidence presented in this chapter supports the view that monetary policy
affects the risk taking behaviours of financial intermediaries. In particular, while
large banks’ managers feel safe due to being too big to fail, their search for high yield
could sow the seeds of the next financial crisis. In this respect, given that standard
monetary policy rules ultimately affect the financial markets through several drivers
such as credit, liquidity and risk taking, policymakers should not ignore but monitor
the stability of the financial intermediaries. In fact, as the debate goes on, many
countries which were effected by the global financial crisis have already begun to
implement macroprudential policies to prevent the build up of financial imbalances
and to ensure that the financial system is resilient to shocks. More research along
these lines is needed.
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.1: Banks’ ranking according to assets size
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Notes: The above figure shows the ranking of the 30 banks used in this chapter according to
assets size as of 2007. The information used to construct the figure is based on the “rcfd2170”
call report item code.
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Figure 2.2: Banks’ average total loans
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Notes: The above figure shows the average total loans of the 30 banks used in this chapter over
the sample period, 1985Q1 to 2007Q4. The information used to construct the figure is based on
the “rcfd1400” call report item code.
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Figure 2.3: Banks’ total loan composition
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Real Estate Commercial Individuals
Notes: The above figure shows the composition of the loan portfolios of the 30 banks used in this
chapter. The figure represents the average of each component over the sample period, 1985Q1 to
2007Q4. The information used to construct the figure is based on the following codes: “rcfd1975” to
capture loans to individuals, “rcfd1600” to capture commercial and industrial loans and “rcfd1410”
to capture loans secured by real estate.
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Figure 2.4: Banks’ average nonperforming loans ratio
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Notes: The above figure shows the ranking of the average nonperforming loans ratio of the 30
banks used in this chapter over the sample period, 1985Q1 to 2007Q4. The information used
to construct the figure is based on the following codes: “rcfd1400” to capture total loans and
“rcfd1407+rcfd1403” to capture total nonperforming loans.
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Figure 2.5: Banks’ average Z-score
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Notes: The above figure shows the average Z-score of the 30 banks used in this chapter over
the sample period, 1985Q1 to 2007Q4. The information used to construct the figure is based on
the following codes: “riad4340” to capture net income, “rsfd2170” to capture total assets and
“rcfd3210” to capture total equity capital. See Section 2.5.2 for more details.
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Figure 2.6: Average equity capital ratio
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Notes: The above figure shows the average equity capital ratio of the 30 banks used in this chapter
over the sample period, 1985Q1 to 2007Q4. The information used to construct the figure is based
on the following codes: “rcfd1400” to capture total loans and “rcfd1407+rcfd1403” to capture total
nonperforming loans.
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Figure 2.7: Response of nonperforming loans ratio to a negative shock in monetary policy
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Figure 2.8: Response of return on assets to a negative shock in monetary policy
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Figure 2.9: Response of loans to assets ratio to a negative shock in monetary policy
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Figure 2.10: Response of nonperforming loans ratio to a positive global shock in nonperforming loans
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Figure 2.11: Response of nonperforming loans ratio to a positive shock in Bank3 nonperforming loans
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Figure 2.12: Response of nonperforming loans ratio to a positive shock in Bank61 nonperforming loans
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Figure 2.13: Response of banks’ Z-score to a negative shock in monetary policy
 
Bank2 zscore Bank3 zscore Bank4 zscore Bank5 zscore Bank6 zscore
Bank7 zscore Bank11 zscore Bank13 zscore Bank15 zscore Bank16 zscore
Bank17 zscore Bank19 zscore Bank21 zscore Bank25 zscore Bank26 zscore
Bank29 zscore Bank30 zscore Bank33 zscore Bank36 zscore Bank38 zscore
Bank39 zscore Bank42 zscore Bank46 zscore Bank51 zscore Bank53 zscore
Bank54 zscore Bank56 zscore Bank58 zscore Bank59 zscore Bank61 zscore
-0.16
-0.14
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.06
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.18
-0.16
-0.14
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.03
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.035
-0.03
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.06
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.06
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.16
-0.14
-0.12
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.1
-0.08
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40
74
S
ection
2.9
C
h
ap
ter
2
Figure 2.14: Response of banks’ Z-score to a negative shock in Bank3 Z-score
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Figure 2.15: Response of banks’ Z-score to a negative shock in Bank61 Z-score
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Figure 2.16: Response of Banks’ Z-score to a negative shock in Bank13 Z-score
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Figure 2.17: Response of nonperforming loans ratio to a negative shock in the Romer and Romer measure of policy rate shock
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2.10 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary statistics: Top 100 banks vs. the 30 banks used
Top 100 Banks Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total assets 23152 85017 2 1318888
Total loans 13417 44205 0.158 688334
Loans to assets ratio 0.6009 0.1522 0.0012 1.0192
Nonperforming loans ratio 0.0145 0.0180 0.0010 0.6528
The Z-score 327 1196 -0.31 108985
Equity capital ratio 0.0819 0.0480 0.0230 0.9518
Return on assets 0.0029 0.0029 -0.0931 0.0293
Return on equity 0.0365 0.0397 -1.1629 0.3726
The 30 banks used Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total assets 40160 112475 21 1318888
Total loans 22920 56651 12 688334
Loans to assets ratio 0.5804 0.1403 0.0855 0.9937
Nonperforming loans ratio 0.0145 0.0148 0.0010 0.1181
The Z-score 309.17 388.09 1.21 9944
Equity capital ratio 0.0702 0.0241 0.0244 0.5236
Return on assets 0.0029 0.0023 -0.0374 0.0293
Return on equity 0.0403 0.0328 -0.6452 0.3726
Notes: Total assets and total loans are in thousands of U.S. $. Figures
represent the means of the variables over the sample period.
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Table 2.2: Details of the 30 banks used
Name of the bank Bank’s ID Rank Consolidated
Assets
Domestic
Assets
Percentage
of Domestic
Domestic
Branches
Foreign
Branches
JPMORGAN CHASE BK NA 852218 2 1,179,390 652,824 55 2852 46
CITIBANK NA 476810 3 1,019,497 537,861 53 1005 375
WACHOVIA BK NA 484422 4 518,123 487,894 94 3159 11
WELLS FARGO BK NA 451965 5 398,671 398,546 100 4052 2
U S BK NA 504713 6 217,802 216,581 99 2822 1
SUNTRUST BK 675332 7 182,628 182,628 100 1942 0
NATIONAL CITY BK 259518 11 134,345 133,894 100 1468 2
STATE STREET B & TC 35301 13 96,296 82,651 86 2 10
PNC BK NA 817824 15 90,142 88,357 98 953 0
KEYBANK NA 280110 16 88,081 85,863 97 1158 1
BANK OF NY 541101 17 85,952 52,731 61 8 9
CITIBANK SD NA 486752 19 79,761 79,761 100 0 0
COMERICA BK 60143 21 58,543 57,252 98 382 1
FIFTH THIRD BK 723112 25 52,672 52,672 100 415 1
NORTHERN TC 210434 26 52,313 33,358 64 17 3
FIFTH THIRD BK 913940 29 48,441 48,441 100 718 0
M & I MARSHALL 983448 30 48,017 48,017 100 309 0
COMMERCE BK NA 363415 33 41,170 41,170 100 343 0
FIRST HORIZON NAT CORP 485559 36 37,608 37,608 100 222 0
HUNTINGTON NB 12311 38 34,914 34,914 100 491 0
COMPASS BK 697633 39 34,181 34,181 100 444 0
MELLON BK NA 934329 42 26,226 22,713 87 26 1
ASSOCIATED BK NA 917742 46 20,532 20,532 100 351 0
ZIONS FIRST NB 276579 51 14,849 14,848 100 169 0
CITY NB 63069 53 14,665 14,665 100 72 0
BANK OF OK NA 339858 54 14,366 13,766 96 79 0
COMMERCE BK NA 601050 56 13,891 13,891 100 169 0
FIRST-CITIZENS B & TC 491224 58 13,327 13,327 100 334 0
FROST NB/CULLEN 682563 59 13,307 13,307 100 123 0
VALLEY NB/VALLEY NBC 229801 61 12,364 12,364 100 161 0
Notes: The table shows information about the 30 banks used in this chapter as of 2007. The ranking is based on total assets. Assets are in thousands
of U.S. $. Data are from The Federal Reserve System, see https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/
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Table 2.3: Contemporaneous effect of foreign variables on domestic variables
Nonperforming loans Return on assets Loan to assets Nonperforming loans Return on assets Loan to assets
Bank2 2.716*** 0.886** 0.448 Bank29 0.109* 0.001 0.463**
(11.087) (3.223) (1.154) (1.652) (0.003) (3.062)
Bank3 1.374*** 0.809*** 0.181 Bank30 0.03 0.109* 0.068
(10.035) (4.535) (1.268) (0.485) (1.569) (0.452)
Bank4 0.152** 0.227* 0.058 Bank33 0.157* 0.011 0.114
(2.6) (1.907) (0.278) (1.994) (0.186) (1.114)
Bank5 0.353*** 0.244* 0.145 Bank36 0.052 0.064 -0.128
(4.574) (1.522) (1.139) (0.807) (0.563) (-1.031)
Bank6 0.194*** 0.064 -0.017 Bank38 0.006 0.276** -0.267**
(3.832) (0.714) (-0.084) (0.106) (2.047) (-2.221)
Bank7 0.056 0.02 0.362** Bank39 0.07* 0.037 -0.236*
(1.324) (0.434) (2.197) (1.589) (0.753) (-1.486)
Bank11 0.178** 0.286** -0.361 Bank42 0.513** -0.075 0.262
(2.832) (2.133) (-2.06) (3.195) (-0.305) (1.278)
Bank13 0.034 -0.144** 0.236** Bank46 0.005 0.047 -0.053
(0.782) (-2.096) (2.14) (0.086) (1.134) (-0.254)
Bank15 0.605*** 0.19** 0.172 Bank51 0.02 0.147 0.139
(9.366) (1.199) (0.722) (0.175) (1.049) (0.762)
Bank16 0.129* 0.167* 0.388** Bank53 0.358* 0.171 -0.152
(1.812) (1.565) (2.695) (1.75) (1.345) (-0.838)
Bank17 0.145 0.33** -0.087 Bank54 -0.02 0.34 0.362**
(1.245) (2.252) (-0.401) (-0.088) (1.242) (2.367)
Bank19 0.336** 0.86* -0.038 Bank56 -0.072 0.073 -0.045
(2.157) (1.791) (-0.144) (-1.395) (1.279) (-0.202)
Bank21 0.037 0.509** 0.463*** Bank58 0.021 0.055 0.096
(0.508) (3.17) (4.184) (0.74) (1.238) (0.92)
Bank25 0.123** 0.203** 0.701** Bank59 -0.087 0.018 -0.082
(2.435) (2.161) (3.006) (-0.527) (0.195) (-0.577)
Bank26 0.276** 0.263** 0.103 Bank61 0.075* 0.017 0.167
(3.445) (3.559) (0.447) (1.962) (0.317) (1.156)
Notes: The table shows the contemporaneous effect of the foreign (starred) variables on their domestic (bank level) counterparts. These effects
describe the co-movements among variables across the 30 banks examined in this chapter. * denotes significance at the 10% level ** denotes signif-
icance at the 5% level and *** denotes significance at the 1% level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
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Risky Asset Holdings by Japanese
Households: The Role of Attitudes,
Trust and Risk Perception
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3.1 Introduction
A distinct feature of Japan is its ageing population as a result of high life ex-
pectancy and a low fertility rate. This demographic structure would suggest that
Japanese households should find stock market participation more attractive as they
will have a higher incentive for wealth accumulation. In contrast, households finan-
cial portfolios in Japan have a very low share of risky financial assets, defined as the
fraction of financial wealth invested in risky assets, in comparison to the U.S. and
Europe. The Bank of Japan (2017b) shows that the share of equity held by Japanese
households was on average 10.0% in 2017 in comparison to 18.0% in the EU and
36.0% in the U.S.. Safe assets in the form of cash and deposits, however, make up
the vast majority of Japanese household financial portfolios, which have been on
average above 50.0% since 1990. The rest of the portfolio consists, on average, of
5.0% investment trust, 30.0% insurance and pension and 5.0% others, the Bank of
Japan (2017b).1
This conservative investment approach by Japanese households is not recent,
it has been observed for many years and it has been of concern to the Japanese
government for decades. The Bank of Japan (2017a) shows that the share of risky
assets in Japanese household financial portfolios has been hovering around 10.0%
since 2004. The share was even lower (around 7.0%) at the end of 1990s as a
result of the collapse of the stock market capitalisation in the early 1990s, which
was a serious crisis that hit investors and the market lost more than 50.0% of its
capital. The literature argues that this cautious investment behaviour of Japanese
households is a typical characteristic of their risk averse nature. A feature that has
been documented by the World Value Survey, where 73.0% of individuals interviewed
in Japan between 2010 and 2014 described themselves as risk averse individuals
compared to only 39.0% of individuals in the U.S..
1“Others” is defined by Bank of Japan (2017b) as the residual which is the remaining after
deducting these categories from total financial assets.
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Although Japanese households, on average, hold a lower proportion of their
wealth in risky assets compared to the U.S. and Europe, the share of risky assets in
Japan and these countries is also of a concern to governments and policy makers.
This is because the observed level of risky asset holdings is not the level that the
classical theory of household financial portfolios predicts and it is not the optimal
level of holdings from the policy maker prospective. The classical theory suggests
that rational investors will participate in the stock market as long as the stock
market return is higher than the return on risk free assets. On the other hand,
the optimal level of holdings from the policy maker prospective should be higher
than the observed rate as a higher level of stock market participation by households
will help accelerate economic growth, see Guiso and Sodini (2013). This disparity
between the predicted optimal level of risky asset holdings and the observed holdings
is referred to as the “participation puzzle” in the literature.
This puzzle has motivated a growing number of studies which aim to investigate
the determinants of holding stocks and shares, see Badarinza et al. (2016) and Guiso
and Sodini (2013) for an excellent review of the literature. These studies are driven
by the increasing availability of high quality microeconomic data which are crucial in
analysing households’ financial decisions. Understanding how individuals allocate
their wealth is an important factor in promoting growth and financial stability.
Specifically, firms and small businesses are moving away from the traditional bank
loans to the capital markets to raise funds. Therefore, changes in the supply side
of financial assets should be met by a change in the demand side, that is increasing
the share of risky assets in household financial portfolios.
Furthermore, understanding how individuals allocate their funds is informative
from a policy formation perspective given the recent adaptation of the defined con-
tribution pension scheme in Japan and many other countries and the debate sur-
rounding its success. Having an understanding of the factors that have an impact
on the level of risky asset holdings and how policies can influence this level, will
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provide an important perspective to the debate on the recent structural reforms of
the Japanese economy brought by the government’s “three-arrows” strategy (also
known as “Abenomics”).2 Despite the importance of understanding households’ fi-
nancial portfolio decisions, only a small number of papers empirically analyse these
decisions for Japanese households. Attempts have been made by a few studies,
(see, for example, Iwaisako et al., 2016; Iwaisako, 2009; Aoki et al., 2016; Kinari,
2007; Nakagawa & Shimizu, 2000; Ito et al., 2017), to explain Japanese households’
cautious investment behaviour, but no conclusions have been reached with regards
to the main factors influencing the low risky asset share in the financial portfolios
of Japanese households. This chapter analyses data drawn from the Keio House-
hold Panel Survey (KHPS) available from the Panel Data Research Centre at Keio
University to provide further insight to the determinants of risky asset holdings in
Japan.
In the existing literature, papers that examine risky assets holdings of Japanese
households are limited in terms of the variables and the econometric models that
are considered in the analysis. Moreover, only a handful of papers examine aspects
of households’ trust in the functioning of the stock market and general trust in the
government and these papers focus on data from the U.S. or Europe.3,4 However,
most of these studies use a generalised measure of trust.5 Therefore, this chapter will
fill these gaps in the existing literature by incorporating the effects of individuals’
opinions of stock market performance and different dimensions of individual trust,
21st Arrow: Dramatic monetary easing to achieve an early end to deflation and overcome
economic stagnation. 2nd Arrow: A robust fiscal policy to stimulate short-term growth. 3rd
Arrow: Introducing a reform of various regulations to encourage private investment and to make
Japanese industries more competitive.
3See, for example, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008), Delis and Mylonidis (2015),
Georgarakos and Pasini (2011), Balloch, Nicolae, and Philip (2015) and Bucciol, Cavasso, and
Zarri (2016).
4Individuals’ trust in the stock market has been recently identified in the literature to be an
important factor in explaining stock market participation, but there are no studies that explore
the role of this factor in Japan.
5With the exception of Balloch et al. (2015) who used a measure of trust which is specific to
household trust in the stock market and Guiso et al. (2008) who proxy trust in the stock market
with individuals’ trust in bank officials and advisers.
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using measures of trust that reflect individuals’ perceived trustworthiness, into a
number of modelling approaches.6
More specifically, the contribution of this chapter to the existing literature is
threefold. Firstly, I am aware of no other empirical study for Japan that has anal-
ysed the effects of household trust in the stock market and household perception
of risk on risky asset holdings. Secondly, this chapter is the first study that uses
the KHPS dataset to analyse household financial portfolios. The KHPS provides
detailed information about respondents’ social and demographic characteristics, and
also information regarding their financial asset holdings. Furthermore, in wave 10
(2013) respondents were asked detailed questions regarding their perceived risk of
selected assets and their opinions about the functioning of the stock market. There-
fore, this chapter will use all waves of the KHPS data set (2004 to 2015) in the
first part of the analysis but the focus will be mainly on wave 10 to further explore
household holdings of risky assets. Finally, the chapter uses four alternative method-
ological approaches to explore the robustness of the findings. The tobit model is
used as a reference case against which the findings of the literature and the alter-
native models adopted here are compared to. This chapter also uses the Censored
Quantile Regression (CQR) and the one-part and the two-part of the Fractional
Regression Model (FRM). The CQR and the two-part FRM approaches are rarely
used in household finance literature.
Each of the approaches employed in this chapter has unique features which help
in exploring and fully understanding the determinants of Japanese households atti-
tudes’ towards risky investments. The FRM can handle proportions and the two-
part model jointly models the decision to hold risky asset and the level of risky asset
holdings. This is crucial as factors that explain the former decision may not be the
same as those that affect the latter decision or their magnitude may be different.
The CQR allows an examination of the complete distribution and handles censor-
6Measures of the trust in the institutions that facilitate holdings of risky assets is arguably far
more important than relying on a generalized measure of trust for this area of analysis.
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ing at zero without the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity that are
necessary in the tobit model. Estimators which are based on the mean conditional
distribution of the dependent variable provide only a partial view of the relationship
between a set of regressors and the outcome variable. However, it is interesting
and informative to identify which characteristics influence risky asset ownership at
different points of the conditional distribution, which is provided by the quantile
regression.
The results are broadly consistent qualitatively across the tobit model, the one-
part FRM and the binary part of the two-part FRM. However, there are significant
differences in terms of the magnitude of the marginal effects among these four mod-
els. Furthermore, the analysis shows that, when examining risky asset holdings
conditional on participation, the coefficients differ not only in terms of magnitude
but also in terms of sign and the level of significance. Finally, the CQR model
reveals that considering only the effects of the regressors on the mean holdings of
risky asset masks considerable heterogeneity in the effects of some variables.
This chapter is structured as follows; Section 3.2 will explain the classical the-
ory of household financial portfolios. A review of the literature relating to house-
hold portfolio allocation is presented in Section 3.3 with a specific focus on Japan.
Section 3.4 provides a discussion of the data, dependent variable and the indepen-
dent variables. Section 3.5 presents the alternative methodologies employed in this
chapter, whilst Section 3.6 discusses the results. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes the
chapter.
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3.2 The classical theory of household financial port-
folios
The composition of household financial portfolios has been analysed extensively
in the literature both theoretically and empirically. One of the most important the-
ories of households’ financial behaviour is the classical theory of household financial
portfolios developed and first formalized by Markowitz (1952). This theory links the
optimal portfolio composition to the return on an asset and the variance of this re-
turn in an extremely parsimonious model. Tobin (1958b) expanded on Markowitz’s
work, building on the same assumptions and structure of the classical theory, and
further illustrates that an investor’s degree of risk aversion will determine the con-
vexity of their utility function. Hence, investors will maximise their utility function
based on the risk-return pattern of available assets, the level of their total wealth
and their degree of risk aversion. Theories which are built on the standard expected
utility framework consider risk preferences as central and a key ingredient in mod-
elling financial decisions. For example, the classical Merton (1969) and Samuelson
(1969) models of consumption and portfolio choice directly link the fraction of finan-
cial wealth invested in risky assets to the individual’s degree of risk aversion and the
distribution of the return on assets. In particular, the investor’s optimal proportion
of risky assets under the assumptions of these models can be defined as:
λi =
E(Rr)−Rf
γiσ2r
, (3.1)
where λi is the proportion of financial wealth invested in risky assets, (E(Rr)−
Rf ) is the expected risk premium, σr is the return volatility of risky assets, and γi
is the degree of relative risk aversion.7
The models described above are based on strong assumptions such as: no partici-
7Where Rr is the expected return of the risky assets and Rf is the return of the risk-free assets.
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pation or transaction costs; markets are complete; no labour income; risk-free assets
generate a constant return; and wealth is held in a liquid form. Based on these unre-
alistic assumptions, two important implications can be observed from Equation 3.1:
the first one is that rational investors will participate in the stock market given that
(Rr − Rf ) > 0, no matter how risk averse an investor is. The second implication
is that the risk aversion parameter γi will ascertain that all heterogeneity in the
observed portfolio shares is related to differences in the risk preference of investors.
This implies that the observed portfolio shares are independent of, for example,
investor’s age and wealth under the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion.
However, the observed risky asset holdings across countries contradict these two im-
plications, despite the historical positive risk premium observed in most countries.
For example, recent data used by Badarinza et al. (2016) shows that there is a high
percentage of household that do not hold any risky assets and also the proportions
of risky assets held by households are much lower than what the classical theory pre-
dicts. Moreover, the data shows that stock market participation rates differ across
countries and change over time. The implication that age and wealth are indepen-
dent of risky asset holdings is also contradicted by the documented inverse-U shape
of age effect on an individual’s risky asset allocation. For example, Ameriks and
Zeldes (2004) analysed household asset allocation behaviour in the U.S. and found
that risky asset shares have a hump-shaped relationship to age. Guiso, Haliassos,
and Jappelli (2002) found similar patterns for the European countries.
The strong assumptions of the classical theory are behind its limitation in ac-
counting for the observed stock holding heterogeneity. For example, the fact that
in reality investors face participation costs might explain the high percentage of
zero risky asset holdings, which is referred to as the “participation puzzle” in the
literature. These costs are associated with the information needed for an investor
to be able to form a portfolio close to the market portfolio and are also associated
with the cost of trading needed to form a diversified portfolio.8 Hence, even small
8The market portfolio is the portfolio of all available securities in the market with each security
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participation costs are sufficient to keep many households out of the stock market
as the benefit from holding risky assets is too small to offset this fixed cost, see
Haliassos (2003). The other unrealistic assumption of the classical theory is that
wealth is held in a liquid and tradeable form. A large component of household
wealth is allocated to housing, which is an illiquid non-financial asset, or in the
form of the non-tradeable human capital, as households cannot sell claims to this
capital. Finally, assuming that investors have no labour income is another unreal-
istic assumption as labour income and the risk associated with its uncertainty are
important determinants of risky asset holdings as the literature suggests.
3.3 Literature review
Given the limitations of the classical theory in capturing the significant discrep-
ancy between the observed heterogeneity and the predicted homogeneity of house-
hold holdings of risky assets from the theory, a rich literature has focused on explain-
ing the “participation puzzle” over the past decade. Many alternative suggestions
to this puzzle have been put forward and empirically tested. Early studies have
focused on the basic demographic factors in explaining the limited stock market
participation by households. Bertaut (1998), used the U.S. Survey of Consumer
Finance (SCF) data to analyse U.S. household stock holding behaviour.9 Bertaut
(1998) finds, like other subsequent studies, that education, financial wealth, non-
financial wealth all have statistically significant positive effects on the probability of
holding risky assets.
The positive correlation between risky asset holdings and wealth has been found
in many other empirical studies (see, for example, Campbell & Cochrane, 1999;
Guiso & Paiella, 2008; Calvet & Sodini, 2014). These studies argue that a plausible
weighted in proportion to its market capitalisations.
9This survey contains rich information on socio-economic characteristics and financial variables
and has been widely used in the household finance literature.
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explanation for this positive correlation could be that the degree of risk aversion
declines with wealth. For example, Calvet and Sodini (2014) confirmed this corre-
lation using high quality Swedish data on identical twins that can clearly identify
the wealth effect as the twins will have the same genetic determinants of risk aver-
sion. Heaton and Lucas (1997) argue that the strong correlation between risky asset
holdings and wealth can also be explained by participation costs. This claim cannot
be empirically tested as participation costs are not observable, however, observing
its implication can help in indirectly testing this.10 In particular, the observed high
rate of non-participation among households at the bottom distribution of wealth
can be justified given that the fixed costs of participation will outweigh the benefit
of investing in risky assets. Participation costs are not limited to brokerage fees and
trading costs, they also include information costs and can vary cross-sectionally de-
pending on the education level of individuals. This is because educated individuals
might have an advantage in acquiring information related to financial markets and
might find it easier to learn about various financial products, hence the positive cor-
relation between education and risky asset holdings. However, this does not imply
that all low-wealth and/or uneducated households do not participate in the stock
market, similarly it does not justify the low participation rate for wealthy and/or
educated households.
Participation costs, risk aversion and demographic variables alone find it hard to
reconcile the observed heterogeneity of risky asset holdings. For example, Guiso and
Sodini (2013) argue that countries with the same level of financial market sophis-
tication will have different levels of risky asset holdings among households. Also,
as mentioned above, participation costs alone cannot justify the low participation
rate for wealthy and/or educated households. Therefore, recent studies have started
to focus on specific attributes of households to explain the “participation puzzle”,
10 Guiso and Sodini (2013, p. 1454) argue that “the increase in stock market participation that
has taken place over the past two decades is also consistent with a decline in participation costs.
The availability of financial information on the Internet, and the expansion of the mutual fund
industry have effectively made access to the equity market cheaper.”
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after controlling for these basic demographic factors. This line of research has also
been helped by the recent availability of high quality data on household’s assets
and liabilities; detailed financial and non-financial assets information and subjective
questions related to preferences and experiences.
The most widely discussed factor in explaining the “participation puzzle” relates
to background risks. Background risks are the idiosyncratic risks which are not easily
avoided or diversified by households and they arise from sources such as labour and
entrepreneurial income or real estate holdings. When households face undiversified
background risks, they are less willing to invest in risky assets. This is because
households will react to the increase in the overall exposure to risk by following
a conservative investment strategy, hence avoiding or reducing their exposure to
tradeable risky investments, such as risky asset holdings. Background risks are not
included in the analysis of the theoretical models discussed above, as the assumption
of complete markets will insure that such risks are correctly priced and capitalised
into households’ wealth (see, Heaton & Lucas, 2000).
The most obvious source of background risks is income uncertainty, as it is diffi-
cult to insure or diversify and income forms a large proportion of household wealth.
Guiso, Jappelli, and Terlizzese (1996) empirically analysed the impact income risk
and borrowing constraints have on the composition of the household’s financial port-
folio using a cross-section of Italian households. Income risk is estimated subjectively
by asking individuals about their opinions of the expected inflation and expected
income growth. Borrowing constraints are estimated based on the probability that
a household was denied credit or discouraged from borrowing. Using a tobit model,
the results of Guiso et al. (1996) support the proposition that income risk and credit
constraints reduce households’ willingness to invest in risky assets. Their results also
indicate that there is a positive relationship between the proportion of risky assets
held and the household’s head age, income, wealth and education in line with the
previous discussions.
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A comprehensive empirical and theoretical discussion about the role of back-
ground risks in household portfolio choices is provided by Heaton and Lucas (2000).
Their results confirm that there is considerable heterogeneity in exposure to back-
ground risks which can reconcile the significant differences in households’ holdings of
risky assets. Heaton and Lucas (2000) claim that heterogeneity in background risks
exposure can be explained by variation in factors such as labour income, proprietary
business risk, and in ownership of employer’s stock. Heaton and Lucas (2000) argue
that the correlation between the return on market portfolios and different household
income sources is another important factor that influences households’ risky asset
holdings. Using the 1979-1990 Panel of Individual Tax Return Data from the U.S.,
Heaton and Lucas (2000) measure the correlation of the return on market portfolio
with the standard deviation of individual’s labour and business income. They find
that business income risk is more important than labour income risk in terms of the
impact on portfolio choice.
The importance of background risks in explaining the limited stock market par-
ticipation puzzle and the observed variation in risky asset holdings is further con-
firmed by Palia, Qi, and Wu (2014) using the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). They estimated standard deviations of the growth rates of labour income,
home equity and business income to proxy for the three main background risks;
human capital, housing and private business, respectively. For the empirical anal-
ysis they use Logit model to assess the impact of background risk variables on the
decision to participate, and a tobit regression to study the impact on the level of
risky asset holdings. The findings suggest that a one standard deviation increase in
all background risk variables will decrease stock market participation by 10.8% and
cause a drop in the proportion of stock holdings to wealth by 3.6%. They argue
that background risks influence the participation decision more than the amount of
stock holdings. Furthermore, they also calculated the covariance of the three back-
ground risk variables with stock returns and the returns on the risk-free asset. They
found that when labour income is highly correlated with stock market returns, both
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participation and the level of stock holding are negatively affected. On the other
hand, a high correlation between the return on risk-free assets and labour income
will increase the probability of participation and households will allocate a higher
proportion of their wealth in stock investments. Another contribution of Palia et
al. (2014) is that, in-line with the empirical and theoretical literature, education
has a significant positive impact on household portfolios as it is considered to be a
proxy for transaction costs. However, they also found that the effect of an increase
in background risks is more pronounced in highly educated households. Unlike find-
ings of Heaton and Lucas (2000), Palia et al. (2014) found that labour income is
the most important factor followed by housing then business income. They argue
that this discrepancy in the results could be due to the fact that Heaton and Lucas
(2000) use a sample of individuals with significant amounts of financial wealth and
income from sources other than labour income, whereas their sample is of general
households.
The association between background risks and the composition of the household’s
financial portfolio is also confirmed using data from Australia. Cardak and Wilkins
(2009) provide comprehensive analysis of households’ portfolio decisions based on
the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. This
dataset contains detailed information about Australian households’ assets and liabil-
ities, which allows the exploration of many hypothesised explanations of households’
financial behaviour. Cardak and Wilkins (2009) include alternative background risks
along with other basic factors in a tobit regression and use two sub-samples, one of
employed individuals and the other is for those who are retired and above the age
of 55. The main contribution of this paper is the inclusion of several variables such
as: observed preferences; liquidity and credit constraints; investment substitutes;
labour income risk; business income; health risk and committed expenditures. Fur-
thermore, the richness of the data makes it possible to construct different measures
of the same variable. For example, credit constraints are measured in three different
ways; the possibility of raising 2000 dollars; having a credit card; paying the credit
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card’s balance monthly. Labour income risk is also measured by realised variabil-
ity of household labour income relative to age and a time trend to ensure that the
measure is not driven by variability from life cycle ageing and economy-wide time
trends. The paper found that demographic factors for the employed sample have
the same effects as that found in the full sample, which are in turn in-line with
other papers. However, within the retired sample, age is statistically insignificant.
Labour income uncertainty and health risk negatively impact on the proportion
of risky assets as expected with the exception that health risk is only important
for the employed sample. Background risk associated with committed expenditure
(mortgage and rent expenditures) has an unexpected positive impact on the risky
assets ratio. Cardak and Wilkins (2009) argue that perhaps home-owners use their
property as collateral to raise cheap credit to fund their investments. Cardak and
Wilkins (2009) also suggest that the positive impacts of educational attainment and
not being an immigrant are associated with the importance of financial awareness
and literacy for risky asset holdings.
Financial literacy has become the main focus of recent and growing literature as
household surveys start to explicitly provide measures of the individual’s financial
awareness. Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie (2011) designed questions related to
the interest rate, inflation and financial market instruments to measure the level of
an individual’s financial numeracy and literacy in Netherlands. They found that
financial literacy is an important determinant of risky asset holdings as their em-
pirical model shows that financially illiterate households are significantly less likely
to invest in the stock market. Van Rooij et al. (2011) also found that a household’s
understanding of the concepts of inflation and the interest rate are much better than
concepts related to financial market instruments (stocks, bonds and mutual funds).
This might be due to the fact that the complexity of financial products has increased
considerably over the years.
As mentioned before, participation costs go beyond the monetary costs, as in-
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vestors need the time and ability to understand the risk-return trade-off and other
information related to stock market operations. The education attainment variable
is used in the literature to account for the fact that some individuals are better able
to gather and understand such information. However, Christiansen, Joensen, and
Rangvid (2007) argue that the type of education and information the individual
receives is also important. They used Danish data to show that the probability of
participating in the stock market increases if the investor completes economics ed-
ucation or if an economist moves into the household. Badarinza et al. (2016, p. 13)
argue that “A difficulty in interpreting these studies is that financial literacy is en-
dogenous; wealthier people, and people with greater risk tolerance and hence greater
interest in risky asset markets, may choose to become financially literate.”
Another factor that has been recently highlighted in the literature to influence an
individual’s financial decisions is the individual’s general trust in formal financial in-
stitutions (see, for example, Guiso et al., 2008; Delis & Mylonidis, 2015; Georgarakos
& Pasini, 2011; Balloch et al., 2015; Bucciol et al., 2016). Guiso et al. (2008) inves-
tigate the impact of trust on an individual’s willingness to participate in the stock
market. Theoretically, they argued that an individual’s view of the stock market can
be compared to that of the three-card game. They argue that even after observing
the game many rounds, an individual may not trust the fairness of the game nor the
person playing it. Using data on Dutch households, the empirical models show that
the probability of direct participation in the stock market increases by 6.5 percent-
age points for individuals who do trust others and those who do participate will on
average have a 3.4 percentage points higher share in stocks.11 Moreover, Guiso et al.
(2008) use the Italian Bank customers survey to construct a measure of trust in the
institutions that facilitate stock market participation rather than the generalized
measure of trust. The findings also show that trust has a positive impact on the
participation rate and the level of participation. The cross country analysis of Guiso
11General trust is measured by the response to “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you have to be very careful in dealing with people?”
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et al. (2008) also shows that stock market participation is low in countries where
trust levels are low. Guiso et al. (2008, p. 2560) argue that “cultural differences in
trust appear to be a new additional explanation for cross-country differences in stock
market development”. Guiso and Sodini (2013) also indicate that the lack of trust
can explain the low participation in stock market among the wealthy, as trust is a
relatively stable individual trait and does not vary across wealth levels. The find-
ings of Guiso et al. (2008) stress the fact that negative events or prolonged exposure
to low returns in the stock market will not only change an individual’s subjective
probabilities about stock market returns, but also the fundamental trust in the sys-
tem that facilitates those returns. Georgarakos and Pasini (2011) also analysed the
joint importance of trust and sociability on households’ financial decisions using
data from the Survey on Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. They found
that both mistrust and sociability affect stock market participation through distinct
channels. Mistrust will affect participation negatively as it dissolves the perceived
risk premium, whereas sociability will enhance participation since it lowers the costs
associated with it through cheaper information sharing.
To examine the importance of stock market literacy, sociability and trust for
households’ financial decisions Balloch et al. (2015) use the American Life Panel
(ALP) surveys. Their measure of trust is based on the average of the responses to
three questions about households’ level of trust in the stock market, trust in stock-
brokers and trust in investment advisers. Similar to Guiso et al. (2008) they also
find that trust is associated with the probability of participation and the share of
investment in stocks. Their results also indicate that stock market literate house-
holds are more likely to participate in stocks and invest a higher proportion of their
wealth in the stock market. Furthermore, they argue that sociability does not play
an important role for participation once stock market literacy is accounted for.
Household future expectations have also been documented in the literature to
influence stock market participation. Using data from the Health and Retirement
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Study in the U.S., Ke´zdi and Willis (2009) show that there is substantial hetero-
geneity in stock market expectations, heterogeneity that is a strong predictor of the
heterogeneity in the fraction of households’ wealth invested in risky assets. Ke´zdi
and Willis (2009) argue that the reason for the systematic differences in expecta-
tions across different demographic groups, despite exposure to common and publicly
available stock prices, is the fact that gathering information to form expectations re-
quires effort, intelligence and motivation.12 Hurd, Van Rooij, and Winter (2011) also
found considerable heterogeneity in expected rates of return among Dutch house-
holds and those who perceive more risk in the rates of return are less likely to hold
stocks. Malmendier and Nagel (2011) focus on the relation between past experiences
and participation in the stock market. They found, using the Survey of Consumer
Finances data from the U.S., that households tend to overweight events they have
experienced in the past especially negative events. Their findings show that risky
asset returns experienced during an individual’s lifetime have a significant effect on
the willingness to participate in the stock market and to take financial risk.
Japanese household portfolios
A distinct feature of Japanese households’ financial portfolios is the high per-
centage of safe assets, such as cash and deposits. A number of studies have made an
attempt to explain and identify factors influencing the low share of risky assets in the
financial portfolios of Japanese households. This section will first describe Japanese
household financial portfolios in terms of the classical theory described previously.
In particular, Equation 3.1 suggests that the share of risky assets is determined by
the following factors: the expected risk premium (Rr−Rf ); the volatility of the risky
asset return σ; and the degree of the investor’s relative risk aversion γi. Therefore,
this section will first analyse each of these factors and see if they can explain the
observed differences in risky asset holdings between Japan, the U.S. and Europe.
12They argue that the low stock holding levels found in single women, single men, African Amer-
icans, the less educated and those with lower cognitive capacity is related to their low expectations
about stock market returns.
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The literature argues that the conservative investment behaviour of Japanese
households is a typical characteristic of their risk averse nature. Investing in risky
assets is not the only indicator of aversion to risk in Japan. Figures from OECD
(2014) show that Japan’s market share in the total gross insurance premium is
second at 10.0% after the U.S. at 49.0%. The World Value Survey conducted in 60
countries assesses individuals’ general risk attitudes by asking the following question:
“Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life”.
Between 2010 and 2014, 2443 individuals were interviewed in Japan of which 73.0%
described themselves as risk averse individuals by answering either “not like me” or
“not like me at all” to the above question. This figure is the highest among eight
developed countries as shown in Figure 3.1. For example, in the U.S. only 39.0%
described themselves as risk averse individuals and in Cyprus this figure is even
lower (20.0%), see Figure 3.1.
Starting up a business is considered to be a risky step to take in life and a
country’s aggregate measure of the number of adults starting own business is a good
indicator of the risk attitude of the country’s individuals. According to the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), Japan’s position among the 29 innovation-driven
economies is last in the number of adults who are either a nascent entrepreneur or
owner-manager of a new business, see Table 3.1.13 Only 3.8% of adults engage in
starting up a new business compared to 13.8% in the U.S. and an average of 8.0%
of the 29 countries. 55.0% of adults who perceive starting up a business as a good
opportunities, indicate that fear of failure would prevent them from taking up such
a step, this compared to only 30.0% in the U.S. and an average of 38.0%.
These numbers might have been amplified by how the economy has been perform-
ing as only 7.0% see good opportunities to start a firm where they live compared to
51.0% in the U.S. and an average of 39.0%, see Table 3.1. Indeed, looking at the his-
torical performance of the Japanese economy it is possible that Japanese people have
13Innovation-driven economies are the most developed economies with technology and
knowledge-intensive business are the dominant source of competitive advantage.
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good reasons to be cautious about starting up businesses given the events that have
damaged their economy. Figures in the “Statistical handbook of Japan”, Statistics
Bureau, Japan (2017) show that Japan’s economy enjoyed 10.0% per annum growth
up until the first oil crisis in 1973 and the second oil crisis in 1978. After changing
Japan’s industrial structure from “energy-dependent” to “energy-saving” and some
administrative and financial reforms, Japan’s economy showed some improvement
at the beginning of the 1980s. However, the sharp decline in land prices after the
fall in stock prices has marked the start of a major economic recession, the so called
collapse of the bubble economy.
Figures reported in the Statistics Bureau, Japan (2017) depicting total stock
market capitalization and the stock price index of Japan over time, show the severity
of the collapse of the stock market capitalisation at the end of 1992. According to
the Statistics Bureau, Japan (2017), total market capitalization was 591 trillion
yen at the end of 1989, it then dropped to 281 trillion yen by the end of 1992.
As a consequences of falling land prices, bad debts started to build up in the loan
portfolio of Japan’s financial institutions, this in turn triggered Japan’s banking
crisis in 1997. Furthermore, Japan was not insulated from the impact of the 2008
financial crisis, despite the fact that the financial sector was not deeply exposed
to sub-prime mortgages or other derivative instruments. The crisis impacted the
Japanese economy through the decline in business investments and exports as a
result of the economic contraction in the U.S. and Europe coupled with the rise in
the yen.
The conservative investment behaviour of Japanese households is even more pro-
nounced when one consider the monetary policy environment faced by Japanese
households since the collapse of the house price boom and the asset price bubble of
the late 1980s. During this period, the so-called lost two decades, the Central Bank
of Japan has adopted a highly expansionary monetary policy. This action will effec-
tively drives down the risk-free rate to very low levels depressing the returns from
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low risk assets. Lian, Ma, and Wang (2019) argue that individuals demonstrate a
stronger preference for risky assets when the risk-free rate is low. This behaviour
is also confirmed by Brown, Kontonikas, and Montagnoli (2020) who show that ex-
pansionary monetary policy is associated with higher household portfolio allocation
to high risk assets and lower allocation to low risk assets. This observation makes
the puzzle of low stock market participation in Japan even more puzzling.
Given the discussion above it might be the case that the difference in risky asset
holdings between Japan and the rest of the world is due to the fundamental risk
averse nature of Japanese people, which has been effected by the performance of the
Japanese economy and the stock market in particular.
The other two determinants of the risky asset share in Equation 3.1, the expected
risk premium (Rr−Rf ) and the return volatility of risky assets σ, might also explain
the low participation in the stock market in Japan. As mentioned previously, the
Japanese stock market is characterised by a very poor history of realised stock
returns as compared to the U.S. and Europe. Over the period 1995-2016 Japanese
stock market index (TPOIX) has underperformed the U.S. S&P 500, see Nakajo,
Shino, and Imakubo (2017). Specifically, Nakajo et al. (2017) show that the prices
of stocks in the S&P 500 have a higher probability to rise than fall, while stocks
in the TPOIX were more likely to fall than to rise. Given this poor performance
of the Japanese stock market, it seems natural to see a low level of stock holdings
among Japanese households. However, stock markets around the world have also
experienced severe losses a multitude of times, but yet the stock market participation
in general has not been as low as the rate observed in Japan.
Having reviewed the performance of the Japanese economy and the stock mar-
ket and how this might influence households’ risky asset holdings according to the
classical theory described in Equation 3.1, the rest of this section reviews the small
number of empirical studies that analyse Japanese households’ financial portfolios.
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Kinari (2007) empirically tested the power of the classical theory and found that
the classical theory cannot fully explain differences in risky asset shares between
Japan and the U.S..14 In particular, Kinari (2007) argues that individuals’ degree
of risk aversion and the distribution of the return on assets discussed in the classical
theory are not sufficient to explain the observed differences in risky asset holdings
between Japan and the U.S.. To highlight the limitations of the classical theory,
Kinari (2007) compared the means and standard deviation values of the risky asset
shares which are predicted by the classical theory with the actual observed values in
Japan and the U.S.. The results confirm that the theoretically predicted values do
not coincide with the observed values. To overcome the limitations of the classical
theory, Kinari (2007) included the commonly used demographic factors in a tobit
model to test if they can explain the differences in the risky assets participation
rate and the level of holdings between Japanese and U.S. households.15 The re-
sults suggest that in general there are common features across the two countries as
several variables are significant and have the same sign. However, the main differ-
ence is that the marginal effects of these variables are larger in the U.S.. Moreover,
unemployment risk and housing are only significant for the U.S., whereas financial
business and health indicators are only significant for Japan. Kinari (2007) con-
cluded that the differential in the risky asset shares between Japan and the U.S.
comes from other factors that are not considered explicitly in the tobit regression,
such as; cohort effect; loss aversion and/or factors related to differences in financial
institutions.
One of the early studies which investigated the reasons Japanese households are
reluctant to invest in risky assets is Nakagawa and Shimizu (2000). Using tobit and
probit models and data from the Family Savings Survey for 1991 and 1999, they
find that the decline in the rate of return on stocks and the high volatility attached
14The paper uses the “Preferences and Life Satisfaction Survey” in Japan and the U.S. conducted
by Osaka University.
15Unemployment risk, borrowing constraints, self-employed, financial business, university, hous-
ing, health, investment horizon, age dummies, income, wealth, and child dummies.
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to this return explain the decline in a household’s risky asset holdings. Moreover,
the deteriorating income environment in the Japanese economy at the time of the
survey has increased precautionary demand for safe assets, “the precautionary sav-
ings motive”. The paper identifies a number of structural factors that make current
risky financial assets unattractive, such as the taxation system, the lack of asset
related information and the high cost of such investment. Furthermore, Nakagawa
and Shimizu (2000) found that Japanese households are two or three times as risk
averse as their U.S. counterparts based on the estimated risk aversion coefficient of
the CAPM and the survey results which indicate that more than 70.0% of house-
holds put great importance on the “safety” and the “liquidity” of assets. However, in
this context the level of risk aversion should be estimated independently of the level
of risky asset holdings, perhaps using subjective questions such as the hypothetical
lottery questions or insurance cover, in order to correctly identify the causality of
the effect.
Since the analysis of Nakagawa and Shimizu (2000) was restricted to two years,
both occurring after the bubble, Iwaisako, Mitchell, and Piggott (2004) argue that
the observed fall in the share of risky assets in the data of Nakagawa and Shimizu
(2000) could be an adjustment back towards the status quo, as stock holdings by
Japanese households increased rapidly in the late 1980s. Iwaisako et al. (2004)
evaluated the patterns in the level and composition of financial and non-financial
assets across different types of Japanese households using the Nikkei Radar data for
the year 2000 and employing probit and tobit models. The paper contributes to
the limited literature on Japanese households’ portfolios by considering households’
claims on social security and pensions. The findings confirm that a household’s
holdings of risky assets, housing assets and total wealth increases with income.
However, households tend to invest a higher proportion of their wealth in real estate
than in equity when they are older. This finding suggests that households still
see housing as a more attractive form of saving than the stock market despite the
price depreciation of houses in Japan. This pattern is further confirmed as income
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positively affects equity holdings, but at a decreasing rate, while in the housing
equations it has a positive and growing impact on housing wealth. The findings
relating to the other variables, such as education, gender and material status all have
the usual effects on equity holdings and housing wealth. However, being employed is
negative and statistically significant in the equity regression, suggesting that if the
head is not working, equity holding will be higher. Iwaisako et al. (2004) argue that
the employment status variable might be reflecting that the head of the household
is retired rather than not working.
To provide a detailed description of the interaction between risky asset holdings
and real estate holdings over the life cycle, Iwaisako (2009) uses the Nikkei Radar
data from 1987 to 1999.16 Iwaisako (2009) emphasises the importance of including
real estate holdings in the analysis of the Japanese financial portfolio due to the
unique structure of the housing market in Japan. The relationship between age
and risky asset holdings has been documented to increase with age, reaching a
peak at middle age before declining, see Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) for the U.S.
and Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2002) for Europe. Iwaisako (2009) found that
the Japanese behave similarly with one exception that the peak comes at a much
later stage of life, in their 50s, and remains fairly constant thereafter. Moreover,
this relationship between age and risky asset holdings is found only conditional on
holding real estate, this relationship disappears for households that do not own real
estate. Iwaisako (2009) argues that the high land prices in Japan and the higher
average down payments compared to the U.S. leave Japanese households in a highly
leveraged position. This will lead to a higher share of real estate in total wealth,
explaining why Japanese households hold less risky assets and the peak of their
holdings comes at a much later stage of life.
To link household choices to the state of the macro economy, Aoki et al. (2016)
16There is an early version of this paper in (2003) which also compares the Nikie data with
other data sets in Japan.
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analyse Japanese households’ financial portfolios based on a life-cycle model.17 They
argue that their counter factual experiments confirm that the persistently low level
of inflation in Japan, which has averaged close to zero for almost 15 years, can
discourage stock market participation. In particular, if the inflation rate in Japan
was similar to the world wide agreed target of 2.0%, stock market participation would
increase from 15.3% in their baseline simulation to around 20.0%. Low expected
stock returns is another factor the paper claims that has an important impact on
household financial behaviour. Aoki et al. (2016) argue that if they increase the mean
equity premium in the baseline calibration model for Japan from 1.8% to 4.0%, stock
market participation rate will increase to 50.0%, a ratio which has been experienced
in the U.S.. The participation cost of the stock market in Japan is estimated by
their calibrated structural model to be relatively high at 9.0%, this cost is estimated
in the literature for the U.S. to be around only 5.0%. Aoki et al. (2016) argue that
the stock market participation rate in Japan would increase from 15.3% to 43.0%
if the participation cost is set at 5.0%. The paper concludes that “persistently
poor macroeconomic performance with low interest rates, low stock returns and low
inflation can have a very far reaching impact on household behaviour” Aoki et al.
(2016, p. 43).
Recently, Ito et al. (2017) analyse the mechanisms that influence household port-
folio selection in Japan and the U.S.. The paper used the “Preferences and Life
Satisfaction Survey” to carry out comparison between Japan and the U.S. as this
survey asks the same questions in both countries. Ito et al. (2017) argue that the
determinants of the level of risky investments (the conditional share) will differ from
those affecting the decision to participate in the stock market (participation rate),
hence they analysed the two issues separately using dynamic panel data models.
The paper assumes that the conditional share of risky assets depends on: the ex-
pected return on risky assets; the return on safe assets; market volatility; relative
risk aversion; liquidity constraints and precautionary saving motives. The paper
17 They used data from the Japanese Survey of Household Finance (SHF) from 1981 to 2014.
105
Section 3.3 Chapter 3
also argues that the participation rate, which is estimated by a random effects panel
probit model, will depend on entry costs as well as the variables in the conditional
share. The findings of the GMM model, used for the level equation, indicate that
the classical theory factors explained in Equation 3.1 and factors related to liquidity
constraints, all have a significant important influence on the level of risky assets held
at the household level in both countries. However, precautionary saving motives and
concern about the future have no significant effects on the level of risky assets in
both countries. In contrast, the results from the probit model indicate that all the
factors included in the model have significant impacts on the participation rate,
especially the financial literacy factors. Ito et al. (2017) argue that the differences
in the conditional share between Japan and the U.S. are mainly explained by the
classical theory factors and other unobserved factors captured by the constant term.
However, the major difference in the participation rate between the two countries is
explained by financial literacy and the constant term along with the other factors
included in the model. Ito et al. (2017) argue that based on these results, to improve
the participation rate and the conditional share in Japan, the following should be
improved: the market distribution of the return on risky assets; structural factors
related to financial institutions and the financial education of Japanese households.18
A limitation of Ito et al. (2017) is that it does not include the impact of real asset
holdings and the life cycle of the households in the analysis. These two factors have
been identified to have a strong impact on the financial behaviour of households.
Summary
The discussion of the papers above shows that the literature have provided a
greater insight into a multitude of topics surrounding risky asset holdings by house-
holds. However, a number of gaps can still be identified in the literature related
18An initiative in the field of financial education which has been operating in Japan since 1983 is
the Central Council for Financial Services Information, www.shiruporuto.jp/e. The main purpose
of the council is to educate the public regarding the importance of basic financial and economic
knowledge.
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to the analysis of risky asset holdings of Japanese households, which is what this
chapter will try to address.
Although there is a number of studies that explain and identify factors influenc-
ing the low share of risky assets in the financial portfolios of Japanese households,
the types of statistical models used can be seen as a limiting factor. Most of the
papers which examine the determinants of risky asset holdings in Japan use a to-
bit specifications. However, using a tobit model for modelling variables that are
proportional in nature is conceptually flawed, as argued by Cook, Kieschnick, and
McCullough (2008), as it violates the assumption of linearity between the dependent
and independent variables. To overcome this issue, the literature suggests the use
of the FRM as an alternative modelling approach to the tobit model, which can
handle proportions where both zeros and ones may appear. Therefore, the empir-
ical analysis presented in this chapter make use of four alternative methodological
approaches to explore the robustness of the findings. Two of these approaches, CQR
and the FRM models, have not been applied to Japanese data in this context. More-
over, aspects of households’ trust in the functioning of the stock market and general
trust in the government have not been analysed before in the literature that focus
on Japanese households.19 Therefore, this chapter will contribute to the existing
literature on the determinants of risky asset holdings by analysing the effects of
household trust in the stock market, trust in the government and household percep-
tion of risk on risky asset holdings for Japanese households. Finally, this chapter
will use the KHPS dataset, a dataset that has never been used before to examine
Japanese households’ financial portfolios.
19Balloch et al. (2015) use the American Life Panel (ALP) surveys to examine the importance
of households’ level of trust in the stock market for households’ financial decisions. Guiso et al.
(2008) examined the role of trust using data from the Dutch National Bank (DNB) Household
Survey and data from the Italian Bank customers survey.
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3.4 Data
This chapter uses the KHPS available from the Panel Data Research Centre
at Keio University. The KHPS is one of the most comprehensive panel surveys of
households in Japan and it has been conducted annually by Keio University since
2004 using the drop-off pick-up (DOPU) method. Respondents were selected by
stratified two-stage random sampling of people aged between 20 and 69, male and
female.20 The KHPS provides detailed information about respondents’ social and
demographic characteristics, and also basic information regarding their financial
asset holdings. In wave 10 (2013) respondents were also asked detailed questions
regarding their perceived risk of selected assets and respondents’ opinions about the
functioning of the stock market. Therefore, this chapter will focus on wave 10 to
further explore household holdings of risky assets.21 This wave contains information
on 3,568 households of which 2,945 provide complete information on the variables
that are the focus of this chapter. Information is collected for the respondent and
his/her spouse in the case of married couples. However, as the analysis in this chap-
ter is of household asset holdings, the household is the unit of analysis rather than
individual respondents. Following Cardak and Wilkins (2009), household character-
istics are derived from the head of the household, who is explicitly identified in the
survey questionnaire.
3.4.1 Dependent variable
The KHPS asks respondents to report the values of the household’s financial
portfolio in two categories, deposits and securities. The KHPS lists the items which
are included in each category as follows: “(1) Deposits: Postal savings certificates,
time deposits, instalment savings and ordinary deposits. Bank, shinkin bank, etc.
20 Generally, responses by other family members are not permitted.
21 In the first part of the chapter, all waves of the KHPS data set (2004 to 2015) are used to
examine the determinants of risky asset holdings. However, only variables included in the baseline
model are analysed to allow for comparison with other studies.
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Time deposits, instalment savings and ordinary deposits. Company deposits, gold
investment accounts, gold savings accounts, medium-term government bond funds,
etc; (2) Securities: Shares (market value), bonds (par value), stock investment trusts
(market value), corporate and public bond investment trusts (market value), loans
in trust and money in trust (par value), etc”.
This chapter follows the literature and defines risky assets category to be to-
tal value of securities (category (2)) and safe assets to be total values of deposits
(category (1)). The chapter also defines total financial wealth as the total value
of deposits and securities (category (1)+(2)). Hence, the dependant variable is the
fraction of financial wealth invested in risky assets.
Table 3.3 provides summary statistics for the risky assets ratio and how this
variable varies by age, education level, gender, employment status, marital status
and health status. The average holdings of risky assets in our sample is 6.4%,
which is much lower than U.S. and European household, see Bank of Japan (2017b).
Table 3.3 also shows that holdings of risky assets increase with age, which is at odds
with the humped shaped relationship observed in the U.S. and Europe. In line
with prior expectations, more educated household heads hold a higher share of risky
assets. Similarly, households with male heads allocate a higher proportion of their
financial assets in risky assets than households with female heads. The summary
statistics in Table 3.3 suggest that household heads who are in part-time employment
or in the “other” category (student, housewife and retired) hold a higher share of
risky assets than those who are in full time employment. Finally, variations of risky
asset holding among the four health status categories, and between being married
and being single are limited. Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the proportion
of risky assets which display a high percentage of zero holdings in our sample.
Figure 3.3 shows the distribution conditional on holding the risky assets, which also
shows that those who do hold risky assets hold small proportions.
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Wealth distribution
To gain an in depth understanding of the wealth distribution in Japan, Table 3.2
reports the summary statistics of the six main asset and liability classes. These
statistics confirm that Japanese households are much more risk averse than their
European and U.S. counterparts, as they hold a lower proportion of securities and
a much larger proportion of safe assets. The statistics in Table 3.2 are also in line
with the data of Bank of Japan (2017b), confirming that the KHPS dataset is a
representative sample of Japanese households. The average value of safe assets in
the sample is ¥8,430,000, whereas the median is ¥3,120,000.22 The mean holding
of securities among all households is ¥1,480,000 (around £9,800) and the median is
zero. Similarly, the means of the other four measures are much less than the median
values, which is due to the fact that only a small proportion of households hold a
large amount in each asset/liability class. Further insight into the distribution of
these measures can be obtained by looking at the distribution by percentiles. We
observe from Table 3.2 that the lower 50 percent of our sample have ¥3,120,000 or
less in safe assets whereas the top 10 percentile have at least ¥20,770,000 in safe
assets. When the distribution of securities is compared to that of savings, we observe
that the former is much more heavily skewed. Only the top 10 percentile of our
sample hold some investment in securities, which reinforces the fact noted earlier
that in our sample the participation rate in risky assets is very low for Japanese
households. In fact, the percentage of households in our sample that hold zero
securities is 78.0%, which is crucial to account for when deciding on the appropriate
empirical methodology as discussed in the next section. When looking at total
assets, defined as, financial wealth plus the market values of the residential property
and the associated plot, it is still clear that the distribution of wealth is heavily
skewed. Households who are in the bottom 25 percentile have only ¥4,570,000 in
total assets, whereas the top 10 percentile have almost 12 times that amount at
¥58,150,000. Total debt and non-mortgage debt display similar trend to the other
22 This is around £56,000 for the mean and £21,000 for the median, assuming £1=¥149.
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measures. However, it is surprising to see that only the top 10 percentile have non-
mortgage debt. To summarise, Table 3.2 shows that in our sample there are a large
variations across households’ allocation of assets and that the distribution of main
assets classes is significantly skewed.
3.4.2 Independent variables
The KHPS dataset contains detailed information on the demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of household heads. The baseline specification discussed
next will first define the commonly used determinants of risky asset holding in the
literature. However, one of the main contributions of this chapter is the analysis of
new variables that might be important in explaining the low stock market participa-
tion rate and be crucial in understanding Japanese household investment decisions.
These variables and the baseline variables are defined in Table 3.4, whilst summary
statistics are presented in Table 3.5.
Baseline variables
The literature has identified a number of demographic and socio-economic char-
acteristics which influence stock market participation decision of households (see, for
example, Haliassos & Bertaut, 1995; Campbell, 2006; Guiso & Sodini, 2013). These
papers suggest that important predictors of risky asset holdings are income and
wealth. In line with Cardak and Wilkins (2009) this chapter adjusts households’
income for household composition using the OECD-modified equivalence scale.23
Finally, the natural logarithm is taken for the adjusted income. Similarly, the nat-
ural logarithm is taken for the net wealth, which is defined as total financial and
non-financial assets minus total debt. For both variables the natural logarithm is
set to zero when the values of these variables are zero. In the case of negative net
wealth, as a result of total debt being larger than assets, an inverse hyperbolic sine
23Specifically, household total pre-tax income is divided by 1.5 for each adult other that the
household’s head and by 0.3 for each child.
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transformation is applied using “asinh” routine in STATA, Oldham, Myland, and
Spanier (2010). The literature suggests that in addition to income and wealth, the
level of education of the household head is a key determinant of risky asset holdings.
This might be due to the fact that educated individual are better able to understand
sophisticated financial products. Table 3.5 shows that there are considerable num-
bers of educated Japanese households in our sample. Table 3.5 shows that 30.0% of
household heads have a university or higher level of education and 46.0% have a high
school level of education. To control for the household head’s current employment
we construct a set of dummies derived from the question: “Last month (January),
did you perform any paid work (including paid work at family businesses)?” The
binary variables are, working (omitted category), unemployed, part-time work and
other (housewife, students and other).
A growing body of literature incorporates background risks in the analysis of
household financial portfolios. Exposure to unfavourable background risks will have
a significant impact on the optimal level of risky asset holdings. The first background
risk to be considered is labour income risk, which is measured at the household level.
The literature suggests different methods of measuring labour income risk, see for
example Cardak and Wilkins (2009). In this chapter we adopt two of these methods,
the first is the classical measure of risk, which measures labour income risk by simply
the variance of household income. However, in the second method individuals derive
their expectations about future income from a prediction based upon their observable
characteristics, for more details see Cardak and Wilkins (2009). This process can
be expressed as:
yit = at +Xitβt + µit , (3.2)
where at is a calendar year effect included to reflect the macroeconomic environment.
Whilst X includes all observable and demographic characteristics of the household
head which have an impact on labour earning. These characteristics include: gender,
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age, region, family size and education.24 Then labour income risk is simply the
variance of µit, which is the idiosyncratic and unpredictable part of household total
labour income yit.
25
Health risk is also one of the variables included as a background risk in the anal-
ysis of risky asset holdings. Risk associated with health status cannot be diversified
and can be seen as a source of income and expenditure risk. Japanese households
will face costs associated with healthcare despite the fact that Japan provides ac-
cess to public health care. Japanese households are required to pay a fraction of
the medical treatment cost, which is 20.0% or 30.0% depending on the insurance
scheme the household enrolled in. This fraction is paid on the day but capped to
a monthly limit to ensure affordability. Hence, the health status of the household
head will potentially influence household portfolio composition. The health variable
included in the KHPS is based on a self-reported question which asks the head of
the household whether his/her health is good, pretty good, normal or poor. Around
15 percent reported poor health, 44 percent of individuals in our sample reported
a normal health status, 12 percent reported good health and 29 percent reported
pretty good health. These self-reported measures of health are commonly used in the
assessment of household portfolios (see, for example, Love & Smith, 2010; Mariotti,
Mumford, & Pena-Boquete, 2015; Cardak & Wilkins, 2009).
Mortgage payments and rent expenses are two types of committed expenditure
identified in the literature as risky liabilities that might have an impact on house-
hold’s portfolio composition (see, for example, Fratantoni, 1998; Cardak & Wilkins,
2009). Generally, committed expenditure risk is measured as the ratio of primary
residence expenditures to household labour income. For those with rented proper-
24The homogeneity of labour income risk with respect to risky asset ownership is unlikely to be
an issue as suggested by Cardak and Wilkins (2009). They argued that it is much easier to control
exposure from holding risky assets than controlling labour income risk, hence it is unlikely that
holdings of risky assets will influence labour market activities.
25However, both of these measures yield similar results, hence we only report the results based
on the simple classical method.
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ties, expenditures include annual rent, while for home owners housing expenditures
include annual mortgage payments. Home ownership is also an important variable
to control for. The literature suggests that home ownership can be considered as
an investment substitute, Cardak and Wilkins (2009). However, other studies argue
that home ownership can be used as collateral to facilitate borrowing and generate
liquidity which is important in household finance decision, see Mariotti et al. (2015).
In addition to the determinants discussed above, this chapter controls for demo-
graphic characteristics which are likely to influence the stock market participation
decision of households. For example, Age has attracted considerable discussion
in the literature as individuals face different financial constraints and saving goals
in different phases of their life. Also, head of household gender is important as
men and women exhibit different behaviour towards financial decisions. It will also
matter whether there are children present in the household, the number of adults
and whether the household’s head is married. Therefore, we control for these vari-
ables alongside two geographical controls, region and city size. Considering the
demographic characteristics mentioned above in more detail, the average age of the
household head in the sample is 51 years old, 87 percent are male, and 82 per cent
are married. The average number of adults in our sample is three adults and 35
percent of households have one or more dependent child present.
The variables discussed above are commonly analysed in the literature. However,
this chapter contributes to the current literature by including key explanatory vari-
ables, each of which captures an aspect of Japanese household behaviour when taking
financial decisions. In each wave the KHPS explores specific aspect of household’s
behaviour. In wave 10 (2013) respondents were asked detailed questions regarding
their perceived risk of selected assets and their opinions about the functioning of
the stock market. These variables have not been analysed for Japanese households
before, therefore, they might help to explain the low participation rate of Japanese
households in the stock market. Table 3.4 provides the specific questions asked in
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the survey for each variable.
Attitudinal variables
A recent trend in the current literature is the focus on non traditional factors,
mainly behavioural factors, to fully explain the low stock market participation rate
of households, see for example, Guiso et al. (2008).
The set of general attitudinal variables aims to capture some of the behavioural
factors which may influence risky asset holdings such as, individual risk attitudes.
An indicator of individual financial risk aversion is usually included in the analysis
of household risky asset holdings, however, the KHPS has a question regarding risk
aversion in general. Specifically, respondents are asked: “When you have to go out
somewhere in your town all day, what is the chance of rain that makes you take
an umbrella with you? 0%-100%”. Therefore, we use this variable to proxy for
the risk aversion level of household heads in our sample, see Jung and Treibich
(2015). In particular, those who answered that they always carry an umbrella will
be considered as risk averse, whereas those who answered that only 100 percent
chance of rain makes them carry one are regarded as risk loving. In our sample, 13
percent of household heads always carry an umbrella, whereas only 2 percent will
carry an umbrella only if there is 100 percent chance of rain.
The second variable in this set is related to savings’ preferences. The question
is:“Around how much is the total savings goal you are now considering for every
month?” However, as we are interested in household’s preferences, this variable is
changed from a continuous one to a binary variable that indicates if the household
has a saving goal or not rather than the actual amount of savings the household
aims for. This variable captures those who have a saving goal and as a result can
be considered as being financially organised and hence are more likely to engage in
other financial products. However, it is also possible that having the need to save
might be a reflection of greater background risk and hence might have a negative
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impact on the proportion of risky asset holdings. 61 percent of the sample have a
saving goal.
Household’s future financial and political expectations have been documented
in the literature to influence various aspects of household finances (see, for exam-
ple, Brown, Garino, Taylor, & Wheatley Price, 2005; Malmendier & Nagel, 2011;
Ke´zdi & Willis, 2009; Lunt & Livingstone, 1991). Expectations will be reflected in
individual risk preferences as these preferences are also based on exposure to risky
environments in the future, not only the riskiness of the environment in which a
decision is currently being made. The two variables included to capture individuals’
future expectations are related to future retirement income and the Japanese gov-
ernment. Specifically, respondents are asked: “Do you think that you have income
and assets that are enough to lead a retirement life without problems?”; and “Do
you support the present government?”. The two indicators capture different subjec-
tive aspects which could influence the investment decision and cannot be covered by
objective variables. While the question relating to expected future retirement in-
come captures how comfortable individuals are about future income, the government
question reflects the trust an individual has in government policies in general. The
latter variable is of particular importance as the Japanese government announced
in January 2013 (at the same time wave 10 was taking place) its “three-arrows”
strategy to achieve an early end to deflation and overcome economic stagnation.
Only 10 percent in our sample think that they have enough retirement income, 20
percent do not know and 70 percent they think that their retirement income is not
enough. Turning to the government support variable, 49 percent do support the
current government, 26 percent they do not and 25 percent they cannot decide.
Table 3.6 shows pairwise correlations between the share of risky assets and the
variables in this set. The table shows that most of the variables in this set correlate
with the expected sign with the dependent variable. For example, those who do
support the current government policy and those who do have a saving goal hold
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more risky assets. Whereas those who think that retirement income is not enough
will limit their exposure to financial risk as they feel uncomfortable with future
income. However, the sign of the risk attitude measure is at odd with expectation.
Impression about stock markets
The main feature of the stock market that attracts investors is the belief that
the stock market will yield a higher return than risk free investments. Without
this belief, investors will choose not to participate in the stock market even in
the absence of any participation costs. However, this belief is built on different
dimensions of trust in the stock market, such as, trust in the profitability, fairness,
efficiency and prudential supervision of the stock market. Therefore, trust in the
stock market is another important factor that has been recently highlighted in the
literature to influence the decision of households to invest in risky financial assets
(see, for example, Guiso et al., 2008; Delis & Mylonidis, 2015; Georgarakos & Pasini,
2011; Bucciol et al., 2016). The measure of trust which has been used in these
studies is a measure of generalized trust, with the exception of Guiso et al. (2008)
who used customers’ confidence toward the bank as a broker.26 However, measures
of the trust in the institutions that facilitate stock market participation is arguably
far more important than relying on a generalized measure of trust for this area
of analysis. Therefore, this paper contributes to the literature by using detailed
measures of individual’s trust in the stock market, which collectively can be seen as
an indicator of households’ impressions of the overall reliability of the stock market.
The statements are:
“Please circle the answer that best applies to you for each of the following state-
ments regarding your impression about the stock market.(0) Disagree (1) Somewhat
disagree (2) can’t say either way (3) Somewhat agree (4) Agree:
1- Profits cannot be made with certainty.
26General trust is measured by the answers to “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you have to be very careful in dealing with people?”.
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2- Significant losses are possible.
3- Illegal activities such as insider trading are widespread.
4- No much progress has been made in terms of disclosure of information on corpo-
rate performance.
5- Market interventions by the central bank and the government are not thoroughly
conducted.”
The first two statements of this set focus on the profitability and riskiness of
the stock market whereas the other three statements focus on stock market fairness,
efficiency and prudential supervision. The risk and return trade-off is crucial for
household in deciding whether to participate in the stock market or not. Profitabil-
ity and riskiness of the stock market as perceived by households are captured by
the first two variables. The variable related to trust in the government discussed in
the previous section can be extended further to analyse individual trust in the stock
market specifically. Guiso et al. (2008) investigate the impact of trust on influencing
individuals’ willingness to participate in the stock market.27 Their findings suggest
that negative events or prolonged exposure to low returns in the stock market will
not only change an individual’s subjective probabilities about stock market returns,
but also the fundamental trust in the system that facilitates those returns. The
last three variables of this set capture different dimensions of households’ trust in
the stock market.28 In particular, the “illegal activities” statement captures the
fairness and the quality of investor protection whereas the information disclosure
statement captures stock market efficiency. Finally, the statement regarding mar-
ket interventions by the central bank and the government captures stock market
prudential supervision. Table 3.7 shows the distribution of these variables, where it
is clear that the majority of respondents agree with the statements concerning the
27 They compared individuals’ views of the stock market to that of the three-card game. They
argue that even after observing the game many rounds, an individual may not trust the fairness
of the game nor the person playing it.
28The order of the response has been reversed to be in line with set three. As a consequence, a
higher value in each of these variables denotes a higher agreement with the statement.
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profitability and riskiness of the stock market. However, most of the respondents
could not decide about the statements related to the three trust dimensions.
Table 3.6 shows pairwise correlations between the share of risky assets and the
variables in this set. Similar to the variable in the “attitudinal variables” set, the
table shows that all of the variables in this set correlate negatively with the depen-
dent variable which is in line with prior expectations. For example, those who do
not trust the fairness and the quality of investor protection of the stock market will
limit their holdings of risky assets.
Risk ranking of selected assets
The variables in this set focus on the household’s personal interpretation of
the riskiness of selected assets. Each respondent is asked to rank the riskiness of
six different types of saving and investment vehicles. Specifically, respondents are
asked: “If we assume stashing cash has a risk value of 0 and purchasing a betting
slip or lottery ticket has a risk value of 10, what do you think are the risk values of
the following types of saving and investment? on a scale of 0 to 10.
1- Putting money in a conventional bank savings account.
2- Putting money in a foreign currency deposit.
3- Putting money in a postal savings account.
4- Buying stocks.
5- Buying a stock investment trust.
6- Investing in land and property.”
These variables reflect individual perception of the risk attached to an asset
given the current state of the economy. Distinguishing between the effect of risk
preferences and risk perception is important to fully capture the underlying process
which form the individual’s optimal portfolio. E. Weber and Milliman (1997, p. 124)
argued that “differences in risky choice should not automatically be interpreted as
the result of changes in people’s preference for risk, but may also, at least partially, be
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the result of changes in their perception of the risks.”. Therefore, it should be noted
that the profitability measure in set two is different from the riskiness of stock and
investment trust variables in this set. While the former measures the uncertainty of
stock market return and individual risk tolerance, the latter focuses on the riskiness
of stock market returns as measured by the perceived return volatility.
M. Weber, Weber, and Nosic´ (2012) analysed brokerage customers’ willingness to
take risk during the period of the (2007, 2009) financial turmoil. Risk attitudes mea-
sures are used along with investors’ expectations of the market return and volatility,
which were measured in two different ways. One using numeric judgements of re-
turns and volatility in returns and the other using subjective rating scales of the
return and volatility (‘extremely bad’ to ‘extremely good’ for returns, and from
‘not at all risky’ to ‘extremely risky’ for risk), which is similar to the measure of
risk of the selected assets used in this chapter. They analysed how these different
measures changed over this period and which characteristics are associated with
changes in risk taking. M. Weber et al. (2012) found that subjective expectations
of market risk and return are a strong predictors of changes in risk taking. Whereas
investors’ numeric estimates of market returns and volatility, which are closer to
the traditional model discussed in Equation 3.1, fail to predict observed changes
in risk taking, suggesting that “the more emotion-based components of these judge-
ments that drive changes in risk taking”, M. Weber et al. (2012, p. 31). Hoffmann,
Post, and Pennings (2013) also found similar results using brokerage records of 1510
clients of the Netherlands. In particular, they found that the main driving force for
portfolio allocation is the fluctuation in investors’ risk perceptions, while investors
risk preferences did not change substantially during that period.
These studies show the importance of including risk perception in a household
level risk taking equation. They also suggest that examining the evolution of in-
vestors risk perceptions and risk preferences may shed a light on the psychological
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factors influencing household financial portfolio decisions.29 However, data on the
set of variables discussed in this section for Japan is not available in a panel struc-
ture, hence this chapter only focus on the 2013 wave of the KHPS.
Table 3.6 shows pairwise correlations between the share of risky assets and the
variables in this set. All of the variables in this set correlate negatively with the
dependent variable, however, only individual perceptions of the risk attached to
saving and postal saving are statistically significant.
3.5 Methodology
As discussed above, an important feature of the dependant variable is that a
significant proportion of households hold no risky assets and that the dependant
variable is proportional in nature. This requires particular econometric techniques to
account for the fact that the dependant variable is defined on the interval [0, 1]. The
chapter uses four alternative methodological approaches to explore the robustness
of the findings to different modelling approaches, two of these approaches have not
been applied to Japanese data in this context. The tobit model, developed by
Tobin (1958a), is the most commonly used approach in the literature to assess the
determinants of risky asset ownership, (see, for example, Cardak & Wilkins, 2009;
Guiso et al., 1996), amongst many others. Therefore, the tobit model is used as a
reference case against which the findings of the existing literature and the alternative
models adopted here are compared to.
The tobit results are important to allow for a comparison with two alternative
models used in this chapter which are, the Censored Quantile Regression (CQR) and
the Fractional Response Model (FRM). Each of these approaches has a unique fea-
ture which helps in exploring the nature of the dataset and furthering understanding
29 Barberis (2013) argue that psychological factors have an important role in the the creation
of the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
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of Japanese households’ attitudes towards risky investments. The FRM consists of
two models; the one-part model and two-part model. Each model of the FRM can
handle proportions where both zeros and ones may appear and the two-part model
jointly models the incidence and extent of risky asset holdings. This is crucial as
factors that explain the former decision may not be the same as those that affect
the latter decision or their effects may be different. The CQR allows an examination
of the complete distribution and handles censoring at zero without the assumptions
of normality and homoscedasticity that are necessary in the tobit model. Estima-
tors which are based on the mean conditional distribution of the dependent variable
provide only a partial view of the relationship between a set of regressors and the
outcome variable. However, it is interesting and informative to explore whether the
effects of determinants vary over the distribution, which is provided by the CQR.
3.5.1 Tobit Model
As mentioned above, the tobit model is commonly used to address the clustering
at zero and one of the proportion of risky assets in household portfolios. Applying
a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression will lead to downward-biased
estimates, because the sub-sample used is limited to households who have at least
some risky asset holdings. Technically, an OLS on the sub-sample of households
with positive risky asset holdings can be applied, but only when it is reasonable
to assume that the decision to hold risky assets is uncorrelated with the level of
risky asset holdings. Tobin (1958a) examined the relationship between household
income and expenditure on luxury goods. He argued that the large concentration
of households who spend exactly zero dollars on luxury goods should be taken into
account. This is because an explanatory variable is expected to influence both the
probability of a household buying luxury items and how much they actually spent,
given that they have spent.
The tobit model is usually interpreted in terms of an underlying latent variable,
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y∗i , of which yi is the realised observation, where the subscript i denotes the house-
hold index.30 In this chapter y∗i will be the propensity of households to hold risky
assets but this is only realised as actual holding, yi, if that propensity exceeds zero.
Hence, although many observations may have zero holdings on the realised variable
yi, they can be considered as having differing holdings on the latent variable y
∗
i .
This latent variable is defined to be left censored at α (the lower limit, which is
zero) and right censored at η (the upper limit, which is one). Therefore, the realised
variable yi is defined as follows:
yi =

η if y∗i ≥ η
y∗i if α < yi < η .
α if y∗i ≤ α
(3.3)
The tobit model can be written in terms of the underlying or latent variable as:
y∗i = β
′
Xi + εi, (3.4)
where Xi is the vector of independent variables discussed above, β is the corre-
sponding vector of parameters. The error term εi is assumed to be normally, inde-
pendently, and identically distributed, εi ∼ N(0, σ2). The above model is estimated
using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (ML). The β vector of parameters that
are typically produced by tobit ML estimation relate directly to the unobserved
latent variable, y∗i . Hence, each coefficient shows the effect of a change in an ex-
planatory variable on the expected value of the latent variable, holding all other
variables constant,that is:
∂E(y∗i |Xi)
∂Xi
= βi. (3.5)
Therefore, to obtain a meaningful results one should relate the coefficients to the
realised variable yi instead. This can be achieved by finding the partial derivative
30The chapter will also use the random effect tobit model in the first part of the analysis. Full
formulation of the random effect tobit model can be found in Greene (2012).
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of the expected, unconditional value of the realized variable yi:
∂E(yi|Xi)
∂Xi
= βi × Pr[α < y∗i < η]. (3.6)
In the above partial derivative, the coefficient is weighted by the probability that an
observation, with a given set of xi values, is uncensored. The impact of a change in
one explanatory variable on yi will depend on this probability. It is common in the
literature to approximate this probability by the following scaling factor:
The number of censored observations
Total number of observations
. (3.7)
Therefore, each coefficient produced by the tobit model is multiplied by this
scaling factor to obtain the marginal effects of changes in xi, see Greene (2012).
3.5.2 Fractional Response Model (FRM)
The preferred estimation technique is largely determined by the nature of the
dependent variable; that is, the proportion of risky assets held in the household
financial portfolio. As mentioned before, the main feature of this variable is that
it is a proportion that ranges continuously from 0 to 1, inclusively. An alternative
modelling approach to the tobit model is the FRM, which can handle proportions
where both zeros and ones may appear. Moreover, the two-part FRM allows the
signs and sizes of the variables’ coefficients for the participation decision equation
to vary from the signs and sizes of the coefficients in the level of holdings equation.
The FRM was developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) to deal with dependent
variables defined on the closed interval yi ∈ [0, 1] . The FRM requires a functional
form for yi that ensures the desired constraints are adhered to as follows:
E(yi|Xi) = G(Xiθ). (3.8)
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Papke and Wooldridge (1996) suggest any cumulative distribution function as pos-
sible specifications for G(.),
G(z) =
ez
1 + ez
. (3.9)
Therefore, the logistic function in Equation 3.9 is a possible choice for G(.), which
maps z onto the (0,1) interval. Papke and Wooldridge (1996) propose estimating
FRMs by quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) based on the Bernoulli log-likelihood
function, which is given by
li(θ) = yi log[G(Xiθ)] + (1− yi) log[1−G(Xiθ)]. (3.10)
The FRM model described above is an efficient model to explain the behaviour
of a dependent variable characterised by a large number of zero values and of a
fractional nature. However, it may be preferable to construct models which allow
separate treatment of participation (to hold or not to hold risky assets) and allo-
cation decisions (how much to hold in risky assets). This is crucial as factors that
explain the former decision may not be the same as those that affect the latter
decision or their effect may be different. In the framework of a “standard tobit”
model, the incidence and extent of holding risky assets are determined by the same
explanatory variables. Furthermore, the coefficients of these variables are restricted
to having the same sign and magnitude in both underlying processes. Therefore, a
two-part model is used in this chapter to allow separate treatments for the partic-
ipation and allocation decisions for risky asset ownership by Japanese households.
To achieve identification, we follow Spaenjers and Spira (2015) and Guiso, Halias-
sos, and Jappelli (2003) and include income and wealth quartiles in the equation
of the stock market participation decision. Spaenjers and Spira (2015) argue that
the relationship between the decision to participate in the stock market and wealth
is non-linear. This is because changes in wealth at very low or very high wealth
quantiles will not have a pronounced impact on the probability of participating in
the stock market. Spaenjers and Spira (2015) argue that the level of holding risky
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assets conditional on participation does not show such non-linearity.
The two-part FRM was introduced by J. Ramalho and Silva (2009) as an ex-
tension of the original Papke and Wooldridge (1996) FRM model. The first part
models the probability of a household participating in risky asset holding using a
binary choice framework defined as:
Pr(y∗i = 1|Xi) = Pr(yi ∈ (0, 1]|Xi) = G(Xiθ), (3.11)
where y∗i is defined as:
y∗i =
0 for yi = 01 for yi ∈ (0, 1], (3.12)
where G(.) is as defined in (4). The second part of the two-part FRM relates to
positive participation, i.e. the magnitude of risky asset holding in the portfolio. In
this case, the specification for this part is:
E(yi|Zi, yi ∈ (0, 1]) = F (Ziγ). (3.13)
F (Ziγ) can be estimated by QML and the logistic function is the specification used
to estimate θ as in the one-part FRM discussed above.31 Therefore, equations (3.8)
and (3.9) in the simple one-part FRM will be extended here to:
E(yi|Xi, Zi) = G(Xiθ).F (Ziγ); (3.14)
E(yi|Xi, Zi) = e
Xiθ+γ
(1 + eXiθ)(1 + eZiγ)
. (3.15)
Similar to the discussion related to the tobit model above, marginal effects should
be obtained to assess the effect of a change in the explanatory variables on the
probability of owning risky assets and the amount of risky assets owned, which are
31Note that the explanatory variables in the first part Xi and second part Zi of the model are
not required to be the same.
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given by the equations (3.16) and (3.17), respectively.32
∂Pr(y∗i = 1|Xi)
∂Xij
= θi
eXiθ
(1 + eXiθ)2
; (3.16)
∂E(yi|Zi, yi ∈ (0, 1])
∂Zij
= γi
eZiγ
(1 + eZiγ)2
. (3.17)
Allowing separate treatment of participation decision (to hold or not to hold
risky assets) and allocation decision (how much to hold in risky assets) is informa-
tive for policy maker. The use of the two-part FRM allows authorities and financial
institutions to target specific variables if their aim is to promote culture of partici-
pation in the stock market. However, if the concern is enhancing the level of holding
of risky assets, then authorities and financial institutions can focus on the variables
that have an impact on the level of allocation decision.
3.5.3 Censored Quantile Regression (CQR)
This chapter expands the analysis of the risky asset holdings by implementing a
censored quantile regression (CQR), which allows an examination of the complete
distribution and handles censoring at zero without any strict assumptions, see Powell
(1986) and Chernozhukov, Ferna´ndez-Val, and Kowalski (2015).
In general, quantile regression has the advantage that it accounts for the full
characterization of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. Estima-
tors which are based on the mean conditional distribution of the dependent variable
provide only a partial view of the relationship between a set of regressors and the
outcome variable. However, it is interesting and informative to identify how vari-
ables’ effects on risky asset ownership vary over the distribution, which is provided by
quantile regression. Moreover, estimators of the conditional mean are very sensitive
to values in the tail of the distribution. Whereas, conditional quantile estimators
32Full formulations of the one-part FRM and two-part FRM can be found in J. Ramalho and
Silva (2009).
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are more robust to extreme values, which is important given the distribution of
household risky asset holdings, see Figure 3.2. Hence, quantile regression is able to
consider the potential impacts of covariates on the shape of the distribution rather
than assuming that covariates will only shift the scale of the conditional distribution,
Brown and Taylor (2008).
Turning to the efficiency of the CQR estimator, the CQR will produce consistent
estimates in the presence of hetroscedastic errors as it is not based on the assumption
of constant variance. Moreover, the CQR estimator is independent of the distribu-
tion of the error terms hence it is efficient when the error terms are not normally
distributed. The formulation of the general QR as introduced by Powell (1986) is
written as:
Qθ(Yi|Xi) = β′θX i, (3.18)
where Qθ(Yi|X i) denotes the θ conditional quantile of Yi. The QR estimator of βθ
is found by solving the following minimisation problem:
min
βθ
1
N
{ ∑
Yi≥β′θXi
θ|Yi − β′θX i +
∑
Yi<β
′
θXi
(1− θ)|Yi − β′θX i}
}
. (3.19)
Equation 3.19 shows that the QR estimator is an extension of the Least Absolute
Deviation (LAD) estimation method as the problem is reduced to minimizing the
sum of the absolute deviations of the error terms when θ = 0.5. Equation 3.18 and
Equation 3.19 can be extended to account for censoring at zero of the dependent
variable and written as:
Qθ(Yi|Xi) = max
{
0, Qθ(β
′
θX i + εθi|Xi)
}
= max
{
0,β
′
θX i
}
. (3.20)
The CQR estimator of βθ is found by solving the following minimisation problem:
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min
βθ
1
N
N∑
i=1
[{θ − I(Yi < max{0,β′θX i})}(Yi −max{0,β
′
θX i})], (3.21)
where I is an indicator function equal to unity when the expression holds and
zero otherwise. Equation 3.21 is estimated in STATA using the CIQV routine,
see Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, Han, and Kowalski (2016).
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Baseline specifications
This section outlines the main results found for the baseline specifications. The
baseline specifications only include factors that are commonly identified in the lit-
erature as determinants of risky asset holdings. One of the contributions of this
chapter is the use of the KHPS data which has not been used before in the analysis
of Japanese household financial portfolios. Therefore, before analysing the results
of wave 10 (2013), it is important that the data panel structure is exploited and
the results are compared to existing literature. This is to make sure that the data
is of a high quality and that the results of the new variables explored in wave 10
(2013) found in this chapter are reliable and not driven by data issues. To do so,
the panel structure of the data, from 2004 to 2015, is exploited using the random
effects tobit model. The results of the random effects tobit model are compared to
the findings of other papers on Japan and other countries. Therefore, the aim of
this section is twofold: first, to compare the results found in the baseline model to
those found in Japan and in other countries. This will help in identifying the causes
of the differential in the risky asset holdings between Japan and other countries.
Secondly, this section will compare the results of the four alternative econometric
methodologies adopted in this chapter, the tobit model, the one-part and two-part
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FRM and the CQR.
The results of the random effects tobit model are reported in Table 3.8 which
includes only the baseline specification variables. The first two columns report
the standard panel and cross-sectional tobit regressions results and the last three
columns report the one-part and two-part FRM results.
The results of the tobit panel regression in the first column show that most
of the variables have the expected sign. Wealth, equivalised income and being a
home owner all have a positive impact on the proportion of risky asset holdings.
Households in major cities hold higher proportions of risky assets than those living in
rural areas. Similarly, education is found to have a positive impact on the proportion
of risky asset holdings. However, the coefficients of age, employment status and
health status are at odds with the findings of the U.S. and Europe for both the
panel and the cross sectional analysis. The explanation of this will be discussed
in the analysis of wave 10 (2013) regressions below. The results of the tobit panel
regression are generally in line with existing literature. This suggest that the data
is of a good quality and the subsequent analyses of wave 10 (2013) for the baseline
specification and the key explanatory variables are reliable and can be regarded as
a reflection of household’s behaviour.
The rest of this section will discuss the results of wave 10 (2013) regressions
reported in the last four columns of Table 3.8 and the marginal effects reported
in Table 3.9. The results in Table 3.9 can be seen to be broadly consistent in
terms of sign and statistical significance across the first three models, tobit, one-
part FRM and the binary part of the two-part FRM. However, there are significant
differences in terms of the magnitude of the marginal effects across these three
models. Moreover, an important observation from Table 3.9 relates to the results
of the fractional part of the two-part FRM in column four, which displays the
marginal effects of the coefficients conditional on holding of risky assets. The analysis
shows that, when examining risky asset holdings conditional on participation, the
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coefficients differ not only in terms of magnitude but also in terms of sign and the
level of significance. This highlights the importance of separating modelling of the
decision to hold risky assets and the level of holding.
Considering the results of the four models in Table 3.9 in more detail, richer
households, both in terms of equivalised income and in terms of their net wealth,
have a higher proportion of risky assets as the tobit model and the one-part FRM
model suggest. The marginal effect of the natural logarithm of equivalised income
in the tobit model is 5 times higher than that in the one-part FRM and it is four
times higher for the natural logarithm of net wealth. Specifically, a 1% increase
in equivalised income corresponds to a 12.7% increase in risky asset holdings for
the tobit model, and 2.3% in the one-part FRM, ceteris paribus. Similarly, a 1%
increase in net wealth will increase the proportion of risky assets by 1.9% in the
tobit and 0.5% in the one-part FRM. On the other hand, the two-part FRM model
yields results which suggest that separating the analysis of the decision to hold
and the decision about the level of holding will dramatically change the results.
Both equivalised income and net wealth are positively associated with a higher
probability of holding of risky assets, which is in accordance with predictions of the
finance theory. However, the results from the fractional continuous part show that
net wealth is negativity associated with the level of risky assets held. The coefficient
of equivalised income is also negative but statistically insignificant.
The effects of the age categories on risky asset holdings are in-line with the
findings of studies on Japanese households but contradict the findings of the U.S.
and European studies.33 In general, risky asset holdings have been documented
to have a humped shaped pattern with age, reaching a peak at middle age before
declining, see Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) for the U.S. and Guiso, Haliassos, and
Jappelli (2002) for Europe. The results of the tobit and the one-part FRM models
in Table 3.9 show that the older the household head, the higher are his/her holdings
33Age-bracket dummies are included to allow for possible non-linearity in the effect of age on
the proportion of risky assets.
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of risky assets. The marginal effects of all age categories is negative and it is stronger
for the young categories (20-30 and 30-40) compared to the omitted category (70+
years old). This suggest that younger people do not take greater investment risks
as theory predicts, but the findings are consistent with the argument that financial
knowledge and experience increase with age, see Bertaut (1998). The finding that
older people reduce risky asset holdings in countries other than Japan is expected
as older people tend to reduce their risk exposure as a response to the prospect
of retirement and the dependence on other sources of income. In Japan, however,
the story is different as argued by Iwaisako et al. (2016) and Iwaisako (2009). The
unique housing market can provide a possible explanation to this relation as high
land prices in Japan and the higher average down payments compared to the U.S.,
force Japanese households to postpone their risky investments until a later stage of
life.
Comparing the results of the modelling approaches show that, similar to the
wealth and income variables, the tobit model seems to overestimate the impact of
the coefficients. The two-part FRM shows that the probability of participating in
the stock market increases with age, however, the impact of age on the proportion
of risky asset holdings is statistically insignificant, although the sign is in-line with
the findings of the other models. Therefore, in contrast to the tobit and one-part
models, the two-part model shows that age is only important for the participation
decision and it is an insignificant determinant of the proportion of risky assets held
by Japanese households.
Table 3.9 confirms the positive relationship between education and risky asset
holdings. According to the tobit and one-part FRM models, education attainment
is positively associated with the proportion of wealth invested in risky assets, this
result is also found in many other studies (see, for example, Christiansen et al.,
2007; Iwaisako et al., 2016; Cardak & Wilkins, 2009). For example, the tobit model
shows that, compared to junior high school education, having a college degree is
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associated with a 21.5% higher proportion of risky assets, ceteris paribus. However,
the level of education only influences the decision to participate in the stock market,
not the proportion of risky assets held as the two-part FRM shows in Table 3.9,
column 4. The positive relationship between education and risky asset holdings is
expected given the fact that investors need the time and the ability to understand
the risk-return trade-off and to understand sophisticated financial products.
As mentioned before, Japanese households face costs associated with healthcare
despite the fact that Japan provides access to public health care. The results of the
self-reported subjective health variable are at odds with the findings of other studies,
such as Guiso et al. (1996) and Fratantoni (1998). Table 3.8 shows that household
heads who reported normal health status will hold less risky assets compared to
those who reported poor health status. In terms of the marginal effects reported
in Table 3.9, those in normal health hold 6.5% less risky assets compared to those
who are in poor health. Comparing the results across the three models, the tobit
model and the one-part FRM model show the same impact, in terms of sign and
significance, but only for those who reported normal health. The results of these
two models for the other two categories are not the same. Moreover, in the two-
part FRM, normal health status is only statistically significant for the proportion of
risky assets held but not for the decision to participate in the stock market. These
puzzling results found for the health status variable across the three models are
difficult to justify. Cardak and Wilkins (2009) found insignificant coefficients for
health status and argued that, in their setting, health risk is captured by the risk
attitude and time preferences variables. In our baseline model, the risk preference
variable is not included but a possible explanation of these puzzling results is that
normal and poor health status are reported mainly by older people and in Japan,
older people hold the highest share of risky assets, see Table 3.3.
Similar to the health and age, the results concerning employment status using the
Japanese data also contradict the findings of studies for other countries. Table 3.8
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shows that, in the tobit model, those who are in the category of “other work”
(student, housewife or retired) hold more risky assets than those who are employed
(the omitted category). Moreover, the one-part FRM model also shows that those
who are in part-time employment also hold more risky assets than those in full
employment. In both of these models, being unemployed has the expected negative
sign but is statistically insignificant. The two-part FRM shows that unemployment
has the expected negative and statistically significant effect on the probability of
participating in the stock market. The other two categories, part-time work and
other work, have the same effect as found in the tobit and one-part models but only
on the proportion of risky assets held by the household and not on the decision to
participate.
The marginal effects of the employment status categories reported in Table 3.9
are of considerable magnitude. For example, the two-part FRM model shows that,
compared to being in full time employment, being in part-time or the “other work”
category increases the proportion of risky assets held by 7.5% and 5.7% respectively,
ceteris paribus. Iwaisako et al. (2004) also found the same puzzling result that if
the household’s head is not working, equity holdings will be higher. Iwaisako et al.
(2004) argue that the employment status variable might be reflecting that the head
of the household is retired rather than not working. In contrast, in this chapter,
household heads who are students, a housewife or retired are grouped under the
other category. Therefore, the positive and statistically significant effect of the
“other” category compared to the “working” category arguably reflects the fact that
the households who are working are saving up to buy a house and given the high
price of houses in Japan this might only be achieved at the retirement age. Hence
individuals will consider investing in risky assets only when they reach retirement.
Moreover, retirement income received by retired households is certain and stable
making them less risk averse than those who are in full-time employment.
Considering the effect of the other demographic factors, Table 3.8 shows that
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being male has a positive and statistically significant effect on the proportion of
risky assets held as the tobit and the one-part FRM models suggest. However,
gender only influences the decision to participate in the stock market but not the
level of risky asset holdings as the two-part FRM model shows. This finding in
consistent with most of the studies in this field, and the explanation of this finding
is related to the argument that there are differences in risk preferences across genders
(Guiso & Sodini, 2013). Indeed, Croson and Gneezy (2009) found that women are
more risk averse than men in their review of the literature on gender differences in
risk preferences in a number of different domains. Table 3.8 also shows that being
married has a negative and statistically significant effect on the proportion of risky
asset holdings across the three models. Findings from other studies on the effect of
marital status on risky asset holdings show conflicting results. Some studies found,
similar to our result, a negative effect of being married on the proportion of risky
asset holdings and argue that married households are more conservative by nature,
see for example Fratantoni (1998) who used the U.S. 1989 Survey of Consumer
Finance. Whereas, other studies found that married or cohabiting households hold a
higher level of risky assets compared to single people and argue that these households
will potentially have more resources than single people, see for example Haliassos
and Bertaut (1995) who also used the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finance but for
1983. The two-part FRM shows that marital status has the same effect, negative
and statistically significant, for both the decision to hold and the level of of risky
assets held. This result is similar to Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002), who found
that being married increases the probability of holding risky assets but decreases
the level of risky asset holdings. The number of children and the number of adults
control for family composition and both of these variables have no effect on risky
asset holdings.
Unlike the findings of other studies, variables related to housing such as home
ownership, mortgage payments and rent expenses, have shown very little importance
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in the portfolio allocation of Japanese households.34 Iwaisako (2009) emphasises the
importance of including real estate holdings in the analysis of Japanese financial
portfolios due to the unique structure of the housing market in Japan. However,
Table 3.8 shows that only the tobit model indicates that households who own a
house hold a higher proportion of risky assets, and Table 3.9 shows that owning a
house increases the proportion of risky assets held by 6.2%, ceteris paribus. The
one-part and two-part FRM models show that home ownership is not an important
determinant of risky asset holdings. This finding is in line with Kinari (2007) who
also found an insignificant effect of housing on the demand for risky assets in Japan.
However, the results are at odds with the findings of Cardak and Wilkins (2009) that
home ownership in Australia is associated with greater risky asset holdings and the
findings of Fratantoni (1998) that home ownership in the U.S. is negatively related
to risky asset demand.35
The other housing related variables are the mortgage ratio and the rent ratio that
measure committed expenditure risks. Similar to the home ownership variable, the
effect of the mortgage ratio is positive and significant but only in the one-part FRM
model, whereas the rent ratio is statistically insignificant across the three modelling
approaches. The mortgage ratio is expected to correlate negatively with the propor-
tion of risky assets held by households as it is a source of background risk given that
the household is committing to mortgage payments out of an uncertain stream of
labour income. These counter-intuitive findings for home ownership and mortgage
variables have also been documented in Cardak and Wilkins (2009). Cardak and
Wilkins (2009) argue that these positive correlation might reflect greater access to
cheap credit to finance investments in risky assets. The insignificant coefficient of
the rent ratio is not surprising given the fact that rental agreements are short-term
34In unreported results, the same regression specification has been repeated by including each
of these three variables separately and the results do not change.
35The literature suggests that home ownership can be considered as an investment substitute
or a source of background risk as a result of house price volatility, Cardak and Wilkins (2009).
However, other studies argue that home ownership can be used as collateral to facilitate borrowing
and generate liquidity which is important in household financial decisions, Mariotti et al. (2015).
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and they do not expose renters to huge costs in the case of defaulting as compared
to mortgage agreements. Labour income risk is also found to have an insignificant
effect on the proportion of risky assets held by Japanese households, which is at odds
with the findings of other studies such as Guiso et al. (1996), Cardak and Wilkins
(2009) and Heaton and Lucas (2000).36
In terms of geographic location, the results show that households who live in the
regions listed in Table 3.8 hold less risky assets compared to the region of Kanto,
the omitted region. However, only two regions are statistically significant across the
tobit model and one-part FRM model, whereas the fractional part of the two-part
model shows that five out of the seven regions are statistically significant. This is
expected as Kanto is the largest region among the main eight regions in Japan and,
with Tokyo located in it, the Kanto region is considered to be the main engine of
Japan’s economy. As for the other geographic variables, the size of the city where
the household lives is statistically insignificant.
In summary, the results of the baseline specification are in line with a small
number of studies that used Japanese data. However, the results can be seen to
be only partially consistent with studies that use U.S. and European data. The
tobit, one-part FRM and binary part of the FRM models show that income, gender,
marital status, education, employment status, age and health status have an impact
on the decision to hold risky assets. Whereas, in the continuous part of the FRM
model only marital status, employment status, health status and wealth significantly
influence the proportion of risky asset holdings. Variables related to housing have
shown mixed results across the three modelling approaches.
36To the best of my knowledge, the effect of labour income uncertainty on portfolio allocation
has not been analysed using Japanese data.
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3.6.2 Key explanatory variables
Household participation in stock markets might be affected by individual char-
acteristics other than those considered by the baseline model. As discussed earlier,
traditional classical finance theory is unable to fully explain the low stock market
participation rate of households. Therefore, this chapter contributes to the existing
literature by analysing other factors which might influence households’ financial de-
cisions. These factors are grouped under three separate sets of variables which are:
general attitudinal variables; impression about stock markets; and risk ranking of
selected assets. The variables in each set have not been explored in the literature
before. Therefore, each variable is modelled separately along with the baseline vari-
ables before including all of the variables in each set jointly. This is to make sure
that each variable is capturing a unique characteristic of the respondent’s behaviour
and to examine the sensitivity of the findings of this chapter. If the sign, magnitude
and the level of statistical significance of the coefficients do not change when all the
variables are jointly estimated, then these variables are not correlated and each one
captures a unique characteristic of the respondent’s behaviour.
Table 3.10, Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 each has three panels showing the results
of the key explanatory variables using the three modelling approaches. Specifically,
Table 3.10 shows the results of the tobit model. In this table, each panel has
a number of the models (models 1 to 7). Each model includes all of the baseline
variables and one variable from each set before jointly include them in the regression
which is reported in model (A). The last column of Table 3.10 shows the results
related to model (B), which includes the baseline variables and all variables in all
sets jointly. Comparing model A and model B with each individual model show that
the sign and the level of statistical significance of the coefficients do not change,
the magnitudes show very mild changes which is expected and can be ignored.37
37There are no significant changes to the results related to the baseline variables when the three
sets are included.
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Table 3.11 shows the results related to the one-part FRM regression and Table 3.12
shows the results related to the two-part FRM regression. Both of these tables show
the same pattern found in Table 3.10 in terms of consistency of the results across
the three sets and hence the same conclusion can be drawn.
Given the consistency of the results across the three sets in Table 3.10, Ta-
ble 3.11 and Table 3.12, the discussion in the following sections will be based on the
marginal effects of the variables in the three sets which are presented in Table 3.13.
Specifically, Table 3.13 has two sections. Section A shows the marginal effects of
the variables when each set is modelled separately using the three modelling ap-
proaches. Whereas section (B) shows the marginal effects when all the variables in
all the three sets are jointly estimated using the three modelling approaches.
General attitudinal variables
The first variable in this set captures risk taking preferences. This chapter proxies
an individual’s financial risk aversion by a general measure of risk preferences. This
measure is captured by the reported chance of rain that makes an individual carry
an umbrella (probability of precipitation). Table 3.13 shows that there is a negative
relationship between the level of risk aversion and the proportion of risky asset
holdings, but only in the tobit model and at the 10% level of significance. The
relationship between the risk aversion variable (higher probability of precipitation
indicates lower risk aversion level) and risky asset holdings is expected to be positive
as found in other studies (see, for example, Guiso et al., 1996; Cardak & Wilkins,
2009; Heaton & Lucas, 2000). On the other hand, the one-part FRM model does
show that this relationship is indeed positive and significant at the 10% level of
significance. However, the marginal effects on the risk attitude variable in both
models are economically insignificant despite being statistically significant.
The second variable in this set is the savings behaviour of the household head,
which is a binary variable taking the value of one if the household has a savings goal
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and zero otherwise. As discussed in the data section, the relationship between this
variable and the proportion of risky asset holdings can be positive or negative. The
tobit model in Table 3.13 shows that households with a savings goal hold on average
a 4.4% higher proportion of risky assets than those which do not have a saving goal,
ceteris paribus. Therefore, the result reflects the possibility that households with
a saving goal are more financially organised and hence are more likely to engage
in other financial products.38 However, the results are not consistent across the
modelling approaches. The one-part FRM shows that having a saving goal is not
significant in the risky asset holdings equation, whereas the two-part model shows
that having a saving goal is significant at the 1% level but only for the decision to
hold stock but not the level of holdings.
Precautionary saving theory predicts that households will reduce their holdings
of risky investments in response to a greater exposure to an unavoidable risk. A
household’s satisfaction with retirement income reflects how comfortable this indi-
vidual is with income in later life. Therefore, this variable is expected to correlate
negatively with the proportion of risky assets held by Japanese households. Indeed,
the variable exerts a significant negative effect in all three models estimated at the
1% and 5% levels of significance. In particular, the proportion of risky asset hold-
ings for those who think that their retirement income is not enough is 15.5% lower
than those who think that their retirement income is enough at the 1% level of
significance, ceteris paribus. The two-part FRM model shows that this variable is
significant for the decision to hold risky assets but not for the level of holdings. This
result has also been documented in Ito et al. (2017) who found that such concerns
about income in later life have a substantial power in explaining the difference in
the probability of holding risky assets between Japan and the U.S.. These findings
might reflect households’ concerns about the ageing population issue in Japan and
its consequences of who is going to fund future retirement income. These concerns
38The precautionary motive of savings, which reflects greater risk exposure, is actually reflected
in the household’s satisfaction with retirement income variable.
140
Section 3.6 Chapter 3
may be reflected in an individual’s risk preferences as these preferences are also
based on exposure to risky environments in the future, not only the riskiness of the
environment in which a decision is currently being made.
The last variable in this set captures an individual’s trust in the current gov-
ernment’s policies. Table 3.13 shows that those who cannot decide on whether to
support the current government yet (grouped under the other category) hold, on
average, a 8.2% lower proportion of risky assets than those who do support the
government, using the tobit model. Comparing those who do not support the gov-
ernment with the omitted category, the tobit model also reveals that their proportion
of risky assets is 3.5% lower at the 10% level of significance, ceteris paribus. However,
when looking at the FRM models, only the binary part of the two-part FRM model
shows that those who cannot decide differ significantly from the omitted category,
suggesting that this variable is only important for the decision to hold stock but not
the level of holdings.
Impression about stock markets
As mentioned in Section 3.4.2, this set is of variables argued to capture the
household’s impression of the overall reliability of the stock market. Recent liter-
ature highlights the influence of trust on the financial decisions of households and
points out that less trusting households are less likely to participate in the stock
market (see, for example, Guiso et al., 2008; Delis & Mylonidis, 2015; Georgarakos
& Pasini, 2011; Balloch et al., 2015; Bucciol et al., 2016). Therefore, this chapter
incorporates the effects of individuals’ opinions of stock market performance and dif-
ferent dimensions of individual trust into the modelling approaches along with the
baseline specifications, building a more realistic framework. This section will discuss
the effect of individuals’ opinions of the stock market performance first, captured by
the profitability and riskiness variables, and will then discuss the trust dimension of
this set, captured by fairness, efficiency and prudential supervision.
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If stock returns are uncertain and an individual is averse to risk, it will be
optimal for those individuals not to participate in the stock market. Table 3.10 shows
that individuals who agree that in the stock market “profit cannot be made with
certainty” hold a lower proportion of risky assets and the coefficient is statistically
significant at the 1% level. Similarly, those who believe that significant losses are
possible also hold a lower proportion of their wealth in risky assets but the coefficient
is not statistically different from zero.
The expected effects of the profitability and riskiness variables cannot be ex-
plicitly discerned from the wording of each statement. The “profit cannot be made
with certainty” statement could reflect the financial risk aversion of the individual,
since the focus of this statement is on uncertainty. Therefore, those who agree with
this statement are relatively risk averse individuals as they believe that the stock
market will not provide compensation for risk via a risk premium. The “significant
losses are possible” statement could be interpreted as an indicator of loss-aversion
since the focus of this statement is on significant losses. However, interesting results
emerge from Table 3.10 when looking at model A and model B, as the the effect of
the statement of “significant losses are possible” becomes positive and significant at
the 5% for model A and 1% for model B, which is at odds with the expected effect
of the loss-aversion indicator. In particular, the results in Table 3.10, Table 3.11
and Table 3.12 show that those who agree that losses are possible hold a higher
proportion of their wealth in risky assets, once all variables in this set are accounted
for.
Another possible explanation for the positive impact of the riskiness variable is
that this statement might reflect the household’s experience in the stock market.
Hence, households disagree with the statement that “losses are possible” if they
have limited experience in the stock market, since recent events clearly support
the statement, especially in the context of the 2008 financial crisis. Therefore, the
positive effect of the riskiness variable can be justified given the historic performance
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of the Japanese stock market, hence those who agree with the statement are likely
to be those who actually hold or have held stocks. This argument is supported by
the results of the two-part FRM model as it shows that the riskiness statement is
only important for the decision to participate but not the level of participation in
the stock market.
The results of Table 3.13, which show the marginal effects when all variables
are included, indicate that these two variables are also economically significant,
compared to some of the key variables reported in Table 3.9. For example, the
binary part of the two-part model shows that a one unit increase in the profitability
variable decreases the probability of participating in the stock market by 2.7%,
ceteris paribus.
Turning to the trust variables; fairness, efficiency and prudential supervision, Ta-
ble 3.10 and Table 3.12 both show that these variables have significant and negative
impacts on the financial decisions of Japanese households, when they are included
separately. The two-part FRM model shows that these variables are only important
for the probability of participation in the stock market. The one-part FRM model,
see Table 3.11, shows that only the “high illegal activities” statement (fairness) has
a strong, significant and negative impact on households’ holdings of risky assets.
Examining the results in Table 3.10 and Table 3.12 in more detail show that
before including all the variables in set two collectively, we obtain a significant and
negative relationship for the “efficiency” and the “prudential supervision” variables
as expected. However, once all variables in this set are included, these two variables
no longer explain stock market participation. Hence in the tobit and two-part FRM
models, it seems that the “high illegal activities” statement captures the association
between these two variables and stock market participation. However, this variation
in the results is not observed in the one-part FRM model, which shows that the
signs and the statistical significance of these variables are consistent when included
separately and jointly, see Table 3.11. The observed result of the high illegal ac-
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tivities variable across the three models reinforces the fact that this variable might
be capturing the association between the “efficiency” and the “prudential supervi-
sion” variables and stock market participation. As mentioned before, these variables
are expected to be correlated and hence in each of the modelling approaches each
variable is included separately first, before jointly including them, to examine the
robustness of the results.39
In general, these results are in line with the findings of Guiso et al. (2008), Delis
and Mylonidis (2015), Georgarakos and Pasini (2011), Balloch et al. (2015) and
Bucciol et al. (2016). However, most of these studies use a generalised measure of
trust with the exception of Balloch et al. (2015) who used a measure of trust which
is specific to household trust in the stock market and Guiso et al. (2008) who proxy
trust in the stock market with individuals’ trust in bank officials and advisers. This
chapter uses trust measures which are similar to Balloch et al. (2015) as they reflect
individuals’ perceived trustworthiness of the stock market.40
Guiso et al. (2008) argue that the trust measure they have used is not a proxy of
other indicators, such as optimism or expectations about stock market performance,
as they control for these characteristics in their model specifications. Balloch et al.
(2015) also argue that a measure of individual trust in the stock market might be
a proxy of an individual’s knowledge of stock market functions. In this chapter
households’ expectations are captured in some of the variables in set one, whereas
set three (discussed next) can be argued to be a proxy of households’ financial
knowledge. The trust variables used in this chapter are a direct measure of trust
in different dimensions of stock market operations and they reflect household con-
fidence in the stock market’s characteristics. In particular, the “illegal activities”
39In unreported results, factor analysis has been used to construct a factor that combines
the profitability and riskiness variables and another factor that combines the effect of the trust
variables. The results of these two factors when included in three modelling approaches are negative
and significant as expected.
40Measures of the trust in the institutions that facilitate holdings of risky assets is arguably far
more important than relying on a generalized measure of trust for this area of analysis.
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statement captures the fairness and the quality of investor protection whereas the
information disclosure one captures stock market efficiency. Market interventions by
the central bank and the government statements capture stock market prudential
supervision. Furthermore, the empirical results reported in model A and model B
across Table 3.10, Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 show that the trust variables remain
key determinants of stock market participation, even after the inclusion of the other
two sets of variables along with the baseline specifications. Therefore, the results
reported in this chapter confirm that trust is a significant determinant of house-
holds’ holdings of risky assets, and the effect of trust does not diminish across the
modelling approaches even after the inclusion of the other sets of variables.
Risk ranking of selected assets
As discussed in the data section, these variables are expected to reflect an in-
dividual’s perception of risk associated with selected assets given the current state
of the economy. The results in Table 3.10, Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 show that
households invest in a manner which is consistent with their risk perceptions. In
particular, Table 3.10 shows that, when each variable is included separately, only
those who perceive that savings and postal savings accounts as possessing high risk
will hold a lower proportion of their wealth in risky assets, the other four variables
are statistically not different from zero. However, when including both the riskiness
of saving accounts and riskiness of stocks together in the regression, both show a
negative and significant correlation with risky asset holdings, see model 7 in Ta-
ble 3.10. Whereas, when considering all the variables in set three together, only the
riskiness of bank saving accounts and investment in stocks variables are significant.
This result might be due to the fact that saving accounts and investing in stocks
are the most common financial vehicles among households in this set.
The results in Table 3.11 are similar to those found using the tobit model. How-
ever, the ranking of stock investment risk perceived by households appears to be
negative and significant when included alone (model 4) and when included with
145
Section 3.6 Chapter 3
the full specification (model B). The effects of saving accounts and postal saving
accounts are both negative and significant when considered alone but only the sig-
nificance of the saving account variable holds for models A and B. The results in
Table 3.12 are in line with the results of the tobit model regarding saving and postal
saving accounts. The fractional part of the two-part model shows that households
who perceive higher risk from investing in stocks hold a lower proportion of their
wealth in risky assets, which is consistent with the risk perception theoretical ex-
pectation. Whereas the binary part shows that only the risk of saving accounts
matters for the decision to participate in the stock market. In terms of magnitude,
Table 3.13 shows that, for the tobit model, a one unit increase in the risk ranking of
savings corresponds to 3.1% decrease in the proportion of risky assets held, ceteris
paribus. The fractional part of the two-part FRM shows that a one unit increase in
the ranking of investing in stocks will result in a 1.3% decrease in the proportion
held of risky assets.
Variables related to saving vehicles could reflect a households’ basic financial
knowledge. Keeping money in saving accounts is considered to be a safe option in
comparison to, for example, buying a lottery ticket and is not expected to be ranked
as a high risk asset. For example, those who ranked saving accounts as a high risk
asset did so as they might not fully understand concepts related to basic banking
activities, such as deposit insurance and investor protection law.41 Therefore, those
individuals are not expected to participate in the stock market where it is impor-
tant to understand complex products, concepts and conditions. This might explain
the negative association between the perceived riskiness of savings and risky asset
holdings found across the three modelling approaches.
Similar to the variables in set two, these variables are also expected to be corre-
lated. The first three variables in this set focus on different savings vehicles. The
other three variables are all related to investments, two variables are concerned with
41High level of inflation might make savings accounts a risky investment. However, for the
period analysed in this chapter inflation rate in Japan was persistently at low levels.
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investments in stocks and the other variable is related to investment in property. The
results of the three modelling approaches show that the effects of saving and postal
savings are significant and negative, but only when included separately. Similarly,
the one-part FRM shows that the riskiness of stocks is also only significant when it
is included separately. However, when all of the variables are jointly included only
the riskiness of savings stays significant and negative. The effect of the riskiness
of investing in stocks is not consistent as it is only significant for model B in the
one-part FRM and the fractional part of the two-part FRM. These results show the
importance of including some variables separately as some of them have not been
examined before in the literature, hence there is no prior expectations about their
power.42
These results, in general, support the findings of previous papers, such as, M. We-
ber et al. (2012) and Hoffmann et al. (2013). In particular, the results show that
the individual’s risk perception is an important predictor of their financial decisions
in Japan. The effect of the risk perception of some assets does not diminish across
the three modelling approaches even after the inclusion of risk preference measures.
Therefore, distinguishing between the effect of risk preferences and risk perception
is important to fully capture the underlying processes which form an individual’s
optimal portfolio.
3.6.3 Models’ performance
The discussion in the previous section shows that the modelling approaches used
in this chapter have significant differences in terms of the magnitude of the marginal
effects. Therefore, it is important to discuss the performance of these models con-
ceptually and formally support this discussing using rigorous statistical tests.
Panel A in Table 3.17 displays the Akaike (1998) Akaike information criterion
42In unreported results, factor analysis has been used to construct a factor that combines the
first three and the last three variables in this set. The results of these two factors when included
in the modelling approaches are negative and significant as expected.
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(AIC) and Schwarz et al. (1978) Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for the tobit,
one-part and two-part models. These statistics measure the goodness of fit of the
models and the lowest value indicates the preferred model. Panel A in Table 3.17
suggests that the one-part FRM model captures the characteristics of the data better
than the standard tobit model and the binary part of the two-part FRM model. This
conclusion holds when the three additional sets of explanatory variables are included
with the baseline specification, see Panel D in Table 3.17. Unfortunately, the AIC
and BIC values of the two-part FRM model are reported for the binary part and
fractional part separately. This is because these values cannot be calculated for the
functional form assumed for the two-part model given in Equation 3.15. Hence, only
the values of the binary part can be compared with the tobit or the one-part model.
The fractional part of the two-part FRM model is based on a different number of
observation as it shows the effects of the coefficients conditional on participating in
the stock market.
However, Panel C in Table 3.17 reports the P test, which compares the perfor-
mance of the two-part FRM model (binary and fractional parts jointly) with the
one-part FRM model. The P test is proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981)
and it has been used by E. Ramalho, Ramalho, and Murteira (2011) for discriminat-
ing between alternative one-part and two-part FRMs (see E. Ramalho, Ramalho,
and Henriques (2010) for full formulation). Specifically, the P test checks if the
one-part FRM (two-part model) has the appropriate specifications to estimate the
dependent variable given the information provided by the two-part model (one-part
FRM). The first line of panel C in Table 3.17 shows that the null hypotheses (the
two-part model) is rejected at the 5% level of significance in favour of the alternative
(the one-part model), but only for the baseline specification. When the full specifi-
cation is considered, panel F in Table 3.17, the null hypotheses is not rejected and
the two-part model is the preferred model. This conclusion is also confirmed when
looking at the second line of panel C and panel F. In this line the null hypotheses is
the one-part model and it is clearly rejected at the 1% level of significance in favour
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of the alternative (the two-part model) for both the baseline specification and the
full specification.
Finally, panel B in Table 3.17 reports the result of a link test, proposed by
Pregibon (1980), for detecting general functional form misspecification. This test
is based on the idea that no additional independent variables should be significant
if a regression equation is properly specified. The link test adds the squared in-
dependent variable to the model and tests if it has any explanatory power. If the
model is correctly specified, adding the squared independent variable to the model
should not have any explanatory power. The coefficients of the predicted squared
independent variable for each model are reported in in Table 3.17 panel B for the
baseline specification and in panel E for full specification. It is apparent from the
table that the squared independent variable is only significant in the tobit model.
The statistics in Table 3.17 show that the one-part FRM model is superior to the
tobit model. On the other hand, Table 3.17 shows that the two-part FRM is superior
to the one-part FRM. The underlying functional form of the FRM model could
explain the superior performance of the FRM one-part and two-part. Specifically,
the FRM model are based on a non-linear function form which is preferred as the
dependent variable is proportional and implies a non-linear relationship with the
independent variables.
Table 3.18 shows an alternative way of evaluating the goodness of fit of the
modelling approaches used in this chapter. The table presents the predicted vs.
the actual mean of the dependent variable for the baseline specification and the full
specification. Table 3.18 reinforces the results found in Table 3.17 as the one-part
model provides the closest prediction to the actual mean for both the baseline and
full specification. Furthermore, the two-part model also provide a close prediction
to the mean of risky assets share conditional on holding risky assets.
In conclusion, the two-part FRM and the CQR are conceptually and statistically
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(for the two-part) the preferred modelling approaches for the analysis of risky asset
holdings.
3.6.4 Censored Quantile Regression (CQR) analysis
Censored Quantile Regression (CQR) analysis is employed in this section to
provide further perspective on the determinants of risky asset holdings in Japan.
CQR is an alternative estimator to the tobit model as it allows an examination of
the complete distribution of the dependent variable and handles censoring at zero
without the assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity that are necessary in
the tobit model. It is interesting and informative to identify which characteristics
influence risky asset holdings at different points of the conditional distribution, which
is provided by the censored quantile regression.
Table 3.14 shows the marginal effects of the baseline specification from the CQR,
in addition to the results of the tobit model discussed in Section 3.6.1 for means
of comparison. The table reveals different behaviour across the quantiles, as some
variables influence risky asset holdings differently for households with a low propor-
tion of risky assets than for those with a high proportion of risky assets.43 Broadly
speaking, Table 3.14 indicates smaller and insignificant effects of some variables in
the lower quantiles, while the effects are significantly larger as we move to higher
quantiles. For example, Table 3.14 shows that the impact of being male increases
significantly as we move to higher quantiles, with the effects at the bottom two
quantiles being statistically insignificant. Similar results are found for the effect of
being married, however, the impact is stronger at the top quantile than what is
indicated by the tobit model. Regarding the number of children and the number of
adults both of these variables have no effect on risky asset holdings, which is in line
with the tobit model.
The impact of education is asymmetric according to the quantile examined.
43Coefficients below the 60th quantile are statistically and economically insignificant
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Households with a head holding a high school or a college qualification hold a higher
proportion of risky assets than those with no qualification but only at the 75th and
85th quantiles and the effect is much smaller than that reported by the tobit model.
Whereas, at the top 95th quantile, only households with a head holding a university
degree significantly hold higher proportions of risky assets than those with no edu-
cation. This disparity was not revealed by the tobit model and is very informative
from a policy formation perspective. For example, these findings suggest that if
policy makers want to encourage individuals to invest a higher proportion of their
wealth in risky assets, then they might have to target those with low education
levels.
The results of the health status of the household head reported in Table 3.14
validate the explanation given to the puzzling results found in the tobit model and
the FRM model. The results of the previous models show that household heads
who reported normal or good health status will hold less risky assets compared to
those who reported poor health status. In Table 3.14 the effect of the self-reported
subjective health variable is only significant at the top 95th quantile and this effect
is stronger than the one found in the tobit model. Table 3.3 shows that holdings
of risky assets increase with age, those who are 70 years old or above hold 11.0%
of their wealth in risky assets, whereas those who are 20 to 30 years old only hold
2.0% of their wealth in risky assets. Therefore, those who belong to the top 95th
quantile will be mainly 70 or above years old and they will more likely report poor
health condition, hence this contradicting results of health status to other papers,
such as Guiso et al. (1996) and Fratantoni (1998).
The age effect reported in Table 3.14 has a significant differential impact ac-
cording to which quantile under investigation. For example, at the 65th quantile
only two age group categories display a significantly lower proportion of risky assets
than those who are over 70, the omitted category. Considering the results at all the
quantiles reveal interesting results. The 50 to 60 and the 60 to 70 year old groups
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are only significant at the 75th and 95th quantiles, whereas, the 20 to 30 years old
group is significant only at the 85th and 95th quantiles. Again, this disparity was
not revealed by the tobit model and is very informative from a policy formation
perspective.
The impacts of equivalised income and net wealth also show a smaller and in-
significant effects in the lower quantiles, while the effects are significantly larger as
we move to higher quantiles. The equivalised income variable shows a weaker impact
on risky asset holdings across the top four quantiles than as indicated by the tobit
model.
As the CQR allows the effects of the regressors to differ at different quantiles of
the conditional distribution of the dependent variable, some variables which were
insignificant in the tobit model, are now identified to have a significant effect on risky
asset holdings at certain parts of the distribution according to the CQR analysis.
For example, the mortgage ratio has a positive and significant effect on risky asset
holdings, but only for households who are at the top two quantiles of the proportion
of risky assets. In contrast, the tobit model indicates that the effect of the mortgage
ratio is insignificant. On the other hand, the effect of home ownership is positive
and significant in the tobit model, whereas it is not significant at any quantile in
the CQR analysis. The positive relationship between risky asset holdings and the
mortgage ratio at the top two quantiles is consistent with Cardak and Wilkins (2009)
and Heaton and Lucas (2000) but at odds with Fratantoni (1998), although these
studies do not use quantile regression. Theoretically, home ownership can be used
as collateral to facilitate borrowing and generate liquidity which is important in
household finance decisions. Heaton and Lucas (2000, p. 1176) argue that “a higher
mortgage leads to higher stock holdings, suggesting that some stocks are indirectly
financed via mortgage debt”. Similar to home ownership, having a household head
who is in part-time employment has a positive and significant effect for households
in the top proportion of risky assets quantile, i.e. Q=0.95, with no significant
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effect found in the tobit model. Households who are in the “other” category of
employment significantly hold higher proportions of risky assets than those who are
in employment at the top two quantiles, with the effect being stronger than that
found with the tobit model.
Table 3.15 reports the results of the CQR for the key explanatory variables anal-
ysed in this chapter. In particular, Table 3.15 has two sections. Section A shows
the marginal effects of the variables when each set is modelled alone using the mod-
elling approaches along the baseline variables in columns (2-7). Whereas section (B)
shows the marginal effects when all the variables in all the key explanatory variables
are jointly estimated using the different modelling approaches in columns (8-13).44
Generally, the effects of the key explanatory variables on risky asset holdings follow
the same pattern found in the baseline variables discussed in the previous section,
except the variables which capture household head’s impression about stock market.
In general, the general attitudinal variables show smaller and insignificant effects
of some variables in the lower quantiles, while these effects are significantly larger
as we move to higher quantiles. A notable exception is for having a saving goal
variable, which has a significant positive impact on the proportion of risky asset
holdings for the tobit model, but this impact is not observed in the CQR analysis.
The household’s satisfaction with retirement income, which reflects how comfortable
this individual is with income in later life, correlates negatively with the proportion
of risky assets held by Japanese households and the effect is insignificant only at
the 65th quantile. However, the effect is significantly larger as we move to higher
quantiles, with the effect being stronger than that found with the tobit model for
those who are not sure about their retirement income. The last variable in this
set, which captures an individual’s trust in the current government’s policies, has a
significant differential impact according to which quantile we are investigating. The
impact at the 85th quantile is similar to the one found in the tobit model but larger
44The results of the baseline variables are not reported in this table, but the coefficients are
consistent with what is reported in Table 3.14.
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in magnitude. However, only those who do not trust the government policy hold
lower proportion of risky assets that those who do trust the government policies.
The impacts at the top 95th quantile and the bottom 60th and 65th quantiles are
statistically insignificant.
The impression about stock markets variables behave in the opposite direction
to the pattern found in the baseline variables, that is, the impacts of these variables
are statistically significant mostly for lower quantiles. Specifically, Table 3.15 shows
that individuals who agree that in the stock market “profit cannot be made with
certainty” hold lower proportions of risky assets but only for individuals at the 60th
and 65th lower quantiles and the impact is smaller than that found with the tobit
model. On the other hand, those who believe that significant losses are possible hold
higher proportions of their wealth in risky assets but again the impact is significant
only for the 60th and 85th quantiles. An explanation to these results is given
in Section 3.6.2 as these two variables are expected to have a similar impact on
risky asset holdings. The other three variables in this set focus on stock market
fairness, efficiency and prudential supervision. Among these variables, only the
“high illegal activities” is significant at all quantiles except the top 95th quantile.
The CQR analysis show that the different dimensions of trust in the stock market
have a significant impact mainly on those who are at the lower quantiles. This is
an important and informative result that was not revealed by the tobit model. The
results suggest that enhancing households’ impressions of the overall reliability of
the stock market is crucial in order to increase stock markets participation in Japan.
The variables in set three rank riskiness of selected assets and focus on the
household’s personal interpretation of the riskiness of selected assets. These variables
reflect individual perception of risk given the current state of the economy. The
results of the three modelling approaches discussed in the previous sections show
that when all of the variables in this set are jointly included only the effect of
the riskiness of savings stays significant and negative. However, according to the
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CQR analysis three variables in this set are now identified to have a significant
effect on risky asset holdings at certain parts of the distribution, these variables
are insignificant in the tobit model. Specifically, the effect of the riskiness of postal
saving account, investing in stocks and putting money in investments trust are now
significant. However, according to section B of Table 3.15 postal saving impact
diminishes when all the variables are considered.
The results of the CQR analysis indicate that considering only the effects of the
regressors on the average holdings of risky asset mask considerable heterogeneity
in the effects of many variables. According to the CQR analysis, some variables
have smaller and insignificant effects in the lower quantiles, while the effects are
significantly larger as we move to higher quantiles, see for example household’s
satisfaction with retirement income, equivalised income and net wealth variables.
On the other hand, the CQR analysis show that some variables have a significant
differential impact according to which quantile we are investigating, such as age
effect, education and individual’s trust in the current government’s policies. The
two variables in set two that are related to profitability and riskiness of the stock
market influence risky asset holdings only for households with a low proportion of
risky assets. Finally and most importantly, the CQR analysis reveals that some
variables which were insignificant in the tobit model, are now identified to have a
significant effect on risky asset holdings at certain parts of the distribution. These
variables are: the mortgage ratio, part time employment and the riskiness of both
postal saving account and investing in stocks.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the determinants of risky asset holdings by Japanese
households using data from the KHPS. The contribution of this chapter to the exist-
ing literature was threefold. Firstly, this chapter is the first chapter to use the KHPS
dataset to analyse holdings of risky assets by Japanese households. Secondly, to the
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best of my knowledge the effects of household trust in the stock market and house-
hold perception of risk on risky asset holdings have not been explored for Japanese
households. Finally, the chapter used four alternative methodological approaches in
the analysis to explore the robustness of the findings. Two of these approaches, the
two-part FRM and CQR, have not been used before for Japan in this context.
The results of the baseline specification can be seen to be only partially consistent
with the literature, which is expected as most of the literature is mainly focused on
the U.S. and Europe. For example, compared to the findings for the U.S. and
Europe, the peak of the positive impact of age on risky asset holdings came at
a much later stage of life due to the structure of the housing market in Japan.
However, the results of income and other demographic variables were in line with
other studies. Variables related to housing have shown very little importance in
the portfolio allocation of Japanese households, unlike the findings of other studies
conducted in the U.S. and Europe.
The analysis of the additional key explanatory variables, which are an additional
contribution in this chapter, revealed interesting results. For example, the variable
related to household satisfaction with retirement income was found to have the most
important impact on risky asset holdings in term of marginal effect amongst all the
variables of the key explanatory variables. In line with expectations, the variables
related to individuals’ opinions of stock market performance were statistically and
economically significant. The results reported in this chapter confirmed that trust
in the legal aspects of the stock market is negatively correlated with households’
holdings of risky asset, and this negative effect exists across all of the modelling
approaches. The results of the variables related to individual’s perception of risk
associated with selected assets suggested that households invest in a manner which
is consistent with their risk perceptions of saving accounts and investments in stocks.
The empirical analysis revealed that the methodological approaches adopted in
this chapter can be seen to be broadly consistent in terms of sign and significance of
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the determinants of risky asset holdings across the first two models, the tobit and
one-part FRM. However, there were significant differences in terms of the magnitude
of the marginal effects among these models. These differences were apparent in the
findings of the fractional part of the two-part FRM model. The analysis showed that,
when examining risky asset holdings conditional on participation, the coefficients
differed not only in terms of magnitude but also in terms of sign and the level of
significance, advocating the separation of the analysis of the decision to hold risky
assets and of the level of holdings.
Interesting results revealed from the use of the CQR approach, which indicated
that considering only the effects of the regressors on the average holdings of risky
asset mask considerable heterogeneity in the effects of many variables. According to
the CQR analysis, some variables had smaller and insignificant effects in the lower
quantiles, while the effects were significantly larger as we move to higher quantiles,
see for example household’s satisfaction with retirement income, equivalised income
and net wealth variables. The CQR analysis also showed that some variables had a
significant differential impact according to the quantile under investigating, such as:
age, level of education and individual’s trust in the current government’s policies.
The variables that were related to profitability and riskiness of the stock market
influence risky asset holdings only for households with a low proportion of risky
assets. Finally and most importantly, the CQR analysis revealed that some variables
which were insignificant in the tobit model, are now identified to have a significant
effect on risky asset holdings at certain parts of the distribution. These variables
are: the mortgage ratio; part time employment; and the riskiness of both postal
saving account and investing in stocks.
Important policy conclusions about Japanese households’ financial decisions can
be drawn from the findings of this chapter. For example, the motivation for using
the two-part FRM was to understand which variables authorities and financial in-
stitutions need to target in order to promote a culture of participation in the stock
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market in Japan and which variables to target if the level of holdings was of concern.
This information cannot be deduced from the tobit and one-part FRM models as
in these models the differential impacts that the covariates have on the decision to
participate in stock market and the level of participation is not accounted for. How-
ever, these two models were crucial in order to compare the findings of this chapter
to the findings of other papers and to help identify the causes of the differentials in
the risky asset holdings between Japan and other countries.
A limitation of this chapter is that the impacts of the key explanatory variables
cannot be examined over time as only in wave 10 (2013) respondents were asked
detailed questions regarding their perceived risk of selected assets and their opin-
ions about the functioning of the stock market. However, examining the evolution
of an investors’ risk perceptions and risk preferences would shed light on the psy-
chological factors influencing a household’s financial portfolio decisions. Therefore,
an interesting area for further research is to assess how Japanese individuals change
their risk preferences and risk perceptions when financial or natural shocks occur.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: Selected indicators for the innovation-driven economies
Economy Perceived Perceived Fear of (TEA) Good career
opportunities capabilities failure rate choice
Japan 7.27 12.23 54.51 3.83 30.98
Italy 26.57 31.31 49.10 4.42 65.05
Germany 37.59 36.40 39.95 5.27 51.66
France 28.26 35.44 41.18 5.34 59.05
Belgium 35.93 30.40 49.35 5.40 52.41
Denmark 59.66 34.88 40.99 5.47 –
Spain 22.61 48.13 38.03 5.47 53.94
Finland 42.38 34.88 36.76 5.63 41.24
Norway 63.45 30.54 37.56 5.65 58.16
Slovenia 17.25 48.6 29.00 6.33 53.39
Ireland 33.36 47.24 39.33 6.53 49.39
Sweden 70.07 36.65 36.53 6.71 51.58
Switzerland 43.67 41.59 28.98 7.12 42.30
Luxembourg 42.54 37.56 42.01 7.14 40.66
Greece 19.91 45.54 61.58 7.85 58.42
Taiwan 33.47 29.00 37.39 8.49 75.22
Austria 44.4 48.67 34.92 8.71 –
Estonia 49.44 42.47 41.77 9.43 55.56
Netherlands 45.55 44.26 34.79 9.46 79.11
Portugal 22.87 46.59 38.38 9.97 62.23
Puerto Rico 25.08 48.84 24.01 10.04 18.51
United Kingdom 40.99 46.44 36.84 10.66 60.30
Slovakia 23.50 54.40 35.96 10.90 45.42
Singapore 16.71 21.35 39.40 10.96 51.73
Canada 55.52 48.98 36.52 13.04 57.25
Australia 45.72 46.80 39.21 13.14 53.35
United States 50.85 53.34 29.66 13.81 64.73
Trinidad and Tobago 58.62 75.23 16.79 14.62 79.47
Qatar 63.38 60.94 25.54 16.38 75.83
Average 38.85 42.02 37.79 8.54 55.07
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) Survey in 2014
Perceived opportunities: Percentage of 18-64 population who see good opportunities to start a firm in the area where
they live.
Perceived capabilities: Percentage of 18-64 population who believe they have the required skills and knowledge to start
a business.
Fear of failure rate: Percentage of 18-64 population perceiving good opportunities to start a business who indicate that
fear of failure would prevent them from setting up a business.
Total early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA): Percentage of 18-64 population who are either a nascent en-
trepreneur or owner-manager of a new business.
Entrepreneurship as a Good Career Choice: Percentage of 18-64 population who agree with the statement that in
their country, most people consider starting a business as a desirable career choice.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics and the distribution of main assets and debt classes
Asset class Mean Std.Dev 10% 25% Median 75% 90% % of zero
Safe assets 842.56 1400.51 0.00 31.15 311.53 1038.42 2076.84 21.81
Securities 147.65 615.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 311.53 78.29
Financial Assets 977.50 1667.95 0.00 31.15 311.53 1038.42 2803.74 22.74
Total Assets 2453.05 3023.73 0.00 456.91 1661.48 3219.11 5815.16 11.66
Total Debt 619.39 1653.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 778.82 2076.84 55.28
Non-mortgage Debt 103.50 1343.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 176.53 77.61
Observations 2945
Figures are in tens of thousands and as of 2013.
Safe assets are the sum of: Postal savings certificates, time deposits, instalment savings and ordinary deposits.
Bank, shinkin bank, etc. Time deposits, instalment savings and ordinary deposits. Company deposits, gold invest-
ment accounts, gold savings accounts, medium-term government bond funds, etc.
Securities are the sum of: Shares (market value), bonds (par value), stock investment trusts (market value), corpo-
rate and public bond investment trusts (market value), loans in trust and money in trust (par value), etc.
Financial assets equal to the sum of safe assets and securities.
Total assets equal to the sum of financial assets and the market values of the residential property and the associ-
ated plot.
Total debt is the sum of all borrowings including the outstanding balances of mortgage loans.
Non-mortgage debt is the sum of all borrowings excluding mortgage loans.
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Table 3.3: The distribution of risky assets share in 2013
Mean Std.Dev 25% Median 75% 90%
Risky assets ratio 0.064 0.168 0 0 0 0.25
Age groups
20 to 30 Years old 0.018 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
30 to 40 Years old 0.035 0.142 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.032
40 to 50 Years old 0.047 0.152 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.118
50 to 60 Years old 0.057 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.231
60 to 70 Years old 0.073 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.286
70+ Years old 0.106 0.207 0.000 0.000 0.114 0.429
Education level
Junior high sch. 0.032 0.139 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010
High school 0.049 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167
College 0.055 0.149 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250
University+ 0.102 0.201 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.400
Other 0.043 0.148 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091
Gender
Female 0.038 0.129 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091
Male 0.068 0.173 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.273
Employment status
Working 0.053 0.154 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.200
Part-time 0.086 0.193 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.417
Unemployed 0.030 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.333
Other work 0.104 0.210 0.000 0.000 0.114 0.411
Marital status
Single 0.054 0.155 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.209
Married 0.066 0.170 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.254
Health status
Good 0.065 0.166 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.255
Pretty good 0.071 0.177 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.308
Normal 0.056 0.154 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.213
Bad 0.072 0.188 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.286
Observations 2945
161
Section 3.8 Chapter 3
Table 3.4: Independent variables: Definitions
Variable Name Definition
Married 1 if the head of household is married or cohabiting, 0 otherwise.
Male 1 if head of household is male, 0 if female.
Number of adults Number of adults present in the household.
Number of children Number of children (under the age of 16) present in the household.
Employment status-(currently employed is the omitted category)
Part-time 1 if head of household is in part-time employment, 0 otherwise.
Unemployed 1 if head of household is studying, 0 otherwise.
Other work 1 if head of household is unemployed or other, 0 otherwise.
Education level-(Below high school is the omitted category)
High school 1 if head of household’s highest level of education is high school level, 0 otherwise.
College 1 if head of household’s highest level of education is college, 0 otherwise.
University+ 1 if head of household’s highest level of education is university or higher, 0 otherwise.
Other 1 if head of household’s highest level of education is other, 0 otherwise.
Age -(Above 70 is the omitted category
20 to 30 Years old 1 if head of household’s age is between 20 to 30 years old, 0 otherwise.
30 to 40 Years old 1 if head of household’s age is between 30 to 40 years old, 0 otherwise.
40 to 50 Years old 1 if head of household’s age is between 40 to 50 years old, 0 otherwise.
50 to 60 Years old 1 if head of household’s age is between 50 to 60 years old, 0 otherwise.
60 to 70 Years old 1 if head of household’s age is between 60 to 70 years old, 0 otherwise.
Self-Reported Health Status - (Being of poor health is omitted category)
Good 1 if the head of household reports being in good health, 0 otherwise
Pretty good 1 if the head of household reports being in pretty good health, 0 otherwise
Normal 1 if the head of household reports being in normal health, 0 otherwise
Region-(The largest region, Kanto, is the omitted category)
Hokkaido 1 if head of household is in Hokkaido, 0 otherwise.
Tohoku 1 if head of household is in Tohoku, 0 otherwise.
Chubu 1 if head of household is in Chubu, 0 otherwise.
Kinki 1 if head of household is in Kinki, 0 otherwise.
Chugoku 1 if head of household is in Chugoku, 0 otherwise.
Shikoku 1 if head of household is in Shikoku, 0 otherwise.
Kyushu 1 if head of household is in Kyushu, 0 otherwise.
City size-(Town/village is the omitted category)
Major city 1 if head of household is in a major city, 0 otherwise.
Other city 1 if head of household is in other cities, 0 otherwise.
Committed expenditure
Rent ratio
Annual rent payments on main residence as a proportion of annual household disposable
income.
Mortgage ratio
annual total mortgage repayments as a proportion of annual household disposable
income.
Financial Measures
Labour income risk The variance of household income over the full sample period 2004-2015.
Equivalised income Household disposable income adjusted for household composition using the OECD scale.
Net wealth Total value of household financial and non-financial assets minus total debt.
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Table 3.4: Independent variables: Definitions. (Continued)
Set one: General attitudinal variables
Proxy of risk attitudes
When you have to go out somewhere in your town all day, what is the chance of rain that makes you take an
umbrella with you? 0%-100%
Has a saving goal
Around how much is the total savings goal you are now considering? This has been changed to a binary
variable. 0 No goal, 1 Has a saving goal.
Retirement income: Enough (omitted
cat.)
Do you think that you have income and assets that are enough to lead a retirement life without problems? Yes
Retir. income, Not sure
Do you think that you have income and assets that are enough to lead a retirement life without problems?
Neither
Retir. income, Not enough Do you think that you have income and assets that are enough to lead a retirement life without problems? No
Support current Gov. (omitted cat.) Do you support the present government? Yes
Don’t support current Gov. Do you support the present government? No
Support current Gov.: Other Do you support the present government? No answer
Set two: Impression about the stock
market
Please circle the answer that best applies to you for each of the following statements regarding your impression about the stock
market.(0) Disagree (1) Somewhat disagree (2) can’t say either way (3) Somewhat agree (4) Agree.
Profitability Profits cannot be made with certainty.
Riskiness Significant losses are possible.
Illegal Illegal activities such as insider trading are widespread.
Disclosure No much progress has been made in terms of disclosure of information on corporate performance.
Intervention Market interventions by the central bank and the government are not thoroughly conducted.
Set three: Risk ranking of selected assets
If we assume stashing cash has a risk value of 0 and purchasing a betting slip or lottery ticket has a risk value of 10, what do you
think are the risk values of the following types of saving and investment? 0-10 scale.
Saving risk Putting money in a conventional bank savings account.
Currency risk Putting money in a foreign currency deposit.
Postal risk Putting money in a postal savings account.
Stock risk Buying stocks.
Trust risk Buying a stock investment trust.
Property risk Investing in land and property.
163
Section 3.8 Chapter 3
Table 3.5: Summary statistics: Explanatory variables
Panel A: Baseline Specifications
Continuous variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Number of adults 3.0000 1.3039 1 10
Number of children 0.5799 0.9343 0 6
Committed expenditure
Rent ratio 0.0424 0.1834 0 6.1091
Mortgage ratio 0.0640 0.1939 0 3.5040
Financial Measures
Labour income risk 0.2741 0.2162 0.0022 2.1188
Equivalised income 5.5965 0.6066 0.6355 8.7483
Net wealth 4.9134 5.6447 -11.2993 11.3928
Binary variables Percent
Married 0.83
Male 0.87
Home owner 0.79
Employment status
Working (omitted cat.) 0.77
Part-time 0.04
Unemployed 0.01
Other work 0.18
Education level
Junior high school (omitted cat.) 0.10
High school 0.47
College 0.08
University+ 0.30
Other 0.05
Age
20 to 30 Years old 0.02
30 to 40 Years old 0.12
40 to 50 Years old 0.21
50 to 60 Years old 0.24
60 to 70 Years old 0.24
70+ Years old (omitted cat.) 0.17
Self-Reported Health Status
Good 0.12
Pretty good 0.29
Normal 0.44
Poor (omitted cat.) 0.15
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Table 3.5: Variables’ summary statistics. (Continued)
Binary variables Percent
Region
Hokkaido 0.05
Tohoku 0.06
Kanto (omitted cat.) 0.32
Chubu 0.17
Kinki 0.19
Chugoku 0.06
Shikoku 0.03
Kyushu 0.12
City size
Major city 0.29
Other city 0.61
Town/village (omitted cat.) 0.10
Panel B: Additional key variables
I: General attitudinal variables Percent
Has a saving goal 0.61
Retirement income: Enough (omitted cat.) 0.09
Retirement income: Not sure 0.21
Retirement income: Not enough 0.70
Support current Gov. (omitted cat.) 0.48
Don’t support current Gov. 0.27
Current Gov.: Other 0.25
Continuous variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
General risk aversion 42.2725 23.3767 0 100
II: Impression about the stock market
Profits are uncertain 2.9489 0.9630 0 4
Losses are possible 3.1608 0.8951 0 4
High illegal activities 2.5477 0.9412 0 4
No Info disclosure 2.4582 0.8636 0 4
CB & GOV. intervention 2.3975 0.8387 0 4
III: Risk ranking of selected assets
Riskiness of savings 2.6968 2.5432 0 10
Riskiness of currency 5.6217 2.5726 0 10
Riskiness of postal 2.5206 2.6211 0 10
Riskiness of stocks 6.3512 2.5501 0 10
Riskiness of trusts 6.4167 2.5845 0 10
Riskiness of property 5.8090 2.5736 0 10
Observations for each variable 2945
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Table 3.6: Correlation between the share of risky assets and the key explanatory variables
I: General attitudinal variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1)Risky assets share 1.00
(2)Proxy of risk attitude -0.06∗∗ 1.00
(3)Has a saving goal 0.04∗ 0.01 1.00
(4)Retirement income:Enough 0.17∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗ -0.01 1.00
(5)Retirement income: Not sure 0.05∗∗ -0.04 -0.01 -0.16∗∗∗ 1.00
(6)Retirement income: Not enough -0.15∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.49∗∗∗ -0.78∗∗∗ 1.00
(7)Support current Gov. 0.06∗∗∗ -0.01 0.07∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ 1.00
(8)Don’t support current Gov. -0.04∗ 0.01 -0.04∗ -0.04∗ -0.02 0.04∗ -0.59∗∗∗ 1.00
(9)Current Gov.: Other -0.04∗ 0.00 -0.04∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.05∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ -0.56∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗ 1.00
II: Impression about the stock market (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1)Risky assets share 1.00
(2)Profitability -0.07∗∗∗ 1.00
(3)Riskiness -0.02 0.64∗∗∗ 1.00
(4)Illegal -0.10∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 1.00
(5)Disclosure -0.05∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 1.00
(6)Intervention -0.08∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗ 1.00
III: Risk ranking of selected assets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1)Risky assets share 1.00
(2)Riskiness of savings -0.07∗∗∗ 1.00
(3)Riskiness of currency 0.02 -0.03 1.00
(4)Riskiness of postal -0.07∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ 1.00
(5)Riskiness of stocks -0.03 -0.28∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ 1.00
(6)Riskiness of trusts -0.02 -0.28∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 1.00
(7)Riskiness of property -0.03 -0.17∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 1.00
(1) *denotes significance at the 10% level **denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 1% level.
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Table 3.7: Distribution of impression about the stock market variables as a percentage of total
response
Disagree Somewhat
disagree
Cannot say
either way
Somewhat
agree
Agree Total
Profits are uncertain 1.75 3.47 27.95 31.7 35.13 100
Losses are possible 1.1 1.41 22.29 30.6 44.61 100
High illegal activities 1.75 7.49 44.06 27.68 19.02 100
No Info disclosure. 1.37 5.94 52.85 25.14 14.7 100
CB & GOV. intervention 1.44 5.6 57.8 22.05 13.12 100
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Table 3.8: The determinants of risky assets share: Baseline specification
Tobit Models Fractional Regression Models2
Panel Cross sect.2 One-part Binary Fractional
Married -0.010 -0.122*** -0.498*** -0.216** -0.202**
(-0.64) (-2.78) (-3.17) (-2.35) (-2.14)
Male 0.011 0.167*** 0.659*** 0.305*** 0.175
(0.73) (3.24) (3.03) (2.92) (1.59)
Number of adults -0.007** 0.009 0.033 0.002 0.005
(-2.03) (0.78) (0.68) (0.10) (0.23)
Number of children 0.003 0.022 0.091 0.042 0.019
(0.50) (1.26) (1.00) (1.18) (0.40)
Part-time 0.068*** 0.101 0.506** 0.020 0.214*
(4.09) (1.51) (2.25) (0.14) (1.65)
Unemployed 0.008 -0.239 -0.677 -0.522* 0.296
(0.28) (-1.58) (-1.11) (-1.75) (1.49)
Other 0.060*** 0.095** 0.386** 0.104 0.162*
(5.33) (2.38) (2.38) (1.14) (1.86)
High school 0.142*** 0.194*** 0.620** 0.313*** -0.096
(6.54) (3.71) (2.28) (3.04) (-0.59)
College 0.205*** 0.275*** 0.907*** 0.388*** -0.024
(6.98) (4.01) (2.85) (2.80) (-0.13)
University+ 0.305*** 0.385*** 1.253*** 0.644*** 0.019
(12.47) (6.99) (4.48) (5.83) (0.12)
Other 0.205*** 0.112 0.352 0.196 -0.068
(6.71) (1.46) (0.91) (1.29) (-0.31)
20 to 30 Years old -0.095*** -0.399*** -1.772*** -0.442* -0.374
(-2.72) (-2.88) (-2.66) (-1.77) (-1.18)
30 to 40 Years old -0.091*** -0.311*** -0.991*** -0.483*** -0.124
(-4.55) (-4.94) (-3.42) (-3.67) (-0.78)
40 to 50 Years old -0.050*** -0.279*** -0.881*** -0.427*** -0.075
(-2.98) (-5.17) (-3.94) (-3.65) (-0.61)
50 to 60 Years old -0.055*** -0.195*** -0.685*** -0.254** -0.144
(-3.82) (-4.17) (-3.59) (-2.38) (-1.49)
60 to 70 Years old -0.010 -0.150*** -0.415*** -0.322*** 0.002
(-0.93) (-3.78) (-2.65) (-3.48) (0.02)
Good 0.019 -0.032 -0.248 -0.012 -0.173
(1.52) (-0.69) (-1.27) (-0.11) (-1.62)
Pretty good 0.023** -0.068* -0.226 -0.111 -0.075
(2.13) (-1.75) (-1.43) (-1.32) (-0.82)
Normal 0.015 -0.084** -0.361** -0.123 -0.158*
(1.52) (-2.29) (-2.39) (-1.58) (-1.81)
Hokkaido -0.317*** -0.496*** -2.192*** -0.841*** -0.459**
(-7.51) (-5.07) (-4.31) (-4.73) (-2.27)
Tohoku -0.242*** -0.077 -0.527** 0.021 -0.240*
(-6.57) (-1.34) (-1.99) (0.18) (-1.91)
Chubu -0.011 -0.016 -0.144 0.039 -0.138*
(-0.48) (-0.47) (-1.06) (0.50) (-1.83)
Kinki -0.009 -0.032 -0.266* 0.033 -0.229***
(-0.40) (-0.93) (-1.96) (0.44) (-3.09)
Chugoku -0.089** -0.071 -0.344 -0.018 -0.102
(-2.42) (-1.27) (-1.54) (-0.15) (-0.80)
Shikoku -0.001 -0.030 -0.299 -0.009 -0.200
(-0.03) (-0.41) (-1.04) (-0.05) (-1.46)
Kyushu -0.153*** -0.137*** -0.654*** -0.167* -0.214**
(-5.42) (-2.99) (-3.19) (-1.77) (-2.05)
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Table 3.8: The determinants of risky assets share: Baseline specification (Continued)
Tobit Models Fractional Regression Models2
Panel Cross sect.2 One-part Binary Fractional
Major city 0.084*** -0.035 -0.192 -0.057 -0.056
(3.84) (-0.74) (-1.02) (-0.55) (-0.52)
Other city 0.058*** -0.058 -0.205 -0.101 -0.043
(3.07) (-1.33) (-1.19) (-1.08) (-0.42)
Rent ratio 0.016 0.010 0.079 -0.163 0.004
(1.22) (0.06) (0.17) (-0.45) (0.01)
Mortgage ratio -0.006 0.097 0.496** 0.087 0.408
(-0.32) (1.42) (2.22) (0.60) (1.32)
Home owner 0.117*** 0.079* 0.214 -0.059 0.004
(8.21) (1.67) (1.01) (-0.60) (0.04)
Labour income risk 0.052 0.038 0.024 -0.029 -0.024
(1.35) (0.66) (0.12) (-0.22) (-0.19)
Equivalised income 0.040*** 0.162*** 0.427*** -0.028
(5.78) (6.65) (4.66) (-0.50)
Net wealth 0.012*** 0.025*** 0.076*** -0.024***
(14.40) (8.20) (3.88) (-2.61)
II income quartile 0.121
(1.46)
III income quartile 0.262***
(3.15)
IV income quartile 0.497***
(5.72)
II wealth quartile 0.187**
(2.33)
III wealth quartile 0.578***
(7.18)
IV wealth quartile 1.205***
(13.53)
Year= 2005 0.080***
(6.00)
Year= 2006 0.102***
(7.62)
Year= 2007 0.091***
(7.04)
Year= 2008 0.098***
(7.50)
Year= 2009 0.047***
(3.48)
Year= 2010 0.041***
(2.97)
Year= 2011 0.046***
(3.26)
Year= 2012 0.029**
(2.08)
Year= 2013 0.032**
(2.22)
Year= 2014 0.082***
(5.81)
Year= 2015 0.097***
(6.84)
Constant -1.116*** -1.539*** -5.902*** -1.241*** 0.421
(-19.05) (-8.59) (-9.37) (-5.43) (0.99)
Observations 34315 2945 2945 2945 639
(1) *denotes significance at the 10% level **denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the
1% level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. (2) Using 2013 wave only. (3) To achieve identification income and
wealth quartiles are used in the one-part equation. 169
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Table 3.9: The determinants of risky assets share: Marginal effects of the baseline specification
Fractional Regression Models
Independent variables Tobit One-Part Binary Fractional
Married −0.096*** −0.030*** −0.053** −0.071**
Male 0.130*** 0.040*** 0.075*** 0.061
Number of adults 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.002
Number of children 0.0177 0.005 0.010 0.007
Home owner 0.062* 0.013 −0.014 0.002
Part-time 0.079 0.031** 0.005 0.075*
Unemployed −0.187 −0.041 −0.129* 0.104
Other work 0.074** 0.023** 0.026 0.057*
High school 0.152*** 0.037** 0.077*** −0.034
College 0.215*** 0.055*** 0.096*** −0.008
University+ 0.301*** 0.076*** 0.159*** 0.007
Other 0.088 0.021 0.049 −0.024
20 to 30 Years old −0.313*** −0.107*** −0.109* −0.132
30 to 40 Years old −0.244*** −0.060*** −0.119*** −0.044
40 to 50 Years old −0.219*** −0.053*** −0.106*** −0.027
50 to 60 Years old −0.153*** −0.041*** −0.063** −0.051
60 to 70 Years old −0.118*** −0.025*** −0.080*** 0.001
Good −0.025 −0.015 −0.003 −0.061
Pretty good −0.053* −0.014 −0.027 −0.026
Normal −0.065** −0.022** −0.031 −0.056*
Hokkaido −0.388*** −0.132*** −0.208*** −0.161**
Tohoku −0.060 −0.032** 0.005 −0.085*
Chubu −0.013 −0.009 0.010 −0.049*
Kinki −0.025 −0.016* 0.008 −0.080***
Chugoku −0.055 −0.021 −0.004 −0.036
Shikoku −0.024 −0.018 −0.002 −0.070
Kyushu −0.107*** −0.039*** −0.041* −0.075**
Major city −0.028 −0.012 −0.014 −0.020
Other city −0.046 −0.012 −0.025 −0.015
Rent ratio 0.008 0.005 −0.040 0.002
Mortgage ratio 0.076 0.030** 0.022 0.143
Labour income risk 0.030 0.001 −0.007 −0.008
Equivalised income 0.127*** 0.026*** −0.010
Net wealth 0.019*** 0.005*** −0.008***
II income quartile 0.030
III income quartile 0.065***
IV income quartile 0.123***
II wealth quartile 0.046**
III wealth quartile 0.143***
IV wealth quartile 0.298***
Constant −1.205***
Observations 2945 2945 2945 639
(1) *denotes significance at the 10% level **denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at
the 1% level. (2) t-statistics are shown in parentheses. (3) To achieve identification income and wealth quartiles
are used in the one-part equation.
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Table 3.10: The determinants of risky assets share: Tobit regressions of the key explanatory variables
I: General attitudinal variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model A Model B
Proxy of risk attitude -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.91) (-0.73) (-0.99)
Has a saving goal 0.055** 0.057** 0.055**
(2.16) (2.26) (2.19)
retir. income, Not sure -0.116*** -0.119*** -0.103**
(-2.85) (-2.91) (-2.56)
retir. income, Not enough -0.206*** -0.205*** -0.185***
(-5.46) (-5.39) (-4.92)
Don’t support current Gov. -0.061** -0.049* -0.045
(-2.05) (-1.66) (-1.55)
Current Gov.: Other -0.131*** -0.099** -0.104**
(-2.62) (-1.95) (-2.06)
II: Impression about stock markets Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model A
Profits are uncertain -0.052*** -0.062*** -0.065***
(-4.29) (-4.16) (-3.88)
Losses are possible -0.008 0.055*** 0.055***
(-0.64) (3.29) (3.08)
High illegal activities -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.063***
(-4.24) (-3.22) (-3.77)
No Info disclosure -0.031** 0.025 0.031
(-2.45) (1.28) (1.46)
CB & GOV. intervention -0.046*** -0.031* -0.030
(-3.51) (-1.67) (-1.42)
III: Risk ranking of selected assets Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model A
Riskiness of savings -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.041*** -0.039***
(-4.34) (-4.77) (-3.20) (-3.06)
Riskiness of currency -0.001 0.009 0.011*
(-0.26) (1.42) (1.80 )
Riskiness of postal -0.017*** 0.016 0.016
(-3.42) (1.28) (1.36)
Riskiness of stocks -0.006 -0.012** -0.011 -0.016
(-1.12) (-2.31) (-1.10) (-1.68)
Riskiness of trusts -0.005 -0.006 -0.002
(-1.03) (-0.64) (0.08)
Riskiness of property -0.003 -0.001 0.001
(-0.64) (-0.19) (0.16)
Observations 2945
(1) *denotes significance at the 10% level **denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 1% level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. (2) Each
model from 1 to 7 includes the baseline specifications and one variable from each set. Model A includes baseline specifications and all variables in each set. Model B includes
baseline specifications and all variables in all sets.
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Table 3.11: The determinants of risky assets share: One-part FRM regressions of the key explanatory variables
I: General attitudinal variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model A Model B
Proxy of risk attitude -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
(-0.65) (-0.30) (-0.59)
Has a saving goal 0.161 0.166 0.156
(1.59) (1.64) (1.54)
retir. income, Not sure -0.285** -0.304** -0.284**
(-2.08) (-2.22) (-2.03)
retir. income, Not enough -0.576*** -0.581*** -0.529***
(-4.52) (-4.48) (-4.01)
Don’t support current Gov. -0.243** -0.214* -0.199*
(-2.06) (-1.81) (-1.67)
Current Gov.: Other -0.314 -0.209 -0.232
(-1.45) (-0.97) (-1.08)
II: Impression about stock markets Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model A
Profits are uncertain -0.171*** -0.211*** -0.202***
(-3.14) (-3.44) (-3.37)
Losses are possible -0.017 0.162** 0.177**
(-0.27) (2.31) (2.48)
High illegal activities -0.148** -0.167* -0.281***
(-1.97) (-1.79) (-3.64)
No Info disclosure -0.073 0.085 0.082
(-1.09) (1.06) (0.99)
CB & GOV. intervention -0.102 -0.042 -0.012
(-1.47) (-0.54) (-0.15 )
III: Risk ranking of selected assets Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model A
Riskiness of savings -0.066*** -0.123** -0.117**
(-2.89) (-2.44) (-2.12)
Riskiness of currency -0.009 0.030 0.043
(-0.46) (1.07) (1.56)
Riskiness of postal -0.049** 0.045 0.050
(-2.29) (0.95) (0.95)
Riskiness of stocks -0.031* -0.071 -0.090*
(-1.79) (-1.45) (-1.87)
Riskiness of trusts -0.020 0.004 0.030
(-1.22) (0.08) (0.64)
Riskiness of property -0.010 0.003 0.009
(-0.55) (0.15) ( 0.41)
Observations 2945
(1) *denotes significance at the 10% level **denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 1% level. t-statistics are shown in parenthe-
ses. (2) Each model from 1 to 7 includes the baseline specifications and one variable from each set. Model A includes baseline specifications and all variables
in each set. Model B includes baseline specifications and all variable in all sets.
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Table 3.12: The determinants of risky assets share: FRM two-part regressions of the key explanatory variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model A Model B
I: General attitudinal variables Binary Frac. Binary Frac. Binary Frac. Binary Frac. Binary Frac. Binary Frac.
Proxy of risk attitude -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.54) -0.20) (-0.53) (-0.55) (-0.72) (-0.59)
Has a saving goal 0.148*** -0.016 0.144*** -0.018 0.141*** -0.026
(2.70) (-0.29) (2.59) (-0.33) (2.51) (-0.46)
Retir. income, Not sure -0.286*** -0.063 -0.294*** -0.050 -0.272** -0.081
(-2.71) (-0.83) (-2.72) (-0.66) (-2.49) (-1.07)
Retir. income, Not enough -0.362*** -0.030 -0.370*** -0.018 -0.355*** -0.041
(-3.69) (-0.39) (-3.68) (-0.23) (-3.48) (-0.54)
Don’t support current Gov. -0.104 -0.074 -0.092 -0.078 -0.085 -0.090
(-1.64) (-1.18) (-1.44) (-1.23) (-1.31) (-1.42)
Other, current Gov. -0.258** 0.153 -0.222** 0.143 -0.241** 0.152
(-2.48) (1.09) (-2.08) (1.06) (-2.24) (1.10)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model A
II: Impression about the stock markets Binary Frac. Binary Frac. Binary Frac. Binary Frac. Binary Frac. Binary Frac. .
Profits are uncertain -0.096*** -0.032 -0.110*** -0.048 -0.123*** -0.047
(-3.78) (-0.98) (-3.25) (-1.35) (-3.35) (-1.33)
Losses are possible -0.024 -0.002 0.107*** 0.006 0.116*** 0.011
(-0.90) (-0.04) (2.80) (0.16) (2.81) (0.30)
High illegal activities -0.111*** 0.012 -0.106*** 0.001 -0.096** -0.005
(-4.39) (0.40) (-3.00) (0.03) (-2.46) (-0.15)
No Info disclosure -0.074*** 0.025 0.044 0.010 0.062 0.021
(-2.76) (0.76) (0.94) (0.23) (1.32) (0.50)
CB & GOV. intervention -0.098*** 0.033 -0.067 0.037 -0.086* 0.034
(-3.57) (1.03) (-1.51) (0.98) (-1.79) (0.89)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model A
III: Risk ranking of selected assets Binary Frac. Binary Frac. Binary Frac. Binary Frac. Binary Frac. Binary Frac. Binary Frac.
Riskiness of savings -0.041*** 0.001 -0.074*** 0.004 -0.077*** 0.004
(-3.91) (0.08) (-2.93) (0.11) (-2.91) (0.10)
Riskiness of currency -0.005 -0.002 0.014 -0.000 0.016 0.000
(-0.50) (-0.19) (1.00) (-0.01) (1.18) (0.03)
Riskiness of postal -0.032*** 0.000 0.027 -0.006 0.029 -0.009
(-3.16) (0.04) (1.10) (-0.19) (1.20) (-0.27)
Riskiness of stocks -0.009 -0.017 -0.006 -0.035* -0.010 -0.038*
(-0.90) (-1.34) (-0.24) (-1.79) (-0.43) (-1.93)
Riskiness of trusts -0.012 -0.002 -0.029 0.018 -0.023 0.017
(-1.23) (-0.14) (-1.22) (0.92) (-1.00) (0.89)
Riskiness of property -0.004 0.004 0.002 0.011 0.005 0.012
(-0.34) (0.33) (0.14) (0.81) (0.38) (0.84)
Observations 2945 639 2945 639 2945 639 2945 639 2945 639 2945 639 2945 639 2945 639
(1)*denotes significance at the 10% level **denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 1% level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. (2) Each model from 1 to 6 includes the baseline specifications and one variable from
each set. Model A includes baseline specifications and all variables in each set. Model B includes baseline specifications and all variable in all sets.
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Table 3.13: The determinants of risky assets share: Marginal effects of Tobit and FRM of the key explanatory variables
Section A2 Fractional Regression Models Section B3 Fractional Regression Models
I: General attitudinal variables Tobit One-Part Binary Fractional Tobit One-Part Binary Fractional
Proxy of risk attitude −0.001* 0.000* 0.000 0.000 −0.001* 0.000* 0.000 0.000
Has a saving goal 0.044** 0.009 0.037*** −0.010 0.041** 0.008 0.035*** −0.009
Retir. income, Not sure −0.085*** −0.016** −0.066** −0.021 −0.079** −0.017** −0.063** −0.029
Retir. income, Not enough −0.155*** −0.033*** −0.085*** −0.009 −0.147*** −0.031*** −0.084*** −0.015
Current Gov.: Don’t support −0.035* −0.019 −0.026 −0.026 −0.031 −0.011 −0.016 −0.031
Current Gov.: Other −0.082** −0.013 −0.056** 0.056 −0.089** −0.015 −0.061** 0.053
II: Impression about the stock markets
Profits are uncertain −0.048*** −0.013*** −0.027*** −0.017 −0.05*** −0.013*** −0.031*** −0.016
Losses are possible 0.043*** 0.010** 0.026*** 0.002 0.044*** 0.010*** 0.029*** 0.004
High illegal activities −0.039*** −0.010* −0.026*** 0.000 −0.035*** −0.009* −0.021** −0.002
No Info disclosure 0.020 0.005 0.011 0.003 0.024 0.006 0.015 0.008
CB & GOV. intervention −0.024 −0.002 −0.016 0.013 −0.023 −0.002 −0.019* 0.012
III: Risk ranking of selected assets
Riskiness of savings −0.032*** −0.007** −0.018*** 0.001 −0.031*** −0.007** −0.018*** 0.001
Riskiness of currency 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.000
Riskiness of postal 0.013 0.003 0.007 −0.002 0.013 0.003 0.007 −0.003
Riskiness of stocks −0.008 −0.004 −0.002 −0.012* −0.011 −0.005* −0.002 −0.013*
Riskiness of trusts −0.005 0.000 −0.007 0.006 −0.002 0.001 −0.006 0.006
Riskiness of property −0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004
(1)*denotes significance at the 10% level **denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 1% level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.(2) Models in this section include baseline specifications and all variables
in each set separately.(3) Models in this section include baseline specifications and all variables in all sets.
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Table 3.14: The determinants of risky assets share: CQR baseline specification
Regression cut points
Independent variables Tobit 60 65 75 85 95
Married −0.096*** −0.005 −0.011 −0.043** −0.064** −0.149**
Male 0.130*** 0.011 0.02 0.066** 0.097** 0.131**
Number of adults 0.007 −0.001 0.001 0.005 −0.006 0.002
Number of children 0.0177 0.001 0.002 0.004 −0.005 0.024
Part-time 0.079 0.012 0.028 0.013 0.102 0.157*
Unemployed −0.187 −0.001 −0.005 −0.07 −0.12 0.021
Other work 0.074** 0.006 0.017 0.03 0.077** 0.111*
High school 0.152*** 0.004 0.005 0.073* 0.076* 0.105
College 0.215*** 0.011 0.017 0.094** 0.101** 0.199
University+ 0.301*** 0.017 0.043 0.124*** 0.187*** 0.316***
Other 0.088 0.003 −0.033 0.026 0.012 0.071
20 to 30 Years old −0.313*** −0.026 −0.063 −0.025 −0.147* −0.386***
30 to 40 Years old −0.244*** −0.015 −0.049** −0.112*** −0.149*** −0.239***
40 to 50 Years old −0.219*** −0.015 −0.036** −0.1*** −0.124** −0.245***
50 to 60 Years old −0.153*** −0.01 −0.017 −0.071** −0.07 −0.145**
60 to 70 Years old −0.118*** −0.008 −0.007 −0.05** −0.035 −0.105**
Good −0.025 0.003 0.014 −0.002 0.014 −0.141
Pretty good −0.053* −0.001 0.005 −0.01 0.013 −0.147**
Normal −0.065** 0.001 −0.002 −0.014 −0.013 −0.176***
Hokkaido −0.388*** −0.012 −0.03 −0.122 −0.049 −0.325***
Tohoku −0.06 −0.002 −0.011 −0.032 −0.042 −0.089
Chubu −0.013 0.002 0.005 −0.003 −0.004 −0.045
Kinki −0.025 −0.001 0.002 −0.007 −0.028 −0.1*
Chugoku −0.055 −0.004 −0.009 −0.026 −0.038 −0.071
Shikoku −0.024 0.001 0.001 0.003 −0.045 −0.144*
Kyushu −0.107*** −0.002 −0.012 −0.069*** −0.074* −0.151**
Major city −0.028 0.002 0.001 −0.003 −0.021 −0.018
Other city −0.046 0.001 −0.002 −0.005 −0.022 −0.021
Rent ratio 0.008 0.022 0.019 −0.105 0.044 0.044
Mortgage ratio 0.076 0.001 0.016 0.052 0.189*** 0.156*
Home owner 0.062* 0.002 −0.005 −0.036 −0.028 0.022
Labour income risk 0.03 −0.001 0.003 0.012 −0.007 −0.014
Equivalised income 0.127*** 0.005 0.014* 0.046*** 0.059*** 0.093**
Net wealth 0.019*** 0.002 0.005 0.017** 0.025*** 0.019***
Constant −1.205*** −0.038 −0.092 −0.391*** −0.436*** −0.208
(1) *denotes significance at the 10% level **denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 1% level. (2) Coefficients
below the 60th quantile are statistically and economically insignificant
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Table 3.15: The determinants of risky assets share: CQR regressions of the key explanatory variables
Section A2 Regression cut points: Each set Section B3 Regression cut points: All sets together
Tobit 60 65 75 85 95 Tobit 60 65 75 85 95
I: General attitudinal variables
Proxy of risk attitude −0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.003** −0.001* 0.000 0.00* 0.00* 0.000 0.000
Has a saving goal 0.044** 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.004 −0.004 0.041** 0.007 0.009 0.016 0.028 0.017
Retir. income, Not sure −0.085*** −0.075 −0.095** −0.077** −0.111** −0.144** −0.079** −0.02 −0.032 −0.029 −0.02 −0.073
Retir. income, Not enough −0.155*** −0.075 −0.097** −0.086*** −0.128*** −0.142** −0.147*** −0.028 −0.039 −0.042 −0.063** −0.131**
Current Gov.: Don’t support −0.035* 0.000 −0.004 −0.028** −0.051** −0.028 −0.031 0.000 0.000 −0.014 −0.022 −0.043
Current Gov.: Other −0.082** −0.001 −0.012 −0.041 −0.096** −0.087 −0.089** −0.014 −0.012 −0.043* −0.08** 0.012
II: Impression about stock markets
Profits are uncertain −0.048*** −0.007* −0.008* −0.007 −0.015 −0.036 −0.05*** −0.004 −0.005 −0.011 −0.013 −0.062***
Losses are possible 0.043*** 0.01** 0.007 0.007 0.022* 0.006 0.044*** 0.012*** 0.007 0.009 0.018 0.04
High illegal activities −0.039*** −0.013** −0.016** −0.026*** −0.04*** −0.044 −0.035*** −0.008 −0.009 −0.017 −0.038*** −0.059**
No Info disclosure 0.02 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.011 0.022 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.042
CB & GOV. intervention −0.024 0.000 −0.002 −0.005 −0.018 −0.041 −0.023 0.003 0.000 −0.003 −0.011 −0.031
III: Risk ranking of selected assets
Riskiness of savings −0.032*** −0.001 −0.005* −0.011** −0.022*** −0.043*** −0.031*** −0.006* −0.006* −0.010 −0.013 −0.028*
Riskiness of currency 0.007 0.000 0.000 −0.001 0.005 0.012 0.008 −0.002 −0.001 0.001 0.001 0.015*
Riskiness of postal 0.013 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.027** 0.013 0.004 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.013
Riskiness of stocks −0.008 −0.001 0.002 0.000 −0.006 −0.031** −0.011 0.002 0.000 −0.002 −0.011 −0.024*
Riskiness of trusts −0.005 0.000 −0.006* −0.005 0.002 0.014 −0.002 −0.005 −0.003 −0.002 0.008 0.01
Riskiness of property −0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 −0.003 −0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 −0.001
(1)*denotes significance at the 10% level **denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 1% level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses.(2) Models in this section include baseline specifications and all variables in each set separately.(3) Models in this section include
baseline specifications and all variables in all sets.(4) Coefficients below the 60th quantile are statistically and economically insignificant.
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Table 3.16: Household’s employment status across age categories
Age groups Working Part-Time Unemploye Other Total
20 to 30 Years old 40 2 0 0 42
30 to 40 Years old 346 4 1 6 357
40 to 50 Years old 601 10 4 3 618
50 to 60 Years old 663 16 7 13 699
60 to 70 Years old 474 49 16 167 706
70+ year old 117 34 7 332 490
Total 2241 115 35 521 2912
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Table 3.17: Model performance of the three alternative methodological approaches
Baseline specification
Panel A: Information Criteria Tobit One part FRM Binary part Fractional part
AIC 2333.918 1136.683 2470.097 641.008
BIC 2549.076 1345.864 2703.185 796.7191
Panel B: Link test 0.205*** 0.0404 -0.1692 -1.027
Panel C: P test
H0: Two-part model. H1: One-part model 4.858**
H0: One-part model. H1: Two-part model 43.468***
The key explanatory variables
Panel D: Information Criteria Tobit One part FRM Binary part Fractional part
AIC 2253.775 1137.533 2425.045 671.0946
BIC 2570.535 1448.316 2759.734 902.4369
Panel E: Link test 0.2067*** -0.0186 -0.1828 -0.8658
Panel F: P test
H0: Two-part model. H1: One-part model 0.011
H0: One-part model. H1: Two-part model 33.336***
Observations 2945 2945 2945 639
(1)*denotes significance at the 10% level **denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 1% level.
Table 3.18: Mean of risky asset holdings: Sample and predicted
Sample mean Conditional
on holding
Tobit One-part FRM Two-part
(Binary)
Two-part
(Frac-
tional)
Baseline specification 0.06363 0.2932 0.06407 0.06363 0.21711 0.30024
Full specification 0.06363 0.2932 0.06411 0.06359 0.21722 0.2944
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3.9 Figures
Figure 3.1: Adventure and taking risks
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Schwartz: Adventure and taking risks are important to this person to have an exciting life.
Very much like me Like me Somewhat like me A little like me Not like me Not at all like me
Source: Data are from the World Value Survey (Wave 6 2010-2014).
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Figure 3.2: Proportion of risky assets
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of risky assets ratio conditional on holding
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Chapter 4
Individual Risk Attitudes: A Com-
parison of the U.S. and Japan
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4.1 Introduction
Economists assign a central role to attitudes towards risk when studying be-
haviours of individuals. Risk attitudes will have an impact on any decision an in-
dividual will take that contains an element of risk. For example, risk attitudes will
impact individual’s fertility, political and health decisions, see De Paola (2013). Fur-
thermore, risk attitudes will have a significant impact on an individual’s financial and
economic decisions such as, portfolio composition, buying insurance, indebtedness
and choice of occupation (see, for example, Dohmen et al., 2011; Schildberg-Ho¨risch,
2018).
At the aggregate level, an increase in the proportion of individuals who are
less willing to take risks has several implications on economic growth. For example,
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2018) argue that this increase will impact investments
which have high growth rate but risky profile since a proportion of entrepreneurs will
prefer safer but lower growth investments. It will also increase the cost of capital and
slow down capital accumulation since investors’ required risk premium will increase
as a result of more individuals being less willing to take risks. More importantly
is the potential impact of risk attitudes on equity investment cost, especially in an
ageing population such as Japan. This is because firms and small businesses are
moving away from the traditional bank loans to the capital markets to raise funds,
so policy makers are trying to encourage individuals to engage more in the stock
markets. Moreover, the defined contribution pension scheme gives participants the
option to choose the level of risk of their portfolios which is significantly influenced
by their attitudes towards risk.
One of the most important aspects of risk attitudes to researchers and policy
makers is identifying what determines individual risk attitudes. Examining the
determinants of individuals’ preferences towards risk and the stability of these pref-
erences are critical in understanding behaviours of individuals which will then help
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in predicting economic outcomes (Dohmen et al., 2016; Hryshko, Luengo-Prado, &
Sørensen, 2011; De Paola, 2013). For example, the financial behaviour of Japanese
individuals is different from their U.S. and EU counterparts. The Bank of Japan
(2017b) shows that the share of equity held by Japanese households was on aver-
age 10.0% in 2017 in comparison to 18.0% in the EU and 36.0% in the U.S.. This
conservative investment approach by Japanese individuals has been linked in the
literature to their less willingness to take risk nature.1
Another important aspect of risk attitudes that has received increasing interest
from policy makers and from the academic circle is its stability and what causes
its variation at the individual level. In order to understand and study individuals’
behaviours over time, it is crucial to start by examining the stability of individuals’
attitudes towards risk. Exogenous shocks, such as changes in economic conditions or
experiencing natural disasters, can cause a permanent change in an individual’s risk
attitudes (Schildberg-Ho¨risch, 2018). By examining the stability of risk attitudes,
policy makers can observe various vital realizations at the aggregate level such as:
predicting labour market structure; predicting health related risky behaviours; and
influencing investments, fertility and migration decisions.
With the exception of Dohmen et al. (2016) and Vieider et al. (2015) a compari-
son of the determinants of risk attitudes across countries is scarce in the literature.2
Moreover, the impact of natural disasters on risk attitudes has only recently received
attention from researchers within existing studies, furthermore, the findings are in-
conclusive. This chapter addresses aspects of risk attitudes in Japan and the U.S.
using panel survey data from the “Preference Parameters Study of Osaka Univer-
sity” conducted in Japan and the U.S.. This survey asks identical questions in these
1 This feature has been documented by the World Value Survey, where 73.0% of individuals
interviewed in Japan between 2010 and 2014 described themselves as individuals who are less
willing to take risk. This is compared to 39.0% in the U.S. and 51.0% the average response of 60
countries.
2Dohmen et al. (2016) compared the determinants of risk attitudes in Ukraine, a transition
economy, and Germany, a mature capitalist economy. Vieider et al. (2015) compared students
participated in experiments in 30 countries.
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two countries. Therefore, this chapter compares risk attitudes and their determi-
nants in two countries with a significant differences in the attitudes of individuals
towards risks. Moreover, given the increasing frequency and severity of natural dis-
asters, this chapter assesses the impact of experiencing natural disasters in each of
these two countries. If the risk attitudes variables are valid proxies for actual risk-
taking behaviours, one should expect these variables to explain a significant part of
the cross-sectional variation in risky choices of individuals. Therefore, this chapter
also test if the two risk attitudes measures used in this chapter explain individual’s
actual choices in a variety of contexts.
The contributions of this chapter to the existing literature are as follows. I am
aware of no other empirical study that compares the determinants of risk attitudes
between Japan and the U.S.. The literature on how risk attitudes are impacted by
natural disasters is new and inconclusive. Most of the papers in the existing litera-
ture use one measure of natural disasters when examining changes in risk attitudes
(see, for example, Cameron & Shah, 2015; van den Berg, Fort, & Burger, 2009; Eckel,
El-Gamal, & Wilson, 2009). This chapter contributes to the existing literature by
using a range of measures of natural disaster risk, an exogenous shock, to ascertain
the impact of such shocks on risk attitudes. The validity of the “Preference Pa-
rameters Study” risk attitudes measures is checked by testing if these measures can
predict various risky behaviours and financial choices. These validation exercises are
further tested in a system of two equations to control for the endogeneity of the risk
attitudes measures in the equations of risky behaviours and financial choices. This
is another contribution to the existing literature as there are no empirical studies,
to the best of my knowledge, that explore the relationship between individuals risky
choices and their attitudes towards risk by employing a joint modelling approach.3
The framework used to estimate this system of two equations is the conditional
mixed-process (CMP) suite of tools developed by Roodman (2011).
3There is a number of studies that employ a joint modelling approach in the literature of
household finance (see, for example, Brown & Taylor, 2008; Gray, 2014; Bridges & Disney, 2010).
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The findings of this chapter indicate that a number of variables have a statis-
tically significant impact on individual’s risk attitudes and the impact of some of
these variables is not the same across Japan and the U.S.. For example, the impacts
of some variables are larger for Japanese individuals, such as age and the back-
ground risk variables. Whereas the magnitude of most of the other variables have
a larger impact on U.S. respondents, such as being self-employed, level of educa-
tion and income. More importantly, the empirical analysis reveals that considering
only the effects of the regressors on the full sample and not controlling for gender
differences masks considerable heterogeneity in the effects of some variables. For
example, height is found to influence the risk attitudes of Japanese male individuals
only, whereas only U.S. male individuals who live in cities are more willing to take
risk compared to those who live in a rural areas. Overall, the findings of this chapter
indicate that risk attitudes of male individuals has shown to be more influenced, in
terms of statistical significance and magnitude, by the set of controls considered
in this chapter than risk attitudes of female respondents. These results show the
importance of controlling for gender differences in the analysis of topics related to
risk attitudes, such as determinants, stability and susceptibility to change.
The risk of exposure to natural disasters impacts only the risk attitudes of
Japanese male individuals and this impact is robust to the use of a number of
earthquake risk measures. Specifically, the results obtained for the set of natural
disaster risk measures show that the measure related to the number of days with an
earthquake and the average intensity measure have no impact on individuals’ risk
attitudes. Whereas, the other three measures that capture earthquakes with high
intensities do have an impact on risk attitudes, indicating that what matters are
those earthquakes with high intensities not small and frequent earthquakes.
These results are intuitive given that Japan is a country which is exposed to
a high risk of earthquake episodes, many of these episodes are small in terms of
intensity and Japanese individuals adopted mechanisms and procedures which mit-
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igated the impact of these earthquake. The finding of this chapter that earthquakes
with large intensities impact the attitudes of Japanese individuals towards risk has
important policy implications. For example, it indicates that the current policies
adopted by the Japanese government are not efficient in making individuals aware
of the risk of earthquakes and well-informed about their consequences, since indi-
viduals risk attitudes are still influenced by these disasters. Finally, the results of
the validation exercises of the two measures of risk attitudes ascertain that these
measures have considerable predictive power for a number of risky decisions in a
variety of contexts.
This chapter is structured as follows; Section 4.2 will review the literature related
to attitudes towards risk. Section 4.3 provides a discussion of the survey, dependent
variables and the independent variables. Section 4.4 presents the methodologies
employed in this chapter, whilst Section 4.5 and Section 4.6 discuss the results.
Finally, Section 4.7 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Literature review
Given that risk attitudes are a fundamental factor in explaining individuals’
behaviours, systematic changes in risk attitudes will have a significant impact on
social, economic and political aggregate outcomes. Therefore, it is not surprising
to see a growing empirical literature that considers different aspects of an individ-
ual’s risk attitudes. One of these aspects is to try to identify what determines an
individuals’ risk attitudes by studying its association with various demographic and
socio-economic characteristics. Another important aspect of individual’s risk atti-
tudes explored in the literature is how it can be observed and measured. A range
of different methodologies to measure risk attitudes have been extensively discussed
in the literature as risk attitudes is not an individual characteristic that is directly
observed. Another aspect that gained popularity in recent years is the stability of
risk attitudes across the life course. A growing number of studies start to question
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the claim which regards risk attitudes as a given attribute and time-invariant factor.
These studies are triggered by the recent financial crisis and the increasing frequency
and severity of natural disasters. I will now explore the literature in these distinct
areas.
4.2.1 Measuring and validating individual’s risk attitudes
Individual willingness to bear risk is not a characteristic that is directly observed
and many different methodologies have been suggested in the literature. In general,
individual risk attitudes could be measured in two different approaches: relying on
survey questions (Barsky, Juster, Kimball, & Shapiro, 1997; Donkers, Melenberg,
& Van Soest, 2001; Guiso & Paiella, 2008); or using an incentivized experiment
(Binswanger, 1980; Holt & Laury, 2002; Eckel & Grossman, 2008).
Risk attitude measures based on experiments are accurate measures as they pre-
cisely quantify the risks under consideration (internal validity) since the experiment
is implemented in a controlled situation and using real choices with real incentives.
However, incentivized experiments’ measures are not cheap to administer and time-
consuming to implement. On the other hand, measures of risk attitudes that are
based on survey questions can be collected easily along with other demographic and
socio-economic information about participants (external validity). The main disad-
vantage of these measures is that they are more prone to measurement error as they
might capture individuals’ risk perception on top of their risk attitudes. In order
to evaluate the trade-off between measurement accuracy against practicality, em-
pirical research tend to test the predictive power of actual risky behaviours of each
type of these measures. Theoretically, differences in risk attitudes across individuals
should be the only factor that explain their actual choices in a variety of contexts
as assumed by the theory of choice under uncertainty, Paiella, Guiso, et al. (2004).
Empirical researches show that survey elicited measures of risk attitudes out-
perform experimental measures in terms of their predictive power of actual risky
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behaviours. For example, Frey, Pedroni, Mata, Rieskamp, and Hertwig (2017) found
that the correlation between 22 self-reported measures was higher than the corre-
lation between 6 different behavioural (experimental) measures. Furthermore, Frey
et al. (2017, p. 8) argue that “self-reported impulsivity and self-control have been
shown to have high predictive validity, and more so than behavioural measures, for a
number of real-world outcomes, such as teenage pregnancy, drug use, and financial
security.”
Dohmen et al. (2011) conducted validation tests between incentivized experi-
mental measures and survey based measures (including hypothetical experiments)
to address the concern that survey questions are able to generate a meaningful mea-
sure of risk attitudes in terms of actual risk-taking behaviours. To do so, Dohmen
et al. (2011) conducted a field experiment using 450 German adults who answered
the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP) survey risk attitudes general and con-
texts specific questions as well as made choices in a real-stakes lottery experiment.
Dohmen et al. (2011, p. 524) concluded that “a simple, qualitative survey measure
can generate a meaningful measure of risk attitudes, which maps into actual choices
in lotteries with real monetary consequences.” Moreover, Dohmen et al. (2011) con-
firm that all risk measures predict various risky behaviours such as; stock holdings,
being self-employed, smoking and engaging in active sports.
To examine the role of risk attitudes in predicting individual behaviours, Paiella
et al. (2004) used data on Italian households drawn from the 1995 wave of the Survey
of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). Paiella et al. (2004) used the Arrow-Pratt
measure of absolute risk attitudes that is constructed using the maximum price the
individual is willing to offer for a hypothetical investment. The results show that
their measure of risk attitudes has strong predictive power on the following consumer
decisions: occupational choice and entrepreneurship; portfolio choice; the decision
to buy an insurance policy; the number of years of education; and the decision
to migrate or to change jobs. Paiella et al. (2004) also address the importance
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of differences in risk attitudes in explaining income inequality by regressing the
variability in expected earnings on risk attitudes and a set of controls. The findings of
Paiella et al. (2004) indicate that differences in attitudes towards risk have the same
power in explaining the standard deviation of expected earnings as other important
controls including; age, gender and father’s occupation.
4.2.2 Determinants of risk attitudes
Individuals’ attitudes towards risk will shape the way they make their decisions
in every aspect of their life. Identifying the factors that determine these choices is
crucial for policy makers and institutions in order to understand and influence these
choices.
A number of exogenous factors that influence individual’s attitude towards risk
are initially examined by Dohmen et al. (2011) before including a wide range of
other variables. The exogenous factors are gender, age, height and parents’ educa-
tion. Dohmen et al. (2011) measure risk attitudes by exploring questions about the
willingness of taking risk in general and in a number of specific contexts, which are
drawn from the 2004 wave of the SOEP.4 Furthermore, as a robustness check, they
measure risk attitudes using a field experiment. All of these measures yield similar
results, however, they conclude that the question related to taking risk in general
can generate a meaningful measure of risk attitudes. Dohmen et al. (2011) found
that females are less willing to take risk than males, willingness to take risks de-
creases significantly with age and the willingness to take risks increases significantly
with the respondent’s height. Willingness to take risk also increases with the level
of parents education, the impact of both parents’ education jointly and individually
are statistically significant. These results are robust to the inclusion of a wide range
of additional characteristics including wealth and income.
4The SOEP general risk question that is answered using an 11-point Likert scale is: “How
willing are you to take risks, in general?”. The survey also includes five additional questions about
risk taking in specific contexts: car driving, financial matters, sports and leisure, health, and career.
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Two waves of the (SOEP) (2004 and 2007) and the Ukrainian Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey (ULMS) are used by Dohmen et al. (2016) to extend the work of
Dohmen et al. (2011). Using questions about the willingness of taking risk in general
and in a number of specific contexts, Dohmen et al. (2016) investigate whether
the exogenous determinants discussed above are the same across the two countries
and whether these determinants are stable over time. Comparing the summary
statistics of the risk attitudes measures, Dohmen et al. (2016) find that, in general,
Ukrainian individuals are less willing to take risk than respondents in Germany.
This finding holds when using the general risk taking question and the context
specific questions with the exception of risk taking in financial decisions where they
observe the opposite. The regression results of risk attitudes determinants using
the basic exogenous specification reveal that the negative impact of gender and age
is larger for Ukrainian, whereas the coefficients of height and parents education
are the same. Having data on Germany, a fully mature capitalist economy, and
Ukraine, a transition economy, enabled Dohmen et al. (2016) to compare the impact
of the recent great recession on individuals risk attitudes in the two countries. The
main driver of changes in risk attitudes in both countries is a large macroeconomic
shock, with the impact being stronger in the Ukrainian case. On the other hand,
individual’s life events and changes in the labour status of the individual have a
minor impact on risk attitudes variation.
To examine the impact of education on individuals’ risk attitudes, Hryshko et
al. (2011) used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the dates of imple-
menting compulsory schooling laws in the U.S.. They found that growing up with
more educated parents and in “good” counties result in an individual who is more
willing to take risk in adulthood.5 However, when using compulsory schooling laws
as an instrument for educational level the county variables are no longer statistically
5The authors constructed a series of variables to measure the “quality” of the county where
the respondent grew up based on a set of indicators such as: median income; the percentage of
population aged 25 and older with a college degree; the median house value; and the percentage
of urban population.
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significant. Based on this finding, Hryshko et al. (2011, p. 4) conclude that “risk at-
titudes is shaped partly by the environment and partly by parental education and that
the compulsory schooling variables capture both effects”. Hryshko et al. (2011) also
confirm that age and gender are significant determinants of risk attitudes. More-
over, they found that more risk averse parents have more risk averse children, older
individuals and females are also more risk averse.
Using both survey and experimental measures of risk attitudes, De Paola (2013)
investigates the determinants of risk attitudes on a sample of Italian students. The
paper also focus on the role of intergenerational transmission of risk attitudes as
this might be part of the explanation for family correlations in economic outcomes.6
Specifically, De Paola (2013) looks at the effect of parents’ risk attitudes on children’s
risk attitudes. Parents’ employment choices, public sector employee or working as
entrepreneurs, are used to proxy for their risk attitudes. De Paola (2013) findings
indicate that job activity of the mother does not impact their children’s risk at-
titudes, whereas if the father works in the public sector the child tend to be less
willing to take risk.
4.2.3 Time varying risk attitudes
Stigler and Becker (1977) argue that preferences are stable at the level of the
individual and any variation in preferences is due to measurement error. A growing
literature from many different disciplines including economics, psychology, manage-
ment, and marketing, has started to question the claim that regards preferences
as a given attribute and time-invariant characteristic. For example, Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) have shown that time-varying risk attitudes is necessary in order
for the size of equity premium and the volatility of the stock returns to fit asset
pricing models.
6See Bowles and Gintis (2002) for a good discussion on mechanisms of the intergenerational
transmission of economic status.
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A theoretical framework that outlines possible channels that might trigger changes
in individual’s risk attitudes is presented by Schildberg-Ho¨risch (2018).7 Under this
framework, risk attitudes for a representative individual is measured by one param-
eter that is characterised by a mean and a variance. According to this framework
risk attitudes instability can be linked to three different possibilities. The first one
is a change in the mean-level of risk attitudes measure over the individual life cycle.
This change is documented in the empirical literature which argue that individuals
become less willing to take risk as they get older. A second possibility in which
attitudes towards risk can permanently change is through a sudden shift to the
mean-level of risk attitudes measure triggered by exogenous shocks. These shocks
could be idiosyncratic changes in economic conditions, like the recent financial cri-
sis; changes in the individual’s economic condition, job loss or changes in wealth;
changes in the individual’s socio-demographic conditions or a major life event, new
child or divorce; and natural catastrophes or violent conflicts. Finally, attitudes
towards risk can also temporarily change through a change in the variance of risk
attitudes measure. This possibility is in line with the empirical literature which sug-
gest that variation in emotions, self-control, or stress can result in risk attitudes to
vary temporarily around an average level, Schildberg-Ho¨risch (2018). The following
subsections will review papers that examine each of these possibilities.
Empirical studies which examine the stability of risk attitudes initially consider
the correlation of an individual’s risk attitudes across time. Chuang and Schechter
(2015) provide an extensive review of the literature studying the stability of pref-
erences in general, including risk attitudes. The reported risk attitudes correlation
coefficient of the studies they reviewed range between 0.13 to 0.68, which is mostly
statistically significant, for time horizons varying from a few days to five years. How-
ever, Chuang and Schechter (2015) found that the correlation coefficient of their
data, using rural Paraguayan households, is positive and large but not significant.
They argue that this result might be due to using a sample that include individuals
7See Schildberg-Ho¨risch (2018) page 142 for a graphical explanation.
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with lower level of education compared to most of the other experiments. Schildberg-
Ho¨risch (2018) argues that the correlation over time of risk attitudes that found in
the literature support the stability of risk attitudes, at least partly. However, the
strict stability of risk attitudes cannot be empirically supported given that the corre-
lation coefficient is low in many studies. Moreover, Schildberg-Ho¨risch (2018) argues
that measurement error in panel data cannot alone account for the deviation from
perfect correlation of risk attitudes that is suggested in Stigler and Becker (1977).
To empirically examine how risk attitudes change over the life course, Dohmen,
Falk, Golsteyn, Huffman, and Sunde (2017) used panel dataset from the Netherlands
and Germany that include self-reported measures of risk attitudes. In Schildberg-
Ho¨risch (2018) theoretical framework, an individual’s age profile can cause changes
to the mean level of measures of risk attitudes. The main difficulty in examining
an age profile in this context is achieving identification as age may reveal cohort
or calender period effects. However, even after controlling for these two effects,
Dohmen et al. (2017) find that willingness to take risk decreases linearly with age
until approximately the age of 65 after which the slope become flatter. The size
of the age effect is substantial as attitudes towards risk decreases by around 0.24
standard deviations in the Dutch data and 0.22 in the German data for an increase
of 10 years in society’s median age.
Focusing on data from Germany, Schurer (2015) used the same SOEP dataset
used by Dohmen et al. (2017) to examine how risk attitudes change over the life
course and also to explore the heterogeneity of this change across the social spectrum.
They also find that willingness to take risk declines strongly for all socio-economic
groups from late adolescence up to age 45. The heterogeneity across socio-economic
groups comes after the age of 45, where risk tolerance for individuals with low socio-
economic status continues to decline but those with high socio-economic status, their
risk tolerance stabilises or even increases after the age of 45.
10 waves of the U.S. Health and Retirement Study are used by Sahm (2012) to
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investigate changes in risk attitudes over time and its heterogeneity across individ-
uals. Sahm (2012) uses expected utility theory to map individual’s response to a
question relating to a gamble over life income to a standard metric of risk prefer-
ence. This measure also accounts for the possibility that income gamble question
generate a substitutional noise and that they provide an interval rather than a point
estimate. Sahm (2012) results are consistent with relative risk aversion expectations
as changes in individual’s income and wealth do not impact his/her risk attitudes.
However, the results show that differences in risk tolerance across individuals are
significantly related to different levels of lifetime income. Sahm (2012) results also
show that individual’s risk attitudes is influenced by the life cycle, in that a one
year increase in age is associated with 1.7% decline in individual’s risk tolerance.
Sahm (2012) also examine the impact of the business cycle and major life events on
risk attitudes.8 The index of consumer sentiment, as a proxy of the business cycle,
has a strong impact on the level of risk tolerance. A ten-point increase in this index
will increase risk tolerance by 9.0%. On the other hand, major life events do not
change the willingness to take risk but they do reveal that risk tolerance individuals
do choose a career that is risky and has a high chance of displacement. These results
are in line with the findings of Dohmen et al. (2016) as large macroeconomic shocks
are the main determinant of changes in risk attitudes, whereas life events have a
minor impact on risk attitudes variation.
The impact of exogenous shocks: Macroeconomic environment and nat-
ural disasters
The impact of the macroeconomic environment individuals experienced over the
course of their lives on the willingness to take financial risks is examined by a
number of studies. For example, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) analysed repeated
cross-section data from the U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances from 1960 to 2007.
Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find that households who experienced lower stock
8This is the second possibility in Schildberg-Ho¨risch (2018) theoretical framework.
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market returns express lower willingness to bear financial risk and are less likely
to participate in the stock market. Moreover, the findings also show that recent
shocks receive higher weights. The authors extrapolate that the effect of the recent
financial crisis might have a long-lasting impact on investment behaviour, arguing
that the impact will only fade-out after 30 years for those who were 30 years old in
2008.
To assess the impact of experiencing economic growth on risk attitudes versus
experiencing a recession, Bucciol and Miniaci (2018) use panel data from the Dutch
Household Survey covering the period 1995–2015, which includes recession as well
as expansion periods. This paper uses a set of six measures of self-assessed risk atti-
tudes to examine their association with contemporaneous macroeconomic indicators
and personal experiences with portfolio risks and returns. The findings indicate that
in general, measures of risk propensity, defined as the willingness to bear risk, are
higher during periods of economic growth and lower during periods of recession
except two measures that suggest preferences remain stable over time. These two
measures of risk propensity are less related to expectations as they explicitly refer
to safe investments. Therefore, Bucciol and Miniaci (2018) argue that the fluctua-
tions observed in risk propensity can be mainly driven by changes in expectations.
More importantly, the authors argue that the experience of past personal portfolio
volatility is much less relevant to risk propensity than the exposure to market large
past risk.
The literature on how risk attitudes are impacted by natural disasters and violent
conflicts is new and inconclusive. Cameron and Shah (2015) measure risk taking of
selected individuals in rural Indonesia, a country that is prone to natural disasters,
using an experiment with monetary payoffs based on the risk game initially used by
Binswanger (1980).9 The findings indicate that individuals who have experienced a
disaster, a flood or an earthquake in the past three years are more averse towards risk.
9This game is based on asking individuals to select one gamble from a set of six possible
gambles, with the risk associated with each gamble increases as the player progresses.
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The authors argue that those individuals attach a higher probability to experiencing
another disasters, hence behave as though they face greater background risk which
in turn causes them to take fewer risks.
The impact of the occurrence and intensity of natural disasters on an individual’s
attitude towards risk is also examined by van den Berg et al. (2009). van den Berg
et al. (2009) measured risk attitudes using games with real money and hypothetical
questions on the willingness to pay for a lottery ticket. The sample analysed is
from two natural-hazard prone countries in Latin America, namely Nicaragua and
Peru. Their results show that the risk attitudes measure that is based on real
money games strongly support the hypothesis that experiencing natural shocks make
individuals less willing to take risk. Whereas the risk attitudes measure that is
based on hypothetical questions leads to unrealistic distributions of preferences.
van den Berg et al. (2009, p. 23) argue that “such disasters not only change the
asset base of the affected population, but also the nature of their preferences and
the weighing of alternative survival strategies. Put differently, risk management and
coping strategies and policies that ex ante seemed optimal are not necessarily so after
a major disaster has taken place.”.
On the other hand, Eckel et al. (2009) findings contradict the previous two
papers. Based on a sample of Hurricane Katrina evacuees and another two samples of
the same population in the U.S., the findings indicate that individuals in the sample
taken from Hurricane Katrina evacuees are significantly more risk loving, especially
females. Bchir and Willinger (2013) used an incentivized field experiment to measure
risk preferences of two populations in Peru, one that is exposed to lahars hazard
and volcanic eruption and another one which is exposed only to lahars hazard.10
The analysis shows that those who are poor and exposed to both background risks
are significantly more risk seeking and significantly more impatient. However, those
who are in a higher income category, their risk and time preferences are unaffected
10Lahars are extremely destructive type of mud-flow or debris-flow that flow down from a
volcano.
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by the exposure to lahars risk.
The stability of risk attitudes of Japanese individuals after experiencing the 2011
Great East Japan Earthquake is examined by Hanaoka, Shigeoka, and Watanabe
(2018). The authors used the seismic intensity of the Earthquake of different lo-
cations around the epicentre of the 2011 Earthquake along with a measure of risk
attitudes elicited from a hypothetical lottery question in the Japan Household Panel
Survey on Consumer Preferences and Satisfaction. Hanaoka et al. (2018) findings
show that males who experienced higher intensity of the Earthquake become more
risk loving and this effect is not a temporary one as they found that it lasts for even
five years after the earthquake.
Finally, transitory changes in attitudes towards risk can be caused by variation in
emotions, self-control, or stress. Guiso et al. (2018) examine the impact of the 2008
financial crisis on investor’s willingness to take risk. Using survey data complimented
with a lab experiment related to clients from an Italian bank they find support to the
emotion channel. Guiso et al. (2018) found that, on average, willingness to take risk
decreased in their sample after the 2008 financial crisis and argue that this might be
related to an emotional fear response. For example, the reporting of Lehman’s fired
employees or knowing people who lost money in the market might have triggered
this emotional response.11 The emotion channel could be tested through the ability
to answer the stock market expectation question after the 2008 crisis. Guiso et al.
(2018) found that those who were not able to answer the question in 2009 but did
answer it in 2007 exhibit a significantly higher decrease in their willingness to take
risk. To further examine this argument, Guiso et al. (2018) asked half of a sample of
a university students to watch a five minutes of a horror film to identify fear effect
in a simple treatment and control framework. They measured risk attitudes using
a hypothetical choices between a risky prospect and sequence of certain sums of
money. The experiment shows that on average treated students have a 27 percent
11The authors also examined changes in wealth or expected income channels but found that
they do not alter investor’s risk attitudes.
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higher risk premium than untreated one. In psychology, these results support the
Affect Infusion Model (see, Forgas, 1995) which posits that individual in bad mood
will be less willing to take risk since they are more attentive to downside risk.12
Support to the emotion channel is also found in Necker and Ziegelmeyer (2016)
who used the German SAVE household panel data to examine the impact of the re-
cent financial crisis on household’s risk attitude, subjective expectations and planned
risk taking behaviour. Necker and Ziegelmeyer (2016) found that actual changes to
the level of wealth as a result of the crisis are unrelated to the change in risk tol-
erance and in planned risk-taking. Whereas, households attributing losses to the
crisis (the shock of experiencing the wealth changes) decrease their risk tolerance,
which the authors interpret as an emotional reaction to the crisis.
4.3 Data
This chapter uses panel survey data from the “Preference Parameters Study of
Osaka University” conducted in Japan and the U.S. by the Central Research Service
Inc. on behalf of Osaka University. Hereafter, this data is referred to as PPS. The
sample from Japan is a random sample drawn from males and females aged 20-
69 years old surveyed annually during the 2003–2013 period by a self-administered
placement method. Fresh samples were selected and added to the sample in the 2004,
2006 and 2009 waves. The U.S. sample is drawn from males and females aged 18-
99 years old surveyed annually during the 2005–2013 period by a self-administered
placement method. Fresh samples were selected and added to the sample in the
2007, 2008 and 2009 waves. Identical survey questions were asked in each country,
making it possible to make direct comparisons between Japan and the U.S..13
12The Mood Maintenance Hypothesis (Isen & Patrick, 1983) posits that subjects in a good
mood avoid taking risk to protect their good mood, while those in a bad mood will take more risk
to improve their mood.
13The survey starts to cover India and China from 2009. However, only data from Japan and
the U.S. is used in this chapter to maintain a large panel as the chapter uses data up to 2010 only.
For more detailed information on the survey, see http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/coe/journal/eng -
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The PPS data provides detailed information on respondents’ socio-demographic
characteristics and socio-economic attributes. However, the PPS data main focus
is on individuals’ preferences such as; risk attitudes, time preference, altruism, and
habit formation. To collect information on individuals’ risk attitudes, the PPS in-
cludes questions related to the willingness to pay for a lottery choice, gambling over
life income and a general risk-taking question. Unfortunately each wave of the survey
did not include the same set of questions that are measuring risk attitudes through-
out the 2003-2013 period and the way the questions are structured changed for some
questions. Specifically, the way lottery choice questions are phrased changed over
time making it difficult to construct a consistent measure of risk attitudes using this
method. However, gamble over life income questions are consistent only from 2005
to 2010 and the general risk-taking question is not available after 2010. Therefore,
the sample used for Japan and the U.S. covers the period from 2005 to 2010 to
maintain consistent measures of risk attitudes.14
The PPS data provides a number of measures relating to respondents’ risky
choices in finance and health such as, risky asset holdings, gambling activities, smok-
ing and drinking. Moreover, the survey also asks questions related to respondents’
risk of becoming unemployed in the near future and self-reported health status. Re-
garding geographical aggregation the PPS data has information about the place and
the size of the local government where respondents reside. In the case of Japan the
geographical information is provided at the prefecture level and it is at the state
level for the U.S..15
The rich information that the PPS data has on individuals’ risk attitudes and
risky choices make it well-suited to examine the determinants and stability of risk
attitudes, whilst also allowing a comparison of the findings across Japan and the
panelsummary.html.
14In this way the final sample will exclude the Great Japan Earthquake that happened in March
2011.
15There are 47 prefectures in Japan, each consists of local governments, including many cities,
towns and villages.
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U.S..16 The final sample only includes those who are aged 20 to 69 in the U.S.
sample to match the Japanese sample and all observations with missing values are
excluded. The Japan sample consist of 15,498 observations and 6,256 individuals,
whereas the U.S. sample has 13,836 observations and 8,628 individuals.
4.3.1 Dependent variables
The first part of this chapter examines the determinants of attitudes towards risk.
As discussed in the previous section, this chapter will use two different methodolo-
gies that are available in the PPS data to measure risk attitudes. The first method
is related to questions about gamble over life income and is refereed to as the hy-
pothetical gamble measure. The second method is related to the general question
about risk-taking and is refereed to as the subjective measure.
The first method was developed by Barsky et al. (1997) and is based on questions
related to a gamble over life income. These questions are similar to those contained
in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and have been used by Rosen and Wu
(2004) amongst many others. Specifically, respondents were asked to choose between
gambling on doubling their current income with some risk of the income being cut
with a certain percentage or receiving small but guaranteed increase in their current
income.17 The question is:
1. “Considering the following two ways of receiving your monthly income, which
is preferable to you? Assume the job assignment is the same under these situations.
If you are a dependent (e.g., student, housewife, etc.), answer this question taking
your living expense as your monthly income.”
16The term risky choices used in this chapter refers to both engaging in risky activities and
holdings of selected financial assets.
17The wording of these questions remains the same through out the 2005-2010 period. However,
in 2010 the amount by which the income is guaranteed to increase changed from 5.0% to 3.0%. It
could be argued that this small change is reflecting the change in economic conditions around that
year and will not have an impact on the consistency of the risk attitudes measure.
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(a) Your monthly income has a 50% chance of doubling, but also has 50% chance of
decreasing by 30% =⇒ answer question 2.
(b) Your monthly income is guaranteed to increase by 5% =⇒ answer question 3.
2. “Of the following two jobs, which would you prefer?”
(a) Your monthly income has a 50% chance of doubling, but also has 50% chance of
decreasing by 50%.
(b) Your monthly income is guaranteed to increase by 5%.
3. “Of the following two jobs, which would you prefer?”
(a) Your monthly income has a 50% chance of doubling, but also has 50% chance of
decreasing by 10%.
(b) Your monthly income is guaranteed to increase by 5%.
The answers given by respondents will be used to construct a variable with four
distinct categories. This variable is decreasing in the willingness to take risk and
takes the following values: 0 if the respondent answered (a) to question 1 and (a) to
question 2; 1 if answered (a) to question 1, but (b) to question 2; 2 if answered (b)
to question 1 and (a) to question 3; and finally 3 if answered (b) to both questions
1 and 3.
The second method measures risk attitudes by directly asking respondents to give
a general assessment on their willingness to take risk. Similar measure is available
in the SOEP data which is used by Dohmen et al. (2011) and Dohmen et al. (2016).
The question is :
“As the proverb says, “Nothing ventured, nothing gained”, there is a way of thinking
that in order to achieve results, you need to take risks. On the other hand, as
another proverb says, “A wise man never courts danger”, meaning that you should
avoid risks as much as possible. Which way of thinking is closest to the way you
202
Section 4.3 Chapter 4
think?
On a scale of 0-10, with 10 being completely in agreement with the thinking “Nothing
ventured, nothing gained”, and 0 being completely in agreement with the thinking “A
wise man never courts danger”, please rate your behavioral pattern.”
The answers to this question is used to construct a subjective measure of risk
attitudes based on an eleven-point likert scale. This measure has been reversed so
that it is decreasing in the willingness to take risk.
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 present summary statistics relating to the distributions
of both the subjective and the hypothetical gamble measures of risk attitudes. The
statistics for the subjective measure indicates that Japanese individuals are less will-
ing to take risk than their U.S. counterparts. The mean of the subjective measure for
Japan is 6.01 whereas it is 4.37 for the U.S.. Moreover, the percentage of individuals
who answered less than 5 (more than 5) for the subjective measure is 20.0% (57.0%)
for Japan whereas this percentage is 53.0% (28.0%) for the U.S.. This distribution
is also clear in Figure 4.1 where the mass of the distribution is to the right of the
value five in the Japan distribution whereas it is to the left in the case of the U.S..18
The hypothetical measure of risk attitudes indicates that individuals in both
samples have similar attitudes towards risk and in both samples they show tendency
towards being less willing to take risk, with the mean of each sample being around
(3.50), see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2. However, an inspection of Table 4.1 shows that
more Japanese individuals (10.0%) had a value of 1 (answered (a) to question 1, but
(b) to question 2) than U.S. individuals (7.5%). Moreover, a higher percentage of
U.S. individuals (68.0%) decided to choose the safest option (answered (b) to both
questions 1 and 3) than the Japanese individuals (65.0%). Consequently, it seems
18Table 4.1 shows that the proportion of individuals in the first two categories for the subjective
measure in Japan are small. The results, not reported in this chapter, do not change when these
two categories are combined together. Moreover, Section 4.5.4 shows that the results discussed
above are robust to the use of two alternative methodological approaches, one of which treats
the responses to the two questions used to construct the measures of risk attitudes as continuous
variable.
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that Japanese respondents are slightly more willing to take risks than their U.S.
counterparts when it comes to risk attitudes over life income.
This chapter follows Guiso et al. (2018) and excludes inconsistent answers for
the risk attitudes measures. This means that individuals who report a value which
indicates more willingness of taking risk in the hypothetical gamble measure (a value
of 0) but the opposite in the subjective risk attitudes measure (a value larger than
7) are excluded (85 observations are deleted). Also exclude those who report a value
which indicate more willing to take risk in the subjective measure (a value less than
3) but a value indicating less willingness to take risk in the hypothetical measure (a
value of 3) of risk attitudes (325 observations are deleted).
The second part of this chapter examines the validity of the two measures of risk
attitudes used in this chapter. Specifically, a set of indicators that captures risky
choices is used in order to test if the risk attitudes measures discussed above have a
predictive power on these choices.
The choices which are considered to be related to risky behaviours are: smoking;
drinking; and gambling, which are also used by Paiella et al. (2004) using Italian
sample and Dohmen et al. (2011) using German data. The PPS survey asks par-
ticipants the following questions to indicate the level of their engagement in these
activities.
Gambling
“Do you gamble in lotteries or at casinos, or bet on sporting events or horse races?
1: Don’t gamble at all;2: Hardly gamble; 3: Several times a year or so; 4: Once a
month or so 5: Once a week or so; 6: Almost everyday.” To account for gambling
activities, a dummy variable is created that equals to one if the participant answers
(4, 5 or 6) to the above question and zero otherwise. Table 4.2 shows that on av-
erage, 15.0% of the Japanese sample engage in gambling compared to 12.0% of the
U.S. sample.
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Drinking
“Do you drink alcoholic beverages?
1: Don’t drink at all; 2: Hardly drink; 3: Drink sometimes; 4: A can of beer (12
oz.) or its equivalent a day, everyday; 5: 3 cans of beer (12 oz. x 3) or its equivalent
a day, everyday; 6: 5 cans of beer (12 oz. x 5) or its equivalent a day, everyday.”
From the answers to this question a dummy variable is generated that equals one
if the individual answers (4, 5 or 6) and zero otherwise. The summary statistics
in Table 4.2 shows that in the Japanese sample, 29.0% of the participants do drink
daily compared to only 10.0% of the participants in the U.S..
Smoking
“Do you smoke?
1: Don’t smoke at all; 2: Hardly smoke; 3: Smoke sometimes; 4: About 10 cigarettes
a day; 5: About a pack a day; 6: More than 2 packs a day; 7: I used to smoke but
had quit.”
Similar to the drinking question, a dummy variable is created that equals one if the
individual answers (4, 5 or 6) and zero otherwise. On average, 24.0% of the Japanese
individuals smoke whereas in the U.S. the proportion is only 11.0%, see Table 4.2.
The summary statistics presented in Table 4.2 show that Japanese individuals
drink, smoke and gamble more that their U.S. counterparts. These figures are not
surprising given the lifestyle differences in the two countries, specially the work
environment. For example, Frone (2016, p. 387) argues that “individuals may use
alcohol to self-medicate the experience of negative affect and work fatigue resulting
from exposure to work stressors”. Furthermore, these figures can also be explained
by using suicide rates as an indicator of societal well-being. The analysis provided
by J. Chen, Choi, and Sawada (2009) shows that Japan’s suicide rate is ranked
second among OECD countries in 2004, whereas the ranking of U.S. was 12 for the
same year.
The PPS survey asks participants to indicate their holdings of a set of financial
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assets. The exact question is as follows:
“Please indicate which of the following financial assets you own, chose all that apply.
1: Bank savings (including cooperative banks, credit unions and other associations);
2: Corporate bonds; 3: Life insurances; 4: Stocks; 5: Investment Trusts 6: Foreign
currency deposits; 7: Futures/Options; 8: Government bonds; 9: Government bonds
of foreign countries; 10: Private pensions (by life insurance companies or postal an-
nuity pension system); 11: Company pensions; 12: Cash Savings; 13: None”
Following Guiso, Jappelli, and Haliassos (2002), these components are grouped
into categories according to the degree of riskiness of the asset. Specifically, cat-
egories “Stocks” and “Futures/Options” are grouped under “Stock binary”; cate-
gories “Bank savings”, “Government bonds” and “Cash Savings” are grouped under
“Saving”; categories “Private pensions” and “Company pensions” are grouped un-
der “Pension”; categories “Corporate bonds”, “Life insurances” and “Investment
Trusts” are kept as they are and categories “Foreign currency deposits” and “Gov-
ernment bonds of foreign countries” are dropped due to small holdings. Table 4.2
shows the proportion of holdings of each category in Japan and the U.S.. The table
shows that the distribution of holdings is similar across the two countries for some
categories (saving, life insurance, investment trusts and pension) but different for
others (stock binary and corporate bonds). Holdings of risky assets, captured by the
category “Stock binary”, confirm that households financial portfolios in Japan have
a very low share of risky financial assets in comparison to the U.S. and Europe, Bank
of Japan (2017b). The PPS survey also asks a question related to the proportion of
holdings of risky assets in the household financial portfolio. This measure has been
used extensively in the literature (see, for example, Cardak & Wilkins, 2009; Guiso
& Sodini, 2013).
The question is: What percentage of your financial assets of your entire household
are in the following:
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Bank savings, cash, government bonds (%).
Investment Trusts, Stocks, Futures/Options, Corporate Bonds, Foreign currency,
deposits, Government bonds of foreign countries (%).
Table 4.2 shows that the percentage of risky asset holdings in Japan is 8.0%, whereas
it is 25.0% in the U.S..
4.3.2 Independent variables
The PPS survey provides detailed information on the demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of respondents. This chapter controls for a set of variables
that are commonly used as determinants of risk attitudes in the literature, see
Dohmen et al. (2011). However, one of the main contributions of this chapter is the
analysis of natural disaster risk that might be important in explaining and under-
standing heterogeneity in the attitudes towards risk among individuals and between
Japanese and the U.S. individuals. Being able to identify the determinants of risk
attitudes is crucial in understanding individuals’ risky behaviours and investment
decisions. Table 4.3 provide a complete definition of these variables and Table 4.4
shows corresponding descriptive statistics.
Dohmen et al. (2011) argue that exogenous variables that directly influence in-
dividual’s risk attitudes are gender, age, parents’ education and height. These vari-
ables are first included in the short specifications. The full specification, however,
includes a number of other variables potentially have an impact on individuals’ risk
attitudes. These variables are: employment status; the level of education; marital
status; income; net wealth; subjective health; home ownership; the risk of being un-
employed; borrowing constraints; whether respondent lives in a city; and the number
of children in the household. Some of these variables might be potentially endoge-
nous, for example, a greater propensity to take risk might lead to higher income and
higher levels of wealth. However, these variables are important economic variables
and would be informative to see how they influence individuals’ attitudes towards
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risk and to assess if they have any deferential impact across Japan and the U.S..
Furthermore, this chapter contributes to the literature by examining the impact of
natural disaster risk on risk attitudes and whether the impact of this risk is different
across Japanese and U.S. individuals. To control for the macro environment, this
chapter uses the growth rate of GDP at the prefecture level in Japan and state
level in the U.S.. Finally, to account for financial development and accessibility,
this chapter includes an index that captures the state/prefecture financial potential.
Each of these variables will be discussed in detail next.
Considering the demographic characteristics mentioned above in more detail,
Table 4.4 shows that the average age in the Japanese sample is 51 years old whereas
it is only 45 years old for the U.S. sample. Individuals in the U.S. sample are, on
average, taller than their Japanese counterparts with the mean being 172cm for the
U.S. sample and 163cm for the Japanese sample. In both samples around 82.0% of
the respondents are in a relationship.
The level of parental education shows a considerable heterogeneity between the
two samples. Table 4.4 shows that only 45.0% of parents of the Japanese respon-
dents completed high school compared to an average of 80.0% (75.0%) of the father
(mother) of the U.S. respondents. A possible explanation to this heterogeneity might
be related to culture differences between the two countries. In Japan, a couple will
not have children before officially being married and on average marriage age is 30
years. In our sample the average age of participants is 51 years old, which means
that they are born around 1955. Taking into account the average marriage age is
30, then the parents of this participant would have been born around 1925. This
would mean that the parents of the average Japanese respondents attended high
school around the second world war. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that only
45.0% of the Japanese sample completed a high school degree.
Table 4.4 shows that, based on the self-reported health question, the U.S. partic-
ipants are more anxious about their health than their Japanese counterparts. An-
208
Section 4.3 Chapter 4
other important determinant of risk attitudes is whether there are children present
in the household. Both samples show that, on average, households have two chil-
dren. In terms of gender, the literature suggests that males and females usually
exhibit different attitudes towards risk. The analysis controls for gender and both
samples have equal number of males and females.
The risk of unemployment and borrowing constraints are two background risks
that will influence respondent’s risk attitudes level. Unemployment risk variable is
a dummy indicator that takes the value of one if respondent answered one or two
to the following question and zero otherwise, similar measures have been used by
Paiella et al. (2004) and Sahm (2012). “Do you think there is a possibility that you
or someone in your family will be unemployed (in case of running your own business,
the possibilities of discontinuing business) within 2 years? 1 “Strong possibility” 2
“Some possibility” 3 “Little possibility” 4 “Don’t know””. Borrowing constraints is
also a dummy variable that equals one if the respondent has ever been rejected for
a loan application (excluding housing loans), zero otherwise, similar measure also
has been used by Guiso and Paiella (2008).
The financial variables that are controlled for at the household level are income
and net wealth; the natural logarithm of these variables are reported in Table 4.4.
For both income variables the natural logarithm is set to zero when the values of
these variables are zero. In the case of negative net wealth, as a result of total debt
being larger than assets, an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation is applied using
“asinh” routine in STATA, see Oldham et al. (2010).
The number of years an individual spends in education is considered to be an
investment that bears risk and uncertainty similar to investing in stocks. Paiella et
al. (2004) argue that individuals who decide to obtain more education expose them-
selves to a risk. This risk will be materialised in financial form in case of failure and
it consists of the forgone salary in the alternative job, any fees paid and the cost of
living during study. The uncertainty part of investing in education comes from the
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fact that the return from education has a relatively long time span, hence the market
value of the degree upon completion is uncertain. Therefore, theoretically individu-
als who spend more time in education are expected to be more willing to take risk.
Table 4.4 shows that individuals who completed a high school or a college education
are larger in the Japanese sample, whereas the U.S. sample has more individuals
with a university degree or higher than the Japanese sample. To control for the
respondent’s current employment status the following binary variables are derived
from the question listed in Table 4.3, employed (omitted category), unemployed,
part-time work, self-employed and not in labour force (housewife/house-husband,
students and retired individuals). The summary statistics related to employment
status are similar across the two samples. Home ownership is also an important
variable to control for, as this might be used by individuals as collateral when tak-
ing any decision that has some elements of risk, 85.0% of the sample’s individuals
own their house in Japan and 77.0% in the U.S.. Finally, 68.0% (72.0%) of the
individuals in the Japanese (U.S.) sample live in a city.
Macroeconomic variables
Recent literature starts to focus on the impact of systematic changes on individu-
als’ attitudes towards risk (see, for example, Sahm, 2012; Dohmen et al., 2016). The
six-year panel used in this chapter provides a unique opportunity to test the impact
of changes in the macro-economy and the risk of natural disasters on risk attitudes of
Japanese and U.S. individuals. Specially that the time window of the samples used
in this chapter coincide with a significant changes in the macro-economy, namely the
financial crisis and the recession that followed it. Therefore, this chapter controls
for the state of the macro-economy by including the growth rate of GDP and an
index capturing the risk of natural disasters at the state level for the U.S. and at
the prefecture level for Japan. These variables are included with a one year lag.
The interview time for the PPS is in February and March, therefore, the impact of
changes in these macroeconomic variables will be reflected in the measure of risk
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attitudes in the year after.
The validity of the risk attitude measures used in this chapter are explored by
including them as a predictors in the equations of three risky behaviours and the
equations of selected financial assets’ holdings. Individual behaviours, specially fi-
nancial behaviours, are influenced by the level of the financial development of the
state/prefecture where the individual lives. Therefore, a measure of the financial
development of the prefecture/state is included in these equations to control for its
impact on individuals’ risky choices. The measure used for the U.S. is the number of
commercial banks in each state per 100,000 residents, see Celerier and Matray (2017)
for a similar application of this measure. For Japan, this chapter uses an index of
financial potential constructed by Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
in Japan, which measures the balance of prefecture revenues to expenditures. Fur-
thermore, we follow Sahm (2012) and Dohmen et al. (2016) and include GDP growth
at the sate/prefecture level to capture the macro-environment surrounding respon-
dents and how this might influence their risk attitudes levels. Table 4.4 provide
summary statistics for these variables at the aggregate level, which shows that the
mean of the GDP growth rate is negative for Japan while it is positive for the U.S.
over the period 2005-2010.
Natural disaster risk
This chapter contributes to the literature by assessing whether individuals’ risk
attitudes change if they are exposed to a higher risk of natural disasters. Given
the fact that Japan is one of the world’s most earthquake-prone countries, this
chapter will proxy natural disaster risk with an index that measurs the intensity of
an earthquake. However, for the U.S., the natural disaster risk is proxied by the
FEMA (The Federal Emergency Management Agency) disaster declarations. This
information is provided by FEMA which include all federally declared disasters and
features all three disaster declaration types: major disaster; emergency; and fire
management assistance. All emergency and major disaster declarations are made
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solely at the discretion of the President of the U.S..19 Table B3 shows the mean of
the disasters declaration count for each state of the 51 U.S. states over the sample
period 2005-2010.
For Japan, a measure of earthquake intensity is used in order to quantify and
understand the impact of natural disasters on individual’s risk attitudes. However,
the ideal measure is the one that captures wide variation of earthquake impact for
individuals who suffered most severely to those who are not affected at all. The
seismic intensity of an earthquake (known as Shindo in Japan) is ideal measure
to use in this context. The seismic intensity is a metric of the strength of an
earthquake measured by the degree of shaking at a certain location. The commonly
know magnitude measure (the Richter Magnitude scale) measures the amount of
energy released at the earthquake’s epicentre. Therefore, the Richter scale takes a
single value for each earthquake, while the intensity measure takes different values
depending on how far away from the epicentre the monitoring station is located.
This measure is constructed by the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) and it is a
well known scale by Japanese people and regularly reported by media. The intensity
scale ranges from 0 to 7 and as the number increases the shaking and effects become
greater. Table B4 provides a full description of the impact of each value of this
scale.20
This chapter uses a number of different intensity measures to check the robustness
of the results. Specifically, the main measure of intensity is the maximum intensity
that have been recorded in one prefecture during one year. However, Japan is
a country which is exposed to higher risk of earthquake episodes than any other
country and earthquakes do occur at a regular bases. Therefore, it could be argued
19For detailed information about the disaster declaration process see
https://www.fema.gov/disaster-declaration-process.
20The aim of including measures of natural disasters is to assess if these events have an impact
on individual’s risk attitudes not to make a direct comparison between their impacts on U.S. and
Japanese individuals. This is because the natural disaster measures for the U.S. is broader one as
it includes all natural disasters, while in Japan it reflects only earthquakes.
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that the number of earthquake episodes that occurred might influence individuals’
risk attitudes towards risk. On the other hand, Japanese might be well prepared,
mentally and practically, for the occurrence of small and regular earthquakes. Hence,
it could also be argued that only earthquakes with intensities that exceed a threshold
will have an impact on individuals’ risk attitudes. Therefore, to account for these
possibilities, four alternative measures are used as a robustness check to the main
measure (maximum intensity measure). The first one is the mean of the intensities
of all earthquakes that happened in one prefecture during one year. The second
one equals to the number of days within one year in which an earthquake has
happened, regardless of the intensity. The other two measures are constructed based
on measuring by how much an earthquake intensity exceeds certain thresholds on
the intensity scale, these thresholds are 3 or 4. Summary statistics of these measures
for the 47 Japanese prefectures and over the sample period 2005-2010 are provided
in Table B3. The table shows that there is no variation in the average intensity
between Japanese prefectures, which means that all prefectures have experienced
some earthquakes. Whereas the maximum intensity measure shows that earthquakes
experienced by some prefectures have a much higher intensities.
4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 Random effects probit model
In order to assess whether the measures of risk attitudes used in this chapter
reveal actual individuals’ risk attitudes, a series of tests are carried out to check
whether these measures can predict various risky choices. Differences in risk atti-
tudes across individuals should significantly explain their actual risky choices in a
variety of contexts. The set of indicators that captures risky activities and hold-
ings of financial assets that are used in these validity exercises are explained in
Section 4.3.1. Most of these are binary response variables and therefore this chap-
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ter uses probit model to carry out the validity exercises. However, the share of
holding risky assets is proportional in nature and there is a significant proportion
of households hold no risky assets. Therefore, a tobit specification is used for this
variable.21
The random effects probit model is interpreted in terms of an underlying latent
variable, y∗it, of which yit is the realised observation, where the subscript i denotes
the household index and t is a time index.22 In this chapter y∗it will be the propensity
of the respondent to engage in these risky choices. The realised discrete choice made
by the individual, yit is defined according to the following choice rule:
yit =
1 if y
∗
it > 0
0 if y∗it ≤ 0 .
(4.1)
The random effects probit model can be written in terms of the underlying or
latent variable as:
y∗it = X
′
itβ + εit, i = 1, 2, ....., N and t = 1, 2, ....T, (4.2)
εit = ai + uit, (4.3)
where Xit is the vector of observable time varying and time invariant independent
variables discussed above, β is the corresponding vector of parameters and ai de-
notes the individual specific unobservable effect. In the random effects probit model
the error term, uit, is assumed to be normally, independently, and identically dis-
tributed, uit ∼ N(0, σ2u). Furthermore, under the random effects specification it is
also assumed that, conditional on the Xit , ai is N(0, σ
2
a) and are independent of uit
and Xit. This implies that the correlation between two successive error terms for
21Full formulation of the tobit model can be found in Greene (2012).
22This section draws heavily from Greene (2012) and Wooldridge (2015).
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the same individual is a constant given by,
ρ = corr(εit, εit−1) =
σ2a
σ2a + σ
2
u
. (4.4)
The parameters of Equation 4.2 are estimated by noting that the distribution
of y∗it conditional on ai are independent normal. Formally, the probability that an
individual randomly chosen from the population chooses yit = 1 when faced with
condition Xit is given by:
Prob(yit = 1|ai, Xit) = Prob(uit
σu
>
−X ′itβ − ai
σu
) = Φ(Zit), (4.5)
where
Zit =
−(X ′itβ + ai)
σu
,
Φ is the standard normal distribution function for the probit model.
The above model is estimated using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (ML),
which is given by:
∏
i
{
∫ ∞
−∞
T∏
t=1
[1−Φ (X ′itβ∗ +
√
ρ
1− ρa
∗)]1−yit [Φ (X
′
itβ
∗ +
√
ρ
1− ρa
∗)]yit φ (a∗) da∗},
(4.6)
where β∗ =
β
σu
and a∗ =
a
σu
.
The marginal effects are used to interpret the magnitude of the relationship
between a specific variable and the outcome of the probability, since the sign and
significance of the coefficients provide the direction only. Specifically, the effect of
changing one particular continuous covariate xj, j = 1, ...k, by a small amount, on
the outcome probability is given by:
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∂Prob(yit = 1|Xit)
∂Xjit
= φ(Xit
′
β)βj j = 1, ...., k, (4.7)
where φ represents the probability density function of a standard normal variable.
In this chapter, the average marginal effects of the regressors will be reported.
4.4.2 Random effects ordered probit model
The two measures of risk attitudes used in this chapter are constructed using the
answers to a general assessment on respondents willingness to take risk question and
to the question related to the hypothetical gamble over income. These responses are
ordinal and cannot be expressed in an interval scale. Therefore, this chapter will
use the random effects ordered probit model proposed by McKelvey and Zavoina
(1975). This section draws heavily from Greene and Hensher (2010), who provides
a full formation of the ordered probit model and other techniques used to model
ordered choices.23
Similar to the binomial probit model, the central idea behind the ordinal out-
comes is that there is a latent continuous metric (defined as y∗it) that is linked to the
observed ordinal response categories of yit. The latent continuous variable, y
∗
it is a
linear combination of a vector of individual and household characteristics denoted
by Xit and a set of unobservable characteristics represented by ai and εit. Where
ai indicates a randomly generated, time invariant individual effect which is uncorre-
lated with the observable characteristics Xit. εit represents unobserved effects that
are allowed to vary over both time and individuals, and is assumed to follow a white
noise process. This can be formally expressed as:
y∗it = β
′
Xit + ai + εit, i = 1, 2, ....., N and t = 1, 2, ....T, (4.8)
23The chapter will also use the interval regression as an alternative modelling approach. How-
ever, the results will only be reported in the appendix and serve as a robustness check of the
ordered probit findings. Full formulation of the interval regression model can be found in Greene
(2012).
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where β is a vector of K parameters to be estimated.
The dependent variable y∗it is unobserved, but what is observed is:
yit = 1 if y
∗
it ≤ µ1
yit = 2 if µ1 < y
∗
it ≤ µ2
yit = 3 if µ2 < y
∗
it ≤ µ3,
.
.
yit = J if µJ−1 < y∗it ≤ µJ
(4.9)
where µj are the threshold parameters to be estimated with β. These parameters
are defined as µ1 = −∞ and µJ = +∞ and also defined to be strictly increasing
in j so that the associated probabilities are positive. The concern in this model is
to assess how changes in the explanatory variables translate into the probability of
individual i at time t observing outcome j. Hence, an individual will report a value
equals j if y∗it, the latent variable, lies between the threshold values of µj−1 and µj.
Therefore, assuming that the error terms εit follow a cumulative normal distribution,
the probability that at time t, individual i reports a value of j, conditional on the
regressors and the random effects, is derived as:
p[yit = j] = p[µj−1 < y∗it ≤ µj]
substituting from Equation 4.8,
= p[µj−1 < β
′
Xit + ai + εit ≤ µj]
= p[µj−1 − β′Xit − ai < εit ≤ µj − β′Xit − ai]
= F (µj − β′Xit − ai)− F (µj−1 − β′Xit − ai)
= Φ(µj − β′Xit − ai)− Φ(µj−1 − β′Xit − ai)
(4.10)
the F(.) is determined by the assumed distribution of εit, which is the cumulative
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standard normal distribution function Φ for the probit model.24
The log-likelihood function of the ordered probit model is based on the normality
assumption for the εit and it is simply the product of the probabilities associated
with each discrete outcome. This is formally written as:
lnL =
n∑
i=1
J∑
j=0
log[F (µj − β′Xit)− F (µj−1 − β′Xit)] (4.11)
Interpretation of the coefficients in the ordered probit model is complicated since
there is no natural conditional mean function in the model. This is because the the
observed ordinal response categories of yit are merely a label for the unordered, non-
quantitative outcomes. However, Greene and Hensher (2010, p. 113) argue that “In
order to attach meaning to the parameters, one typically refers to the probabilities
themselves”.
The marginal effect of xi for the j-th response is given by:
δj(Xi) =
∂Prob(y = j|Xi)
∂Xi
= [F (µj − β′Xi)− F (µj−1 − β′Xi)]β. (4.12)
4.4.3 A joint modelling framework
The common technique which is used in applied micro-econometrics to account
for endogeneity issues is the instrumental variable approach. However, Wooldridge
(2010) argues that in non-liner models, such as the probit and ordered probit models,
dealing with the endogeneity issue requires careful consideration. This is because the
standard instrumental variable methods such as the two stage least squares (2SLS)
or Control Function (CF) approaches, which are used in linear models, may pro-
duce inconsistent estimates in non-liner models. Furthermore, Greene and Hensher
24The logit model uses the cumulative logistic function.
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(2010) assert that instrumental variable approach is based upon the moments of the
data which is not applicable in a non-linear model. Jointly modelling the determi-
nants of individuals’ risk attitudes and the probability of these individuals engaging
in risky choices means that there could be unobserved factors that affect both equa-
tions.25 Hence, the framework used to jointly estimate these two equations should
allow the error terms in the regression equations to be correlated. Therefore, to
account for both the endogeneity and to have contemporaneous cross-equation error
correlation this chapter implement the “Conditional Mixed Process” (CMP) frame-
work developt by Roodman (2011). The CMP framework estimates multi-equations
where the dependent variable of each equation may have a different format, such as
binary, ordered, categorical or censored equations. The CMP approach is based on
a general seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework, by which the dependent
variables are independent from each other but allows for correlations between their
error terms. The estimations are performed in Stata 15 using the “cmp” command
developed by Roodman (2011) where the first stage regression is probit and the
second stage is ordered probit regression.
The CMP framework can be formally expressed as:
y∗it,1 = X
′
it,1β1 + γyit,2 + εit,1, i = 1, 2, ....., N and t = 1, 2, ....T, (4.13)
which represents the equations of the risky choices. The endogenous yit,2 corresponds
to the measure of risk attitudes. y∗it,1 is as defined in Equation 4.1, X
′
it,1 is a vector
of observable characteristics and β1 is the corresponding vector of parameters. The
equation of the risk attitudes measure is expressed as:
y∗it,2 = X
′
it,2β2 + εit,2, i = 1, 2, ....., N and t = 1, 2, ....T, (4.14)
25The term risky choices used in this chapter refers to both engaging in risky activities and
holdings of selected financial assets.
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where y∗it,2 is as defined in Equation 4.9, X
′
it,2 is a vector of observable charac-
teristics and β2 is the corresponding vector of parameters.
The error terms ( εit,1, εit,2 ) are identically distributed, with a bivariate normal
distribution, with a mean of zero and unit variance and correlation coefficient. That
is, εit,1, εit,2 ∼ N(0, 0, σ21, σ21, ρ). These error terms are correlated across the risky
choices and the risk attitudes measure equations such that:
εit,1
εit,2
 ∼ N

0
0
 ,
1 ρ
ρ 1

 (4.15)
In this specification, if ρ 6= 0 then a joint modelling estimation is characterised by
greater efficiency as it accounts for the endogeneity of the attitudes towards risk
measure in the risky choices equation.
The approach requires that the system be recursive, meaning that the measures
of attitudes towards risk will affect risky choices but not the other way round. The
identification of the two equations in the CMP framework is achieved by impos-
ing exclusion restrictions. Specifically, in the risky choices equations the controls
that are included in these regressions are similar to those included in the determi-
nants of attitudes towards risk shown in Table 4.9. However, in the probit regres-
sions, height of the respondents is excluded and a measure of financial potential
at the state/prefecture levels is included, see Neymotin (2010). The latter vari-
able is included to capture the financial sophistication of the state/prefecture, see
Section 4.3.2 for full definition of this variable.
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4.5 Empirical results
4.5.1 Correlations and transitions
Table 4.5 shows pairwise correlations between the two measures of risk attitudes
and the measures of risk attitudes with risky choices. The subjective measure and
the hypothetical measure of risk attitudes are positively and significantly correlated
with each other in both countries but the correlation is stronger in Japan (0.21) than
the U.S. (0.17). These correlations are higher than the one found in Ding, Hartog,
and Sun (2010) (0.15) between a hypothetical lottery question and a general risk
attitudes question using a sample of Chinese individuals but lower than the one
found in Dohmen et al. (2011) (0.26) for a sample of German individuals. More-
over, the correlations of the two measures used in this chapter with risky behaviours
and financial choices are also statistically significant and with the expected signs,
indicating that those who are less willing to take risk engage less in risky activities.
However, the correlations found for the U.S. and Japan are lower than what is been
found in other studies. For example, Dohmen et al. (2011) found that the correlation
between the willingness of taking risk in general and in a number of specific contexts
to be around 0.50 for each context in a sample of German population. A notable
observation from Table 4.5 is the stronger correlation of the risky behaviours and
financial choices with the subjective measure of risk attitudes compared to the cor-
relations with the hypothetical gamble measure in both countries. The same pattern
has been found in Dohmen et al. (2011) and Ding et al. (2010). These statistically
significant correlations between the two measures of risk attitudes and the risky
choices serve as an initial confirmation to the validity of the risk attitudes measures
in reflecting risky choices before formally, using probit regressions, confirming this
validity jointly with other individual’s characteristics in Section 4.6.
Risk attitudes are expected to be different between individuals given their char-
acteristics and experiences, however, what is interesting to examine is whether in-
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dividuals revise their risk attitudes over time. Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 examine the
transition probabilities of respondents between the various categories of the two risk
attitudes measures used in this chapter. In general, the two tables show that there
is high transition rate between categories of the the subjective and hypothetical
measures of risk attitudes over time. This transition rate is higher in Japan than
in the U.S.. For example, Table 4.7 of the Japanese respondents that selected value
zero (more willing to take risk) for the hypothetical gamble measure, only 25.84
percent subsequently choose the same value again, i.e. 25.84 percent remain in the
“more willing to take risk” category over the six-year period. The remaining 21.28
percent of respondents transitioned to the value one in the next period, while 23.10
percent and 29.79 percent transitioned to values 2 and 3 respectively. For the U.S.,
the percentage that remained in the “more willing to take risk” category over the
six-year period is 27.04 which slightly higher.
This high transition rate may indicate that respondents are inconsistent in their
answers over time leading to some measurement error in the risk attitudes indices,
especially the subjective measure since there is no clear differences between neigh-
bouring values of this measure. However, such high transition rate is not observed
from “less willing to take risk” values to “more willing to take risk” values, i.e. re-
spondents have stronger preference to become less willing to take risk over time.26
For example, Table 4.7 of the U.S. respondents that selected value 3 for the hy-
pothetical gamble measure, 79.52 percent subsequently choose the same value and
remain in the “less willing to take risk” category over the six-year period.27 The
findings in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 show that individuals in the U.S. and Japan
become less willing to take risk over time since a relatively high proportion of re-
spondents revise their own risk attitudes. This clearly contradicts the assumption
of fixed risk attitudes for individuals over time. Therefore, policies that are based
on aggregate measures of risk attitudes might have to be revised periodically since
26Similar results are found in West and Worthington (2012)
27A similar transition behaviour is observed in the subjective measure of risk attitudes.
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these measures will not be suitable over an extended horizon given the high rate of
transition.
4.5.2 The determinants of risk attitudes: Baseline specifi-
cation
This section outlines the main determinants of individuals’ attitudes towards
risk, focusing first on the role played by the exogenous variables as defined in the
baseline specification. The baseline specification model includes variables that are
argued in the literature to be exogenous determinants of risk attitudes, see Dohmen
et al. (2011). The main purpose of analysing only these variables first is to see if
they can explain individuals’ risk attitudes in the same way as other studies found
and whether these exogenous variables are equally important across Japan and the
U.S.. As discussed in Section 4.4, this chapter uses two alternative econometric
methodologies, ordered probit model and interval regressions model. However, the
main discussion will be based on the ordered probit model and the interval regression
results will only be reported in the appendix and serve as a robustness check of the
ordered probit findings.
The subjective and hypothetical gamble measures of risk attitudes are decreas-
ing in the willingness to take risks and the estimated coefficients of the ordered
probit model are interpreted only in terms of their signs and statistical significance.
Therefore, if the coefficient is positive, then an increase in the independent variable
necessarily increases the probability of reporting a higher value of the risk attitudes
measure “less willing to take risk” and decreases the probability of reporting a lower
value of the risk attitudes measure, that is “more willing to take risk”.
Panel A in Table 4.8 shows the regression results of the ordered probit model
for both Japan and the U.S. using the subjective and hypothetical gamble measures
of risk attitudes.28 The table indicates that being male increases the probability
28The cut points of the categories of the two measures are tested to see if they are different from
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of being more willing to take risk, the signs and the statistical significance are
consistent in both countries and across both measures of risk attitudes. This result
is consistent with the literature which suggests that male and female usually exhibit
different attitudes towards risk, see Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999). On the other
hand, age influences risk attitudes in the opposite direction to gender. Panel A in
Table 4.8 shows that as individuals in Japan and the U.S. advance in age, they
become less willing to take risk as the age coefficient is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level. The results of age and gender are in line with most of
the findings of other papers (see, for example, Dohmen et al., 2011; De Paola, 2013).
Interestingly, taller individuals are more likely to be more willing to take risk,
but the coefficients are only statistically significant in Japan. Specifically, Panel A
in Table 4.8 shows that the subjective and hypothetical gamble measures of risk
attitudes correlate negatively with the respondent’s height of Japanese individuals
at the at the 10% and 1% respectively. Similar results are found by Dohmen et al.
(2005) for a sample of German and by Addoum, Korniotis, and Kumar (2017) using
data from several European countries and the U.S.. The channel through which
taller individuals are more likely to be more willing to take risk is put forwards
by Persico, Postlewaite, and Silverman (2004), who found that wage differences
associated with height is similar, in terms magnitude, to the differences associated
with race. They argue that an important channel for the emergence of the wage
height premium might be through the impact of height in adolescence on confidence
and self-esteem. Therefore, taller individuals will have greater confidence which will
be translated into higher willingness to take risks and higher earnings potential.29
Neymotin (2010, p. 998) also find similar results and argue that “It is unclear whether
each other. panel A of Table 4.8 indicates that the null hypothesis that the adjacent cut points are
equal is rejected. For the sack of brevity the statistics related to the cut points are not reported
in all the tables that follow.
29Dohmen et al. (2005) also argue that this results might reflect correlation with other factors,
in particular parental education. Educated parents will provide better nutrition to their children
and hence might have a taller children. However, parents’ education attainments are controlled
for in all specifications of this chapter.
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this operates through a genetic pathway, social pathway or a combination of the
two, although recent evidence points to a genetic dominance of taller individuals by
cognitive abilities.”
The results indicate that only father’s education is a relevant determinant of risk
attitudes and this variable is only significant for the hypothetical gamble measure.
Specifically, having a father who completed high school increases the probability of
being more willing to take risk. This variable is significant at the 10% level for Japan
and 5% level for the U.S.. Mother’s education is statistically insignificant for both
countries and using both measures of risk attitudes. The literature has examined
and documented the impact of parental variables, in particular parents’ educational
attainment, see Dohmen et al. (2011) and Dohmen et al. (2016). However, while
Dohmen et al. (2011) found that the impact of both parents’ education jointly and
individually are statistically significant in the SOEP data, the results reported in
panel A of Table 4.8 indicate that only father’s education is statistically significant.
Following Dohmen et al. (2017) and Hanaoka et al. (2018), the baseline spec-
ification in panel A of Table 4.8 is repeated on a sample split by gender. The
argument put forward in the literature in support of splitting the sample by gender
is that emotional responses to negative shocks may change individuals’ attitudes
towards risk. On the other hand, the psychology literature suggests that gender is
an important factor influencing such emotional responses. Therefore, panels B and
C of Table 4.8 repeat the same regression specifications discussed in the previous
section on males and females, respectively. Interestingly, the results reveal that the
effects of the regressors in the full sample mask considerable heterogeneity in the
effects of some variables. Specifically, panel B and C of Table 4.8 show that, for
Japan, while risk attitudes of male individuals are only influenced by the father’s
level of education, females’ risk attitudes are influenced by the mother’s education
only. Furthermore, the significance level of the height of the Japanese respondents
is larger for males than for females. Specifically, while the height is statistically
225
Section 4.5 Chapter 4
significant determinant of males’ risk attitudes for both measures of risk attitudes,
it is only statistically significant for the hypothetical gamble measure in the case
of female individuals. The impact of age does not show any heterogeneity across
gender as it is still significant and positive for both measures of risk attitudes and
in both countries.
4.5.3 The determinants of risk attitudes: Full specification
This section discusses the results of the full specifications, where personal, house-
hold and regional characteristics are included in the ordered probit regressions.
These additional explanatory variables are included to investigate if they have any
predictive power on individuals’ risk attitudes. The discussion of the result of each
variable will be in relation to the full sample which is reported in Table 4.9, then
the focus will move to gender differences and the related marginal effects of each
variable.
The literature suggests the existence of gender differences in the determinants
of risk attitudes, see Byrnes et al. (1999). Table 4.10 shows the determinants of
attitudes towards risk for male respondents in panel A and for female respondents in
panel B. Similar to the findings of the short specification, the table reveals significant
differences in the determinants of risk attitudes between male and female individuals
and these differences are not the same across Japan and the U.S..
The results reported in Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 reveal the direction of the im-
pacts of the independent variables on the two measures of risk attitudes used in this
chapter. However, other than the signs and the level of statistical significance, it
is difficult to understand the size and importance of the impacts of these variables
on the individual’s attitude towards risk. Furthermore, it is informative to examine
if the magnitude of the impact of each variable is different across gender and be-
tween Japan and the U.S.. Therefore, Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 report the marginal
effects of the independent variables on the hypothetical gamble measure and sub-
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jective measure of risk attitudes respectively. However, for the sake of brevity only
the magnitudes of the variables related to the hypothetical gamble measure of risk
attitudes are discussed in the following subsections. The impacts of the variables on
the subjective measure are similar to the results of the hypothetical gamble but the
magnitudes are lower, see Table 4.12.
The marginal effects are estimated at the mean of the independent variables and
reported only at selected outcomes of the subjective measure of risk attitudes for the
sake of brevity. Specifically, the subjective measure of risk attitudes has 11 outcomes,
of these outcomes the marginal effects of only selecting a value of 2 (outcome 3);
a value of 4 (outcome 5); a value of 8 (outcome 9); and a value of 10 (outcome
11) are reported in Table 4.12. However, for the hypothetical gamble measure of
risk attitudes, the marginal effects are reported at all possible outcomes which are
related to being a signed the following values 0, 1, 2 and 3 in Table 4.11. These
marginal effects represent the changes in the proportion of individuals belonging to
one risk attitudes outcome when the independent variable increases by one unit if
the variable is continuous, or evaluated with regards to the omitted category in the
case of dummy variables.
Parental education
Table 4.9 shows the results of the full specification. Interestingly, the statistical
significance disappears for parents’ education after considering the full specification
in both countries. This is in contrast to the findings of Dohmen et al. (2011) where
the level of parental education remain statistically significant in the most compre-
hensive specification. Specifically, Table 4.9 shows that parents’ education has no
impact on the level of individual’s risk attitudes in Japan and the U.S.. However,
the literature argues that individual’s income and wealth are highly correlated with
parents’ education (see, for example, Dohmen et al., 2005). Furthermore, empirical
studies usually use parents’ education as a proxy for the level of individual’s income
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to control for endogeneity (see, for example, Sacerdote, 2011; Solon, 1999).30 There-
fore, this result is not surprising since the full specification has variables that might
be correlated with the education level of the respondent’s parents.
However, Table 4.10 shows that the impact of parents’ education on risk attitudes
retains its statistical significance when gender differences are taken into account. The
results of the short specification discussed in Table 4.8 indicated that only father’s
education has an impact on the hypothetical gamble measure of risk attitudes and
this impact is no longer statistically significant in Table 4.9 as the full specification
is considered. However, Table 4.10 shows that father’s level of education has a
negative and statistically significant impact on the hypothetical gamble measure of
risk attitudes of the U.S. male individuals. Table 4.11 shows that for the U.S. sample,
having a father holding a high school degree or higher reduces the probability of the
male individual reporting the highest value of the hypothetical gamble measure
(increases the willingness of taking risk) by 5.80 percentage points.31 Table 4.9 also
shows that risk attitudes of Japanese female respondents are negativity influenced
by their mother’s education. Table 4.12 shows that having a mother holding a high
school degree or higher reduces the probability of the female individual reporting the
highest value of the subjective measure (increases the willingness of taking risk) by
0.24 percentage points. This result is an indication to the importance of considering
gender differences in empirical studies examining individual attitudes towards risk,
given that mother’s education was not significant at all in the full sample.
Demographic variables
After considering the full specification the coefficients of some of the demographic
variables show some significant heterogeneity between gender and across the two
30In unreported results, when income is excluded from the full specification, the impacts of
parents’ education regain the statistical significance found in Table 4.8.
31Recall that risk attitudes measures are decreasing in the willingness of taking risk. This means
that the highest value of the risk attitudes measures indicate less willingness to take risk.
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countries.32 For example, age only have a statistically significant impact on Japanese
male individuals using the hypothetical gamble measure, as seen in Table 4.10, while
the impact is statistically significant for both male and female individuals for the U.S.
sample. The magnitude of the impact of age is larger for Japanese male respondents
than for U.S. male respondents. However, for the U.S. sample, the impact of age
is larger for male than female individuals. For example, a one year increase in
age increases the probability of the Japanese male individual reporting the highest
value of the hypothetical gamble measure by 1.40 percentage points, while it will
increase it by 1.10 percentage points for the U.S. male individuals. As for the U.S.
female respondents, the probability of reporting the highest value of the hypothetical
gamble measure will increase by 0.80 percentage points for a one year increase in
age.
Height of the respondent remains, in the full specification, a statistically signif-
icant determinant of risk attitudes of Japanese individuals as found in Table 4.8.
However, when considering the impact of height by gender, Table 4.10 shows that
height is only statistically significant for Japanese male individuals. An increase in
height by one centimetre reduces the probability of the male individual reporting
the highest value of the hypothetical gamble measure by 0.28 percentage points.
Table 4.9 shows that the correlation between being married and risk attitudes is
positive for both measures in the U.S. sample but only for the subjective measure
in the Japan sample. This means that in both countries those who are in a rela-
tionship are more likely to be less willing to take risk. However, this relationship is
not as clear when considering gender differences. Specifically, Table 4.10 shows that
U.S. married female respondents are more likely to be less willing to take risk in
both measures. Whereas, Japanese married female respondents are likely to report
more willingness to take risk in the subjective measure and the opposite for the
hypothetical gamble measure. Table 4.11 shows that being in a relationship reduces
32The impacts of age, height and gender after considering the full specification, as shown in
Table 4.9, are virtually unchanged to what have been found in Table 4.8 that shows the results of
the short specification.
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the probability of reporting the highest value of the hypothetical gamble measure
by 5.80 percentage points for Japanese female respondents. Whereas, for the U.S.
female respondents the probability increases by 5.03 percentage points.
The coefficient that captures the number of children in the household correlates
negatively with risk attitudes of individuals. This is an interesting result as the
coefficient of the marital status indicate that those who are in a relationship have
a higher probability of reporting a higher value of risk attitudes. However, as the
number of children increases the willingness of taking risk increases. This results is
also found in Halek and Eisenhauer (2001, p. 20) who argue that “These findings
may reflect a self-selection process, in which those who are most risk averse are more
inclined toward marriage and less inclined to have children in the first place.” The
results presented in Table 4.10 show that only the risk attitudes of male individuals
in Japan is negatively correlated with this variable, whereas for the U.S. it is the
risk attitudes of female respondents that are negatively influenced by the number of
children.
The literature suggests that those who live in cities are likely to be more willing
to take risk than those who live in rural areas (see, for example, De Paola, 2013).
The results of the full specification in Table 4.9 show that the place of residency
of the respondent has no impact on both measures of risk attitudes for Japan and
the U.S.. However, interesting results emerge when considering the impact of this
variable on attitudes towards risk by gender. Specifically, Table 4.10 shows that this
variable is statistically significant for the U.S. male individuals using both measures
of risk attitudes. The correlation between this variable and risk attitudes of U.S.
male individual is negative as expected. This means that those who live in a city
are more willing to take risk since they are likely to report a lower value of risk
attitudes compared to those who live in a rural areas.
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Employment status
Employment status of individuals should correlate strongly with the their atti-
tudes towards risk. For example, entrepreneurship or self-employment are typically
associated with risk bearing as the return is volatile and uncertain. On the other
hand, wage employment or public sector employment are relativity risk free since
these types of employment have a higher job security and less income volatility.
Hence, these types of employment will attract individuals who are less willing to
take risk, whereas people who are self-employed will be those who are more willing
to take risk. In line with the empirical literature (De Paola, 2013; Guiso et al.,
2018), Table 4.9 shows that for Japan, the coefficients on the variables of being “un-
employed” and “not in labour force” are positively correlated with the subjective
measure of risk attitudes. This means that these individuals are less willing to take
risk in comparison to those who are in full time employment, which is the omitted
category.33 Furthermore, the coefficient of being self-employed is negatively corre-
lated with the hypothetical gamble measure of risk attitudes for Japan and both
measures for the U.S. in support to the findings of Paiella et al. (2004) and Dohmen
et al. (2011). This negative and statistically significant correlation between self-
employment and risk attitudes for both Japan and the U.S. supports the argument
that self-selection into occupations is triggered by heterogeneity in risk attitudes
among individuals, see Paiella et al. (2004).
The impact of the employment status of the respondent on their risk attitudes
does not change significantly when the sample is split by gender, only one exception
is for those who are not in labour force. While the results in Table 4.9 indicate that
respondents in this category are less willing to take risk in comparison to those who
are in employment, this finding only holds for female respondents. Male respondents
who are not in labour force actually report higher level of willingness to take risk than
33Other papers found no noticeable influence of employment on risk attitudes (see, for example,
Halek & Eisenhauer, 2001).
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those who are employed, although this is statistically significant only for Japanese
individuals. In terms of magnitudes, Table 4.11 shows that for Japan, being in part-
time employment reduces the probability of males reporting the highest value of the
hypothetical gamble measure by 9.60 percentage points compared to those who are
in full-time employment. This probability is reduced by 5.30 percentage points for
those who are self-employed and by 6.40 percentage points for those who are not in
labour force. The magnitude of the effect of self-employed is lower than those who
are in the other categories which is surprising, but this is not the case for the U.S.
sample. Panel B of Table 4.11 shows that, for the U.S., the self-employed category is
the only significant category and with the impact being larger than that found for the
Japanese male individuals. Specifically, being a self-employed male individual in the
U.S. reduces the probability of the male individual reporting the highest value of the
hypothetical gamble measure by 15.50 percentage points compared to those who are
in full-time employment. For female U.S. respondents the results are as expected,
in that, being self-employed female respondents increase the probability of being
more willing to take risk by 9.50 percentage points, while not being in labour force
increases this probability by 4.20 percentage points compared to those who are in
full-time employment. The impact of employment status on the subjective measure
of risk attitudes is in line with expectation for both countries, however, the impact
is not as large as that found for the hypothetical gamble measure of risk attitudes.
The level of education
The literature suggests that the level of education of the respondent will have
an impact on their attitudes towards risk. In line with the expected impact of
education discussed in Section 4.3, Table 4.9 shows that in both Japan and the
U.S. those who hold a university degree or higher are more willing to take risk than
those who only completed a high school. Similar results are found in Guiso et al.
(2018). However, these results are only statistically significant for the hypothetical
gamble measure of risk attitudes. When considering the differences across gender,
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the results in Table 4.10 indicate that male individuals who hold a college degree
in Japan are more willing to take risk than those who completed high school. The
coefficient of holding a college degree was not significant for both countries and
using both measures when the full sample is considered, see Table 4.9. Table 4.11
reveals that, in general, the magnitudes of the level of education impacts are lager
for male compared to female individuals in the U.S., while the impacts are larger for
female individuals for Japan. For example, using the hypothetical gamble measure
of risk attitudes, the table shows that having a university degree or higher reduces
the probability of the Japanese male individuals reporting the highest value by
6.30 percentage points compared to those who hold a high school degree, while the
probability is reduced by 7.90 percentage points for Japanese female individuals.
However, for the U.S. sample, the same probability is reduced by 12.30 percentage
points for males and only by 4.30 percentage points for females.
Financial variables
The literature suggests that it is important to control for the level of income
and wealth of the individual when examining their attitudes towards risk. High
levels of income and wealth will cushion the impact of bad realisation and hence
may increase individual’s willingness to take risk.34 Table 4.9 documents that the
level of income is correlated with both measures of risk attitudes, across Japan and
the U.S. with the expected sign. Table 4.10 also shows that while the same negative
correlation is found in the male samples, household income for female respondents is
now only correlated with the subjective measure of risk attitudes in both countries.
On the other hand, net wealth does not have statistical significant impact on risk
attitudes for both measures and across the two countries, in line with the findings of
Dohmen et al. (2016). In terms of magnitude, the level of income of the household
has a stronger impact on the U.S. male individuals compared to Japanese male
34The issue of potential endogeneity of these two variables is suggested in the literature as greater
willingness to take risk will lead to more income and more wealth accumulation. Therefore, the
discussion will be based on association rather than causation.
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individuals. Specifically, Table 4.11 shows that an increase in household income by
1% reduces the probability of the Japanese male individuals reporting the highest
value of the hypothetical gamble measure by 0.025 percentage points, while the
probability is reduced by 0.034 percentage points for the U.S. male individuals.
Table 4.9 shows that home ownership is a significant determinant of risk atti-
tudes. The hypothetical gamble measure of risk attitudes is positively correlated
with home ownership for Japan, but for the U.S. it is the subjective measure that is
positively correlated with home ownership. This means that respondents who own
their homes have a higher probability of being less willing to take risk than those who
do not. This result is in line with the literature which argue that home ownership
can be considered as a source of background risk as a result of house price volatility
(Cardak & Wilkins, 2009). However, other papers argue that home ownership could
act as a collateral to facilitate borrowing and generate liquidity and smooth the
impact of bad realisation (Mariotti et al., 2015). When considering gender differ-
ences, home ownership is only significant for the U.S. sample, where it is positively
correlated with the hypothetical gamble measure for males and subjective measure
for females. In terms of magnitude, being a home owner increases the probability
of the U.S. male individuals reporting the highest value of the hypothetical gamble
measure by by 3.90 percentage points.
Background risks
Risk attitudes might be influenced not only by individuals’ characteristics but
also by the environment faced by the individuals. This section examines the impact
of a number of background risks on individuals’ risk attitudes. Self-reported health
status, the risk of unemployment and the risk of facing borrowing constraints are
considered in this chapter which are faced at the individual level.
The self-reported health status indicator is increasing in good health. Table 4.9
reveals a negative and statistically significant correlation between health status and
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measures of risk attitudes, similar to the findings of Dohmen et al. (2011). Table 4.10
shows that the self-reported health status for the female samples of the U.S. and
Japan correlate in the same way as that found using the full sample. In terms of
magnitude, Table 4.12 shows that reporting not anxious about your health reduces
the probability of the Japanese female individuals reporting the highest value of
the subjective measure by 0.14 percentage points, this probability is reduced by
0.15 percentage points for U.S. female individuals. However, health status of male
individuals in Japan does not have an impact on either risk attitudes measures,
whereas health status of U.S. male individuals is correlated negatively with both
measures of risk attitudes. The differential impact of health status in Japanese and
U.S. male individuals might be related to the structure of health provision in these
two countries. Accessing health services in Japan is completely free, while it is not
the case for U.S. individual. In general, this negative correlation is expected and
intuitive as those who are anxious about their health will anticipate exposure to
financial expenses, hence will avoid taking any risk.
The hypothetical gamble measure correlates negatively with the risk of being
unemployed in the near future.35 This means that those who face an increased risk
of losing their job are more willing to take risk. Interestingly, splitting the sample by
gender, reveals the impact of this variable is only statistically significant for Japanese
male and female individuals. For example, Table 4.11 shows that being exposed
to the possibility of being unemployed decreases the probability of the Japanese
(male and female) individuals, statistically significant at the 10% level, reporting
the highest value of the hypothetical gamble measure by 2.50 percentage points.
This relationship is expected and in line with the findings of other papers (see, for
example, Paiella et al., 2004; Sahm, 2012). Occupations that involve a higher risk
of being short-term and unstable are chosen by individuals who are more willing to
take risk. However, this risk taking behaviour is not irrational as these occupations
35The impact of this measure is statistically significant at the 1% level for Japan but only at
the 10% level for the U.S..
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generally offer a higher return than similar but stable occupations. Interestingly, this
relationship is significant only for the hypothetical gamble measure of risk attitudes,
the measure that is related to gamble over life income.
Table 4.9 indicates that the risk of facing borrowing constraints correlates nega-
tively with risk attitudes, meaning that individuals who are borrowing constrained
are more willing to take risk.36 The impact is statistically significant at the 1% level
for both measures in Japan but only for the hypothetical gamble measure for the
U.S.. This result contradicts the findings of Guiso and Paiella (2008), who found
that those who are defined to be liquidity constrained are less willing to take risk.37
Guiso and Paiella (2008, p. 1137) argue that “liquidity constraints act to reduce the
consumer horizon, thus limiting opportunities to “time diversify” any risk currently
taken and accentuating risk attitudes”. However, the results of this chapter indicate
that those who are faced with borrowing constraints have a higher probability of
reporting the lowest value of the risk attitudes measure. A possible explanation
to this result is that those who are not credit constrained are those who behave
more prudently and, in general, those who behave prudently are individuals who
are less willing to take risk. The impact of facing the risk of borrowing constraints
shows some significant heterogeneity between males and females. Specifically, bor-
rowing constraints correlate significantly only with the subjective measure of risk
attitudes of Japanese female respondents only. Whereas, U.S. female respondents
risk attitudes is not influenced by the risk of facing borrowing constraints. Coeffi-
cients related to male individuals in both countries show the same correlation found
in Table 4.9. In terms of magnitude, borrowing constraints have a similar impact
across the two countries, however, the impact for Japanese female respondents risk
36The correlation between the risk of facing borrowing constraints and risk attitudes in the raw
data is also negative.
37Guiso and Paiella (2008) measure of liquidity constrained is a wider measure than the one used
in this chapter, although it refers to liquidity, their measure also capture the borrowing capacity
of the individual. Specifically, their measure includes those who have a ratio of liabilities to total
assets above 25.0%; or have financial assets amounting to less than 1.0% of their net worth as well
as those who have been refused credit.
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attitudes is larger than that for male individuals using the subjective measure, see
Table 4.12.
Macroeconomic variables
The state of the macroeconomy and the risk of experiencing natural disaster are
two background risks that will have an impact on respondent’s attitudes. Table 4.9
shows that GDP growth impacts only the subjective measure of risk attitudes and
this holds only for the U.S. sample. The coefficient indicates a negative relationship
which means that U.S. individuals become more willing to take risk as the GDP
growth increases. This finding is in line with the results from papers that examine
the impact of the financial crisis on individuals’ risk attitudes (see, for example,
Necker & Ziegelmeyer, 2016; Malmendier & Nagel, 2011; Bucciol & Miniaci, 2018).
For example, Malmendier and Nagel (2011) find that households who experienced
lower stock market returns express lower willingness to bear financial risk and are less
likely to participate in the stock market. However, Table 4.10 shows that the GDP
growth only impact risk attitudes for male individuals in the U.S. sample, which
means that U.S. male individuals become more willing to take risk during positive
economic growth. In terms of the magnitude of the relationship, Table 4.12 shows
that the impact of GDP growth is only statistically and economically significant for
the U.S. male individuals. Specifically, a one unit increase in the growth of GDP
will increases the probability of the U.S. male individuals reporting the lowest value
of the subjective measure by 0.28 percentage points.
One of the main contributions of this chapter is to examine whether experiencing
a natural disaster by individuals have an impact on their attitudes towards risk.
Furthermore, it is interesting to see if Japanese individuals change their attitudes
towards risk differently from U.S. individuals. As discussed in Section 4.3, the
natural disaster measure for the U.S. is the number of FEMA disaster declarations.
However, for Japan this chapter employs a number of different earthquake intensity
measures that are taken at the prefecture level. Table 4.9 indicates that the number
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of disaster declarations has no impact on attitudes towards risk of U.S. individuals.
However, for Japan, Table 4.9 indicates that the maximum earthquake intensity
that was recorded a year before the interview has a statistically significant impact
on the attitudes towards risk of Japanese individuals. This impact is positive and
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance for the hypothetical gamble
measure. However, Table 4.10 show that experiencing a natural disaster has a
statistical significant impact only for male individuals. This means that as the
earthquake intensity increases Japanese male individuals become less willing to take
risk. The marginal effects of the impact of natural disaster risk will be explained in
detail in the following section.
As discussed before, the impact of natural disasters on individuals attitudes
towards risk are inconclusive. While the findings of this chapter are in line with, for
example, Cameron and Shah (2015) and van den Berg et al. (2009), they contradict
findings of Hanaoka et al. (2018) and Eckel et al. (2009). A possible explanation
of this inconsistency might be related to the severity of the disasters examined in
each study. Specifically, Eckel et al. (2009) and Hanaoka et al. (2018) consider the
impact of severe disasters. Hurricane Katrina, examined by Eckel et al. (2009), was
an extremely destructive and deadly disaster which caused 1,836 fatalities and the
total economic impact exceeded $150 billions according to the National Hurricane
Center of the U.S.. Similarly, Hanaoka et al. (2018) examined the impact of the
Great East Japan Earthquake which resulted in 15,897 fatalities according to the
National Police Agency of Japan and the estimated economic cost was US$235
billions, according to The World Bank, making it the costliest natural disaster in
history. Therefore, it might be the case that individuals become more willing to take
risk when experiencing rare and severe disaster but less willing to take risk when
faced with moderate and regular natural disasters. To test the robustness of the
impact of earthquake on risk attitudes, Section 4.5.4 will present the results of the
alternative earthquake risk measures in detail.
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Overall, the results of Table 4.10 indicate that the risk attitudes of male indi-
viduals are more influenced by the set of controls considered in this chapter than
the risk attitudes of female respondents. These results are generally in line with
the literature. For example, Hanaoka et al. (2018) findings indicate that males’ risk
attitudes are more likely to change than those of females. These results show the
importance of controlling for gender differences in the analysis of topics related to
risk a version, such as determinants, stability and susceptibility to change.
Similarly, the magnitudes of these determinants reveal that these determinants
have a larger impact on the levels of risk attitudes of male individuals than on female
individuals. This is clear when the hypothetical gamble measure of risk attitudes
is concerned. As for the comparison between Japan and the U.S., the results are
mixed. For example, the impact of some variable is larger for Japanese individuals,
such as age and the background risk variables. Whereas the magnitude of most of
the other variables have a larger impact on U.S. respondents, such as being self-
employed, level of education and income. All of the employment status categories
are statistically different from the omitted one (being in employment) in the case of
Japan, whereas only being self-employed shown to be statically different from being
employed in the sample of U.S. individuals.
4.5.4 Robustness checks
This section outlines the robustness checks for the results of the determinants of
risk attitudes by using alternative estimation techniques. Furthermore, the robust-
ness of the impacts of earthquake risk in the Japanese sample is further checked by
using a number of different measures of earthquake risk.
Alternative estimation techniques
The results discussed above are robust to the use of two alternative method-
ological approaches, interval regressions and random effects OLS regressions, see
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Table B1 and Table B2. Specifically, Dohmen et al. (2011) argue that interval re-
gression can be used when the outcomes of the dependent variable have interval
censoring. In other words, the ordered category into which each observation falls in
the two measures of risk attitudes are known, but what is not known is the exact
value of the observation. Interval regression accounts for the interval characteristic
of the measure of risk attitudes by treating each value of the dependent variable as a
left-censoring and right censoring observation. Another way to check the robustness
of the ordered probit model findings is to treat the responses to the two questions
used to construct the measures of risk attitudes as continuous variable. Therefore,
the random effects OLS regression is also used to further check the findings of this
chapter.
Table B1 and Table B2 show the results of these two alternative estimation
techniques. The result in these two tables are, in general, similar to those found using
the ordered probit regressions in Table 4.9. These results confirm the robustness of
the ordered probit findings discussed above.
The impact of earthquake intensity
A number of different earthquake risk measures are now considered, to check the
robustness of the impact of earthquake risk on risk attitudes found in Table 4.9.
Specifically, the main measure of earthquake’s intensity is the maximum intensity
that have been recorded in one prefecture during one year, this is the measure which
has been used in Table 4.9. However, Japan is a country which is exposed to higher
risk of earthquake episodes than any other country and earthquakes do occur at a
regular bases. Therefore, it could be argued that the number of earthquake episodes
that occurred might influence individuals’ attitudes towards risk. On the other hand,
Japanese might be well prepared, mentally and practically, for the occurrence of
small and regular earthquakes. Hence, it could also be argued that only earthquakes
with intensities that exceed a threshold will have an impact on individuals’ risk
attitudes. Therefore, to account for these possibilities, four alternative measures are
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used as a robustness check to the maximum intensity measure used in Table 4.9.
The first one is the mean of the intensities of all earthquakes that happened in one
prefecture during one year. The second one equals the number of days within one
year in which an earthquake has happened, regardless of the intensity. The other two
measures are constructed by measuring how much an earthquake intensity exceeds
certain thresholds on the intensity scale, these thresholds are 3 or 4.38
The results of the alternative measures of earthquake risk are displayed in Ta-
ble 4.13. For the sake of brevity, the table only includes the coefficients of the
earthquake risk measures. Each of these coefficients represents a separate regression
which includes the same controls that are included in Table 4.9. Similar to the results
found in Table 4.9, the results of Table 4.13 indicate that none of the earthquake
measures have an impact on the subjective measure of risk attitudes. However, the
results indicate that the hypothetical gamble measure of risk attitudes is influenced
by some of these measures and the impacts are statistically significant. Specifically,
the measure which captures the average mean of the intensities of all earthquakes
has no impact on risk attitudes. Similarly, the number of earthquakes episodes that
happened within one year in each prefecture also has no impact on risk attitudes
of Japanese individuals. On the other hand, the earthquake risk measure that cap-
tures the maximum intensity that is recorded in one year for each prefecture has
a significant positive impact on risk attitudes as been discussed before. Moreover,
the two measures that capture earthquakes with intensities exceeding a threshold (3
and 4) also have statistically significant impacts on risk attitudes. The impacts of
these three measures are positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Which
mean that as the intensities of earthquakes increase, Japanese individuals become
less willing to take risk.
The results above reveal some interesting association between individuals’ atti-
tudes towards risk and the risk of exposure to natural disasters. Japan is a country
38Table B3 shows the means of the four measures used across the 47 Japanese prefectures and
over the sample period 2005-2010.
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which is exposed to a high risk of earthquake episodes, many of these episodes are
small in terms of intensity. For example, Table B3 shows that on average, 44 earth-
quakes hit Japan in one year. A potential explanation to this is that Japanese
individuals may have adopted mental coping mechanisms and safety procedures as
a result of these regular earthquakes. However, the average intensity of these earth-
quakes is only 1.40, which would only be felt by some people according to Table B4.
Therefore, the findings of Table 4.13 that only earthquake with high intensity have
an impact on individuals are intuitive. The mechanisms and procedures that have
been adopted by Japanese individuals might have mitigated the impact of small
earthquakes but not large earthquakes. Specifically, the results confirm that the
frequency of earthquake in Japan has no statistically significant impact on individu-
als’ risk attitudes, what matters are those earthquakes with high intensities. These
findings are in line with other papers that examine the impact of earthquakes on
individuals’ behaviours. For example, Maruyama, Kwon, and Morimoto (2001) ex-
amine the impact of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake on individuals mental
health. The mental health status of those who experienced an earthquake intensity
of 4 and above is affected differently from those who experienced an earthquake
with intensity less than 4. Hanaoka et al. (2018) also suggest that intensities above
a threshold should be accounted for as their results show that the impact of these
intensities are different.
Similar to the analysis in the previous section, the impact of the alternative
measures of earthquakes risk is further examined by gender. Table 4.13 panel B
shows the analysis for male respondents while panel C shows the impact on females
respondents. The table confirms the findings of Table 4.9, in which only male indi-
viduals are influenced by high earthquake intensities. The three measures that are
statistically significant in the full sample (panel A) also have positive and statisti-
cally significant impact on the attitudes of male respondents towards risk, with the
coefficients being larger compared to panel A and also significant at the 1% level of
significance compared to 5% found in panel A.
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The magnitudes of the impact of these measures are shown in Table 4.14, which
only shows the marginal effects of the significant coefficients in Table 4.13. Specif-
ically, panel A of Table 4.14 shows the marginal effects of the maximum intensity
measure for male individuals at all four possible outcomes of the hypothetical gam-
ble measure of risk attitudes. Panel A also shows the marginal effects of the all
the controls that are included in the regression. Panel B and panel C of Table 4.14
only show the coefficients of the other two earthquake risk measures as the marginal
effects for the controls are identical to those displayed in panel A, see Table B13
and Table B14 in Section 6.2.
In general, Table 4.14 shows that the three measures of earthquake risk have
a sizeable impact on risk attitudes of Japanese male individuals. For example,
all the measures are larger than the impact of a one year increase in age. A one
year increase in age will increases the probability of the Japanese male individual
reporting the highest value of the hypothetical gamble measure by by 1.30 percentage
points, whereas experiencing an earthquake equals or larger than 4 will increase it
by 4 percentage points. The results confirm the argument put forwards in the
previous paragraph, in that earthquakes with high intensities have more impact
on individuals’ risk attitudes than low intensities earthquakes. Specifically, the
table shows that the impact of having an earthquake equals or larger that 4 is
larger that the impact of having an earthquake equals or larger than three and
the impacts of these two measures are larger than the the impact of the maximum
intensity measure. For example, experiencing an earthquake equals or larger than 4
increases the probability of the Japanese male individual reporting the highest value
of the hypothetical gamble measure by 4 percentage points, while the probability
will increase it by 3 percentage points for an earthquake equals or larger than 3.
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4.6 Validation of the risk attitudes measures
In order to assess whether the measures of risk attitudes used in this chapter
reveal actual attitudes towards risk, this section checks whether these measures
are statistically and economically significant in predicting risky choices. The set of
variables that are used to proxy for individuals’ risky choices in the validity exercises
covers a variety of contexts and are explained in Section 4.3.1. Specifically, smoking,
drinking and gambling are the three risky behaviours that are influenced by the
attitude an individual has towards risk. Holdings of financial assets are also used in
these exercises since individuals’ financial choices that form the composition of their
financial portfolio are also influenced by the attitudes individuals have towards risk.
Table 4.15 shows the marginal effects of the random effects probit regressions re-
lated to the risky behaviours in panel A and the one related to the decisions to hold
selected financial assets in panel B, these marginal effects are the average marginal
effects of independent variables. Each coefficients represents a separate regression
which includes the respective behaviour as dependent variable, a measure of risk
attitudes and a set of controls. The full results of each regression are reported in the
appendix, see Table B5 to Table B10. The controls that are included in these re-
gressions are similar to those included in the determinants of risk attitudes equation
shown in Table 4.9. However, height of the respondents is not included in these re-
gression since the height of the individual affect financial decisions indirectly through
its impact on risk attitudes, see Neymotin (2010).39 Moreover, a measure of financial
potential at the state/prefecture levels is included in the behaviours and financial
choices equations to capture the financial sophistication of the state/prefecture, see
Section 4.3.2 for full definition of this variable.
In general, panel A of Table 4.15 shows that the measures of risk attitudes used in
this chapter have statistically significant impact on smoking, drinking and gambling
39This exclusion restriction is important in order to achieve identification in the two equations
system presented in the following section.
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activities of the respondents. Specifically, the table shows that the hypothetical
gamble measure of risk attitudes is negatively correlated with gambling and drinking
behaviours in the U.S. and gambling behaviour of Japanese individuals. These
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level of significance for Japan and
5% level for the U.S.. Moreover, the subjective measure of risk attitudes is a powerful
predictor of all risky behaviours in both countries except drinking behaviour in
Japan. The coefficients of the subjective measure are negatively correlated with
these activities and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level of significance. The
negative correlation between the measures of risk attitudes and the three variables
capturing risky behaviours indicate that individuals who are less willing to take risk
engage less in these activities.
A further confirmation of the behavioural validity of the two risk measures used
in this chapter can be observed from panel B of Table 4.15. The table shows the
marginal effects of the probit regressions of the decision to hold certain financial
assets as well as the proportion of holding stocks in the respondent’s financial port-
folio. Holdings of stocks is regarded as a risky choice given the relative riskiness
of this financial investment compared to keeping assets in banks’ saving accounts.
The negative correlation between these coefficients and the two measures of risk at-
titudes indicates that individuals who are less willing to take risk hold less stocks in
their portfolios. These results are in line with the standard portfolio theory which
predicts that individual’s risk attitudes will determine the amount of wealth the
individual is willing to invest in risky assets. These findings are in line with the
validation tests performed by Paiella et al. (2004) using Italian sample and Dohmen
et al. (2011) using German data.
Overall, these results are as expected and are in line with the findings of other
papers (see, for example, Dohmen et al., 2011; Paiella et al., 2004; Jung & Treibich,
2015; Beauchamp, Cesarini, & Johannesson, 2017). Moreover, similar to the findings
of this chapter, Dohmen et al. (2011) indicate that subjective survey based measure
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of risk attitudes have more predictive power on the behavioural outcomes than the
hypothetical gamble measure and these power. In terms of magnitudes, the marginal
effects of the two risk attitudes measures shown in Table 4.15 indicate that the risk
attitudes measures have stronger predictive power for risky behaviours than for the
decisions of holdings various financial assets, especially for the U.S.. For example,
an increase in the subjective measure of risk attitudes by one unit, decreases the
probability of engaging in gambling activities by 0.7% for Japan and 1.0% for the
U.S.. Similarly, an increase in the hypothetical gamble measure by one will decrease
the probability of holing stock by 0.6% for Japan and by 1.7% for the U.S. holding
other controls constant. Similar to Beauchamp et al. (2017), the results indicate
that these predictive powers are more pronounced, statistically and economically, in
the three risky behaviours compared to the financial related choices.
4.6.1 A Joint modelling framework
The results in the previous section indicate a strong relationship between the
measures of attitudes towards risk on a range of behavioural outcomes in a variety
of contexts. Specifically, the results show that individuals who are less willing to
take risk tend to undertake safer actions when allocating their financial assets or
when deciding on engaging in risk activities. However, it may be the case that the
relationship between taking risky choices and attitudes towards risk is endogenous.
This would mean that those who are less willing to take risk sort themselves into
choices with lower exposure to risk leading to a problem when examining the im-
pact of risk on choices. Specifically, there could be unobserved factors that affect
both the determinants of attitudes towards risk and holdings of financial assets or
engaging in risky activities. Therefore, to deal with this potential issue, a system
of two equations is estimated to account for this possible endogeneity by using the
Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) framework. Since the interest of this section is to
test the predictive power of the measures of risk attitudes, the two equations system
is modelled as a recursive system, meaning that the measures of attitudes towards
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risk will affect holding of assets or engaging in risky activities but not the other way
round.
In the existing literature there are no empirical studies, to the best of my knowl-
edge, that explore the relationship between individuals risky choices and their at-
titudes towards risk by employing a joint modelling approach. However, there is a
number of studies that employ a joint modelling approach in the literature of house-
hold finance. For example, Brown and Taylor (2008) used a bivariate tobit model
to examine the determinants of debt and assets at the household level. Brown and
Taylor (2008) findings indicated that in the presence of inter-dependent decision-
making with respect to financial assets and liabilities a joint estimation is preferred
as it is characterized by greater efficiency. Gray (2014) used the German SOEP to
examine the relationship between the household’s financial position and overall life
satisfaction. The author used a recursive bivariate ordered probit specification to ac-
count for the potential endogeneity of the household’s subjective financial measures
in the determinants of overall life satisfaction. Gray (2014) findings revealed that
the relationship between the unobserved characteristics of the overall life satisfaction
and subjective financial position equations is statistically significant, advocating the
use of a joint modelling approach. Bridges and Disney (2010) explored the relation-
ship between subjective debt burden and depression in Britain by employing a joint
modelling approach. The findings revealed a statistically significant correlation be-
tween the unobserved components of the self-reported depression equation and the
equation of the subjective debt measure.
The results of the joint modelling of the determinants of risk attitudes equations
and the equations of engaging in risky choices are reported in Table 4.16. Each
coefficient in each panel is a separate regression of a system of two equations linked
via their error processes. The correlation between the errors of the system of two
equations can also be recovered and examined in the joint modelling approach.
These correlation shows the impact that unobservable characteristics have on the
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various dependent variables and referred to by the coefficient ρ which is reported
beneath the related coefficient in Table 4.16.
The results in Table 4.16 show that the predictive power of the two measures
of risk attitudes used in this chapter is consistent with the findings of Table 4.15
even after controlling for the potential endogeneity issue. These findings indicate
that the two measures of risk attitudes constructed from the PPS survey are reli-
able measures in predicting actual individuals’ risk attitudes. However, the results
in Table 4.16 also indicate to a statistically significant relationship between the
unobserved characteristics of a number of risky choices and attitudes towards risk
equations, implying there is interdependency between these equations. The positive
correlations, indicated by ρ, between the unobserved characteristics found in most
of the regressions in Table 4.16 indicate that unobserved characteristics which cause
individuals to report being less willing to take risk also lead to individuals reporting
engaging in risky activities and holding risky assets. Furthermore, Table 4.15 shows
that once a recursive model is utilised, the subjective measure of risk attitude be-
come a statistically significant determinant in the drinking decision equation of the
Japan sample.
The findings of Table 4.16 are important as they suggest that the relationships
between risky choices and the two measures of attitudes towards risk presented in
the previous section are potentially biased due to endogeneity. This finding advocate
the use of a joint modelling approach as it will take into account the endogeneity of
the risk attitudes measure in the risky choices equations and provide more efficient
coefficient estimates. Therefore, this section concludes that individuals’ risk atti-
tudes can be accurately measured using survey questions and policy makers can rely
on these measures in predicting various behavioural outcomes. This is because the
predictive power of the two risk attitudes measures is still statistically significant
even in the joint modelling approach
248
Section 4.7 Chapter 4
4.7 Conclusion
The theory of choice under uncertainty assumes that the observed differences in
behaviours among individuals are attributed to differences in their attitudes towards
risk. In the existing literature, major developments have been made in examining the
determinants of individuals’ attitudes towards risk. However, with the exception of
Dohmen et al. (2016) and Vieider et al. (2015), a comparison of the determinants of
risk attitudes across countries is scarce in the literature. This chapter has compared
risk attitudes and their determinants in Japan and the U.S. and examined how these
determinants are influenced by natural disasters.
This chapter has contributed to the existing literature by examining risk atti-
tudes in two countries that differ significantly in the attitudes of their individuals
towards risks. To do so, six waves of the “Preference Parameters Study” conducted
in Japan and the U.S. and ask identical questions in both countries were used. An-
other contribution of this chapter was the robust assessment of the impact of natural
disasters, an exogenous shock, on risk attitudes by employing a set of different mea-
sures of natural disaster risk. Moreover, this chapter examined the validity of the
“Preference Parameters Study” measures of risk attitudes by assessing whether these
measures reflect actual risk taking behaviours of individuals.
In general, the findings of this chapter showed that a number of variables had
a statistically significant impact on individual’s risk attitudes and the impacts of
some of these variables were not the same across Japan and the U.S.. For example,
the magnitudes of some variables were larger for Japanese individuals, such as:
age; being exposed to the risk of unemployment in the near future; and the risk
of facing borrowing constraints. Whereas the magnitude of other variables had a
larger impact on U.S. respondents, such as: being self-employed; level of education;
income; and self-reported health status. More importantly, the empirical analysis
revealed that considering only the effects of the regressors on the full sample and not
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splitting the sample by gender masked considerable heterogeneity of the effects of
some variables. For example, height of the individual and the risk of experiencing an
earthquake were found to influence the risk attitudes of Japanese male individuals
only. Similarly, the state of the economy had a statistically significant impact on
risk attitudes of U.S. male individuals and only U.S. male individuals who live in
cities were more willing to take risk than those who live in a rural areas.
Overall, the findings of this chapter indicated that risk attitudes of male indi-
viduals were more influenced, in terms of statistical significance and in terms of
magnitudes, by the set of controls considered in this chapter than risk attitudes of
female respondents. These results showed the importance of splitting the sample
by gender in the analysis of topics related to risk attitudes, such as determinants,
stability and susceptibility to change.
The impact of earthquake risk on the attitudes of Japanese individuals towards
risk was robust to the use of five different earthquake risk measures. The results
showed that the number of days with an earthquake and the average intensity of
earthquakes measures had no impact on individuals’ risk attitudes. These results are
intuitive given that Japan is a country which is exposed to a high risk of earthquake
episodes, many of these episodes are small in terms of intensity and Japanese in-
dividuals adopted mechanisms and procedures which mitigated the impact of these
earthquake. On the other hand, the other three measures, that capture earthquakes
with high intensities, were found to have a statistically significant impact on risk
attitudes of Japanese male individuals. These results indicated that what matters
are those earthquakes with high intensities not small and frequent earthquakes.
The results of the validation exercises of the two measures of risk attitudes
ascertained that these measures have considerable predictive power for a number of
risky choices in a variety of contexts. Specifically, the results showed that individuals
who are less willing to take risk tend to undertake safer actions when allocating their
financial assets or when deciding on engaging in risk activities such as smoking,
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drinking and gambling. The results indicated that the prediction power of the two
measures of risk attitudes was more pronounced in the risky behaviours than the
financial choices outcomes. Moreover, the results also showed that the subjective
measure of risk attitudes had a stronger predictive power than the hypothetical
gamble measure. Furthermore, the statistically significant relationship between the
unobserved characteristics of a number of risky choices and attitudes towards risk
equations advocated the use of a joint modelling approach as it will provide more
efficient coefficients estimates.
Overall, this chapter provided a detailed insight into the determinants of risk
attitudes of Japanese and U.S. individuals. The findings of this chapter can help
identify the causes of the differentials in attitudes towards risk between Japan and
the U.S.. Moreover, important policy conclusions about individuals’ risk attitudes in
Japan and the U.S. can be drawn from the findings of this chapter. For example, the
variables that are identified to have an impact on individuals risk attitudes can be
targeted by policy makers to influence individuals’ behaviours and achieve various
vital realizations at the aggregate level such as: predicting labour market structure;
predicting health related risky behaviours; and influencing investments, fertility and
migration decisions. Moreover, the findings indicated that experiencing earthquakes
of large intensities can alter the attitudes towards risk of Japanese male individuals.
This means that policy makers should expect systematic changes in the attitudes
towards risk of Japanese male individuals after earthquakes with large intensities.
Finally, the findings of this chapter confirmed that survey based measures of risk
attitudes had a considerable predictive power in explaining individuals’ decisions in
a variety of contexts. This predictive power makes these measures valid instruments
for policy makers to rely on in predicting individuals’ behaviour and in explaining
inequality in income and wealth distribution. Therefore, devoting more resources to
data collections on individuals preferences and developing comprehensive preferences
questions will enrich further researches concerning individuals’ preferences.
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This chapter examined the determinates of risk attitudes of Japanese and U.S. in-
dividuals. However, the literature concerning individuals preferences is still sparse.
For example, the presence of endogeneity issues when examining determinants of
individuals’ risk attitudes using non-experimental data prevents researchers from
drawing a strong causal inference. Therefore, efforts should be made to identify
direct causal effect of some of the variables considered in this chapter on individu-
als’ risk attitudes. Furthermore, examining differences in time preferences and the
marginal propensity to consume between Japanese and U.S. individuals are identi-
fied as areas for further research in this field.
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4.8 Tables
Table 4.1: Summary statistics: Risk attitudes measures
Subjective measure Hypothetical measure
Japan U.S. Japan U.S.
Mean 6.01 4.37 3.47 3.52
Standard Deviation 1.92 2.39 0.83 0.8
Percentage of each category
0 0.43% 4.19% 4.01% 4.15%
1 0.35% 5.55% 10.03% 7.51%
2 1.52% 14.88% 21.16% 20.65%
3 7.42% 15.45% 64.8% 67.69%
4 10.4% 12.67%
5 23.27% 19.36%
6 13.99% 7.34%
7 22.42% 8.36%
8 9.57% 6.69%
9 6.16% 2.93%
10 4.47% 2.57%
Observations 15,498 13,836 15,498 13,836
Number of ID 6,264 8,628 6,264 8,628
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics: Financial assets holdings and risky behaviours
Japan U.S.
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Stock share 0.08 0.18 0 1 0.25 0.34 0 1
Holdings of assets Percentage holding Percentage holding
Stock binary 19.59% 45.61%
Saving 89.87% 82.41%
Bonds 62.33% 7.73%
Life insurance 64.14% 59.34%
Investment trusts 13.20% 12.27%
Pension 32.82% 41.93%
Risky activities Percentage engaging Percentage engaging
Gamble risk 15.49% 11.57%
Drink risk 28.57% 9.10%
Smoke risk 24.02% 10.86%
Observations 15,498 13,836
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Table 4.3: Independent Variables: Definitions
Variable Name Definition
Father’s education 1 if the respondent’s father completed high school, 0 otherwise.
Mother’s education 1 if the respondent’s mother completed high school, 0 otherwise.
Height The height of the respondent in centimetres.
Male 1 if the respondent is male, 0 if female.
Age Respondent’s age in years.
Married 1 if the respondent is married or cohabiting, 0 otherwise.
Number of children Number of children (under the age of 16) present in the household.
Lives in a city 1 if the respondent is in a major city, 0 otherwise.
Region See Table B4 for a list of prefectures and states.
Employment status-(currently employed is the omitted category)
Part-time 1 if the respondent is in part-time employment, 0 otherwise.
Unemployed 1 if the respondent is studying, 0 otherwise.
Self-employed 1 the respondent is self-employed, 0 otherwise.
Not in labour force 1 the respondent is student, housewife/husband or retired, 0 otherwise.
Education level-(Below high school is the omitted category)
High school 1 if the respondent’s highest level of education is high school level, 0 otherwise.
College 1 if the respondent’s highest level of education is college, 0 otherwise.
University+ 1 if the respondent’s highest level of education is university or higher, 0 otherwise.
Self-Reported Health Status: 5 values from the agreement to the statement: I have anxieties about my health, where:
1 It is particularly true for you.
5 It doesn’t hold true at all for you.
Financial Measures
Log of income Log of household total income.
Net-wealth
Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the total value of household financial and non-financial
assets minus total debt.
Home ownership 1 if the respondent’s owns his/her house.
Background risk
Risk of unemployment 1 if there is a possibility that the respondent or someone in his/her family will be unemployed.
Borrowing constraint 1 if the respondent has ever been rejected for a loan application (excluding housing loans)
GDP growth The growth rate of the state/prefecture level of GDP.
Risk of a natural disaster See Table B3 and Table B4 for more details.
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Table 4.4: Summary statistics: Independent variables
Japan U.S.
Continuous variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age 50.66 12.74 20 77 44.38 13.87 20 77
Respondent’s height 162.35 8.52 135 188 171.43 10.69 102 216
Anxieties about health 2.77 1.05 1 5 3.15 1.19 1 5
Log of household income 6.34 0.63 5 8 4.02 0.72 2 6
Log of net-wealth 14.26 9.53 -18 20 11.59 5.10 -13 15
Number of children 1.79 1.06 0 8 1.60 1.67 0 15
Growth rate of GDP -0.01 3.56 -5 4 0.58 2.47 -3 3
Financial potential 0.65 0.29 0 1 2.59 2.63 0 16
Risk of a natural disaster 3.12 1.39 0 7 55.23 99.34 0 763
Dummy variables Percentage Percentage
Mother’s education 45% 80%
Father’s education 45% 74%
Male 49% 49%
Married 83% 81%
Employment:
Employed(omitted) 53% 62%
Unemployed 4% 4%
Part-time 12% 8%
Self-employed 9% 7%
Not in labour force 23% 20%
Education:
High School(omitted) 59% 45%
College 16% 11%
University+ 25% 44%
Home ownership 84% 77%
Lives in a city 67% 72%
Unemployment risk 29% 33%
Borrowing constraints 8% 18%
Observations 15,498 13,836
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Table 4.5: Correlations between risk attitudes and behavioural outcomes
Japan Subjective Hypothetical Stock binary Saving Bonds Life insurance Inves. trusts Pension Gambling Drinking Smoking
Subjective 1.00
Hypothetical 0.21∗∗∗ 1.00
Stock binary -0.05∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 1.00
Saving 0.01 -0.00 0.11∗∗∗ 1.00
Bonds 0.06∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 1.00
Insurance -0.02 -0.01 0.12∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 1.00
Investment trusts -0.02 -0.02∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 1.00
Pension -0.01 0.00 0.21∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 1.00
Gambling -0.11∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.02∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01 1.00
Drinking -0.10∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗ -0.02∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.00 0.13∗∗∗ 1.00
Smoking -0.10∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.02∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 1.00
U.S. Subjective Hypothetical Stock binary Saving Bonds Insurance Inves. trusts Pension Gambling Drinking Smoking
Subjective 1.00
Hypothetical 0.17∗∗∗ 1.00
Stock binary -0.07∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ 1.00
Saving -0.03∗∗∗ -0.01 0.29∗∗∗ 1.00
Bonds -0.03∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 1.00
Insurance -0.01 0.04∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 1.00
Investment trusts -0.02∗ -0.00 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 1.00
Pension -0.01 0.04∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 1.00
Gambling -0.16∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.01 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 0.06∗∗∗ 1.00
Drinking -0.13∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 1.00
Smoking -0.05∗∗∗ 0.00 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 1.00
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.6: Transitions table of the subjective measure of risk attitudes
Subjective measure of risk attitudes
Japan 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
0 27.78 11.11 16.67 11.11 8.33 13.89 5.56 2.78 0 0 2.78 100
1 11.11 18.52 11.11 22.22 14.81 7.41 0 7.41 0 0 7.41 100
2 3.65 3.65 16.06 24.82 16.79 13.14 7.3 11.68 2.19 0.73 0 100
3 0.45 0.45 5.07 31.19 23.43 14.63 8.81 10.15 3.43 1.79 0.6 100
4 0 0.1 1.54 17.47 21.99 26.31 15.52 12.23 3.39 1.03 0.41 100
5 0.19 0.14 0.84 4.8 11.1 42.21 13.85 16.18 5.22 3.22 2.24 100
6 0.08 0.15 0.85 3.24 11.34 21.91 26.54 24.23 6.79 3.47 1.39 100
7 0.05 0 0.29 2.91 6.73 17 16.56 35.88 13.32 4.99 2.28 100
8 0.11 0 0.22 2.99 3.21 13.62 9.97 32 21.59 12.4 3.88 100
9 0 0.36 0 1.78 3.38 12.99 7.12 21.53 17.97 23.67 11.21 100
10 0.48 0 0.24 0.71 1.66 14.73 3.56 13.78 15.44 16.63 32.78 100
Total 0.32 0.27 1.28 7.23 10.61 23.58 14.62 22.48 9.69 6.01 3.9 100
U.S. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
0 33.87 17.74 11.29 6.99 5.38 10.75 2.69 1.61 1.61 1.61 6.45 100
1 9.19 26.5 28.98 11.31 6.36 7.42 2.47 3.18 2.12 1.41 1.06 100
2 4.27 11.66 29.66 21.24 11.4 9.72 3.76 4.27 2.72 0.65 0.65 100
3 1.66 3.8 19.6 26.6 17.1 14.96 6.41 5.7 3.21 0.48 0.48 100
4 1.56 2.81 9.05 24.02 19.34 19.66 9.2 7.18 5.62 1.25 0.31 100
5 1.82 1.07 8.23 10.47 14.53 40.71 7.69 7.16 4.17 2.14 2.03 100
6 0.54 2.17 6.5 13.55 12.74 18.7 17.07 15.18 8.13 3.79 1.63 100
7 0.23 0.92 6.68 8.06 9.22 13.82 12.67 23.73 17.05 4.61 3 100
8 0.85 2.28 4.56 5.98 9.4 13.11 9.4 21.65 19.94 7.12 5.7 100
9 1.32 1.32 7.28 6.62 4.64 11.26 6.62 13.91 21.19 16.56 9.27 100
10 8.47 2.54 5.93 4.24 5.08 21.19 4.24 5.93 10.17 10.17 22.03 100
Total 3.56 5.57 14.15 15.86 12.85 19 7.71 9.23 6.89 2.75 2.44 100
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Table 4.7: Transitions table of the hypothetical
gamble measure of risk attitudes
Hypothetical gamble measure
Japan 0 1 2 3 Total
1 25.84 21.28 23.1 29.79 100
2 6.93 27.61 26.95 38.5 100
3 4.15 13.26 44.13 38.46 100
4 1.91 5.88 13.65 78.55 100
Total 3.74 10.15 21.82 64.29 100
U.S. 0 1 2 3 Total
1 27.04 15.82 23.98 33.16 100
2 12.18 15.01 25.5 47.31 100
3 4.56 8.94 43.16 43.34 100
4 1.6 4.77 14.11 79.52 100
Total 3.95 6.81 21.54 67.7 100
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Table 4.8: Determinants of risk attitudes measures: Baseline specifi-
cation
Japan U.S.
Panel A Subjective Hypothetical Subjective Hypothetical
Mother’s education -0.057 -0.007 -0.036 -0.016
(0.036) (0.042) (0.041) (0.050)
Father’s education -0.017 -0.075∗ -0.016 -0.101∗∗
(0.037) (0.043) (0.038) (0.046)
Respondent’s height -0.006∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.440∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.335∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.054) (0.039) (0.047)
Age 0.011∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
cut1 -4.556∗∗∗ -3.034∗∗∗ -2.777∗∗∗ -2.476∗∗∗
(0.497) (0.528) (0.312) (0.367)
cut2 -4.224∗∗∗ -2.114∗∗∗ -2.154∗∗∗ -1.713∗∗∗
(0.495) (0.528) (0.311) (0.366)
cut3 -3.579∗∗∗ -1.132∗∗ -1.276∗∗∗ -0.667∗
(0.494) (0.527) (0.311) (0.365)
cut4 -2.536∗∗∗ -0.647∗∗
(0.493) (0.310)
cut5 -1.851∗∗∗ -0.187
(0.493) (0.310)
cut6 -0.877∗ 0.547∗
(0.492) (0.310)
cut7 -0.371 0.885∗∗∗
(0.492) (0.311)
cut8 0.571 1.383∗∗∗
(0.492) (0.311)
cut9 1.178∗∗ 1.998∗∗∗
(0.493) (0.311)
cut10 1.844∗∗∗ 2.485∗∗∗
(0.493) (0.312)
Observations 15498 15498 13459 13459
Number of ID 6264 6264 8376 8376
Panel B: Male
Mother’s education -0.024 -0.006 -0.005 -0.077
(0.053) (0.060) (0.060) (0.071)
Father’s education -0.100∗ -0.068 -0.046 -0.249∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.060) (0.057) (0.067)
Respondent’s height -0.007∗ -0.008∗ -0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.010∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 7528 7528 6604 6604
Number of ID 3060 3060 4033 4033
Panel C: Female
Mother’s education -0.088∗ -0.008 -0.063 0.056
(0.050) (0.060) (0.056) (0.070)
Father’s education 0.063 -0.083 0.008 0.040
(0.051) (0.060) (0.051) (0.064)
Respondent’s height -0.003 -0.009∗ -0.004 0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.011∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 7970 7970 6855 6855
Number of ID 3204 3204 4364 4364
[1] Ordered probit coefficient estimates. [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [4] Each column in each panel is a separate
regression.
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Table 4.9: Determinants of risk attitudes measures: Full specification
Japan U.S.
Subjective Hypothetical Subjective Hypothetical
Mother’s education -0.048 0.025 -0.017 0.008
(0.036) (0.043) (0.041) (0.050)
Father’s education -0.005 -0.036 0.005 -0.051
(0.037) (0.043) (0.038) (0.046)
Respondent’s height -0.005∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.002 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Male -0.384∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.298∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.057) (0.039) (0.046)
Age 0.038∗∗∗ 0.017 0.015∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008)
Age-squared -0.030∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.012∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009)
Married 0.123∗∗∗ -0.020 0.085∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.051) (0.040) (0.046)
Number of children -0.040∗∗ 0.017 0.001 -0.030∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.010) (0.011)
Lives in a city 0.037 0.003 -0.022 -0.062
(0.038) (0.041) (0.036) (0.042)
Employment:
Unemployed 0.135∗∗ -0.025 0.124∗ -0.147∗
(0.059) (0.074) (0.065) (0.080)
Part-time 0.047 -0.018 0.052 0.046
(0.041) (0.050) (0.046) (0.058)
Self-employed -0.077 -0.133∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.055) (0.050) (0.057)
Not in Labour force 0.128∗∗∗ -0.032 0.092∗∗ 0.053
(0.037) (0.044) (0.039) (0.048)
Education:
College -0.044 -0.066 -0.018 -0.038
(0.042) (0.047) (0.046) (0.056)
University+ -0.039 -0.201∗∗∗ 0.018 -0.258∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.045) (0.033) (0.039)
Anxieties about health -0.033∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.038∗∗∗ -0.017
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013)
Risk of unemployment 0.007 -0.080∗∗∗ -0.029 -0.056∗
(0.024) (0.030) (0.026) (0.032)
Borrowing constraint -0.249∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.045) (0.052) (0.034) (0.042)
Log of household income -0.082∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027)
Log of net-wealth -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.006∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Home ownership 0.062 0.079∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.068
(0.043) (0.047) (0.036) (0.043)
State GDP growth 0.000 -0.005 -0.010∗ 0.001
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Risk of a natural disaster 0.011 0.033∗∗ -0.000 0.000
(0.010) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15498 15498 13459 13459
Number of ID 6264 6264 8376 8376
[1] Ordered probit coefficient estimates. [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] ∗ p <
0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [4] Each column in each panel is a separate regression. [5]
Omitted groups: Education: High school. Employment Status: Employed.
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Table 4.10: Determinants of risk attitudes measures: By gender
Japan U.S.
Panel A: Male Subjective Hypothetical Subjective Hypothetical
Mother’s education -0.010 0.026 0.031 -0.034
(0.053) (0.061) (0.060) (0.070)
Father’s education -0.072 -0.012 -0.016 -0.172∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.061) (0.057) (0.066)
Respondent’s height -0.006 -0.008∗ -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.058∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.011 0.033∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011)
Age-squared -0.048∗∗∗ -0.017 -0.002 -0.026∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012)
Married 0.123∗ 0.094 0.022 0.180∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.071) (0.058) (0.063)
Number of children -0.115∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.014 -0.025
(0.025) (0.027) (0.014) (0.016)
Lives in a city 0.040 -0.009 -0.100∗ -0.137∗∗
(0.053) (0.057) (0.052) (0.059)
Employment:
Unemployed 0.196∗∗ -0.007 0.106 -0.093
(0.088) (0.108) (0.097) (0.116)
Part-time -0.163 -0.280∗ 0.029 0.015
(0.129) (0.153) (0.081) (0.097)
Self-employed -0.030 -0.158∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗ -0.436∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.067) (0.065) (0.071)
Not in Labour force 0.018 -0.190∗∗ 0.034 -0.073
(0.066) (0.079) (0.065) (0.075)
Education:
College -0.217∗∗∗ -0.154∗ -0.043 -0.026
(0.076) (0.083) (0.070) (0.081)
University+ -0.093∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.040 -0.358∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.056) (0.047) (0.053)
Anxieties about health -0.022 -0.029 -0.032∗∗ -0.031∗
(0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.018)
Risk of unemployment 0.008 -0.073∗ -0.018 -0.052
(0.034) (0.041) (0.037) (0.043)
Borrowing constraint -0.229∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -0.043
(0.057) (0.065) (0.050) (0.058)
Log of household income -0.071∗∗ -0.075∗ -0.205∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.038) (0.034) (0.038)
Log of net-wealth -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Home ownership 0.046 0.072 0.077 0.116∗∗
(0.060) (0.065) (0.052) (0.059)
State GDP growth -0.003 -0.004 -0.016∗∗ -0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Risk of a natural disaster 0.017 0.066∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000
(0.015) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 7528 7528 6604 6604
Number of ID 3060 3060 4033 4033
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Table 4.10: Determinants of risk attitudes measures: By gender. (Con-
tinued)
Japan U.S.
Subjective Hypothetical Subjective Hypothetical
Panel B: Female
Mother’s education -0.088∗ 0.018 -0.066 0.063
(0.050) (0.061) (0.056) (0.071)
Father’s education 0.069 -0.048 0.016 0.066
(0.051) (0.061) (0.051) (0.065)
Respondent’s height -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Age 0.006 -0.013 0.014 0.028∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.009) (0.012)
Age-squared 0.002 0.029∗ -0.015 -0.023∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.013)
Married 0.135∗∗ -0.190∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.076) (0.056) (0.068)
Number of children 0.038 0.039 0.015 -0.033∗∗
(0.025) (0.028) (0.013) (0.016)
Lives in a city 0.021 0.017 0.062 0.028
(0.054) (0.060) (0.049) (0.060)
Employment:
Unemployed 0.040 -0.031 0.140 -0.180
(0.081) (0.102) (0.089) (0.112)
Part-time 0.065 0.066 0.041 0.068
(0.046) (0.056) (0.056) (0.074)
Self-employed -0.209∗∗ -0.124 -0.171∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.100) (0.078) (0.096)
Not in Labour force 0.150∗∗∗ 0.075 0.102∗∗ 0.156∗∗
(0.046) (0.055) (0.050) (0.065)
Education:
College 0.053 -0.045 -0.005 -0.028
(0.052) (0.059) (0.060) (0.077)
University+ 0.073 -0.244∗∗∗ 0.060 -0.152∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.075) (0.046) (0.057)
Anxieties about health -0.050∗∗∗ 0.015 -0.042∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.019)
Risk of unemployment 0.006 -0.082∗ -0.039 -0.063
(0.035) (0.043) (0.036) (0.047)
Borrowing constraint -0.285∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.012 0.059
(0.072) (0.089) (0.048) (0.062)
Log of household income -0.107∗∗∗ -0.034 -0.126∗∗∗ -0.054
(0.032) (0.039) (0.031) (0.039)
Log of net-wealth -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Home ownership 0.076 0.105 0.087∗ 0.026
(0.061) (0.068) (0.049) (0.062)
State GDP growth 0.004 -0.006 -0.004 0.003
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Risk of a natural disaster 0.005 -0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.014) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 7970 7970 6855 6855
Number of ID 3204 3204 4364 4364
[1] Ordered probit coefficient estimates. [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [4] Each column in each panel is a separate regression. [5] Omitted groups: Education:
High school. Employment Status: Employed. [6] State fixed effects and year fixed effects are included
in all the regressions.
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Table 4.11: Marginal effects: Hypothetical gamble measure of risk attitudes
Male Female
Panel A: Japan Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4 Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4
Mother’s education -0.0011 -0.0030 -0.0046 0.0087 -0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0037 0.0057
Father’s education 0.0005 0.0013 0.0021 -0.0039 0.0007 0.0045 0.0096 -0.0149
Respondent’s height 0.0003∗ 0.0009∗ 0.0015∗ -0.0028∗ 0.0001 0.0006 0.0012 -0.0019
Age -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0046∗∗∗ -0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0013 0.0027 -0.0041
Age-squared 0.0007 0.0019 0.0030 -0.0056 -0.0004∗ -0.0027∗ -0.0058∗ 0.0089∗
Married -0.0040 -0.0108 -0.0169 0.0317 0.0027∗∗ 0.0178∗∗ 0.0379∗∗ -0.0584∗∗
Number of children 0.0008 0.0021 0.0033 -0.0063 -0.0006 -0.0037 -0.0079 0.0121
Lives in a city 0.0004 0.0010 0.0015 -0.0029 -0.0002 -0.0016 -0.0033 0.0052
Employment:
Unemployed 0.0003 0.0008 0.0012 -0.0022 0.0005 0.0031 0.0063 -0.0099
Part-time 0.0144 0.0345∗ 0.0470∗∗ -0.0959∗ -0.0009 -0.0062 -0.0133 0.0205
Self-employed 0.0073∗∗ 0.0185∗∗ 0.0274∗∗ -0.0532∗∗ 0.0022 0.0131 0.0248 -0.0402
Not in Labour force 0.0090∗∗ 0.0226∗∗ 0.0327∗∗ -0.0644∗∗ -0.0011 -0.0070 -0.0150 0.0231
Education:
College 0.0063∗ 0.0176∗ 0.0281∗ -0.0521∗ 0.0006 0.0040 0.0091 -0.0137
University+ 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0215∗∗∗ 0.0337∗∗∗ -0.0631∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗ 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0495∗∗∗ -0.0787∗∗∗
Anxieties about health 0.0012 0.0033 0.0052 -0.0097 -0.0002 -0.0014 -0.0031 0.0047
Risk of unemployment 0.0031∗ 0.0083∗ 0.0130∗ -0.0243∗ 0.0012∗ 0.0077∗ 0.0163∗ -0.0251∗
Borrowing constraint 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.0368∗∗∗ -0.0690∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0020 0.0042 -0.0065
Log of household income 0.0032∗ 0.0085∗ 0.0133∗ -0.0250∗ 0.0005 0.0032 0.0067 -0.0103
Log of net-wealth 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0005
Home ownership -0.0031 -0.0082 -0.0129 0.0242 -0.0015 -0.0098 -0.0209 0.0322
State GDP growth 0.0002 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0014 0.0001 0.0006 0.0013 -0.0020
Risk of a natural disaster -0.0028∗∗∗ -0.0076∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.0003 0.0006 -0.0009
Panel B: U.S.
Mother’s education 0.0015 0.0031 0.0067 -0.0113 -0.0007 -0.0040 -0.0129 0.0176
Father’s education 0.0077∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0343∗∗∗ -0.0580∗∗∗ -0.0008 -0.0042 -0.0137 0.0187
Respondent’s height 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0003
Age -0.0015∗∗∗ -0.0031∗∗∗ -0.0066∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗ -0.0003∗∗ -0.0018∗∗ -0.0057∗∗ 0.0078∗∗
Age-squared 0.0011∗∗ 0.0024∗∗ 0.0051∗∗ -0.0087∗∗ 0.0003∗ 0.0014∗ 0.0047∗ -0.0064∗
Married -0.0081∗∗∗ -0.0168∗∗∗ -0.0361∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗ -0.0021∗∗ -0.0113∗∗∗ -0.0368∗∗∗ 0.0503∗∗∗
Number of children 0.0011 0.0023 0.0049 -0.0083 0.0004∗ 0.0021∗∗ 0.0068∗∗ -0.0093∗∗
Lives in a city 0.0061∗∗ 0.0127∗∗ 0.0273∗∗ -0.0461∗∗ -0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0057 0.0077
Employment:
Unemployed 0.0040 0.0086 0.0189 -0.0315 0.0027 0.0134 0.0387 -0.0548
Part-time -0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0030 0.0049 -0.0008 -0.0042 -0.0141 0.0190
Self-employed 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗ 0.0817∗∗∗ -0.1554∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗ 0.0244∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ -0.0947∗∗∗
Not in Labour force 0.0031 0.0067 0.0148 -0.0246 -0.0015∗∗ -0.0089∗∗ -0.0315∗∗ 0.0419∗∗
Education:
College 0.0008 0.0020 0.0055 -0.0083 0.0003 0.0016 0.0057 -0.0076
University+ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.0736∗∗∗ -0.1226∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗ 0.0098∗∗∗ 0.0316∗∗∗ -0.0432∗∗∗
Anxieties about health 0.0014∗ 0.0029∗ 0.0063∗ -0.0106∗ -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0009
Risk of unemployment 0.0023 0.0048 0.0103 -0.0175 0.0008 0.0040 0.0130 -0.0177
Borrowing constraint 0.0019 0.0040 0.0085 -0.0144 -0.0007 -0.0038 -0.0122 0.0167
Log of household income 0.0045∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.0200∗∗∗ -0.0337∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.0034 0.0111 -0.0151
Log of net-wealth 0.0003 0.0006 0.0013 -0.0022 0.0001 0.0004 0.0014 -0.0019
Home ownership -0.0052∗ -0.0108∗∗ -0.0232∗∗ 0.0392∗∗ -0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0054 0.0074
State GDP growth 0.0001 0.0003 0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0007 0.0009
Risk of a natural disaster -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
[1] Ordered probit marginal effect estimates. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [2] Omitted groups: Education: High school. Employment
Status: Employed. [6] State fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all the regressions. [7] Outcome 1 refers to choosing value 0,
while outcome 4 refers to value 3.
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Table 4.12: Marginal effects: Subjective measure of risk attitudes
Male Female
Panel A: Japan Outcome 3 Outcome 5 Outcome 9 Outcome 11 Outcome 3 Outcome 5 Outcome 9 Outcome 11
Mother’s education 0.0001 0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0003∗ 0.0081∗ -0.0112∗ -0.0024∗
Father’s education 0.0008 0.0103 -0.0065 -0.0014 -0.0002 -0.0064 0.0088 0.0019
Respondent’s height 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0000
Age -0.0007∗∗∗ -0.0082∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ -0.0000 -0.0005 0.0007 0.0002
Age-squared 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ -0.0043∗∗∗ -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0000 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0001
Married -0.0014∗ -0.0176∗ 0.0111∗ 0.0024∗ -0.0004∗ -0.0124∗∗ 0.0172∗∗ 0.0037∗∗
Number of children 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗ -0.0022∗∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0035 0.0049 0.0011
Lives in a city -0.0005 -0.0057 0.0036 0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0019 0.0026 0.0006
Employment:
Unemployed -0.0018∗∗∗ -0.0270∗∗ 0.0194∗∗ 0.0047∗ -0.0001 -0.0039 0.0051 0.0010
Part-time 0.0023 0.0238 -0.0135 -0.0026 -0.0002 -0.0061 0.0082 0.0016
Self-employed 0.0004 0.0043 -0.0027 -0.0006 0.0009∗ 0.0228∗∗ -0.0247∗∗∗ -0.0039∗∗∗
Not in Labour force -0.0002 -0.0025 0.0016 0.0003 -0.0004∗∗∗ -0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0195∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗
Education:
College 0.0029∗∗ 0.0317∗∗∗ -0.0185∗∗∗ -0.0036∗∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0049 0.0067 0.0015
University+ 0.0011∗ 0.0134∗ -0.0085∗ -0.0018∗ -0.0002 -0.0066 0.0093 0.0021
Anxieties about health 0.0003 0.0031 -0.0020 -0.0004 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ -0.0064∗∗∗ -0.0014∗∗∗
Risk of unemployment -0.0001 -0.0012 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0005 0.0008 0.0002
Borrowing constraint 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗ -0.0207∗∗∗ -0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0263∗∗∗ -0.0364∗∗∗ -0.0079∗∗∗
Log of household income 0.0008∗∗ 0.0101∗∗ -0.0064∗∗ -0.0014∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.0099∗∗∗ -0.0136∗∗∗ -0.0030∗∗∗
Log of net-wealth 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0000
Home ownership -0.0005 -0.0065 0.0041 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0070 0.0097 0.0021
State GDP growth 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0001
Risk of a natural disaster -0.0002 -0.0024 0.0015 0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0005 0.0007 0.0002
Panel B: U.S.
Mother’s education -0.0055 0.0001 0.0019 0.0003 0.0106 0.0025 -0.0051 -0.0008
Father’s education 0.0028 -0.0001 -0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0027 -0.0006 0.0013 0.0002
Respondent’s height 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000
Age -0.0019 0.0000 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0023 -0.0005 0.0011 0.0002
Age-squared 0.0004 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0024 0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0002
Married -0.0040 0.0001 0.0014 0.0002 -0.0251∗∗∗ -0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗
Number of children 0.0025 -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0025 -0.0006 0.0012 0.0002
Lives in a city 0.0179∗ -0.0004 -0.0061∗ -0.0008∗ -0.0101 -0.0024 0.0048 0.0007
Employment:
Unemployed -0.0185 -0.0008 0.0071 0.0010 -0.0219∗ -0.0064 0.0114 0.0018
Part-time -0.0051 -0.0000 0.0018 0.0003 -0.0067 -0.0016 0.0032 0.0005
Self-employed 0.0647∗∗∗ -0.0095∗∗∗ -0.0167∗∗∗ -0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0293∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ -0.0114∗∗ -0.0015∗∗
Not in Labour force -0.0061 -0.0001 0.0022 0.0003 -0.0162∗∗ -0.0044∗ 0.0081∗∗ 0.0012∗
Education:
College 0.0077 -0.0002 -0.0026 -0.0004 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0001
University+ 0.0073 -0.0001 -0.0025 -0.0003 -0.0097 -0.0024 0.0047 0.0007
Anxieties about health 0.0058∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0020∗∗ -0.0003∗ 0.0068∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗ -0.0033∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗
Risk of unemployment 0.0032 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0001 0.0062 0.0015 -0.0030 -0.0004
Borrowing constraint 0.0464∗∗∗ -0.0011 -0.0157∗∗∗ -0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0019 0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0001
Log of household income 0.0369∗∗∗ -0.0008 -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0203∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ -0.0097∗∗∗ -0.0015∗∗∗
Log of net-wealth 0.0006 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Home ownership -0.0139 0.0003 0.0047 0.0006 -0.0141∗ -0.0034∗ 0.0067∗ 0.0010∗
State GDP growth 0.0028∗∗ -0.0001 -0.0010∗ -0.0001∗ 0.0006 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0000
Risk of a natural disaster 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
[1] Ordered probit marginal effect estimates. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [2] Omitted groups: Education: High school. Employment
Status: Employed. [6] State fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in all the regressions. [7] Outcome 3 refers to choosing value 2, while
outcome 11 refers to value 10.
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Table 4.13: Robustness check for the impact of earthquake risk.
Hypothetical Subjective
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Full sample
Average intensities 0.042 0.020
(0.030) (0.024)
No. of days with earthquake 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Max. intensity recorded 0.033∗∗ 0.011
(0.013) (0.010)
Max. intensity recorded=3+ 0.037∗∗ 0.001
(0.018) (0.014)
Max. intensity recorded=4+ 0.059∗∗ -0.007
(0.027) (0.021)
Males
Average intensities 0.058 0.052
(0.043) (0.035)
No. of days with earthquake 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Max. intensity recorded 0.067∗∗∗ 0.018
(0.018) (0.015)
Max. intensity recorded=3+ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.025) (0.020)
Max. intensity recorded=4+ 0.118∗∗∗ -0.027
(0.037) (0.030)
Female
Average intensities 0.024 -0.008
(0.043) (0.033)
No. of days with earthquake -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Max. intensity recorded -0.003 0.006
(0.018) (0.014)
Max. intensity recorded=3+ -0.020 -0.000
(0.026) (0.020)
Max. intensity recorded=4+ -0.010 0.007
(0.039) (0.030)
[1] Ordered probit coefficient estimates. [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [4] Each coefficient in each
panel is a separate regression. [5] All controls that are in Table 4.9 are included in each regression.
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Table 4.14: Marginal effects of the hypothetical gamble measure on male individuals
Japanese male individuals
Panel A Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4
Max. intensity recorded -0.0028∗∗∗ -0.0076∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗ 0.0222∗∗∗
Mother’s education -0.0011 -0.0030 -0.0046 0.0087
Father’s education 0.0005 0.0013 0.0021 -0.0039
Respondent’s height 0.0003∗ 0.0009∗ 0.0015∗ -0.0028∗
Age -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0046∗∗∗ -0.0072∗∗∗ 0.0135∗∗∗
Age-squared 0.0007 0.0019 0.0030 -0.0056
Married -0.0040 -0.0108 -0.0169 0.0317
Number of children 0.0008 0.0021 0.0033 -0.0063
Lives in a city 0.0004 0.0010 0.0015 -0.0029
Employment:
Unemployed 0.0003 0.0008 0.0012 -0.0022
Part-time 0.0144 0.0345∗ 0.0470∗∗ -0.0959∗
Self-employed 0.0073∗∗ 0.0185∗∗ 0.0274∗∗ -0.0532∗∗
Not in Labour force 0.0090∗∗ 0.0226∗∗ 0.0327∗∗ -0.0644∗∗
Education:
College 0.0063∗ 0.0176∗ 0.0281∗ -0.0521∗
University+ 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0215∗∗∗ 0.0337∗∗∗ -0.0631∗∗∗
Anxieties about health 0.0012 0.0033 0.0052 -0.0097
Risk of unemployment 0.0031∗ 0.0083∗ 0.0130∗ -0.0243∗
Borrowing constraint 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.0368∗∗∗ -0.0690∗∗∗
Log of household income 0.0032∗ 0.0085∗ 0.0133∗ -0.0250∗
Log of net-wealth 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0003
Home ownership -0.0031 -0.0082 -0.0129 0.0242
State GDP growth 0.0002 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0014
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B
Max. intensity recorded=3+ -0.0038∗∗∗ -0.0101∗∗∗ -0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗
Panel C
Max. intensity recorded=4+ -0.0050∗∗∗ -0.0133∗∗∗ -0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0391∗∗∗
Panel D
Average intensities -0.0024 -0.0064 -0.0101 0.0189
Panel E
No. of days with earthquake -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0005
[1] Ordered probit marginal effects estimates. [2] ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [3] Each panel
is a separate regression. [4] All controls that are in panel A are included in panel B and panel C re-
gressions. [5] Outcome 1 refers to choosing value 0, while outcome 4 refers to value 3.
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Table 4.15: Validation of the risk attitudes measures: Marginal effects
Dependent variables Explanatory variables
Japan U.S.
Subjective Hypothetical Subjective Hypothetical
Panel A: Risky behaviour
Gambling -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.007**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Drinking -0.002 -0.001 -0.002** -0.011***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Smoking -0.003** 0.003 -0.003*** 0.003
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Panel B: Assets choice
Stock share -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
Stock binary -0.006*** -0.006* -0.007*** -0.017***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.005)
Saving 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004
(0.001) (0.003) (0.523) (0.004)
Bonds 0.007*** 0.007 -0.002* -0.006**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003)
Life insurance -0.004* -0.006 -0.003 0.012**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.103) (0.005)
Trust -0.003** -0.006** -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.270) (0.004)
Pension -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.011**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.329) (0.005)
[1] Probit marginal effects estimates. [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [4] Each coefficient in each panel is a separate regression were the dependent variables
are the behavioural outcomes. [5] All controls that are in Table B5 are included in each regression.
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Table 4.16: Validation of the risk attitudes measures: A joint modelling approach
Japan U.S.
Subjective Hypothetical Subjective Hypothetical
Panel A: Risky behaviours
Gambling -0.4092*** -0.2352*** -0.4556*** -0.2480***
(0.0461) (0.0664) (0.0392) (0.0577)
ρ 0.4146*** 0.1825** 0.4735*** 0.3163***
(0.0661) (0.0845) (0.0709) (0.0930)
Drinking -0.2993*** -0.1094 -0.2115*** -0.1911***
(0.0751) (0.0913) (0.0645) (0.0542)
ρ 0.3013*** 0.0950 0.2056** 0.1058**
(0.0917) (0.1039) (0.0841) (0.0754)
Smoking -0.4500*** -0.1589 -0.2387*** -0.2564
(0.0556) (0.0985) (0.0485) (0.0856)
ρ 0.4183*** 0.2355 0.3568*** 0.0568
(0.0782) (0.0596) (0.0587) (0.0568)
Panel B: Holdings of assets
Stock share -0.0879*** -0.1225*** -0.0559*** -0.0936***
(0.0182) (0.0208) (0.0129) (0.0141)
ρ 0.0541** 0.1212*** 0.0389*** 0.0823***
(0.0209) (0.0250) (0.0159) (0.0183)
Stock binary -0.2487*** -0.3206*** -0.2387*** -0.2869***
(0.0526) (0.0607) (0.0410) (0.0501)
ρ 0.2011*** 0.3340*** 0.2618*** 0.3201***
(0.0657) (0.0826) (0.0613) (0.0804)
Savings 0.0347 -0.0145 -0.0796* -0.0138
(0.0349) (0.0445) (0.0443) (0.0583)
ρ -0.0410 -0.0081 0.1150* -0.0314
(0.0487) (0.0634) (0.0662) (0.0892)
Bonds 0.1088*** 0.0141 -0.0196 -0.0931
(0.0327) (0.0422) (0.0519) (0.0632)
ρ -0.0825** 0.0106 -0.0541 0.0571
(0.0418) (0.0541) (0.0788) (0.0983)
Life insurance -0.0523** -0.0798** -0.0351 0.1006**
(0.0263) (0.0335) (0.0392) (0.0489)
ρ 0.0443 0.0768* -0.0144 -0.0831
(0.0353) (0.0456) (0.0556) (0.0728)
Trust -0.1088** -0.2752*** -0.0559 0.0305
(0.0541) (0.0622) (0.0349) (0.0438)
ρ 0.0677 0.2730*** 0.0647 -0.0580
(0.0666) (0.0837) (0.0552) (0.0711)
Pension -0.0907*** -0.0637 -0.0363 0.0586
(0.0305) (0.0389) (0.0340) (0.0426)
ρ 0.1029** 0.0673 0.0397 -0.0418
(0.0397) (0.0511) (0.0501) (0.0646)
[1] Risky behaviours and assets choices equations are a random effects probit model. The equation of
the share of stock is a fractional probit model. The equations of the two risk attitudes measures are a
random effects ordered probit model. [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. [4] Each coefficient in each panel is a separate regression of a system of two equations linked
via their error processes. [5] All controls that are in Table B5 are included in each regression. How-
ever, to achieve identification, in the risky choices equations, height of the respondents is excluded and
a measure of financial potential at the state/prefecture levels is included. [6] ρ is the “atanhrho” which
is an unbounded transformation of “rho” using arc-hyperbolic tangents. This coefficient represents the
correlation between the residuals of the two equations for each regression.
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Figure 4.1: The distributions of the subjective risk attitudes measure
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5.1 Conclusion
The overall aim of this thesis was to contribute to the existing literature relating
to financial institutions’ risk appetite and the household sector’s risk profile. The
level of financial risk in the economy has recently received increased academic at-
tention as a result of the 2008 financial crisis. Using advanced macro-econometric
and micro-econometric techniques, this thesis explored issues that have far reaching
implications for the banking sector, household sector, policy makers and for the
economy as a whole.
5.1.1 Thesis summary
The first empirical chapter was motivated by the excessive risk taking behaviours
of banks during periods of low interest rate. The link between monetary policy and
financial institutions’ appetite for risk has received increased attention from re-
searchers since this link has been identified as a potential cause of the 2008 financial
crisis. Furthermore, there is strong evidence in the current literature that the re-
sponses of banks to an expansionary monetary policy shock vary across different
types of banks. Therefore, the first empirical chapter used the Global Vector Au-
toregression (GVAR) methodology, developed by Pesaran et al. (2004), to examine
three interrelated questions that concern the risk-taking channel of monetary policy.
The chapter initially examined the impact of a downward exogenous change of the
policy rate on banks’ risk taking activities, profitability and lending behaviours. The
heterogeneity of banks’ behaviours in response to monetary policy shocks formed
the second focus. Finally, the presence of spillover effects of credit risk within the
banking system was examined.
To address these questions, bank level data relating to 30 banks from the largest
100 banks in the U.S., in terms of assets size, was examined over the period of
1985Q1-2007Q4. The data was extracted from the Consolidated Report of Condition
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and Income (“Call Reports”); all insured commercial banks in the U.S. have to
submit this report to the Federal Reserve in each quarter.
Generally, the findings of this chapter supported the link between the interest
rate and banks’ risk taking, but also revealed that this relationship is more complex
than earlier thought. In particular, the results indicated that while the increase in
risk seems to be more pronounced and often more significant in larger, well capital-
ized banks, some banks do decrease risk. This observation is entirely consistent with
the theoretical model presented in Chapter 2 Section 2.2 and with Dell’Ariccia et al.
(2017) who discussed the role of capital structure in relation to banks’ risk taking
behaviours. The reactions of banks’ profitability and lending behaviours to expan-
sionary monetary policy shocks showed that these shocks can introduce fragility into
the financial system as both indicators decline in the medium to the long-run.
The impulse response functions presented clear evidence of spillover effects of
risk, as shocks originating from larger and riskier banks had lasting effects on the
whole system. These results indicated a strong co-movement amongst banks’ non-
performing loans in the sample and stressed the importance of a healthy banking
system as a whole as well as at the bank level. The linkages among banks’ variables
are further confirmed by the results of the impact elasticity of the starred (foreign)
variables on the domestic variables and the results of the GFEVD, which showed the
relative contributions of each bank to the explanation of the forecast error variance
of a simulated shock. The results of the first empirical chapter are robust to the use
of two alternative measures of a bank’s risk; nonperforming loans and the Z-score.
Moreover, the results are also robust to the use of the Romer and Romer (2004)
measure as an alternative proxy of monetary policy shock.
The second empirical chapter was motivated by the increasing interest in under-
standing households’ financial decisions especially in a country like Japan where its
ageing population problem is a crucial concern to the Japanese government. Within
the current household finance literature, major developments have been made in
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explaining the determinants of risky asset holdings. However, only a small number
of papers have empirically analysed these determinants for Japanese households.
Increasing household risky asset holdings is likely to have a significant role in pro-
moting growth and enhancing capital allocation efficiency; it is therefore imperative
to understand the fundamental influences upon households risky asset holdings,
such as those associated with households’ socio-economic characteristics and finan-
cial variables. However, as well as these variables, households risky asset holdings
are likely to be determined by factors which are associated with the investment envi-
ronment in which households take their financial decisions. The focus of the second
empirical chapter was to ascertain the determinants that influence the composition
of Japanese households’ financial portfolios.
The second empirical chapter analysed data drawn from the Keio Household
Panel Survey (KHPS) available from the Panel Data Research Centre at Keio Uni-
versity to provide further insight into the determinants of risky asset holdings in
Japan. All waves of the KHPS data set (2004 to 2015) were initially used to exam-
ine the determinants of risky asset holdings. Subsequently, the focus was only on
wave 10 since in this wave respondents were asked detailed questions regarding their
perceived risk of selected assets and respondents’ opinions about the functioning of
the stock market that potentially explain their financial decisions.
This chapter has contributed to the existing literature by exploring the role of
key explanatory variables on holdings of risky assets as well as controlling for the
standard socio-economic characteristics and financial variables. The key explanatory
variables were related to three themes. The first is related to attitudinal factors and
included: savings preferences; risk preferences; a variable that captures how com-
fortable individuals are about future income; and a variable that reflects the trust an
individual has in government policies. The second set of variables is related to house-
holds’ impressions of the overall reliability of the stock market and included variables
related to trust in the profitability, fairness, efficiency and prudential supervision of
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the stock market. Individuals’ trust in the stock market has been recently identified
in the literature as an important factor in explaining stock market participation,
but there are no studies that explore the role of this factor in Japan.1 The final set
of variables reflects a household’s personal interpretation of the riskiness of selected
assets. Furthermore, the second empirical chapter has contributed to the existing
literature by using four different methodological approaches to assess whether the
model employed affects the estimated parameter coefficients. The findings of the
second empirical chapter are of importance to both policy makers and financial ad-
visors. For example, to maximise households’ asset returns, financial advisors have
to advise individuals according to their socio-economic characteristics and personal
circumstances.
The findings of the second empirical chapter indicated statistically significant im-
pacts from the key explanatory variables considered in this chapter, revealing new
channels which influence Japanese households’ financial decisions. For example,
household satisfaction with retirement income was found to have the most impor-
tant impact on risky asset holdings in terms of magnitude amongst all the variables
in the sets of key explanatory variables. This finding might reflect households’ con-
cerns about the ageing population issue in Japan and its consequences for who is
going to fund future retirement income. Similarly, trust in the current government
was also found to have an important impact on risky asset holdings. The results
reported in this chapter confirmed that variables related to households’ impressions
of the overall reliability of the stock market are mostly negatively correlated with
households’ holdings of risky asset, and these negative effects are statistically signif-
icant across most of the modelling approaches. The results of the variables related
to an individual’s perception of risk associated with selected assets generally suggest
that households invest in a manner which is consistent with their risk perceptions
1Guiso et al. (2008) examined the role of trust using data from the Dutch National Bank
(DNB) Household Survey and data from the Italian Bank customers survey. Delis and Mylonidis
(2015) also explored this factor using Dutch household survey data from the Longitudinal Internet
Studies for the Social sciences (LISS) panel.
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of saving accounts and investments in stocks.
Moreover, the four alternative methodological approaches employed in the analy-
sis reinforced the robustness of the impact of the variables considered in this chapter
and also revealed considerable heterogeneity in the effect of some variables across the
different modelling approaches. The results were broadly consistent across the tobit
model, the one-part FRM and the binary part of the two-part FRM. However, there
were significant differences in terms of the magnitude of the marginal effects across
these three models. Furthermore, the analysis showed that, when examining risky
asset holdings conditional on participation, the coefficients differ not only in terms
of magnitude but also in terms of sign and the level of significance. The CQR model
revealed that considering only the effects of the regressors on the mean holdings of
risky asset masks considerable heterogeneity in the effects of some variables. This
confirms that each model unmasked an important aspect of the financial behaviour
of Japanese households.
The third empirical chapter was motivated by the cautious attitudes of Japanese
individuals towards risk compared to individuals from the U.S.. The conservative
investment behaviour of Japanese households in risky asset holdings is one of the
indicators of their strong aversion to risk.2 In the existing literature, major devel-
opments have been made in ascertaining the determinants of individuals’ attitudes
towards risk. However, with the exception of Dohmen et al. (2016) and Vieider et
al. (2015), comparisons of the determinants of risk attitudes across countries are
scarce in the literature. Furthermore, it is important to understand how individu-
als’ risk attitudes vary when they face a high risk of exposure to natural disasters,
since systematic changes in risk attitudes will have a significant impact on social,
economic and political aggregate outcomes.
2The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) figures show that only 3.8% of adults engage
in starting up a new business in Japan compared to 13.8% in the U.S. and an average of 8.0% of
29 countries.
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The third empirical chapter has contributed to the existing literature by com-
paring the determinants of risk attitudes in two countries, Japan and the U.S., that
differ significantly in the attitudes of their individuals towards risks. Another contri-
bution of this chapter was the robust assessment of the impact of natural disasters,
an exogenous shock, on risk attitudes by employing a set of different measures of nat-
ural disaster risk. In addition, this chapter examined the validity of the “Preference
Parameters Study” measures of risk attitudes by assessing whether these measures
reflect the actual risk taking behaviours of individuals. To achieve this, six waves
(2005 to 2010) of the “Preference Parameters Study” conducted in Japan and the
U.S. were analysed.
The results indicated that a number of variables have a statistically significant
impact on individuals’ risk attitudes in both countries. However, the magnitude
and the statistical significance of some variables differed across Japan and the U.S..
For example, the magnitudes of some variables were larger for Japanese individuals,
such as: age; being exposed to the risk of unemployment in the near future; and
the risk of facing borrowing constraints. Whereas the magnitudes of other variables
had a larger impact on U.S. respondents, such as: being self-employed; the level of
education; income; and self-reported health status. The risk of exposure to natural
disasters was found to only influence Japanese male individuals. Specifically, as
the earthquake intensity increases, Japanese male individuals become less willing
to take risk, and this finding was robust to the use of different earthquake risk
measures. An interesting finding of this chapter was that the determinants, stability
and susceptibility to change of attitudes towards risk were different depending on the
gender and the country of the individual. The validity of the risk attitudes measures
used in the final chapter was confirmed as they had considerable predictive power
in explaining individuals’ decisions in a variety of contexts. Moreover, the validity
of these measures was further confirmed using a system of two equations to account
for possible endogeneity between risky choices and attitudes towards risk.
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5.1.2 Policy implications
Important policy implications can be drawn from the findings of this thesis. From
the first empirical chapter, and consistent with the literature, it is evident that there
is a link between changes in the interest rate and banks’ risk taking. This link is
relevant and important to both monetary policy authorities and academic circles.
Given that the findings indicated that central banks can inadvertently destabilize
the functioning of the financial markets, an integrated macroprudential regulation
requires that the monetary authority’s responsibilities may have to be extended
beyond price stability and aggregate demand to encompass financial stability.
Important policy conclusions about Japanese households’ financial decisions can
be drawn from the findings of the second empirical chapter. For example, the mo-
tivation for using the two-part FRM was to understand which variables authorities
and financial institutions might need to target in order to promote a culture of par-
ticipation in the stock market in Japan given its historical performance, and which
variables to target if the level of holdings was of concern. Education, age, gender,
impressions about the stock market and future retirement income were found to im-
pact the decision to participate in stock market. Whereas, only employment status,
wealth and marital status were found to influence the level of risky asset holding.
Such information cannot be deduced from the tobit and one-part FRM models as
in these models the differential impacts that the covariates have on the decision to
participate in stock market and the level of participation is not accounted for.
Finally, the findings of the third empirical chapter are potentially important to
policy makers given that the attitude an individual has towards risk is a fundamental
factor in explaining her/his behaviour. For example, by understanding individual
risk attitudes, policy makers can achieve various vital realizations at the aggregate
level such as: predicting labour market structure; predicting health related risky
behaviours; and influencing investments, fertility and migration decisions. Further-
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more, based on the findings of the third empirical chapter, it is possible that policy
makers may locate and predict where policies, which aim to influence the risk profile
of individuals, will have the greatest impact. Furthermore, the findings related to
experiencing earthquakes mean that policy makers should expect systematic changes
in the attitudes towards risk of Japanese male individuals after earthquakes with
large intensities.
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6.1 Appendix to Chapter 2
6.1.1 Tables
Table A1: Definitions of the Call Reports codes
Code Definition
(rcfd3210) Total equity capital.
(rcfd2170) Total assets.
(rcfd1400) Total loans and leases, gross.
(rcfd1975) Loans to individuals.
(rcfd1600) Commercial and industrial loans.
(rcfd1410) Loans secured by real estate.
(rcfd1407) Total loans and lease finance receivables, past due 90 days and more and still accruing.
(rcfd1403) Total loans and lease finance receivables: nonaccrual.
(riad4340) Net income (loss).
(rcfd1350) Federal funds sold and securities purchased.
(rcfd2800) Federal funds purchased and securities sold.
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Table A2: Unit root tests for the domestic variables at the 5% significance level
Nonperforming loans Return on assets Loan to assets
+Trend Level 1st diff. 2nd diff. +Trend Level 1st diff. 2nd diff. +Trend Level 1st diff. 2nd diff.
Critical values -3.450 -2.890 -2.890 -2.890 -3.450 -2.890 -2.890 -2.890 -3.450 -2.890 -2.890 -2.890
Bank2 -2.046 -0.986 -6.365 -9.506 -3.730 -3.738 -11.115 -7.763 -2.329 -1.176 -6.354 -7.609
Bank3 -2.498 -1.066 -5.221 -6.963 -2.681 -2.052 -4.028 -8.262 -2.595 -1.417 -4.937 -6.568
Bank4 -2.589 -2.566 -4.736 -6.605 -3.412 -3.435 -6.493 -8.884 -1.990 -1.828 -7.538 -8.285
Bank5 -2.669 -2.173 -4.124 -8.845 -3.650 -3.390 -6.050 -8.339 -1.994 -1.637 -5.161 -8.728
Bank6 -2.038 -2.058 -6.431 -7.153 -5.324 -2.490 -6.215 -7.945 -2.544 -2.822 -7.011 -7.075
Bank7 -2.236 -2.328 -3.715 -12.317 -2.792 -1.535 -6.259 -9.114 -2.321 -0.999 -5.911 -7.999
Bank11 -0.498 -0.997 -2.975 -7.964 -1.610 -1.950 -5.360 -7.372 -2.550 -0.526 -6.342 -8.463
Bank13 -2.267 -1.480 -3.850 -11.586 -6.936 -6.937 -9.633 -12.693 -0.815 -1.917 -6.641 -7.327
Bank15 -2.533 -1.327 -6.356 -7.665 -3.799 -3.546 -10.158 -8.749 -1.188 -1.495 -3.706 -10.497
Bank16 -2.594 -2.545 -5.453 -7.217 -1.841 -1.574 -10.549 -8.232 -2.035 -1.192 -5.165 -7.201
Bank17 -1.980 -1.616 -3.748 -10.356 -2.417 -2.202 -7.949 -9.449 -1.254 0.460 -5.106 -8.603
Bank19 -2.632 -1.414 -5.011 -9.142 -3.548 -3.570 -9.618 -8.726 -2.123 -1.066 -6.683 -7.471
Bank21 -2.226 -2.560 -4.130 -13.609 -3.395 -2.061 -7.713 -10.138 -2.320 -1.102 -4.602 -7.843
Bank25 -2.922 -2.998 -4.744 -11.593 -0.235 -0.312 -7.827 -10.435 -2.597 -2.086 -7.150 -8.968
Bank26 -3.462 -2.716 -5.720 -6.912 -2.458 -2.759 -9.361 -11.681 -2.085 0.277 -13.668 -7.754
Bank29 -1.813 -1.962 -4.262 -7.498 -2.841 -2.935 -8.702 -7.206 -2.919 -1.796 -4.231 -14.424
Bank30 -3.263 -3.996 -5.694 -8.351 -2.848 -2.985 -7.018 -9.025 -2.159 -1.215 -5.270 -7.436
Bank33 -2.406 -2.220 -4.842 -8.294 -1.863 -1.341 -7.304 -9.018 -3.003 -1.743 -4.100 -10.754
Bank36 -0.256 -1.406 -5.689 -7.412 -0.002 -1.274 -5.203 -8.084 -2.297 -1.447 -7.657 -8.060
Bank38 -1.884 -2.399 -5.983 -7.477 -3.153 -3.262 -6.562 -8.644 -4.664 -2.014 -7.882 -7.339
Bank39 -2.191 -2.246 -5.536 -7.916 -1.581 -2.229 -7.429 -10.249 -2.673 -2.904 -4.875 -6.398
Bank42 -2.786 -1.271 -6.891 -9.344 -1.820 -1.909 -11.746 -8.591 -1.368 0.175 -5.499 -8.086
Bank46 -3.517 -3.365 -6.917 -7.743 -3.335 -3.550 -9.384 -16.927 -1.922 -2.071 -7.433 -7.197
Bank51 -1.791 -1.284 -7.342 -7.449 -2.352 -2.378 -7.779 -8.528 -1.048 -0.980 -5.319 -8.092
Bank53 -2.048 -1.697 -4.858 -7.336 -1.902 -1.821 -2.848 -8.399 -1.985 -1.588 -6.096 -7.863
Bank54 -2.748 -1.874 -4.645 -6.653 -1.889 -1.141 -8.510 -13.032 -1.874 -2.317 -3.995 -8.831
Bank56 -1.967 -2.546 -6.736 -7.804 -2.405 -1.366 -7.767 -7.927 -1.991 -0.961 -3.693 -10.181
Bank58 -1.699 -1.441 -6.189 -8.360 -3.718 -3.247 -6.241 -7.293 -2.491 -1.969 -5.614 -7.373
Bank59 -1.460 -1.115 -6.614 -8.855 -3.344 -0.840 -10.302 -10.024 -1.942 -0.933 -2.768 -8.711
Bank61 -2.685 -2.466 -3.089 -11.357 -2.454 -1.928 -5.145 -8.435 -2.681 -2.607 -4.085 -7.301
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Table A3: Unit root tests for the foreign variables at the 5% significance level
Nonperforming loans Return on assets Loan to assets
+Trend Level 1st diff. 2nd diff. +Trend Level 1st diff. 2nd diff. +Trend Level 1st diff. 2nd diff.
Critical Value -3.24 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -3.24 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55 -3.45 -2.55 -2.55 -2.55
Bank2 -2.184 -1.870 -4.017 -6.774 -1.915 -1.915 -7.427 -7.831 -2.728 -1.936 -4.206 -8.223
Bank3 -1.539 -1.435 -5.922 -9.427 -4.617 -4.392 -9.710 -7.590 -2.299 -0.777 -6.475 -8.794
Bank4 -1.477 -1.387 -5.854 -9.202 -3.863 -3.579 -5.855 -7.681 -2.545 -0.704 -6.501 -7.727
Bank5 -1.486 -1.402 -5.857 -9.292 -3.883 -3.656 -5.779 -7.596 -2.351 -0.751 -6.376 -7.474
Bank6 -1.481 -1.394 -5.815 -9.165 -3.890 -3.650 -5.834 -7.654 -2.385 -0.706 -6.418 -8.709
Bank7 -1.473 -1.390 -5.804 -9.172 -3.881 -3.570 -5.833 -7.649 -2.351 -0.692 -6.435 -7.513
Bank11 -1.481 -1.391 -5.788 -9.129 -3.902 -3.611 -5.838 -7.679 -2.365 -0.718 -6.392 -8.628
Bank13 -1.486 -1.409 -5.801 -9.033 -3.869 -3.537 -5.861 -7.773 -2.380 -0.848 -6.337 -8.479
Bank15 -1.484 -1.398 -5.807 -9.180 -3.905 -3.647 -5.841 -7.670 -2.355 -0.720 -6.390 -8.610
Bank16 -1.477 -1.394 -5.802 -9.138 -3.911 -3.621 -5.834 -7.651 -2.365 -0.712 -6.411 -8.688
Bank17 -1.436 -1.409 -5.654 -8.911 -3.917 -4.258 -5.806 -7.625 -2.349 -0.893 -6.494 -8.558
Bank19 -1.481 -1.398 -5.797 -9.144 -3.900 -3.627 -5.819 -7.641 -2.368 -0.745 -6.391 -8.626
Bank21 -1.478 -1.398 -5.805 -9.150 -3.900 -3.635 -5.830 -7.666 -2.374 -0.717 -6.405 -8.672
Bank25 -1.481 -1.395 -5.794 -9.143 -3.906 -3.620 -5.818 -7.643 -2.388 -0.704 -6.400 -8.711
Bank26 -1.470 -1.400 -5.796 -9.166 -3.899 -3.632 -5.832 -7.669 -2.361 -0.742 -6.403 -7.518
Bank29 -1.481 -1.396 -5.811 -9.170 -3.895 -3.625 -5.829 -7.659 -2.384 -0.712 -6.411 -8.689
Bank30 -1.482 -1.396 -5.820 -9.175 -3.894 -3.634 -5.828 -7.654 -2.379 -0.707 -6.401 -7.513
Bank33 -1.483 -1.395 -5.840 -9.206 -3.901 -3.648 -5.830 -7.651 -2.385 -0.710 -6.411 -7.533
Bank36 -1.482 -1.395 -5.813 -9.159 -3.904 -3.643 -5.831 -7.672 -2.376 -0.719 -6.399 -8.678
Bank38 -1.482 -1.395 -5.839 -9.200 -3.903 -3.649 -5.833 -7.652 -2.385 -0.709 -6.404 -7.519
Bank39 -1.488 -1.392 -5.888 -9.265 -3.906 -3.681 -5.835 -7.650 -2.392 -0.688 -6.408 -7.572
Bank42 -1.479 -1.400 -5.824 -9.197 -3.878 -3.642 -5.805 -7.643 -2.381 -0.763 -6.445 -8.715
Bank46 -1.483 -1.394 -5.846 -9.213 -3.900 -3.652 -5.830 -7.651 -2.389 -0.706 -6.406 -7.531
Bank51 -1.474 -1.404 -5.712 -9.024 -3.883 -3.573 -5.820 -7.677 -2.357 -0.754 -6.389 -8.598
Bank53 -1.470 -1.404 -5.709 -9.048 -3.873 -3.554 -5.815 -7.658 -2.370 -0.768 -6.420 -8.632
Bank54 -1.489 -1.392 -5.892 -9.272 -3.903 -3.682 -5.823 -7.633 -2.392 -0.688 -6.411 -7.574
Bank56 -1.474 -1.401 -5.751 -9.095 -3.886 -3.592 -5.826 -7.658 -2.373 -0.744 -6.410 -8.653
Bank58 -1.472 -1.403 -5.713 -9.047 -3.871 -3.552 -5.817 -7.655 -2.367 -0.768 -6.409 -8.633
Bank59 -1.474 -1.406 -5.687 -9.011 -3.869 -3.545 -5.819 -7.657 -2.363 -0.782 -6.415 -8.617
Bank61 -1.482 -1.396 -5.823 -9.185 -3.897 -3.635 -5.829 -7.652 -2.382 -0.717 -6.406 -7.515
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Table A4: Panel unit root tests for the domestic variables
+Trend Level 1st diff. 2nd diff.
Nonperforming loans -0.598 -0.687 -12.451 -27.687
(0.275) (0.246) (0.000) (0.000)
Return on assets 6.382 3.5693 -36.968 -20.913
(0.998) (0.988) (0.000) (0.000)
Loan to assets -0.443 -1.318 -14.611 -25.138
(0.329) (0.114) (0.000) (0.000)
The table shows the Levin–Lin–Chu bias-adjusted t statistic (Levin et al.
(2002)) and the p-values in parentheses. The number of lags for each panel
is set by minimizing the AIC, subject to a maximum of 10 lags. H0: Panels
contain unit roots, H1: Panels are stationary.
Table A5: Test for weak exogeneity at the 5% significance level
Bank’s F test Critical Nonperf. return on Loan to GDP Interest hpi
name value 5% loans assets assets rate
Bank2 F(2,76) 3.1170 3.4775 2.7901 1.1392 5.7994 0.0127 0.7164
Bank3 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.0009 5.1588 0.1122 2.1454 0.4877 1.7710
Bank4 F(1,77) 3.9651 1.5094 1.9309 0.8267 0.8158 0.0072 0.3070
Bank5 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.9018 0.1347 0.3269 1.5914 2.0194 0.3593
Bank6 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.0412 0.0553 1.4257 0.0643 0.0640 3.9422
Bank7 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.5578 2.9591 1.4253 1.2630 7.2486 0.4582
Bank11 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.8892 2.1146 2.4606 0.9227 0.3254 0.9293
Bank13 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.4823 4.2033 2.4025 1.6600 3.8017 1.7200
Bank15 F(2,76) 3.1170 2.3757 1.0253 1.5619 2.6316 0.4066 1.5268
Bank16 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.3926 0.7289 0.1981 0.1039 0.8308 0.2694
Bank17 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.1077 1.5679 1.4994 0.6576 0.4908 1.0246
Bank19 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.7606 2.1864 1.0255 0.5495 0.9425 1.2365
Bank21 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.0665 4.6269 2.9454 1.9350 2.4128 1.7943
Bank25 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.4716 0.3736 5.8730 0.4513 0.1984 3.8645
Bank26 F(2,76) 3.1170 1.4335 2.3407 0.9013 0.3357 4.3716 0.2398
Bank29 F(1,77) 3.9651 1.2707 0.2132 1.1634 1.2994 0.4682 0.2249
Bank30 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.1343 0.8612 2.9386 0.3735 3.3881 0.7690
Bank33 F(3,75) 2.7266 1.1061 4.5798 0.4717 1.5142 0.5416 0.2772
Bank36 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.4226 2.0718 0.8569 4.7184 0.9441 1.3861
Bank38 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.7324 0.3926 2.4811 0.9101 7.2336 1.2041
Bank39 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.9952 0.0377 1.6445 0.2445 0.3726 0.0984
Bank42 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.8712 0.1628 1.9042 1.6287 1.2571 0.0213
Bank46 F(1,77) 3.9651 0.0097 1.4337 0.1994 8.5880 0.0048 1.6164
Bank51 F(2,76) 3.1170 1.6700 3.8676 0.6857 0.1578 1.3134 0.1268
Bank53 F(2,76) 3.1170 1.9231 0.2885 0.1015 1.0184 1.9646 0.0007
Bank54 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.1378 4.4748 0.9187 1.4493 1.2937 0.5683
Bank56 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.1013 2.4943 0.4794 0.9546 3.0382 1.0555
Bank58 F(3,75) 2.7266 0.7165 3.5846 0.8237 0.1425 2.1528 1.3477
Bank59 F(2,76) 3.1170 0.3865 0.3588 0.0683 0.0968 4.7613 0.0283
Bank61 F(2,76) 3.1170 1.4397 4.3236 1.7975 2.0857 5.0037 0.1572
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Table A6: Average pairwise cross-section correlations: variables and residuals
Nonperforming loans Return on Assets Loan to assets
Level 1st Diff. VECMX* Level 1st Diff. VECMX* Level 1st Diff. VECMX*
Bank2 0.6262 0.2070 -0.1004 0.0959 0.0186 -0.0729 -0.1016 0.0556 -0.0193
Bank3 0.6271 0.2351 0.0060 0.2925 0.1304 0.0406 0.0091 0.0766 0.0212
Bank4 0.4342 0.1928 0.0440 0.0732 0.0577 0.0441 0.0215 0.0371 0.0027
Bank5 0.5217 0.1688 -0.0095 0.1682 0.0747 0.0395 -0.1111 0.0020 -0.0022
Bank6 0.3987 0.1030 0.0168 0.2375 0.0791 0.0853 0.1501 0.0364 0.0081
Bank7 0.3773 0.1884 0.0002 -0.1873 0.0289 0.0464 0.1081 0.0570 0.0323
Bank11 0.5037 0.1884 0.0016 0.2276 0.1494 0.0856 0.0700 0.0739 0.0427
Bank13 0.5664 0.1025 -0.0342 -0.0141 0.0299 0.0357 -0.0651 0.0185 -0.0088
Bank15 0.4785 0.1337 0.0166 0.2232 0.1097 0.0107 0.1482 0.0561 0.0093
Bank16 0.3368 0.0868 0.0252 0.0549 0.0257 0.0190 0.1037 0.0438 0.0028
Bank17 0.6446 0.1225 0.0148 0.2945 0.0714 0.0194 -0.0548 -0.0026 -0.0001
Bank19 0.5610 0.0424 -0.0238 0.1025 0.0005 -0.0407 -0.0223 0.0398 0.0712
Bank21 0.5141 0.0823 0.0157 0.2706 0.1307 0.0593 0.1128 0.0582 -0.0107
Bank25 0.3743 0.1545 0.0340 0.1030 -0.0261 0.0192 -0.0348 0.0420 0.0236
Bank26 0.4633 0.0834 -0.0064 0.2031 0.1616 0.0304 -0.0413 0.0250 -0.0242
Bank29 0.5481 0.1825 0.0643 0.1728 0.0570 0.0608 0.1174 0.0688 0.0054
Bank30 0.2182 0.0819 0.0059 0.1416 0.0011 0.0393 0.0220 0.0622 0.0449
Bank33 0.4276 0.1331 0.0009 -0.0063 0.0175 0.0050 0.0274 0.0701 -0.0270
Bank36 0.5142 0.1014 0.0453 0.3146 0.0945 0.0274 0.0820 0.0196 0.0050
Bank38 0.5652 0.1466 0.0217 0.2428 0.1174 0.0488 0.0317 -0.0129 0.0215
Bank39 0.3760 0.1228 0.0336 0.3304 0.0833 0.0214 -0.0397 0.0128 0.0446
Bank42 0.5055 0.0941 0.0071 0.2909 0.0724 0.0047 -0.0368 0.0391 0.0208
Bank46 0.0977 0.0302 0.0153 0.1155 0.0339 0.0438 -0.0118 0.0048 0.0162
Bank51 0.4464 0.0343 -0.0315 0.2710 0.1142 0.0427 -0.0339 0.0441 0.0256
Bank53 0.4130 0.1784 -0.0153 0.1616 0.0626 0.0215 0.1733 0.0300 -0.0095
Bank54 0.3853 -0.0036 -0.0150 0.2367 0.0830 -0.0051 -0.0610 0.0770 0.0615
Bank56 0.2955 0.0510 0.0168 0.2447 0.0546 0.0178 0.1248 0.0396 0.0243
Bank58 0.3619 0.0223 -0.0087 0.1919 0.0114 0.0159 0.0717 -0.0031 0.0066
Bank59 0.5834 0.0209 0.0161 0.2528 -0.0494 -0.0422 0.1040 0.0915 0.0250
Bank61 0.4052 0.1383 -0.0178 -0.0678 0.0425 0.0783 0.1724 0.1068 0.0398
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Table A7: Corresponding Moduli of the eigenvalues of the GVAR Model
Moduli Count
1 1
1 2
1 3
1 4
1 5
1 6
1 7
1 8
1 9
1 10
1 11
1 12
1 13
1 14
1 15
1 16
1 17
1 18
1 19
1 20
1 21
1 22
1 23
1 24
1 25
1 26
1 27
1 28
1 29
1 30
1 31
1 32
1 33
0.97903148 34
0.97903148 35
. .
. .
. .
. .
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Table A8: Generalized forecast error variance decompositions: A positive stan-
dard error unit shock to Bank2 nonperforming loans
Quarter 0 1 2 4 8 12 24
Bank2 Nonperforming loans 0.313 0.238 0.155 0.090 0.046 0.037 0.027
Bank2 Return on assets 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.011 0.010
Bank2 Loans to assets 0.011 0.078 0.067 0.097 0.116 0.151 0.148
Bank3 Nonperforming loans 0.117 0.111 0.114 0.125 0.159 0.150 0.112
Bank3 Return on assets 0.002 0.027 0.044 0.090 0.088 0.089 0.075
Bank3 Loans to assets 0.002 0.007 0.013 0.020 0.025 0.028 0.020
Bank4 Nonperforming loans 0.076 0.056 0.084 0.067 0.050 0.044 0.042
Bank4 Return on assets 0.002 0.023 0.031 0.036 0.022 0.016 0.011
Bank4 Loans to assets 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.024 0.037 0.038 0.034
Bank5 Nonperforming loans 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003
Bank5 Return on assets 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank5 Loans to assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank6 Nonperforming loans 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank6 Return on assets 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002
Bank6 Loans to assets 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
Bank7 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank7 Return on assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank7 Loans to assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
Bank11 Nonperforming loans 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Bank11 Return on assets 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank11 Loans to assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Bank13 Nonperforming loans 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.004
Bank13 Return on assets 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
Bank13 Loans to assets 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank15 Nonperforming loans 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
Bank15 Return on assets 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank15 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003
Bank16 Nonperforming loans 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003
Bank16 Return on assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank16 Loans to assets 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006
Bank17 Nonperforming loans 0.013 0.010 0.015 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.004
Bank17 Return on assets 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004
Bank17 Loans to assets 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003
Bank19 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank19 Return on assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank19 Loans to assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank21 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank21 Return on assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank21 Loans to assets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Bank25 Nonperforming loans 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007
Bank25 Return on assets 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.005
Bank25 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Bank26 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank26 Return on assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank26 Loans to assets ratio 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003
Bank29 Nonperforming loans 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank29 Return on assets 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank29 Loans to assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
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Table A8: Generalized forecast error variance decompositions: A positive stan-
dard error unit shock to Bank2 nonperforming loans. (Continued)
Quarter 0 1 2 4 8 12 24
Bank30 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank30 Return on assets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
Bank30 Loans to assets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank33 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank33 Return on assets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Bank33 Loans to assets 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank36 Nonperforming loans 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank36 Return on assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003
Bank36 Loans to assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Bank38 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
Bank38 Return on assets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Bank38 Loans to assets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank39 Nonperforming loans 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
Bank39 Return on assets 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank39 Loans to assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank42 Nonperforming loans 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.005
Bank42 Return on assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank42 Loans to assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.011 0.014 0.011
Bank46 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank46 Return on assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank46 Loans to assets 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank51 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003
Bank51 Return on assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
Bank51 Loans to assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Bank53 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Bank53 Return on assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank53 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank54 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Bank54 Return on assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank54 Loans to assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
Bank56 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank56 Return on assets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
Bank56 Loans to assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.007
Bank58 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
Bank58 Return on assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank58 Loans to assets 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Bank59 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank59 Return on assets 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank59 Loans to assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Bank61 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Bank61 Return on assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank61 Loans to assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
Global GDP 0.007 0.016 0.018 0.025 0.023 0.033 0.043
Global Interest rate 0.016 0.042 0.048 0.065 0.138 0.120 0.190
Global hpi 0.006 0.016 0.021 0.028 0.045 0.051 0.075
Notes: Proportion of the N-step ahead forecast error variance of of the historical shock to the Bank2 nonper-
forming loans.
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Table A9: Generalized forecast error variance decompositions: A positive stan-
dard error unit shock to Bank61 nonperforming loans
Quarter 0 1 2 4 8 12 24
Bank2 Nonperforming loans 0.025 0.066 0.049 0.081 0.045 0.035 0.024
Bank2 Return on assets 0.008 0.021 0.018 0.010 0.012 0.012 0.009
Bank2 Loans to assets 0.012 0.018 0.017 0.025 0.028 0.031 0.042
Bank3 Nonperforming loans 0.005 0.030 0.024 0.073 0.098 0.131 0.109
Bank3 Return on assets 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.015 0.053 0.058 0.054
Bank3 Loans to assets 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.015 0.013
Bank4 Nonperforming loans 0.005 0.024 0.019 0.049 0.054 0.053 0.039
Bank4 Return on assets 0.003 0.009 0.009 0.013 0.024 0.019 0.010
Bank4 Loans to assets 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.016 0.036 0.055 0.048
Bank5 Nonperforming loans 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank5 Return on assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank5 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank6 Nonperforming loans 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank6 Return on assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
Bank6 Loans to assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
Bank7 Nonperforming loans 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank7 Return on assets 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank7 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank11 Nonperforming loans 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
Bank11 Return on assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank11 Loans to assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Bank13 Nonperforming loans 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004
Bank13 Return on assets 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank13 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank15 Nonperforming loans 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002
Bank15 Return on assets 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank15 Loans to assets ratio 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Bank16 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004
Bank16 Return on assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank16 Loans to assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.006
Bank17 Nonperforming loans 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.014 0.011 0.008 0.005
Bank17 Return on assets 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Bank17 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.004
Bank19 Nonperforming loans 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank19 Return on assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank19 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank21 Nonperforming loans 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002
Bank21 Return on assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank21 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
Bank25 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.010 0.009
Bank25 Return on assets 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.007
Bank25 Loans to assets 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.008
Bank26 Nonperforming loans 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003
Bank26 Return on assets 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank26 Loans to assets 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.005
Bank29 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank29 Return on assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank29 Loans to assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
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Table A9: Generalized forecast error variance decompositions: A positive stan-
dard error unit shock to Bank61 nonperforming loans. (Continued)
Quarter 0 1 2 4 8 12 24
Bank30 Nonperforming loans 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank30 Return on assets 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank30 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank33 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank33 Return on assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank33 Loans to assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank36 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank36 Return on assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank36 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank38 Nonperforming loans 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank38 Return on assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank38 Loans to assets 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank39 Nonperforming loans 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank39 Return on assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank39 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank42 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.008
Bank42 Return on assets 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank42 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.013 0.012
Bank46 Nonperforming loans 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank46 Return on assets 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank46 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank51 Nonperforming loans 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.006
Bank51 Return on assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank51 Loans to assets 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank53 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank53 Return on assets 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank53 Loans to assets 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
Bank54 Nonperforming loans 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank54 Return on assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank54 Loans to assets 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank56 Nonperforming loans 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank56 Return on assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank56 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.007
Bank58 Nonperforming loans 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank58 Return on assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank58 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank59 Nonperforming loans 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002
Bank59 Return on assets 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank59 Loans to assets 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
Bank61 Nonperforming loans 0.555 0.358 0.266 0.099 0.070 0.066 0.049
Bank61 Return on assets 0.007 0.016 0.011 0.009 0.005 0.006 0.004
Bank61 Loans to assets 0.025 0.020 0.057 0.040 0.047 0.048 0.039
Global GDP 0.021 0.026 0.042 0.051 0.101 0.093 0.088
Global Interest rate 0.251 0.213 0.311 0.233 0.175 0.112 0.207
Global hpi 0.011 0.021 0.030 0.022 0.033 0.052 0.065
Notes: Proportion of the N-step ahead forecast error variance of of the historical shock to the Bank61 non-
performing loans.
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Table A10: Bilateral exposure weights
Bank Bank2 Bank3 Bank4 Bank5 Bank6 Bank7 Bank11 Bank13 Bank15 Bank16 Bank17 Bank19 Bank21 Bank25 Bank26
Bank2 0.000 0.535 0.573 0.557 0.557 0.545 0.536 0.527 0.556 0.543 0.453 0.538 0.546 0.546 0.548
Bank3 0.182 0.000 0.109 0.106 0.105 0.105 0.104 0.107 0.105 0.104 0.100 0.103 0.104 0.104 0.104
Bank4 0.132 0.074 0.000 0.055 0.052 0.056 0.056 0.067 0.051 0.054 0.077 0.054 0.053 0.054 0.053
Bank5 0.077 0.043 0.033 0.000 0.031 0.034 0.033 0.039 0.031 0.032 0.045 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.032
Bank6 0.042 0.023 0.017 0.017 0.000 0.017 0.017 0.021 0.016 0.017 0.025 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.016
Bank7 0.059 0.033 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.000 0.026 0.031 0.025 0.026 0.034 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.026
Bank11 0.028 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.000 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.016 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
Bank13 0.111 0.066 0.061 0.060 0.059 0.060 0.059 0.000 0.058 0.059 0.062 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.059
Bank15 0.034 0.019 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.017 0.000 0.014 0.020 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013
Bank16 0.030 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.000 0.017 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.013
Bank17 0.047 0.031 0.035 0.034 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.034 0.033 0.000 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033
Bank19 0.010 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.004
Bank21 0.017 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.007
Bank25 0.034 0.019 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.020 0.014 0.014 0.000 0.014
Bank26 0.032 0.018 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.019 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.000
Bank29 0.013 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Bank30 0.013 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Bank33 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Bank36 0.020 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
Bank38 0.013 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004
Bank39 0.014 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Bank42 0.031 0.017 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.012 0.013 0.018 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.012
Bank46 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank51 0.017 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Bank53 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank54 0.012 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
Bank56 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Bank58 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank59 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Bank61 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
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Table A10: Bilateral exposure weights. (Continued)
Bank Bank29 Bank30 Bank33 Bank36 Bank38 Bank39 Bank42 Bank46 Bank51 Bank53 Bank54 Bank56 Bank58 Bank59 Bank61
Bank2 0.548 0.557 0.566 0.553 0.566 0.597 0.550 0.569 0.499 0.494 0.598 0.519 0.497 0.485 0.556
Bank3 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.106 0.104 0.105 0.101 0.101 0.106 0.102 0.101 0.100 0.104
Bank4 0.052 0.050 0.047 0.051 0.047 0.040 0.053 0.046 0.064 0.064 0.039 0.058 0.063 0.066 0.049
Bank5 0.031 0.030 0.028 0.031 0.029 0.024 0.031 0.028 0.038 0.038 0.024 0.035 0.037 0.039 0.030
Bank6 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.016 0.014 0.020 0.020 0.012 0.018 0.020 0.021 0.015
Bank7 0.025 0.024 0.023 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.025 0.023 0.029 0.029 0.021 0.027 0.029 0.030 0.024
Bank11 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.011 0.014 0.014 0.010 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.012
Bank13 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.059 0.057 0.060 0.059 0.057 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.058
Bank15 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.011 0.016 0.016 0.009 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.012
Bank16 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.010 0.012 0.011 0.015 0.015 0.010 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.012
Bank17 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.038 0.034 0.036 0.029 0.029 0.038 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.034
Bank19 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004
Bank21 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.007
Bank25 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.014 0.012 0.016 0.016 0.011 0.015 0.016 0.017 0.013
Bank26 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.011 0.015 0.015 0.010 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.012
Bank29 0.000 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.005
Bank30 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.004
Bank33 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Bank36 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.007
Bank38 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.004
Bank39 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.003
Bank42 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.000 0.011 0.015 0.015 0.009 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.011
Bank46 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002
Bank51 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Bank53 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Bank54 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.003
Bank56 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.003
Bank58 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002
Bank59 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.003
Bank61 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
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6.1.2 Weights construction: Estimating bilateral exposure
with incomplete information
For a system of N banks the aim is to estimate a matrix of the form:1
X =

x1,1 · · · x1,j · · · x1,N
·
xi,1 · · · xi,j · · · xi,N
·
xN,1 · · · xN,j · · · xN,N

a1
·
ai
·
aN
l1 · · · lj · · · lN
where xij denotes outstanding loans made by bank i to bank j, ai =
∑
j
xi,j and
lj =
∑
i
xi,j are respectively, bank i’s interbank total assets and liabilities.
2 In
general, since one can only observe each bank’s total interbank debt (lj) and credits
(ai) further restrictions are required in order to identify bilateral bank exposure
(xij). In the absence of any further information, a sensible approach suggested by
the literature is to assume that banks maximise the uncertainty of their interbank
activity, see Upper and Worms (2004) and Wells (2004). This implies that the
amount lent by bank i to bank j, is increasing in both bank i’s share of total
lending and of bank j’s share of total borrowing. Normalizing
N∑
i=1
ai =
N∑
j=1
lj = 1,
the individual exposure will be given by xij = ailj. In this specification, exposures
reflect the relative importance of each institution in the interbank market.
1X contains N2 while the a and l provides only 2N pieces of information. Therefore, identifi-
cation of X will require N(N − 2) restrictions on X.
2Note that ai is computed by summing across row i while summing down across column j gives
lj .
294
Section 6.1 Chapter 6
Note, the above problem does not account for the restriction that a bank cannot
be exposed to itself. However, it is straightforward to impose the restriction that
the diagonal elements of X are equal to zero. Given an initial estimate of X0, one
can solve a minimisation problem to find a matrix X as close as possible to X0
subject to row and column adding up restrictions (i.e. ai =
∑
j
xi,j and j =
∑
i
xi,j).
3
A suitable distance measure for this type of problem is the cross-entropy between
two matrices, see Fang, Rajasekera, and Tsao (2012). Following this approach the
appropriate interbank structure is given by the solution to:
min
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
xij ln
(
xij
x0ij
)
subject to
N∑
i=1
xij = lj
xij ≥ 0
Note also that xij = 0 if, and only if x
0
ij = 0, and ln(0/0) = 0. This sort of problem
is solved numerically by using RAS algorithm.4
3The elements of X0 are given by
x0ij =
 0 if i = jailj , otherwise

4For further details see Censor and Zenios (1997).
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6.2 Appendix to Chapter 4
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Table B1: Determinants of risk attitudes measures: Interval regression
Japan U.S.
Subjective Hypothetical Subjective Hypothetical
Mother’s education -0.065 0.026 -0.042 0.009
(0.048) (0.044) (0.070) (0.052)
Father’s education -0.005 -0.037 -0.003 -0.054
(0.049) (0.045) (0.065) (0.049)
Respondent’s height -0.007 -0.007∗∗ -0.004 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Male -0.509∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.316∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.059) (0.068) (0.049)
Age 0.048∗∗∗ 0.018 0.027∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008)
Age-squared -0.039∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.022∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009)
Married 0.161∗∗∗ -0.020 0.156∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.053) (0.069) (0.049)
Number of children -0.052∗∗ 0.018 0.001 -0.032∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.020) (0.016) (0.012)
Lives in a city 0.049 0.003 -0.038 -0.066
(0.050) (0.043) (0.061) (0.044)
Employment:
Unemployed 0.173∗∗ -0.027 0.222∗∗ -0.158∗
(0.078) (0.076) (0.113) (0.085)
Part-time 0.059 -0.018 0.085 0.048
(0.054) (0.052) (0.079) (0.062)
Self-employed -0.103 -0.138∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗ -0.405∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.057) (0.086) (0.061)
Not in Labour force 0.171∗∗∗ -0.033 0.162∗∗ 0.055
(0.049) (0.046) (0.067) (0.051)
Education:
College -0.059 -0.069 -0.031 -0.043
(0.056) (0.049) (0.079) (0.059)
University+ -0.044 -0.208∗∗∗ 0.026 -0.270∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.046) (0.056) (0.041)
Anxieties about health -0.043∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.065∗∗∗ -0.018
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014)
Risk of unemployment 0.011 -0.083∗∗∗ -0.054 -0.059∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.045) (0.034)
Borrowing constraint -0.320∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.059) (0.054) (0.059) (0.045)
Log of household income -0.110∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.075∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.028) (0.040) (0.029)
Log of net-wealth -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Home ownership 0.083 0.082∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.071
(0.057) (0.048) (0.061) (0.045)
State GDP growth 0.000 -0.005 -0.017∗ 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
Risk of a natural disaster 0.014 0.034∗∗ -0.000 0.000
(0.013) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 6.092∗∗∗ 4.242∗∗∗ 5.149∗∗∗ 3.164∗∗∗
(0.706) (0.598) (0.628) (0.450)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15498 15498 13459 13459
Number of ID 6264 6264 8376 8376
[1] Interval regression coefficient estimates. [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] ∗ p <
0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [4] Each column in each panel is a separate regression. [5]
Omitted groups: Education: High school. Employment Status: Employed.
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Table B2: Determinants of risk attitudes measures: OLS random effects
Japan U.S.
Qualitative Quantitative Qualitative Quantitative
Mother’s education -0.060 0.018 -0.048 0.003
(0.047) (0.021) (0.068) (0.023)
Father’s education -0.006 -0.015 -0.003 -0.027
(0.048) (0.021) (0.063) (0.021)
Respondent’s height -0.006 -0.003∗ -0.004 0.000
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Male -0.505∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.028) (0.065) (0.022)
Age 0.048∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.005) (0.011) (0.004)
Age-squared -0.038∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.022∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.005) (0.012) (0.004)
Married 0.160∗∗∗ 0.005 0.152∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.025) (0.067) (0.022)
Number of children -0.049∗∗ 0.009 0.001 -0.013∗∗
(0.023) (0.010) (0.016) (0.005)
Lives in a city 0.049 0.002 -0.037 -0.026
(0.049) (0.020) (0.059) (0.020)
Employment:
Unemployed 0.176∗∗ -0.007 0.202∗ -0.081∗∗
(0.077) (0.035) (0.109) (0.037)
Part-time 0.057 0.003 0.083 0.013
(0.053) (0.024) (0.076) (0.026)
Self-employed -0.099 -0.075∗∗∗ -0.401∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.027) (0.082) (0.028)
Not in Labour force 0.163∗∗∗ -0.007 0.161∗∗ 0.015
(0.048) (0.021) (0.065) (0.022)
Education:
College -0.054 -0.024 -0.039 -0.023
(0.055) (0.024) (0.076) (0.025)
University+ -0.044 -0.099∗∗∗ 0.016 -0.110∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.023) (0.054) (0.018)
Anxieties about health -0.040∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.062∗∗∗ -0.009
(0.015) (0.007) (0.018) (0.006)
Risk of unemployment 0.012 -0.037∗∗ -0.049 -0.023
(0.031) (0.015) (0.043) (0.015)
Borrowing constraint -0.308∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.058) (0.026) (0.057) (0.020)
Log of household income -0.106∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗
(0.030) (0.013) (0.038) (0.013)
Log of net-wealth -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Home ownership 0.083 0.041∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.038∗
(0.056) (0.024) (0.059) (0.020)
State GDP growth -0.000 -0.004 -0.015∗ 0.000
(0.007) (0.003) (0.009) (0.003)
Risk of a natural disaster 0.013 0.018∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000
(0.013) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 6.514∗∗∗ 3.628∗∗∗ 5.669∗∗∗ 3.229∗∗∗
(0.697) (0.287) (0.608) (0.201)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15498 15498 13459 13459
Number of ID 6264 6264 8376 8376
[1] OLS random effects coefficient estimates. [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] ∗ p <
0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [4] Each column in each panel is a separate regression. [5]
Omitted groups: Education: High school. Employment Status: Employed.
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Table B3: Means of the natural disasters measures by state/prefecture
Prefecture Average
inten-
sity
Number
of days
Maximum
inten-
sity
Intensity
above 3
Intensity
above 4
State Disaster
Decla-
rations
Japan 1.40 34.38 2.90 0.49 0.15 U.S. 306.00
Hokkaido 1.51 249.90 4.42 1.42 0.42 Alabama 45.00
Aomori 1.41 18.18 2.67 0.17 0.00 Alaska 6.17
Iwate 1.43 80.87 3.92 0.92 0.42 Arizona 14.17
Miyagi 1.58 58.57 4.17 1.17 0.33 Arkansas 64.50
Akita 1.58 14.10 2.83 0.33 0.00 California 41.50
Yamagata 1.76 8.02 2.33 0.00 0.00 Colorado 17.50
Fukushima 1.63 61.31 4.00 1.00 0.17 Connecticut 6.33
Ibaraki 1.65 113.54 4.33 1.33 0.33 Delaware 1.33
Tochigi 1.47 17.92 3.17 0.50 0.00 Columbia 0.67
Gumma 1.32 4.85 1.83 0.00 0.00 Florida 49.83
Saitama 1.04 3.83 1.33 0.00 0.00 Georgia 45.50
Chiba 1.66 84.74 4.58 1.58 0.58 Hawaii 3.83
Tokyo 1.43 71.36 4.33 1.33 0.33 Idaho 10.17
Kanagawa 1.25 10.88 2.42 0.42 0.25 Illinois 43.00
Niigata 1.65 85.41 4.67 1.67 0.83 Indiana 71.67
Toyama 1.08 1.83 1.17 0.00 0.00 Iowa 74.33
Ishikawa 1.61 35.67 3.92 1.08 0.58 Kansas 111.50
Fukui 1.63 14.17 3.00 0.17 0.00 Kentucky 92.33
Yamanashi 1.41 14.25 2.50 0.17 0.00 Louisiana 76.50
Nagano 1.30 46.03 3.33 0.67 0.00 Maine 19.00
Gifu 1.46 18.69 3.00 0.33 0.00 Maryland 10.17
Shizuoka 1.48 27.11 3.67 0.67 0.33 Massachusetts 14.67
Aichi 1.57 20.30 3.00 0.33 0.00 Michigan 15.83
Mie 1.49 9.94 2.75 0.42 0.25 Minnesota 42.67
Shiga 1.40 11.84 2.67 0.17 0.00 Mississippi 45.50
Kyoto 1.42 19.86 2.83 0.17 0.00 Missouri 144.00
Osaka 1.42 2.33 1.67 0.17 0.00 Montana 12.00
Hyogo 1.32 12.58 2.33 0.00 0.00 Nebraska 83.50
Nara 1.23 4.93 1.83 0.00 0.00 Nevada 13.33
Wakayama 1.29 81.79 3.50 0.50 0.00 Hampshire 15.17
Tottori 1.36 15.54 2.33 0.17 0.00 New Jersey 14.00
Shimane 1.59 12.99 3.00 0.17 0.00 New Mexico 13.00
Okayama 0.99 2.13 1.17 0.00 0.00 New York 31.33
Hiroshima 1.25 3.00 1.50 0.00 0.00 North Carolina 35.33
Yamaguchi 1.61 4.17 2.17 0.00 0.00 North Dakota 45.83
Tokushima 1.37 8.67 2.17 0.00 0.00 Ohio 41.00
Kagawa 0.50 0.83 0.67 0.00 0.00 Oklahoma 142.83
Ehime 1.51 37.05 3.67 0.67 0.00 Oregon 16.83
Kochi 1.23 6.38 2.00 0.33 0.00 Pennsylvania 23.50
Fukuoka 1.38 21.50 2.75 0.42 0.25 Rhode Island 3.50
Saga 0.75 1.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 South Carolina 9.00
Nagasaki 1.49 10.73 2.33 0.00 0.00 South Dakota 51.67
Kumamoto 1.40 41.43 3.83 0.83 0.17 Tennessee 34.83
Oita 1.54 41.74 4.17 1.17 0.50 Texas 282.33
Miyazaki 1.47 32.40 3.50 0.67 0.17 Utah 8.00
Kagoshima 1.40 94.74 3.83 0.83 0.00 Vermont 4.50
Okinawa 1.39 76.67 4.00 1.00 0.33 Virginia 46.17
Washington 28.33
West Virginia 26.17
Wisconsin 23.50
Wyoming 1.17
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Table B4: Definition of the JMA Seismic Intensity Scale (Shindo)
Seismic intensity Human perception and reaction
0 Imperceptible to people, but recorded by seismometers.
1 Felt slightly by some people keeping quiet in buildings.
2 Felt by many people keeping quiet in buildings. Some people may be awo-
ken.
3 Felt by most people in buildings. Felt by some people walking. Many people
are awoken.
4 Most people are startled. Felt by most people walking. Most people are
awoken.
5 Lower Many people are frightened and feel the need to hold onto something stable.
5 Upper Many people find it hard to move; walking is difficult without holding onto
something stable.
6 Lower It is difficult to remain standing.
6 Upper It is impossible to remain standing or move without crawling.
People may be thrown through the air.7
Seismic intensity Indoor situation
0 -
1 -
2 Hanging objects such as lamps swing slightly.
3 Dishes in cupboards may rattle.
4 Hanging objects such as lamps swing significantly, and dishes in cupboards
rattle. Unstable ornaments may fall.
5 Lower Hanging objects such as lamps swing violently. Dishes in cupboards and
items on bookshelves may fall. Many unstable ornaments fall. Unsecured
furniture may move, and unstable furniture may topple over.
5 Upper Dishes in cupboards and items on bookshelves are more likely to fall. TVs
may fall from their stands, and unsecured furniture may topple over.
6 Lower Many unsecured furniture moves and may topple over. Doors may become
wedged shut.
6 Upper Most unsecured furniture moves, and is more likely to topple over.
7 Most unsecured furniture moves and topples over, or may even be thrown
through the air.
Seismic intensity Outdoor situation
0 -
1 -
2 -
3 Electric wires swing slightly.
4 Electric wires swing significantly. Those driving vehicles may notice the
tremor.
5 Lower In some cases, windows may break and fall. People notice electricity poles
moving. Roads may sustain damage.
5 Upper Windows may break and fall, unreinforced concrete-block walls may col-
lapse, poorly installed vending machines may topple over, automobiles may
stop due to the difficulty of continued movement.
6 Lower Wall tiles and windows may sustain damage and fall.
6 Upper Wall tiles and windows are more likely to break and fall. Most unreinforced
concrete-block walls collapse.
7 Wall tiles and windows are even more likely to break and fall. Reinforced
concrete-block walls may collapse.
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Table B5: Validation of the hypothetical gamble risk attitudes measure: Risky be-
haviours
Gambling Drinking Smoking
Japan U.S. Japan U.S. Japan U.S.
Hypothetical -0.113∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗ -0.018 -0.199∗∗∗ 0.056 0.088
(0.035) (0.036) (0.041) (0.045) (0.049) (0.056)
Mother’s education -0.313∗∗∗ -0.125 0.028 0.094 0.030 0.117
(0.097) (0.093) (0.118) (0.135) (0.133) (0.143)
Father’s education 0.129 -0.147∗ 0.018 0.313∗∗ 0.041 -0.188
(0.098) (0.089) (0.121) (0.131) (0.134) (0.131)
Male 2.161∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 4.264∗∗∗ 1.364∗∗∗ 3.839∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.074) (0.170) (0.125) (0.140) (0.106)
Age 0.102∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.017) (0.039) (0.024) (0.036) (0.025)
Age-squared -0.121∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗ -0.306∗∗∗ -0.022 -0.283∗∗∗ -0.156∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.018) (0.039) (0.025) (0.037) (0.027)
Married -0.219∗ -0.120 0.338∗∗ -0.063 -0.752∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗
(0.116) (0.097) (0.146) (0.134) (0.153) (0.144)
Number of children -0.052 -0.064∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ 0.028 -0.132∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.024) (0.065) (0.034) (0.062) (0.036)
Lives in a city 0.178∗ 0.111 0.139 -0.093 0.070 -0.255∗∗
(0.104) (0.087) (0.134) (0.120) (0.134) (0.122)
Employment:
Unemployed -0.100 -0.420∗∗ -0.405∗∗ -0.492∗∗ -0.737∗∗∗ 0.188
(0.158) (0.170) (0.190) (0.243) (0.239) (0.208)
Part-time -0.034 -0.219∗ -0.057 -0.302∗ -0.047 -0.084
(0.122) (0.129) (0.131) (0.162) (0.153) (0.184)
Self-employed -0.120 -0.026 0.218 0.033 -0.072 0.204
(0.119) (0.118) (0.154) (0.155) (0.167) (0.174)
Not in Labour force -0.265∗∗ -0.090 -0.216∗ -0.316∗∗ -0.368∗∗∗ -0.065
(0.107) (0.096) (0.118) (0.139) (0.135) (0.145)
Education:
College -0.329∗∗∗ -0.142 0.067 -0.177 -0.953∗∗∗ -0.732∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.110) (0.142) (0.155) (0.159) (0.153)
University+ -0.650∗∗∗ -0.486∗∗∗ -0.177 -0.159 -1.667∗∗∗ -1.499∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.082) (0.157) (0.108) (0.154) (0.122)
Anxieties about health 0.008 -0.039 0.041 0.016 -0.057 0.039
(0.030) (0.026) (0.035) (0.036) (0.040) (0.039)
Risk of unemployment 0.083 0.110∗ 0.125∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.037 0.108
(0.063) (0.064) (0.074) (0.081) (0.087) (0.094)
Borrowing constraint 0.352∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.081 0.059 0.367∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗
(0.106) (0.082) (0.130) (0.116) (0.149) (0.113)
Log of household income 0.048 0.162∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ -0.034 -0.517∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.056) (0.076) (0.081) (0.080) (0.082)
Log of net-wealth -0.004 0.000 -0.006 0.023∗∗ -0.011∗∗ 0.001
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Home ownership -0.198∗ -0.238∗∗∗ -0.183 -0.111 -0.523∗∗∗ -0.471∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.087) (0.156) (0.122) (0.150) (0.123)
State GDP growth 0.021 0.029∗ -0.017 -0.004 -0.003 0.015
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021)
Risk of a natural disaster 0.013 -0.000 -0.044 0.000 0.040 -0.001
(0.027) (0.000) (0.030) (0.001) (0.037) (0.001)
Financial potential 0.035 -0.158 0.903 0.125 0.735 -0.151
(0.920) (0.194) (1.046) (0.243) (1.219) (0.274)
Constant -4.484∗∗∗ -4.878∗∗∗ -16.059∗∗∗ -7.640∗∗∗ -7.609∗∗∗ -5.930∗∗∗
(0.815) (0.908) (1.164) (1.186) (1.062) (1.211)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15498 13459 15498 13459 15498 13459
Number of ID 6264 8376 6264 8376 6264 8376
[1] Probit coefficient estimates. [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [4] Each
column is a separate regression. [5] Omitted groups: Education: High school. Employment Status: Employed.
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Table B6: Validation of the subjective risk attitudes measure: Risky behaviours
Gambling Drinking Smoking
Japan U.S. Japan U.S. Japan U.S.
Subjective -0.082∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.043∗∗ -0.050∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019)
Mother’s education -0.315∗∗∗ -0.124 0.027 0.093 0.025 0.104
(0.097) (0.091) (0.119) (0.133) (0.131) (0.140)
Father’s education 0.122 -0.137 0.018 0.313∗∗ 0.044 -0.173
(0.098) (0.086) (0.122) (0.128) (0.132) (0.129)
Male 2.110∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 4.273∗∗∗ 1.377∗∗∗ 3.817∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.072) (0.194) (0.103) (0.137) (0.105)
Age 0.104∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.016) (0.041) (0.023) (0.035) (0.025)
Age-squared -0.123∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.280∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.017) (0.040) (0.024) (0.036) (0.027)
Married -0.207∗ -0.116 0.344∗∗ -0.068 -0.737∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗
(0.115) (0.094) (0.148) (0.132) (0.151) (0.142)
Number of children -0.058 -0.062∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗ -0.092∗∗∗ 0.025 -0.121∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.023) (0.067) (0.033) (0.061) (0.035)
Lives in a city 0.183∗ 0.108 0.140 -0.086 0.071 -0.234∗
(0.103) (0.085) (0.138) (0.117) (0.133) (0.120)
Employment:
Unemployed -0.083 -0.371∗∗ -0.396∗∗ -0.478∗∗ -0.717∗∗∗ 0.216
(0.158) (0.166) (0.191) (0.242) (0.237) (0.203)
Part-time -0.027 -0.205 -0.058 -0.290∗ -0.047 -0.072
(0.122) (0.127) (0.132) (0.160) (0.152) (0.179)
Self-employed -0.123 -0.063 0.214 0.052 -0.071 0.169
(0.118) (0.116) (0.156) (0.155) (0.164) (0.170)
Not in Labour force -0.251∗∗ -0.068 -0.213∗ -0.313∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗ -0.044
(0.106) (0.094) (0.119) (0.136) (0.135) (0.143)
Education:
College -0.332∗∗∗ -0.149 0.064 -0.163 -0.952∗∗∗ -0.710∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.108) (0.144) (0.152) (0.157) (0.149)
University+ -0.641∗∗∗ -0.470∗∗∗ -0.183 -0.131 -1.673∗∗∗ -1.502∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.080) (0.163) (0.106) (0.151) (0.123)
Anxieties about health 0.004 -0.044∗ 0.040 0.015 -0.055 0.032
(0.030) (0.025) (0.035) (0.036) (0.040) (0.038)
Risk of unemployment 0.087 0.112∗ 0.126∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.038 0.115
(0.063) (0.063) (0.074) (0.081) (0.086) (0.092)
Borrowing constraint 0.342∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ 0.077 0.041 0.369∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.080) (0.131) (0.115) (0.147) (0.110)
Log of household income 0.046 0.131∗∗ 0.187∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.482∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.055) (0.077) (0.079) (0.079) (0.081)
Log of net-wealth -0.004 -0.000 -0.006 0.024∗∗ -0.011∗∗ 0.002
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009)
Home ownership -0.194∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.182 -0.120 -0.517∗∗∗ -0.447∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.084) (0.159) (0.120) (0.148) (0.121)
State GDP growth 0.021 0.026∗ -0.017 -0.003 -0.003 0.016
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021)
Risk of a natural disaster 0.012 -0.000 -0.043 0.000 0.044 -0.001
(0.027) (0.000) (0.030) (0.001) (0.037) (0.001)
Financial potential 0.024 -0.140 0.885 0.134 0.746 -0.115
(0.917) (0.191) (1.048) (0.242) (1.207) (0.267)
Constant -4.350∗∗∗ -4.462∗∗∗ -16.033∗∗∗ -8.221∗∗∗ -7.113∗∗∗ -4.674∗∗∗
(0.808) (0.882) (1.211) (1.130) (1.045) (1.175)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15498 13459 15498 13459 15498 13459
Number of ID 6264 8376 6264 8376 6264 8376
[1] Probit coefficient estimates. [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01. [4] Each column is a separate regression. [5] Omitted groups: Education: High school. Em-
ployment Status: Employed.
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Table B7: Validation of the hypothetical gamble risk attitudes measure: Assets choice Japan
Tobit Probit
Stock share Stock binary Saving Bonds Life insurance Trust Foreign
main
Hypothetical measure -0.013∗∗∗ -0.067∗ -0.018 0.035 -0.026 -0.075∗∗ -0.012
(0.004) (0.035) (0.028) (0.022) (0.020) (0.036) (0.022)
Mother’s education 0.011 -0.042 0.175∗∗ 0.052 0.087∗ 0.005 0.051
(0.012) (0.099) (0.072) (0.061) (0.052) (0.096) (0.058)
Father’s education 0.034∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ -0.039 0.058 0.061 0.278∗∗∗ 0.065
(0.012) (0.099) (0.071) (0.061) (0.052) (0.098) (0.058)
Male 0.032∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.048 -0.428∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗ -0.194∗∗ -0.041
(0.013) (0.103) (0.063) (0.061) (0.048) (0.099) (0.056)
Age 0.011∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.009 0.008 0.118∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.030) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.029) (0.016)
Age-squared -0.004 -0.099∗∗∗ -0.002 0.009 -0.114∗∗∗ -0.018 -0.098∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.029) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.028) (0.016)
Married 0.036∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.135) (0.078) (0.073) (0.062) (0.133) (0.075)
Number of children -0.030∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗ -0.023 -0.195∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.051) (0.030) (0.029) (0.024) (0.051) (0.028)
Lives in a city 0.014 0.146 -0.136∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ 0.069 0.160 0.046
(0.013) (0.108) (0.066) (0.062) (0.050) (0.107) (0.059)
Employment:
Unemployed 0.034∗ 0.314∗∗ -0.043 0.057 -0.116 -0.040 -0.075
(0.019) (0.157) (0.113) (0.099) (0.086) (0.157) (0.098)
Part-time -0.006 -0.024 -0.094 -0.008 -0.037 -0.128 -0.157∗∗
(0.014) (0.110) (0.080) (0.069) (0.061) (0.114) (0.068)
Self-employed -0.002 -0.250∗ 0.050 0.115 0.147∗∗ 0.020 -0.058
(0.016) (0.134) (0.091) (0.078) (0.068) (0.130) (0.077)
Not in Labour force 0.043∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.211∗∗∗ -0.018 0.223∗∗ 0.075
(0.012) (0.098) (0.072) (0.062) (0.052) (0.095) (0.059)
Education:
College 0.058∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.129∗
(0.014) (0.118) (0.079) (0.071) (0.059) (0.117) (0.068)
University+ 0.127∗∗∗ 1.062∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ -0.007 0.933∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.115) (0.077) (0.069) (0.056) (0.112) (0.065)
Anxieties about health 0.010∗∗∗ 0.059∗ 0.036 0.001 0.033∗∗ 0.058∗ 0.011
(0.004) (0.031) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.031) (0.019)
Risk of unemployment 0.009 0.020 -0.137∗∗∗ -0.011 0.026 0.048 -0.061
(0.008) (0.064) (0.049) (0.041) (0.036) (0.066) (0.040)
Borrowing constraint -0.054∗∗∗ -0.300∗∗ -0.601∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗ -0.351∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.136) (0.073) (0.073) (0.063) (0.150) (0.076)
Log of household income 0.075∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.065) (0.044) (0.039) (0.033) (0.062) (0.038)
Log of net-wealth 0.004∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Home ownership 0.070∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.234∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.132) (0.071) (0.071) (0.058) (0.131) (0.072)
State GDP growth 0.002 0.018 0.009 0.005 -0.002 -0.006 0.005
(0.002) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009)
Risk of a natural disaster 0.001 -0.001 0.006 -0.027 -0.007 0.016 0.033∗∗
(0.003) (0.026) (0.023) (0.017) (0.016) (0.026) (0.017)
Financial potential 0.238∗∗ 1.837∗∗ 0.745 0.466 0.361 0.534 0.277
(0.106) (0.871) (0.746) (0.583) (0.519) (0.927) (0.566)
Constant -1.483∗∗∗ -15.189∗∗∗ -2.381∗∗∗ -2.016∗∗∗ -5.145∗∗∗ -10.833∗∗∗ -7.881∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.911) (0.543) (0.489) (0.414) (0.897) (0.502)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15498 15456 15498 15498 15498 15498 15498
Number of ID 6264 6244 6264 6264 6264 6264 6264
[1] Probit and tobit coefficient estimates. [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [4] Each
column is a separate regression. [5] Omitted groups: Education: High school. Employment Status: Employed.
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Table B8: Validation of the subjective risk attitudes measure: Assets choice Japan
Tobit Probit
Stock share Stock binary Saving Bonds Life insurance Trust Pension
main
Subjective measure -0.014∗∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗ 0.006 0.037∗∗∗ -0.016∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.012
(0.002) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010)
Mother’s education 0.009 -0.049 0.175∗∗ 0.056 0.085 0.001 0.050
(0.012) (0.098) (0.072) (0.061) (0.052) (0.096) (0.058)
Father’s education 0.034∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ -0.038 0.058 0.061 0.283∗∗∗ 0.065
(0.012) (0.099) (0.071) (0.061) (0.052) (0.098) (0.058)
Male 0.025∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.054 -0.410∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.211∗∗ -0.047
(0.013) (0.103) (0.063) (0.061) (0.048) (0.099) (0.057)
Age 0.011∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.009 0.007 0.118∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.030) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.029) (0.016)
Age-squared -0.004 -0.101∗∗∗ -0.001 0.010 -0.115∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.099∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.029) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.028) (0.016)
Married 0.038∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.135) (0.078) (0.073) (0.062) (0.133) (0.075)
Number of children -0.031∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗ -0.024 -0.196∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.051) (0.030) (0.029) (0.024) (0.051) (0.028)
Lives in a city 0.015 0.150 -0.136∗∗ -0.254∗∗∗ 0.069 0.161 0.047
(0.013) (0.108) (0.066) (0.062) (0.050) (0.107) (0.059)
Employment:
Unemployed 0.038∗∗ 0.334∗∗ -0.044 0.051 -0.114 -0.037 -0.074
(0.019) (0.158) (0.113) (0.099) (0.086) (0.157) (0.098)
Part-time -0.005 -0.023 -0.094 -0.010 -0.037 -0.129 -0.156∗∗
(0.014) (0.110) (0.080) (0.069) (0.061) (0.114) (0.068)
Self-employed -0.003 -0.256∗ 0.053 0.117 0.147∗∗ 0.018 -0.058
(0.016) (0.133) (0.091) (0.078) (0.068) (0.130) (0.077)
Not in Labour force 0.046∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.042 0.206∗∗∗ -0.015 0.229∗∗ 0.077
(0.012) (0.098) (0.072) (0.062) (0.052) (0.095) (0.059)
Education:
College 0.058∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.128∗
(0.014) (0.118) (0.079) (0.071) (0.059) (0.117) (0.068)
University+ 0.127∗∗∗ 1.061∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ -0.005 0.938∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.115) (0.077) (0.069) (0.056) (0.113) (0.065)
Anxieties about health 0.009∗∗ 0.055∗ 0.036 0.003 0.032∗ 0.056∗ 0.010
(0.004) (0.031) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.031) (0.019)
Risk of unemployment 0.010 0.024 -0.137∗∗∗ -0.013 0.027 0.053 -0.060
(0.008) (0.064) (0.049) (0.041) (0.036) (0.066) (0.040)
Borrowing constraint -0.057∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗ -0.597∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗ -0.363∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.136) (0.073) (0.073) (0.063) (0.150) (0.076)
Log of household income 0.074∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.065) (0.044) (0.038) (0.033) (0.063) (0.038)
Log of net-wealth 0.004∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Home ownership 0.070∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗ 0.232∗ 0.335∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.132) (0.071) (0.071) (0.058) (0.131) (0.072)
State GDP growth 0.002 0.019 0.009 0.005 -0.002 -0.005 0.005
(0.002) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.009)
Risk of a natural disaster 0.001 -0.002 0.006 -0.027 -0.008 0.014 0.033∗∗
(0.003) (0.026) (0.023) (0.017) (0.016) (0.026) (0.017)
Financial potential 0.239∗∗ 1.870∗∗ 0.735 0.467 0.359 0.570 0.278
(0.106) (0.872) (0.745) (0.583) (0.519) (0.928) (0.566)
Constant -1.448∗∗∗ -15.016∗∗∗ -2.472∗∗∗ -2.115∗∗∗ -5.131∗∗∗ -10.846∗∗∗ -7.849∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.907) (0.541) (0.486) (0.412) (0.897) (0.500)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15498 15498 15498 15498 15498 15498 15498
Number of ID 6264 6264 6264 6264 6264 6264 6264
[1] Probit and tobit coefficient estimates. [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [4] Each
column is a separate regression. [5] Omitted groups: Education: High school. Employment Status: Employed.
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Table B9: Validation of the hypothetical gamble risk attitudes measure: Assets choice U.S.
Tobit Probit
Stock share Stock binary Saving Bonds Life insurance Trust Foreign
main
Hypothetical measure -0.017∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.031 -0.087∗∗ 0.069∗∗ -0.005 0.057∗∗
(0.006) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024)
Mother’s education 0.022 0.126 0.281∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗ 0.037 0.008 0.038
(0.016) (0.086) (0.082) (0.101) (0.074) (0.067) (0.065)
Father’s education 0.035∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.128 -0.071 0.095 0.059
(0.015) (0.079) (0.076) (0.092) (0.069) (0.062) (0.060)
Male 0.059∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.031 0.109 -0.129∗∗ -0.084∗ 0.001
(0.011) (0.062) (0.061) (0.069) (0.054) (0.047) (0.046)
Age 0.015∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.004 0.103∗∗∗ 0.005 0.119∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Age-squared -0.010∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ 0.020 0.041∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ 0.011 -0.081∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Married -0.060∗∗∗ -0.164∗ -0.057 -0.017 0.421∗∗∗ -0.021 0.208∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.085) (0.081) (0.099) (0.073) (0.067) (0.065)
Number of children -0.009∗∗ -0.051∗∗ -0.036∗ -0.085∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.009
(0.004) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
Lives in a city 0.032∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.060 -0.106 -0.104 -0.029 0.094∗
(0.014) (0.075) (0.071) (0.085) (0.065) (0.057) (0.056)
Employment:
Unemployed -0.185∗∗∗ -0.699∗∗∗ -0.746∗∗∗ -0.456∗ -0.732∗∗∗ -0.470∗∗∗ -0.851∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.158) (0.118) (0.251) (0.123) (0.157) (0.127)
Part-time -0.029 0.030 0.043 -0.114 -0.300∗∗∗ 0.018 -0.285∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.090) (0.099) (0.118) (0.083) (0.079) (0.074)
Self-employed -0.048∗∗ -0.068 -0.340∗∗∗ 0.183 -0.314∗∗∗ 0.115 -0.782∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.104) (0.101) (0.114) (0.090) (0.082) (0.083)
Not in Labour force -0.017 0.059 -0.225∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗ -0.037 -0.457∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.080) (0.080) (0.093) (0.071) (0.066) (0.065)
Education:
College 0.084∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.094) (0.091) (0.115) (0.083) (0.074) (0.072)
University+ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.070) (0.075) (0.080) (0.060) (0.053) (0.052)
Anxieties about health 0.009∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.040∗ 0.032 0.022 -0.003 0.017
(0.004) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
Risk of unemployment 0.007 -0.013 -0.004 0.027 -0.122∗∗∗ -0.017 -0.057
(0.010) (0.052) (0.055) (0.065) (0.047) (0.045) (0.042)
Borrowing constraint -0.109∗∗∗ -0.508∗∗∗ -0.518∗∗∗ -0.387∗∗∗ -0.114∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.074) (0.065) (0.111) (0.061) (0.068) (0.057)
Log of household income 0.195∗∗∗ 1.054∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.057) (0.053) (0.065) (0.045) (0.040) (0.041)
Log of net-wealth 0.010∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Home ownership 0.135∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.077) (0.069) (0.105) (0.063) (0.068) (0.060)
State GDP growth -0.004∗ 0.000 0.018 0.012 0.011 0.005 0.017∗
(0.002) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Risk of a natural disaster 0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial potential -0.022 0.030 -0.186 -0.237 -0.102 -0.069 -0.016
(0.029) (0.150) (0.163) (0.175) (0.138) (0.127) (0.122)
Constant -1.417∗∗∗ -9.488∗∗∗ -2.957∗∗∗ -6.539∗∗∗ -5.362∗∗∗ -3.673∗∗∗ -7.605∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.744) (0.706) (0.885) (0.634) (0.580) (0.579)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13459 13459 13459 13459 13459 13459 13459
Number of ID 8376 8376 8376 8376 8376 8376 8376
[1] Probit and tobit coefficient estimates. [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [4] Each
column is a separate regression. [5] Omitted groups: Education: High school. Employment Status: Employed.
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Table B10: Validation of the subjective risk attitudes measure: Assets choice U.S.
Tobit Probit
Stock share Stock binary Saving Bonds Life insurance Trust Pension
main
Subjective measure -0.009∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.033∗∗ -0.015 -0.010 -0.008
(0.002) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Mother’s education 0.021 0.124 0.280∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗ 0.036 0.008 0.038
(0.016) (0.086) (0.082) (0.101) (0.074) (0.067) (0.065)
Father’s education 0.035∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.131 -0.072 0.095 0.057
(0.015) (0.079) (0.076) (0.092) (0.069) (0.062) (0.060)
Male 0.059∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.033 0.117∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.085∗ -0.008
(0.011) (0.062) (0.061) (0.069) (0.054) (0.046) (0.046)
Age 0.015∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.005 0.105∗∗∗ 0.005 0.120∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Age-squared -0.010∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ 0.021 0.042∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ 0.010 -0.082∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Married -0.060∗∗∗ -0.165∗ -0.060 -0.021 0.429∗∗∗ -0.020 0.214∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.085) (0.081) (0.100) (0.073) (0.066) (0.065)
Number of children -0.009∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.035∗ -0.084∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.010
(0.004) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015)
Lives in a city 0.032∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.061 -0.107 -0.106 -0.029 0.092∗
(0.014) (0.075) (0.071) (0.085) (0.065) (0.057) (0.056)
Employment:
Unemployed -0.181∗∗∗ -0.680∗∗∗ -0.743∗∗∗ -0.455∗ -0.733∗∗∗ -0.468∗∗∗ -0.854∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.158) (0.118) (0.252) (0.123) (0.156) (0.127)
Part-time -0.029 0.032 0.042 -0.117 -0.298∗∗∗ 0.019 -0.283∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.090) (0.099) (0.119) (0.083) (0.079) (0.074)
Self-employed -0.048∗∗ -0.062 -0.335∗∗∗ 0.186 -0.334∗∗∗ 0.111 -0.797∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.104) (0.100) (0.114) (0.090) (0.081) (0.083)
Not in Labour force -0.016 0.062 -0.223∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.035 -0.453∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.080) (0.080) (0.093) (0.071) (0.066) (0.065)
Education:
College 0.084∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.094) (0.091) (0.116) (0.083) (0.074) (0.072)
University+ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.070) (0.075) (0.081) (0.060) (0.053) (0.052)
Anxieties about health 0.009∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.040∗ 0.031 0.021 -0.004 0.016
(0.004) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
Risk of unemployment 0.007 -0.013 -0.004 0.025 -0.124∗∗∗ -0.017 -0.057
(0.010) (0.052) (0.055) (0.065) (0.047) (0.045) (0.042)
Borrowing constraint -0.111∗∗∗ -0.519∗∗∗ -0.519∗∗∗ -0.392∗∗∗ -0.117∗ -0.278∗∗∗ -0.216∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.074) (0.065) (0.112) (0.061) (0.068) (0.057)
Log of household income 0.193∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.635∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.057) (0.053) (0.065) (0.045) (0.040) (0.041)
Log of net-wealth 0.010∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Home ownership 0.135∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.076) (0.068) (0.106) (0.063) (0.068) (0.060)
State GDP growth -0.004∗ -0.001 0.018 0.011 0.010 0.004 0.017∗
(0.002) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Risk of a natural disaster 0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial potential -0.021 0.041 -0.185 -0.237 -0.105 -0.068 -0.019
(0.029) (0.150) (0.163) (0.175) (0.138) (0.127) (0.122)
Constant -1.431∗∗∗ -9.660∗∗∗ -3.024∗∗∗ -6.680∗∗∗ -5.052∗∗∗ -3.637∗∗∗ -7.364∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.738) (0.700) (0.881) (0.627) (0.573) (0.574)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13459 13459 13459 13459 13459 13459 13459
Number of ID 8376 8376 8376 8376 8376 8376 8376
[1] Probit and tobit coefficient estimates. [2] Standard errors in parentheses. [3] ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [4] Each
column is a separate regression. [5] Omitted groups: Education: High school. Employment Status: Employed.
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Table B11: Subjective risk attitudes measure: Average Marginal Effects
Japan
Outcome 1 Outcome 4 Outcome 6 Outcome 8 Outcome 10
Panel A: Full sample
Mother’s education 0.000 0.007 -0.000 -0.006 -0.001
Father’s education 0.000 0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000
Respondent’s height 0.000∗ 0.001∗ -0.000 -0.001∗ -0.000∗
Male 0.000∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.049∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
Age -0.000∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Panel B: Male
Mother’s education 0.000 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000
Father’s education 0.000∗ 0.015∗ -0.004∗ -0.009∗ -0.002∗
Respondent’s height 0.000∗ 0.001∗ -0.000∗ -0.001∗ -0.000∗
Age -0.000∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Panel C: Female
Mother’s education 0.000 0.008∗ 0.004∗ -0.012∗ -0.002∗
Father’s education -0.000 -0.006 -0.003 0.008 0.002
Respondent’s height 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
Age -0.000∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
U.S.
Outcome 1 Outcome 4 Outcome 6 Outcome 8 Outcome 10
Panel A: Full sample
Mother’s education 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.000
Father’s education 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
Respondent’s height 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
Male 0.009∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
Age -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Panel B: Male
Mother’s education 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
Father’s education 0.003 -0.000 -0.004 -0.003 -0.000
Respondent’s height 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
Age -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Panel C: Female
Mother’s education 0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001
Father’s education -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
Respondent’s height 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
Age -0.000∗∗ -0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗
[1] Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B12: Hypothetical gamble risk attitudes measures: Average
Marginal Effects
Japan
Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4
Panel A: Full sample
Mother’s education 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002
Father’s education 0.002∗ 0.008∗ 0.015∗ -0.025∗
Respondent’s height 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
Male 0.004∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗
Age -0.000∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
Panel B: Male
Mother’s education 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002
Father’s education 0.003 0.008 0.013 -0.023
Respondent’s height 0.000∗ 0.001∗ 0.002∗ -0.003∗
Age -0.001∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
Panel C: Female
Mother’s education 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.002
Father’s education 0.001 0.008 0.018 -0.026
Respondent’s height 0.000∗ 0.001∗ 0.002∗ -0.003∗
Age -0.000∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
U.S.
Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4
Panel A: Full sample
Mother’s education 0.000 0.001 0.003 -0.005
Father’s education 0.002∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.022∗∗ -0.032∗∗
Respondent’s height 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
Male 0.007∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗
Age -0.000∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Panel B: Male
Mother’s education 0.003 0.007 0.017 -0.027
Father’s education 0.009∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗
Respondent’s height 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
Age -0.000∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
Panel C: Female
Mother’s education -0.001 -0.003 -0.012 0.016
Father’s education -0.000 -0.002 -0.009 0.012
Respondent’s height -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
Age -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
[1] Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B13: Marginal effects of the hypothetical gamble measure on male indi-
viduals: Measure 2
Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4
Max. intensity recorded=3+ -0.0038∗∗∗ -0.0101∗∗∗ -0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009)
Mother’s education -0.0011 -0.0029 -0.0046 0.0087
(0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.020)
Father’s education 0.0005 0.0012 0.0019 -0.0036
(0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.021)
Respondent’s height 0.0003∗ 0.0009∗ 0.0015∗ -0.0027∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Age -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0047∗∗∗ -0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0137∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Age-squared 0.0007 0.0019 0.0030 -0.0057
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Married -0.0040 -0.0107 -0.0168 0.0316
(0.003) (0.008) (0.013) (0.024)
Number of children 0.0008 0.0022 0.0034 -0.0064
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009)
Lives in a city 0.0003 0.0007 0.0012 -0.0022
(0.002) (0.007) (0.010) (0.019)
Employment:
Unemployed 0.0003 0.0007 0.0012 -0.0022
(0.004) (0.012) (0.019) (0.035)
Part-time 0.0140 0.0335 0.0459∗ -0.0934∗
(0.010) (0.021) (0.024) (0.054)
Self-employed 0.0072∗∗ 0.0184∗∗ 0.0272∗∗ -0.0528∗∗
(0.003) (0.008) (0.011) (0.023)
Not in Labour force 0.0090∗∗ 0.0225∗∗ 0.0326∗∗ -0.0642∗∗
(0.004) (0.010) (0.013) (0.027)
Education:
College 0.0063∗ 0.0174∗ 0.0279∗ -0.0516∗
(0.004) (0.010) (0.015) (0.029)
University+ 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0214∗∗∗ 0.0336∗∗∗ -0.0628∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.010) (0.019)
Anxieties about health 0.0013 0.0034 0.0053 -0.0099
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Risk of unemployment 0.0031∗ 0.0084∗ 0.0132∗ -0.0248∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014)
Borrowing constraint 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0234∗∗∗ 0.0367∗∗∗ -0.0688∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.022)
Log of household income 0.0032∗ 0.0087∗∗ 0.0136∗∗ -0.0255∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013)
Log of net-wealth 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Home ownership -0.0031 -0.0082 -0.0128 0.0241
(0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.022)
State GDP growth 0.0001 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0009
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
[1] Ordered probit marginal effects estimates. [2] ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [3] Each
panel is a separate regression. [4] Outcome 1 refers to choosing value 0, while outcome 4 refers
to value 3.
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Table B14: Marginal effects of the hypothetical gamble measure on male indi-
viduals: Measure 3
Outcome 1 Outcome 2 Outcome 3 Outcome 4
Max. intensity recorded=4+ -0.0050∗∗∗ -0.0133∗∗∗ -0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0391∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013)
Mother’s education -0.0011 -0.0030 -0.0046 0.0087
(0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.020)
Father’s education 0.0004 0.0011 0.0017 -0.0032
(0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.021)
Respondent’s height 0.0003∗ 0.0009∗ 0.0015∗ -0.0027∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Age -0.0017∗∗∗ -0.0047∗∗∗ -0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0137∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Age-squared 0.0007 0.0020 0.0031 -0.0057
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Married -0.0040 -0.0107 -0.0167 0.0314
(0.003) (0.008) (0.013) (0.024)
Number of children 0.0008 0.0021 0.0033 -0.0062
(0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.009)
Lives in a city 0.0002 0.0007 0.0010 -0.0020
(0.002) (0.007) (0.010) (0.019)
Employment:
Unemployed 0.0002 0.0004 0.0007 -0.0012
(0.004) (0.012) (0.019) (0.035)
Part-time 0.0139 0.0333 0.0456∗ -0.0928∗
(0.010) (0.021) (0.024) (0.054)
Self-employed 0.0072∗∗ 0.0183∗∗ 0.0271∗∗ -0.0526∗∗
(0.003) (0.008) (0.011) (0.023)
Not in Labour force 0.0089∗∗ 0.0224∗∗ 0.0325∗∗ -0.0638∗∗
(0.004) (0.010) (0.013) (0.027)
Education:
College 0.0063∗ 0.0175∗ 0.0280∗ -0.0518∗
(0.004) (0.010) (0.015) (0.029)
University+ 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0215∗∗∗ 0.0336∗∗∗ -0.0630∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.010) (0.019)
Anxieties about health 0.0013 0.0034 0.0053 -0.0099
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Risk of unemployment 0.0032∗ 0.0086∗ 0.0135∗ -0.0254∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.014)
Borrowing constraint 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0236∗∗∗ 0.0370∗∗∗ -0.0694∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.022)
Log of household income 0.0032∗ 0.0087∗∗ 0.0137∗∗ -0.0256∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013)
Log of net-wealth 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Home ownership -0.0030 -0.0081 -0.0127 0.0238
(0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.022)
State GDP growth 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
[1] Ordered probit marginal effects estimates. [2] ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. [3] Each
panel is a separate regression. [4] Outcome 1 refers to choosing value 0, while outcome 4 refers
to value 3.
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